Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP01196, Date: 2023-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCP01196    Hearing Date: August 25, 2023    Dept: 86

PEREZ v. JOHNSON

Case Number: 22STCP01196

Hearing Date: August 25, 2023 

[Tentative]       ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

Petitioner, Andres Perez, seeks a writ of administrative mandate directing Respondents, the California Department of Social Services (Department) and Kim Johnson, in her official capacity as Director of the Department, to set aside an administrative decision denying Petitioner’s claim for retroactive Approved Relative Caregiver (ARC) benefits at the dual-agency rate with the full $1,000 supplemental rate for his grandson, R.A., from May 14, 2017 through June 30, 2020.[1]

Respondents’ unopposed request for judicial notice (RJN) of Exhibits A through D is granted. 

The petition is granted.

BACKGROUND

Resource Family Approval Program and Foster Care Benefits

The Resource Family Approval (RFA) program, enacted by the Legislature in 2007 and implemented statewide in 2017, established a unified process for licensing foster care providers and approving guardians as well as adoptive families. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 16519.5-16519.7; RJN Exh. A.)  The RFA program is administered through written directives issued by the Department. The Department’s directives have the same force and effect as regulations. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 16519.5, subd. (f)(1)(A).) 

The approval process for the RFA program requires a comprehensive assessment of the applicant’s ability to parent a child and provide a safe, nurturing home.  (RJN Exh. A at 3; AR 12-15.)  When a child is placed in out-of-home care on an emergency basis, the county shall complete the comprehensive assessment and prepare a written report within 90 days of placement absent good cause. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 16519.5, subd. (d)(4)(A); RFA Written Directive (effective Feb. 6, 2017), Art. 7, Sec. 7-01 at RJN Exh. B; Opposition 6:24-7:4.) 

In 2014, the Legislature created the ARC Funding Option Program (ARC Funding) allowing counties to pay approved relative caregivers the foster care basic level rate for a child who is ineligible for the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Foster Care (AFDC-FC). (Senate Bill (SB) 855 (Ch. 29, Stats 2014); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11461.3.) In 2017, the Legislature required all counties to participate in the ARC Funding. (SB 89 (Ch. 24, Stats 2017).)

A RFA applicant is not eligible to receive foster care benefits, including ARC Funding, on the child’s behalf until the applicant receives approval as a resource family—that is, approval of the RFA application.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11461.3(i); RJN Exh. C.)

R.A.’s Placement with Petitioner

Petitioner is R.A.’s maternal grandfather. (AR 147.)  R.A. has cerebral palsy and uses a wheelchair. (AR 41, 25.)  When R.A. was very young, his father died and his mother left R.A. with Petitioner.  (AR 41.)  R.A. has lived with his maternal grandparents since 2014. (AR 148.)  R.A. was formally placed in Petitioner’s home on February 18, 2017 when R.A. was 17 years old.  (AR 147.)  R.A.’s placement with Petitioner was non-paid “pending Resource Family Approval (RFA) and funding eligibility determination.”  (AR 147.) 

First RFA Application (February 2017 through July 2018)

In February 2017, Petitioner and his wife submitted an initial RFA assessment intake request to determine their eligibility for foster care funding from Los Angeles County’s Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). (AR 41.) Petitioner submitted a RFA application on May 17, 2017.  (AR 4, 41, 148, 175.) 

The parties do not dispute R.A.’s initial placement with Petitioner was on an “emergency” basis pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 16519.5, subdivision (d)(4)(A) and RFA Written Directive Article 7, Section 7-01.  (See Opposition 6:24-7:4; Opening Brief 6:27-28.)  Thus, absent good cause based upon R.A.’s needs, DCFS was required to conduct a comprehensive assessment for the RFA program within 90 days of February 18, 2017.  (Welf. § Inst. Code,

§ 16519.5(d)(4)(A); see also AR 17 [“the 90 days the county is directed to complete the task”].) 

DCFS assigned R.A.’s case to three different Child Social Workers (CSWs). The first in-home meeting with a CSW related to Petitioner’s RFA application occurred on or about January 30, 2018, 11 months after Petitioner submitted the application.  (AR 142.)  On January 16, 2018, in a phone call, the CSW introduced herself to Petitioner and informed him that “the RFA process is a long process and funding will not be providing [sic] until the home is approved.”  (AR 142.) 

According to Petitioner, during the assessment process, a social worker named “Carla”[2] told Petitioner he should “do a conservatorship to keep [R.A.] in the home . . . .” (AR 41.) The CSW did not advise Petitioner he “would receive less funding for [R.A.] if [he] did so.” (AR 41.) The CSW also informed Petitioner “conservatorship was the only option if [he] wanted to keep [R.A.] in [his] house” and adoption was not “a viable option because [R.A.] was approaching 18 years old.” (AR 41.) Petitioner thereafter withdrew his RFA application because he was “very concerned about having [R.A.] taken away from [his] home, . . . .” (AR 42.)

On July 20, 2018, Petitioner received a letter from DCFS confirming the withdrawal of his RFA application. (AR 42.) DCFS notes (case notes) indicate Petitioner informed DCFS that “he no longer wanted to continue with RFA because the plan was conservatorship for dependent youth.” (AR 142.) Case notes also reveal Petitioner had not completed all requirements for the RFA application, including live scans, at the time he withdrew the application. (AR 142.) 

Petitioner Obtains Conservatorship of R.A.

In December 2018, Petitioner obtained a conservatorship over R.A. (AR 42.)  In January 2019, the dependency court terminated its jurisdiction over R.A. (AR 43, 373.) On March 4, 2019, DCFS sent Petitioner a notice of action informing him, effective January 24, 2019, Petitioner was no longer eligible for DCFS foster care funding since R.A. was no longer under Petitioner’s care with DCFS supervision.  (AR 43.)  On July 18, 2019, the dependency court “re-opened” R.A.’s case, and DCFS assessed R.A. for the Supervised Independent Living Program.  (AR 43.) Thereafter, R.A. stayed in Petitioner’s care and “received payments that were only supposed to last for approximately one year.”  (AR 43.) 

Second RFA Application and Approval of RFA

On November 27, 2019, Petitioner submitted a second RFA assessment Intake request.  In December 2019, Petitioner submitted a second RFA application and completed a supplemental background check, along with live scans and health screenings.  (AR 43.)  DCFS inspected Petitioner’s home on March 2, 2020. (AR 43.) On March 3, 2020, DCFS approved Petitioner’s RFA application and issued a Resource Family Approval Certificate.  (AR 44.) 

Adoption of R.A.

Petitioner formally adopted R.A. on August 6, 2020. (AR 44.) Foster care funding ceased in August 2020, when R.A. turned 21 years old.  (AR 44.) 

Administrative Hearing and Decision

On May 28, 2020, R.A.’s representative filed a request for a state hearing and “retroactive and prospective funding at the appropriate rate.”  (AR 20.)  In January 2021, Petitioner filed an administrative hearing brief requesting that Respondents “order DCFS to provide Claimant with the equivalent of ARC benefits at the Dual Agency Rate with the full $1,000 Supplemental Rate for the period from May 14, 2017 to June 30, 2020.”  (AR 38.)  Petitioner asserted DCFS should be equitably estopped from denying him retroactive funding because DCFS violated its statutory duties by delaying the home approval process and directing him to obtain a conservatorship over R.A., rather than adopting him—which allegedly caused Petitioner to receive less funding for R.A.’s care.  (AR 23-38.) 

In his administrative hearing brief, Petitioner described his alleged financial loss:

DCFS was aware that Claimant would have been receiving the Dual Agency Rate plus Full Supplemental Rate on behalf of [R.A.] (about $2,617 plus the full $1,000 supplemental rate, totaling $3,617 per month) if he pursued foster care funding instead of SSI benefits. This is in contrast to SSI, which (as stated in the [DCFS Statement of Position]) was about $825 per month. (AR 36.)

An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing on January 14, 2021.  (AR 3.)  In a proposed decision, the ALJ found Petitioner had established only three of the four requirements of estoppel.  (AR 18-19.)  Accordingly, the ALJ found Petitioner was not entitled to retroactive funding from May 14, 2017 through March 2, 2020 based on his estoppel theory.  (AR 3, 19.) 

The ALJ addressed Petitioner’s claim for benefits after March 2, 2020. The ALJ found:

With regards to the claimant’s second RFA application that application was signed by the claimant on December 9, 2019, and the RFA Approval Certificate was issued on March 3, 2020, which was within the 90-day time line to approve a home under the standards of RFA. As such it is determined that the county correctly issued funding, effective March 3, 2020.  (AR 19.) 

The Department adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision as its own on April 2, 2021.  (AR 2.) 

This proceeding ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Petitioner seeks relief from the court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.[3]

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the issues for review of an administrative decision are: whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

“In reviewing decisions denying applications for public assistance . . ., the superior court exercises its independent judgment” on the record.  (Norasingh v. Lightbourne (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 740, 752.)  Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.”  (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.)  The court may draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the credibility of witnesses.  (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.)  “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)

ANALYSIS 

Petitioner contends the ALJ “erred in holding the fourth element of equitable estoppel—[Petitioner’s] detrimental reliance on DCFS’ advice—was not satisfied; and . . . by failing to apply the ‘public policy’ prong of the equitable estoppel inquiry.”  (Opening Brief 4:13-15.)  Petitioner contends “DCFS’ inaction and misstatements led [Petitioner] to withdraw from the RFA process and obtain a conservatorship over [R.A.], causing [Petitioner] to receive at least $136,548 less in funding than he would have received had DCFS provided him with the correct information.” (Opening Brief 4:9-11.)[4]

Summary of Law – Equitable Estoppel Against Government Welfare Agency

“The requisite elements for equitable estoppel . . . are: (1) the party to be estopped was apprised of the facts, (2) the party to be estopped intended by conduct to induce reliance by the other party, or acted so as to cause the other party reasonably to believe reliance was intended, (3) the party asserting estoppel was ignorant of the facts, and (4) the party asserting estoppel suffered injury in reliance on the conduct.  ‘[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the government where justice and right require it.’”  (Medina v. Board of Retirement (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 864, 868.) 

“Correlative to this general rule, however, is the well-established proposition that an estoppel will not be applied against the government if to do so would effectively nullify ‘a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public. . . .’ ”  (Medina v. Board of Retirement, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at 868-869.)  “The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel.”  (City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 496-497 [Mansell].)

Equitable estoppel may be applied against government welfare agencies under appropriate circumstances. (See Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 396-402, 407.)

In Canfield v. Prod (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 722, “the plaintiff received county benefits to pay an attendant who helped care for her. The county was statutorily obligated to (i) inform the plaintiff of her obligation to pay a federal employer’s tax for her attendant and (ii) augment the plaintiff's grant to pay that tax. The county failed to either inform the plaintiff of her obligation or augment her grant during 1969 and 1970, and in 1974 a federal tax lien was placed on her home for delinquent taxes and penalties.”  (Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 400 [summarizing and discussing Canfield with approval].) 

“The Canfield court held the county was estopped from asserting the applicable claims limitation statute against the plaintiff’s 1974 claim for augmented 1969-1970 benefits. Applying the Mansell test, the court concluded that application of estoppel would not frustrate a strong rule of public policy because the probable reason for the limitation statute—to prevent recipients from receiving windfall benefits unrelated to their present needs—was inapplicable in the circumstances of the case, in which the plaintiff was threatened with the loss of her home. . . . The court also found that a confidential relationship existed between the plaintiff and the county, and that the county’s error had seriously affected the plaintiff's actions.”  (Ibid.) 

In Lentz v. McMahon, the Supreme Court found Canfield v. Prod’s result to be “sound.”  The Court reasoned:

On the ‘burden on the individual’ side of the Mansell balance, we note that welfare benefits, like the pensions involved in Driscoll, supra, are intended to provide basic means of subsistence to recipients. Welfare department workers, who purport to advise and direct recipients, clearly stand in a confidential relation to them. . . . And, as demonstrated by the facts in Canfield, a recipient's justified reliance on a county welfare department can produce compelling hardship. The failure to apply estoppel in such circumstances may cause serious injustice. . . .  On the ‘policy’ side of the Mansell balance, . . . [e]stoppel against a county's assertion of purely procedural preconditions and limitations on benefits, when the county itself is responsible for the procedural default, will not defeat the underlying statutory policy of safeguarding accurate and orderly administration of the welfare system.  (Id. at 401.) 

The High Court concluded “that estoppel against a welfare agency may be appropriate when, as in Canfield, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 722, a government agent has negligently or intentionally caused a claimant to fail to comply with a procedural precondition to eligibility, and the failure to invoke estoppel would cause great hardship to the claimant.”  (Id. at 401-402.)

First, Second, and Third Elements of Estoppel

Respondents (through the ALJ) found Petitioner satisfied the first three requirements of equitable estoppel.  (AR 18-19.)  Neither party has challenged the ALJ’s findings as to the first three requirements of estoppel.

Fourth Requirement of Estoppel – Detrimental Reliance

Petitioner contends the ALJ’s findings as to the fourth requirement of estoppel are not supported by the weight of the evidence because (1) Petitioner’s declaration and a DCFS service activity logs show incorrect statements and omissions by CSW “Carla” caused Petitioner to withdraw from the RFA process; (2) the ALJ drew unsupported conclusions from a single service log entry; and (3) Petitioner’s withdrawal from the RFA process demonstrates reliance, not a lack of reliance.  (See Opening Brief 10-13.)  Relatedly, Petitioner contends the ALJ abused her discretion by failing to “consider” relevant parts of his declaration.  (Opening Brief 4:22-27, 11:26-28.)

Petitioner’s Withdrawal from the RFA Process

The ALJ found as to the fourth requirement of estoppel:

While it is noted that the RFA process had significant delays, as the claimant took affirmative steps to stop the RFA process in July 2018, it is concluded that the claimant did not rely on the county to receive funding for this youth. Therefore, it is determined that the fourth element of estoppel is not met.  (AR 19.)

Petitioner contends the weight of the evidence supports a finding his withdrawal from the RFA process was based on his reliance on DCFS, not a lack of reliance. While the court ultimately agrees with Petitioner, the court finds it helpful to provide the context of this finding by the ALJ. 

For the first three requirements of estoppel, the ALJ focused entirely on DCFS’s lengthy delays in processing Petitioner’s RFA application.  The ALJ found the “county’s failure to process the RFA application within 90 days requires the application of equity in this case.”  The ALJ stated the “county had familiarity with the RFA procedures and was in the best position to process the claimant’s case in a timely manner” and “claimant intended the county to act timely on the submitted information.”  (AR 18 [emphasis added].)  In the context of DCFS’s processing delays, the ALJ could find Petitioner did not detrimentally rely on the “significant delays” in the RFA process because he “took affirmative steps to stop the RFA process.” That is, the significant delays did not cause Petitioner to withdraw his application.

Petitioner has not developed an argument the DCFS’s processing delays, on their own, caused Petitioner to withdraw his RFA application.  While Petitioner “questioned whether [his] home would ever be approved due to endless delays” and “was also very concerned about having [R.A.] taken away from [his] home,” his claim of estoppel is also based on his reliance on alleged statements made by CSW “Carla” concerning conservatorship and adoption.  (AR 41-42.)  Accordingly, his challenge to the ALJ’s findings related to the fourth estoppel requirement depends on whether the weight of the evidence shows Petitioner detrimentally relied on certain statements or omissions made by DCFS to withdraw his application.

Additional Factual Background

In his declaration submitted in the administrative proceedings, Petitioner states:

In May 2017, my wife and I submitted a Resource Family Approval (“RFA”) application to receiver foster care funding from DCFS to support [R.A.] At that time, a DCFS social worker informed me that the home approval process was going to be a “quick” process. The social worker told me that my home would be approved within 90 days.  I was assigned several different RFA social workers over time within the home approval process, which significantly delayed the RFA process.  Representatives from DCFS immediately began to question whether I had authority to care for [R.A.], because I did not have any documents authorizing me to do so. This was distressing to me and my family.  During this delayed home approval process, I consistently asked what I could do to help move the process along but was given no guidance or information. I was unaware of anything else that I needed to do.  I repeatedly asked a DCFS social worker, CSW Carla, what I could do to keep [R.A.] in my home and I suggested adoption. CSW Carla suggested that I do a conservatorship to keep [R.A.] in the home and did not inform me that I would receive less funding for [R.A.] if I did so. CSW Carla said conservatorship was the only option if I wanted to keep [R.A.] in my house.  CSW Carla informed me that adoption was not a viable option because [R.A.] was approaching 18 years old. CSW Carla never informed me about the possibility of extended foster care benefits, specialized care rates, or the difference in the amount of funding between SSI benefits and foster care benefits. . . . DCFS did not inform me that conservatorship would provide significantly less funding for [R.A.] than RFA. (AR 41-42 [emphasis added; paragraph numbering omitted].)

In his declaration, Petitioner further explains he was not familiar with the RFA and conservatorship processes, and he relied on the DCFS social workers to provide him accurate and correct information.  Petitioner states: “I questioned whether my home would ever be approved due to endless delays. I was also very concerned about having [R.A.] taken away from my home, so I decided to withdraw from the RFA process. I informed CSW Carla and her supervisor of my intent to withdraw from the RFA process for this reason.”  (AR 42.)

In relevant part, the February 16, 2018 DCFS service activity log upon which the ALJ relied states:

CSW [Karla Genovez] asked [Petitioner] if the regional center has been out to the home and he stated that she had not. CSW stated that they need to follow up on conservatorship or Adoption. CSW asked if the RFA worker had been out to see the family. . . . [Petitioner] stated that he would like to adopt [R.A.] and at least have him feel that type of connection. (AR 58-59 [emphasis added].)

The following evidence from DCFS service log entries (cited or discussed in the parties’ briefs) is also relevant to Petitioner’s detrimental reliance claim:

On January 27, 2017, CSW Karla Genovez arrived at Petitioner’s home to meet with R.A.  The service log entry for this date indicates the CSW “asked [Petitioner’s wife] what changed her husband's decision about adopting or even having custody of [R.A.].”  (AR 46.) Petitioner’s wife “stated that her husband was very upset about the incident that occurred at the Christmas party. . . . [Petitioner’s wife] stated that they are willing to do guardianship, anything that would take less time as [Petitioner] does not want to deal with DCFS.”  (AR 46.)

A service log entry dated May 9, 2017 reports: “CSW Genovez . . . went down the list as to the RFA action plan list one by one and [Petitioner] stated that he would be willing to work with the Department to keep [R.A.] in his home and obtain legal guardianship. CSW Genovez will follow up with RFA workers to [get] specifics of what need to be done for [Petitioner] meet the criteria for RFA approval. ¶ [R.A.’s] room needs painting and a wall will be added to separate the garage door and his room. . . .”  (AR 49.)

Service log entries from June 2017 state a CSW informed Petitioner R.A. “needs to be accommodated in a bedroom upstairs while they decide as a family to proceed with the RFA process.” (AR 50.) The CSW also discussed “safety issues in the garage” with Petitioner. (AR 51.) During the CSW’s visit, Petitioner “became very emotional and started crying, [and] stated that he feels the Department will traumatize [R.A.] by removing him from his care.”  (AR 51.)

A service log entry dated January 28, 2018 reports: “CSW asked the family if the RFA worker has been to the home and Emma stated that someone had called and made an appointment but has been a no show twice. Emma stated that the family is upset that the RFA process has not been moving forward and they feel as the time is just passing by and nothing is getting done. CSW stated that she will try to get a hold of the RFA worker and find out that is the next step.” (AR 58.)

In a service entry log dated January 28, 2020, a CSW described Petitioner’s response to a question about why Petitioner and his family “didn’t adopt [R.A.].”  (AR 78.) According to the service entry log, Petitioner stated adoption “was an option that was not provided to him or his family.”  (AR 78.) 

              ALJ’s Findings Concerning Petitioner’s Declaration

The ALJ rejected Petitioner’s contention the “county misled the claimant to obtain conservatorship over the youth . . . .” The ALJ noted Petitioner did not present evidence in his declaration that “the county intentionally diverted the claimant to obtain conservatorship over the youth to hinder the RFA process.”  (AR 19 [emphasis added].) The ALJ stated: “A mere suggestion to obtain a conservatorship is insufficient to prove the county misled the claimant.” (AR 19.)

The ALJ erred to the extent she believed Petitioner could establish detrimental reliance only through “intentional” conduct by DCFS.  As argued by Petitioner and conceded by Respondents (see Opening Brief 10:17-18 and Opposition 13:1-2), estoppel against a welfare agency may be appropriate when “a government agent has negligently or intentionally caused a claimant to fail to comply with a procedural precondition to eligibility.”  (Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 401-402 [emphasis added].)  Thus, a negligent representation or omission by DCFS may be sufficient to support estoppel.  The ALJ’s error on the law likely resulted in the ALJ failing to address whether negligent representations or omissions by DCFS caused Petitioner to withdraw from the RFA process.   

Contrary to the ALJ’s finding, Petitioner did present evidence DCFS “diverted” Petitioner to a long-term plan of conservatorship for R.A. Specifically, in his declaration, Petitioner explained how DCFS’s inaccurate statements and omissions concerning conservatorship and adoption, combined with DCFS’s exceptionally long delay and Petitioner’s concerns about having [R.A.] taken from his home, caused Petitioner to withdraw from the RFA process.  (See AR 41-42.)  

Notably, Respondents have not cited any testimony or declaration of DCFS presented during the administrative hearing, including that of CSW Karla Genovez, disputing Petitioner’s account of what DCFS CSWs told him. (See Evid. Code, § 413.) Nor have Respondents disputed conservatorship was not the only option if Petitioner wanted to maintain custody of [R.A.] in his home; adoption was a viable option even though [R.A.] was approaching 18 years of age;[5] and the funding available to Petitioner through a conservatorship would be less than that available had he pursued RFA.

Further, Petitioner’s declaration is corroborated, in part, by DCFS’s service log entry dated January 28, 2020.  In the entry, a CSW described Petitioner’s response to a question about why Petitioner and his family “didn’t adopt [R.A.].”  (AR 78.)  Petitioner stated adoption “was an option that was not provided to him or his family.”  (AR 78.)  The service log entry thus partly corroborates Petitioner’s declaration a CSW told him adoption was not a “viable” option. 

Notably, Petitioner appeared at the administrative hearing on January 14, 2021 and was available to give testimony under oath.  Petitioner could have been questioned by the County about the statements in his declaration, but he was not. (AR 369, 388.)  The ALJ questioned Petitioner, but she asked only a single question of him—a question not related to equitable estoppel.  (AR 390.)  Accordingly, the hearing transcript provides no basis to question the credibility of Petitioner’s declaration—that is, no party attacked Petitioner’s veracity during the administrative hearing.

Contrary to Respondents’ assertion,[6] the ALJ did not make any express finding Petitioner’s declaration was not credible. (AR 19.) Rather, the ALJ found Petitioner had not proven detrimental reliance, in part, because he stated in his declaration that the social worker “suggested that I do a conservatorship to keep [R.A.] in the home.” (AR 19, 41.) The ALJ found that “[a] mere suggestion to obtain a conservatorship is insufficient to prove that the county misled the claimant.” (AR 19.)  Petitioner’s unrebutted evidence demonstrates the CSW incorrectly “said conservatorship was the only option if [Petitioner] wanted to keep [R.A.] in [his] house”; inaccurately stated “adoption was not a viable option because Ricardo was approaching 18 years old”; and never informed Petitioner about “the difference in the amount of funding between SSI benefits and foster care benefits.” (AR 41-42.) Thus, the unrebutted evidence does not show only a “mere suggestion,” but also affirmative statements and omissions upon which Petitioner relied to his detriment. 

Respondents contend Petitioner did not show reliance because he admitted he withdrew from the RFA process because he was “ ‘very concerned about having R.A. taken away from my home, so [he] decided to withdraw from the RFA process.’ ”  (Opposition 16:5-6 [citing AR 42].)  However, Petitioner’s statement must be read in context—DCFS informed Petitioner “conservatorship was the only option if [he] wanted to keep [R.A.] in [his] house” and that adoption was not viable.  (AR 41-42 [emphasis added].)  In context of those incorrect statements from DCFS, Petitioner’s admission that he acted, in part, out of fear [R.A.] would be removed from his custody is evidence of detrimental reliance on the false and inaccurate statements and omissions of DCFS. 

Respondents contend “in the very first [service log] entry, dated January 27, 2017, the CSW and petitioner discussed the possibility of adoption.”  (Opposition 15:17-18 [citing AR 46].)  The service log entry indicates the CSW asked “asked [Petitioner’s wife] what changed her husband's decision about adopting or even having custody of [R.A.].”  (AR 46.)  It is unclear from the entry whether Petitioner was present when the CSW asked this question of Petitioner’s wife.  Further, the discussion occurred in January 2017, before Petitioner had submitted his first RFA application in May 2017 and before the lengthy process, which continued into 2018, associated with that first application.  The January 27, 2017 service log entry does not negate Petitioner’s evidence a CSW later told him adoption “was not a viable option because [R.A.] was approaching 18 years old.”  (AR 41.) 

Respondents contend: “There is no evidence in the record to substantiate petitioner’s claim that he was ever advised to withdraw his RFA application or told that conservatorship was his only option.”  (Opposition 17:19-21.)  The latter part of Respondents’ argument is refuted by Petitioner’s declaration, which states CSW Karla Genovez told him that “conservatorship was the only option if [he] wanted to keep [R.A.] in his house.”  (AR 41.)  As discussed earlier, the County did not rebut that evidence. 

The former part of this argument—Petitioner did not present evidence he was “advised to withdraw his RFA application”—presents a closer issue.  In a footnote, Respondents elaborate: “Even if petitioner had been advised to pursue a conservatorship, this would not require his withdrawal from the RFA process. Conservatorship is not mutually exclusive with RFA. Indeed, petitioner here ultimately obtained both a conservatorship over R.A. as well as RFA.”  (Opposition 17, fn. 7.)  In reply, Petitioner interprets the footnote as a concession by Respondents that “adoption and conservatorship are not mutually exclusive.” (Reply 6:10-12.)  However, Petitioner does not address Respondents’ point Petitioner could have pursued a conservatorship while his RFA application proceeded. 

That Petitioner could have pursued conservatorship and RFA simultaneously does not support the ALJ’s findings or detract from Petitioner’s estoppel claim. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the court reviews the findings made by the agency.  The ALJ did not find Petitioner could have pursued RFA and conservatorship at the same time, or that Petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of such possibility.  Further, Petitioner’s declaration shows he was unfamiliar with the RFA process and conservatorships; he relied upon DCFS to provide him with correct information about the funding available through RFA and conservatorship; and DCFS did not inform him a conservatorship would provide significantly less funding for [R.A.] than RFA. (AR 41-42.) 

DCFS had a legal duty to explain the welfare benefits available to Petitioner. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10500.)  Respondents cite no evidence DCFS informed Petitioner he would receive less welfare benefits if he pursued a conservatorship over R.A. instead of RFA.  Accordingly, the weight of the evidence supports a finding, combined with the excessively long delays in the RFA process and Petitioner’s reasonable concern [R.A.] would be removed from Petitioner’s care, DCFS’s inaccurate and incorrect statements and omissions concerning the welfare benefits available in a conservatorship and the lack of viability of adoption reasonably caused Petitioner to believe that he should withdraw from the RFA process and pursue a conservatorship over R.A. 

Exercising its independent judgment, the court concludes the weight of the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding “[n]o evidence was provided that the county intentionally diverted the claimant to obtain conservatorship over the youth to hinder the RFA process.”  (AR 19.)

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              Reference to Adoption in February 26, 2018 Service Entry Log

The ALJ found the reference to “adoption” in the service log entry dated February 26, 2018, “negates the allegation that the county misled the claimant to obtain a conservatorship over the youth.”  (AR 19; see AR 58-59 [entry].)[7]  The parties present contrasting interpretations of the word “they” in the service log entry. The court finds it unnecessary to opine on the meaning of the word “they.” 

Exercising its independent judgment on the whole record, the court concludes the ALJ did not properly weigh this service log entry, which is vague, against the much more specific declaration of Petitioner.  Regardless of the interpretation of “they” in the entry, the entry provides no solid information about what the CSW told Petitioner, if anything, about his options with respect to conservatorship and adoption. 

Weighing the evidence, the court finds more persuasive Petitioner’s declaration stating DCFS incorrectly informed Petitioner “conservatorship was the only option if [he] wanted to keep [R.A.] in [his] house” and “adoption was not a viable option because [R.A.] was approaching 18 years old.”  (AR 41.)  Further, even though a CSW told Petitioner he should pursue conservatorship, DCFS failed to tell Petitioner a “conservatorship would provide significantly less funding for [R.A.] than RFA.”  (AR 41-42.) Even assuming there had been some (minimal) discussion of conservatorship and adoption with Petitioner, Petitioner’s testimony the CSW made misleading (inaccurate and/or incorrect) statements and omissions about his custodial options is not undermined.  Accordingly, the weight of the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding the service log entry dated February 26, 2018 “negates the allegation that the county misled the claimant to obtain a conservatorship over the youth.”  (AR 19.)

Finally, in the context of Petitioner’s declaration, Petitioner’s withdrawal from the RFA process is evidence of detrimental reliance on DCFS’s false (inaccurate and/or incorrect) statements and omissions.  Thus, as Petitioner persuasively argues, the weight of the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding Petitioner failed to establish the fourth requirement for estoppel simply because Petitioner took affirmative steps to withdraw from the RFA process. 

An abuse of discretion is established if the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)  Exercising its independent judgment, the court concludes the weight of the evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings for the fourth requirement of estoppel. Because the ALJ’s decision did not address all parts of Petitioner’s declaration, including the evidence of negligent misrepresentations and omissions, the court also concludes the ALJ’s findings do not support the decision.  Accordingly, for these reasons, Petitioner has shown that Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by adopting the proposed decision with respect to Petitioner’s estoppel claim.  

Public Policy Balancing

Petitioner contends the ALJ erred by “failing to apply the ‘public policy’ prong of the equitable estoppel inquiry.”  (Opening Brief 4:15.)  According to Petitioner, “equitable estoppel is not a two-step inquiry where public policy comes into play only after all other elements are satisfied.”  (Reply 7:11.)  Rather, Petitioner contends “an analysis of the public policy is a crucial part of an equitable estoppel inquiry that should impact a court’s consideration of all other elements.”  (Reply 7:16-17.)

On this point, Respondents have the stronger argument.  As discussed earlier and as reflected in the ALJ’s decision, equitable estoppel has four primary requirements.  (See Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 399. [“Generally speaking, four elements must be present . . . .”] See also Evid. Code, § 623.)  The four requirements must be met whether the party to be estopped is a private party or the government. If estoppel is sought against the government, however, a separate public policy balancing approach is required.  This “balancing approach” has been summarized by our Supreme Court:

[O]ur cases recognize the correlative principle that estoppel will not be applied against the government if to do so would effectively nullify “a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public.” [Citation.] In Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d 462, we adopted a balancing approach to accommodate these concerns: “The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel. (Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 399-400.)

Thus, public policy considerations only come into play if estoppel is sought against the government and the four requirements of estoppel are proven.  Petitioner has cited no authority to the contrary.[8] 

As applied here, the ALJ’s failure to address the public policy balancing approach of Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 393 and Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at 462 requires a remand for further proceedings. Public policy issues must be addressed by the ALJ if, on remand, she finds Petitioner has established the fourth requirement of estoppel against the County.

To the extent Petitioner contends the court should conduct the Mansell balancing on judicial review of an agency’s decision, the court is unpersuaded.  Estoppel claims against government welfare agencies are appropriately decided, in the first instance, in fair hearings before the Department of Social Services.  (Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 402-406.)  Further, Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (f) provides: “Where the judgment commands that the order or decision be set aside, it may order the reconsideration of the case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment . . . but the judgment shall not limit or control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent.”  (Emphasis added.)  Petitioner identifies no reason for the court to depart from these rules for the public policy balancing required by the Supreme Court. 

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also supports remanding to Respondents for reconsideration. “The exhaustion doctrine is grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and judicial efficiency . . . .”  (California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1489.)  Here, as Petitioner acknowledges, the ALJ’s decision does not reveal any findings or analysis of the required public policy balancing.  The appropriate remedy here is a remand order “allowing [the] agency to develop the necessary factual background of the case, letting the agency apply its expertise and exercise its statutory discretion.” (Ibid.) 

Accordingly, the court directs Respondents to reconsider the case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment. (AR 1-19 [decision].)[9] 

Remaining Contentions

Petitioner seeks a writ directing payments of “retroactive funding at the Dual Agency Rate with the full $1,000 Supplemental Rate and from March 4, 2017 to June 30, 2020.”  (Pet. Prayer

¶ 1.a.)

Petitioner qualified for RFA on March 3, 2020 and obtained a RFA certificate on that date.  (AR 19.)  Petitioner has cited no evidence or developed an argument that he was not paid the ARC or other funding to which he was entitled commencing March 3, 2020.  Accordingly, Petitioner does not show he is entitled to retroactive funding for the period March 3, 2020 to June 30, 2020. His claim is to such relief is therefore denied.

In the administrative briefing, Petitioner requested retroactive benefits “for the period from May 14, 2017 to June 30, 2020.”  (AR 38.)  Petitioner also specified the same period at the administrative hearing.  (AR 382.)  Petitioner selected May 14, 2017 as the start date because it was “90 days after Claimant initially applied for Resource Family Approval.”  (AR 23.)  Here, however, Petitioner has not explained why he seeks retroactive benefits from March 4, 2017.  It appears Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to retroactive benefits accruing prior to May 14, 2017. Petitioner’s position here is puzzling.

Respondents contend Petitioner also is not entitled to retroactive benefits prior to March 3, 2020 for various reasons, including: (1) “Petitioner and his family had not met the substantive criteria for RFA by May 14, 2017,” and had not even submitted an RFA application until May 17, 2017; (2) “safety concerns still existed in the home in June 2017, caregiver training had not been completed and had only been scheduled by petitioner in July 2017, and petitioner and his wife had not completed their required physicals as of 2018”; (3) “petitioner cannot be awarded retroactive benefits for the time period from January 24, 2019, through July 17, 2019, during which the juvenile dependency court had no jurisdiction over R.A.”; and (4) “retroactively awarding petitioner ARC benefits would result in double payments to petitioner, who already received all benefits to which he was entitled while R.A. was a dependent of the court.”  (See Opposition 19-20.)  The ALJ’s decision does not address any of these issues or include any relevant findings supporting Respondents’ position.  Respondents do not show, with citation to authority, the court should decide these factual and legal issues in the first instance on judicial  review of the administrative decision. 

In reply, Petitioner points out the ALJ “ ‘determined that the county’s failure to process the RFA application within 90 days requires the application of equity in this case to cover the period where the claimant did not receive any ARC benefits or the equivalent for the period from May 14, 2017 to March 2, 2020.’ ”  (Reply 8:9-12 [citing AR 18].)  Petitioner contends “Respondents did not appeal the ALJ’s finding on this point and it is improper for them to challenge it for the first time in their response to Mr. Perez’s opening brief.”  (Reply 8:12-14.) 

To the extent Petitioner suggests Respondents lack discretion on remand to consider the propriety of retroactive benefits between May 14, 2017 to March 2, 2020, the court disagrees.  The ALJ did not conduct the required public policy balancing.  Respondents’ arguments about the availability of retroactive benefits between May 14, 2017 to March 2, 2020 may be relevant to public policy balancing. For example, the Supreme Court has held that estoppel against a welfare agency may be appropriate when “a government agent has negligently or intentionally caused a claimant to fail to comply with a procedural precondition to eligibility.”  (Lentz v. McMahon, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 401-402 [emphasis added].)  Lentz v. McMahon also explained “[t]he policy considerations may well be different, however, when substantive preconditions of benefits are in issue.”  (Id. at 401.)  The Court did not decide “whether there are situations in which the nature of the official misconduct and the resulting hardship on a substantively ineligible recipient would be sufficient to outweigh the burden on the government, and hence support a claim of estoppel.”   (Id. at 402.) 

Thus, for public policy balancing, the ALJ may need to assess whether Petitioner was procedurally and/or substantively eligible for RFA and ARC Funding benefits during the period in question.  The ALJ may also need to consider “the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel.”  (Id. at 400.)  The court does not conduct such balancing in the first instance.  Nor can the court limit Respondents’ discretion in such balancing and reconsideration on remand.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (f); Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011)  52 Cal.4th 499, 531; Carlton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1428, 1434-35. [“Where an administrative decision is set aside for insufficiency of the evidence it is customary to remand the matter to the agency for a new hearing.”])

Whether Respondents’ other contentions (see Opposition section IV) may be raised on remand as part of the required public policy balancing, or for other issues, is a discretionary question to be decided in the first instance by Respondents. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the petition is granted in part. The court will issue a writ directing Respondents to set aside their administrative decision adopted April 2, 2021, to the extent such decision denied Petitioner’s claim for retroactive benefits for the period of May 14, 2017 to March 2, 2020.  Respondents are directed to reconsider the case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (f).) 

The petition is denied as to Petitioner’s claim for retroactive benefits accruing from March 4, 2017 to May 13, 2017 and March 3, 2020, to June 30, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

August 25, 2023                                                                                                                                                           

________________________________ 

Hon. Mitchell Beckloff  

Judge of the Superior Court