Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case Number: 22STCP01267, Date: 2023-12-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP01267, Date: 2023-12-20 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner, Los Angeles Times Communications LLC, brings this proceeding under the California Public Records Act (CRPA), Government Code[1] section 7921, et seq. Petitioner seeks an order compelling Respondent, City of Los Angeles, to disclose all non-exempt public records as requested by Los Angeles Times journalist, Paul Pringle, in three CPRA requests. The City opposes the petition.

The records requests at issue related to an incident on May 18, 2021, when Fred Mathis, then the chief deputy of administrative operations for the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), was allegedly under the influence of alcohol while on duty at a LAFD facility. On that date, LAFD battled a major wildfire in the Pacific Palisades area of Los Angeles that threatened lives and property. Pringle reported Mathis was “overseeing the agency’s operations center during the Palisades fire” when he appeared to be intoxicated. (Pet. Exh. M [LA Times article entitled “LAFD chief deputy allegedly drunk during a major fire gets no discipline, $1.4-million payout”]; Pringle Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. N-P [additional LA Times reporting].)

On May 28, 2021, Pringle requested the mayor’s office provide him with the following records:

-- All communications involving the conduct and employment status of Chief Fred Mathis, including reports that he was under the influence at City Hall East and any other location, from May 16 to the date you fulfill this request . . .

-- The complaint filed against Chief Mathis regarding the report(s) that he allegedly was under the influence at City Hall East during the period defined above. . . .

-- The identification numbers, including the "shop" and license plate numbers, of the [LAFD] vehicle assigned to Chief Mathis.

-- Vehicle entry and exit logs and security camera footage for the parking structure at City Hall East used by [LAFD] employees for the dates of May 16 through May 20. The footage would be for the entrances and exits of the structure.

-- Security camera footage of the interior and pedestrian entrances and exits of the [LAFD] backup operations and dispatch centers beneath City Hall East for the dates of May 16 through May 20.

On June 21, 2021, Rachel Teitelbaum, Deputy Legal Counsel for the mayor, responded to the May 28, 2021 CPRA request. Teitelbaum “produced the letters from the two employee groups expressing concern about how the incident was handled.” (Pringle Decl. ¶ 8; see Ans. ¶ 10 and Pet. ¶ 10, Exh. B, C.) Teitelbaum also wrote: “Please be advised that this Office declined to produce any records that fall into the following, well-established exemptions to the CPRA [citing Government Code §§ 6254(c), 6254.3, 6254.20, and 6255].” (Pet. Exh. B.)

Pringle advised Teitelbaum he disagreed with her legal exemptions analysis by email on July 14, 2021. (Pet. Exh. D.) On July 19, 2021, Teitelbaum reiterated the City’s position the mayor’s office had disclosed all non-exempt records in its possession “and exempt records were withheld pursuant to well-established exemptions to the CPRA.” Teitelbaum also directed Pringle to other departments within the City, including the LAFD, that might be in possession of additional records responsive to his records request. (Pet. Exh. E.)

In October 2021, Pringle exchanged a series of emails with Cheryl Getuiza, a spokeswoman for LAFD, concerning questions Pringle raised about Deputy Chief Mathis. (See Pet. Exh. F, G, H.) In an exchange of emails on October 18, 19, and 21, 2021, Getuiza asserted an investigation of Mathis by an outside law firm (Law Firm) hired by the City precluded disclosure of information in response to questions asked by Pringle about Mathis’ access to a complaint tracking system (CTS), whether Mathis violated any Department rules in accessing the CTS as well as related matters. (Pet. ¶ 15 and Exh. H.)

On January 19, 2022, Pringle sent a second CPRA request to the mayor’s office requesting “copies of all communications involving the worker compensation claim approved for Fred Mathis of the Los Angeles Fire Department.” (Pet. Exh. I.) On January 28, 2022, Teitelbaum responded: “After a diligent search, we have determined that the Office does not have possession, custody, or control of any records that are responsive to your Request. Other City Departments, such as the Los Angeles Fire Department or the Personnel Department, may be in possession of responsive records.” (Pet. Exh. J.)

On February 22, 2022, after learning that the investigative report had been completed, I contacted the City’s Director of Communications, Alex Comisar, expressed concerns as to why the report had not been publicly released, and asked for the City to produce a copy, arguing it was a public record. I spoke with Mr. Comisar for approximately 17 minutes. [¶] Instead of producing a copy of the investigative report, on February 24, 2022, I received a response from Cheryl Getuiza claiming that the “complete report cannot be released due to privacy concerns as a personnel record under the California Constitution and the Public Records Act and based on attorney-client privilege.” (Pringle Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; see also Pet. ¶ 18.)[3]

On February 24, 2022, Getuiza provided five findings made by Law Firm in its investigation report. (Pet. Exh. K.) Getuiza advised Pringe:

The complete report cannot be released due to privacy concerns as a personnel record under the California Constitution and the Public Records Act and based on attorney-client privilege. Should you have additional questions, direct them to the City Attorney's Office. (Pet. Exh. K.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:

A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.

“There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (California Ass'n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “Generally, a writ will lie when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy . . . .” (Pomona Police Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Pomona (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-584.)

“When there is review of an administrative decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, courts apply the following standard of review: ‘[J]udicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the [agency] to determine whether [its] action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether [it] has failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 584)

Pursuant to the CPRA, individual citizens have a right to access government records. In enacting the CPRA, the California Legislature declared that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” (§ 7921.000; see also County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.)

Article 1, section 3(b) of the state’s Constitution affirms that “[t]he people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business.” The Constitution mandates that the CPRA be “broadly construed,” while any statute “that limits the right of access” must be “narrowly construed.” (See National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 507.) “Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of the portions that are exempted by law.” (§ 7922.525, subd. (b).)

“To establish an agency has a duty to disclose under [the CPRA], the petitioner must show that: (1) the record ‘qualif[ies] as [a] ‘public record[ ]’ . . . ; and (2) the record is ‘in the possession of the agency.’ ” (Anderson-Barker v Superior Court (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 528, 538.)

Under the CPRA, “the public agency has the burden of proof when asserting an exemption under the CPRA or when claiming certain documents should be redacted.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 383, 398.) As disclosure under the CPRA is favored, “all exemptions are narrowly construed.” (American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 67.)

“ ‘On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.’ . . . Interpretation of a statute or regulation is a question of law.” (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.)

The Investigation Report is Responsive to Pringle’s February 22, 2022 CPRA Request

Petitioner does not contend the investigation report is responsive to Pringle’s first two records requests made on May 18, 2021 and January 18, 2022. Instead, Petitioner argues the investigation report is responsive to Pringle’s February 22, 2022 oral request of Comisar. (Reply 2:7-10.)

As noted, Pringle attested he “contacted the City’s Director of Communications, Alex Comisar, expressed concerns as to why the report had not been publicly released, and asked for the City to produce a copy, arguing it was a public record.” (Pringle Decl. ¶ 12 [emphasis added].) Pringle also declares the City declined to produce the investigation report in response to his request. (Pringle Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; see also Pet. ¶ 18 and Opening Brief 5:13-14.)

The City fails to address this evidence. In a footnote, the City notes “although in its Opening Brief, the Times states, ‘on February 22, 2022, Pringle requested the City release the investigative report;’ this statement contains no citation to a February 22nd CPRA request in the record, or any specific document to support this assertion. (See Opening Brief, p. 5.)” (Opposition fn. 1.)

While the City is correct—Petitioner did not cite Pringle’s declaration in its Opening Brief at page 5—Petitioner did attach Pringle’s declaration to its Opening Brief and expressly referenced Pringle’s request for the investigation report. (Opening Brief 5:13-14.) Petitioner also noted Pringle’s February 22, 2022 phone call with Comisar in it petition. (Pet. ¶ 18.) Thus, contrary to the City’s assertion, both the petition and Petitioner’s Opening Brief noted Pringle’s CPRA request for the investigation report from the City.[4]

The City has not argued Pringle’s February 22, 2022 CPRA request was deficient because it was made orally or because it failed to reasonably describe the investigation report. Oral requests for records are permissible under the CPRA. (Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor Transp. Authority (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1392.) A CPRA request requires reasonably described identifiable record. (§ 7922.530(a).)

The undisputed evidence before the court demonstrates Pringle reasonably described and requested the investigation report in his phone conversation with Comisar on February 22, 2022. (Pringle Decl. ¶ 12.)

Further, the parties’ conduct shows the City understood Pringle requested the investigation report from Comisar, and the City declined to provide it. On February 24, 2022, two days after Pringle spoke to Comisar on the phone, Getuiza, LAFD’s “Government Affairs Director,” wrote to Pringle: “The complete report cannot be released due to privacy concerns as a personnel record under the California Constitution and the Public Records Act and based on attorney-client privilege.” (Pet. Exh. K [emphasis added].) Getuiza’s communication also included a legal analysis of whether “the potential harm the disclosure of the investigative report could cause to the employee's privacy interest outweigh the public interest in disclosure.” (Pet. Exh. K.) The legal analysis undertaken demonstrates the City elected not to disclose the investigation report as an exempt document under the CPRA.

Pringle emailed Getuiza the next day, February 25, 2022, and contested her assessment: “Why are you withholding the parts of the law firm's report that dealt with the allegations of a cover-up, including as they related to the failure to test Mathis, the delay in entering the complaint into the system and the altered timekeeping record? I have the same question regarding the matters of his accessing the CTS and his use of the city credit card and vehicle. Those materials are disclosable under the CPRA and have nothing to do with his personal problems.” (Pet. Exh. L at p. 59 of 75 [emphasis added].)

That same day, Getuiza, on behalf of LAFD, responded: “The investigative report is being withheld due to privacy concerns and personnel record exemptions pursuant to the California Constitution (Article I, Section 1), the Public Records Act exception for personnel records (Government Code Section 6254(c), the Public Records Act balancing test exception (Government Code Section 6255), and applicable case law.” (Pet. Exh. L at p. 59 of 75 [emphasis added].)

On the evidence, the court finds Petitioner made an oral request under the CPRA for the investigation report on February 22, 2022, and the City declined to produce it. The City has not demonstrated “the Writ must be denied because the Investigation Report was not responsive to either the May 21st nor January 18th CPRA Requests.” (Opposition 10:14-15.)

The City contends “the Mayor’s Office has never received or ever been in possession of the Investigation Report.” (Opposition 10:5-6.) There is a single agency—the City—from which Petitioner sought documents under the CPRA. The City’s attempts to limit the responsibility for responding to the CPRA request to the mayor’s office—and not the agency as a whole—is unpersuasive. The court rejects the City’s contention Petitioner must have directed its request for the investigation report to the LAFD to obtain the report.

Several provisions in the CPRA makes clear an agency is responsible for a response to a CPRA request, not a department within the agency. Section 7922.525, subdivision (a) provides: “Public records are open to inspection at all times during the office hours of a state or local agency and every person has a right to inspect any public record, exempted as otherwise provided.” (Emphasis added.) Section 7922.530 states: “Except with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by express provisions of law, each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly available to any person upon payment of fees covering direct costs of duplication, or a statutory fee if applicable.” (Emphasis added.) Section 7922.535, subdivision (a) mandates: “Each agency, upon a request for a copy of records, shall, within 10 days from receipt of the request, determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency and shall promptly notify the person making the request of the determination and the reasons therefor.” (Emphasis added.)

(a) A county. (b) A city, whether general law or chartered. (c) A city and county. (d) A school district. (e) A municipal corporation. (f) A district. (g) A political subdivision. (h) Any board, commission, or agency of the foregoing. (i) Another local public agency. (j) An entity that is a legislative body of a local agency pursuant to subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 54952.

The City here is undisputedly a “local agency” under the CPRA. On February 22, 2022, Pringle made his request for the investigation report from Comisar, the City’s Director of Communications. (Pringle Decl. ¶ 2.) The record demonstrates the LAFD—part of the local agency—has possession and control of the investigation report. (Pet. Exh. K, L.) Thus, the City has possession and control of the investigation report.

Additionally, “records related to public business are subject to disclosure if they are in an agency's actual or constructive possession. [Citations.] ‘[A]n agency has constructive possession of records if it has the right to control the records, either directly or through another person.’ ” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 623.) Thus, even assuming the mayor’s office does not have actual possession of the investigation report, nothing suggests the mayor’s office does not have constructive possession of or the right to control it.

Do Deputy Chief Mathis’ and Chief Terrazas’ Privacy Interests Outweigh the Public Interest in Disclosure of the Unredacted Investigation Report?

In the alternative, Respondent contends it fulfilled its obligations under the CPRA when it disclosed the findings from the Investigation Report. Specifically, Respondent contends that it is not required by the CPRA to produce the full, unredacted investigation report because (1) the investigation report is a “personnel record” of Mathis; (2) “the Investigation Report contains highly sensitive and confidential medical information about Mathis and his family” (Opposition 12:15-16); (3) Mathis has privacy interests in his “disciplinary records”; and (4) there is no significant public interest in disclosure because the investigators concluded the allegations were unfounded.[5]

“Public records are exempt from disclosure if they (1) are personnel, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [§ 7927.700] or (2) fit within a catch-all exemption where the facts of the particular case demonstrate that the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record [§ 7922.000]. Courts apply a three-step analysis in determining whether [either of these exemptions] applies. As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether the records sought constitute a personnel file, or other similar file. If so, the court must determine whether disclosure of the information would ‘compromise substantial privacy interests; if privacy interests in given information are de minimis disclosure would not amount to a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Lastly, the court must determine whether the potential harm to privacy interests from disclosure outweighs the public interest in disclosure.” (Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 530, 539 [cleaned up].)

“The tests under the two statutes . . . are essentially the same.” (BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 755 [BRV].) The agency bears the burden of proof and must “demonstrate a ‘clear overbalance’ on the side of confidentiality.” (Id. at 756 [emphasis added].)

The scope of the CPRA’s personnel record exemption has been addressed by the Court of Appeal in a body of case law dating to 1978. (Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal. App. 4th 1250, 1272-1274 [summary].) The law is well settled: “where complaints of a public employee's wrongdoing and resulting disciplinary investigation reveal allegations of a substantial nature, as distinct from baseless or trivial, and there is reasonable cause to believe the complaint is well founded, public employee privacy must give way to the public's right to know.” (Bakersfield City School Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1046 [Bakersfield].)

In Bakersfield, the trial court granted a newspaper’s petition for writ of mandate for access to disciplinary records of a school district employee. After an in camera review, the trial court granted disclosure “as to complaints regarding an incident . . . the court described on the record as ‘Sexual type conduct, threats of violence and violence’.” (Id. at 1043-1044.) On appeal, the petitioner asserted “ ‘[a] charge or complaint is well-founded only if there is reasonable cause to believe the complaint or charge of misconduct is true’ or if discipline has been imposed.” (Id. at 1044.)

The Court of Appeal rejected the petitioner’s position and affirmed the trial court’s order. The Court held “neither the imposition of discipline nor a finding that the charge is true is a prerequisite to disclosure.” (Id. at 1044.) Bakersfield explained: “The courts . . ., both originally and upon review, are required to examine the documents presented to determine whether they reveal sufficient indicia of reliability to support a reasonable conclusion that the complaint was well founded. The courts must consider such indicia of reliability in performing their ultimate task of balancing the competing concerns of a public employee's right to privacy and the public interest served by disclosure.” (Id. at 1047.)

The balance of competing interests may weigh more strongly in favor of public disclosure if the allegations of misconduct are against a senior public official or a public employee who occupies a position of “trust and responsibility.” Thus, in BRV, supra, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 742, a school district received complaints that its superintendent had sexually harassed and verbally abused students. The school district retained a private investigator to investigate the complaints, and the investigator prepared a confidential report. The superintendent resigned conditioned on the district accepting the terms of a written agreement, including paid administrative leave until his retirement date, a salary increase, and that the district would not release any documents in the superintendent’s personnel file without his consent. A newspaper sought disclosure of the confidential investigation report under the CPRA. After in camera review, the trial court denied disclosure as to most of the report. (Id. at 746-749.)

After its own in camera review, the Court of Appeal in BRV held the entire report should be disclosed except for the identities of students, parents, staff and faculty members. (Id. at 759.) The Court held the public interest in disclosure outweighed the private right of confidentiality in part because the case involved a school superintendent, a “position of authority as a public official.” The Court also applied a lesser standard of reliability than it otherwise would under the rule of Bakersfield because the superintendent is a public official. (Id. at 759.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal reasoned in part as follows:

Here, members of the public were greatly concerned about the behavior of the city's only high school superintendent and his governing elected board in responding to their complaints. Indeed, from the public's viewpoint, the District appeared to have entered into a “sweetheart deal” to buy out the superintendent from his employment without having to respond to the public accusations of misconduct. The public's interest in judging how the elected board treated this situation far outweighed the Board’s or [superintendent’s] interest in keeping the matter quiet. Because of Morris's position of authority as a public official and the public nature of the allegations, the public’s interest in disclosure outweighed Morris’s interest in preventing disclosure of the Davis report.

We reviewed the report, but because of Morris’s status as a public official, we applied a lesser standard of reliability than we otherwise would for a nonpublic official under the rule of Bakersfield. Although the investigator determined most of the allegations were not sufficiently reliable, we could not conclude the allegations were so unreliable the accusations could not be anything but false. The report exonerated Morris of all serious allegations of misconduct except those relating to outbursts of anger. In this circumstance, the public’s interest in understanding why Morris was exonerated and how the District treated the accusations outweighs Morris’s interest in keeping the allegations confidential.

The Court of Appeal has analyzed CPRA requests for personnel records of public employees similarly in Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1274-1276 and Caldecott v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 212, 224-225. In Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist., although the teacher (whose disciplinary records were sought) was not a high-ranking official, the Court explained the teacher “occupies a position of trust and responsibility as a classroom teacher, and the public has a legitimate interest in knowing whether and how the District enforces its sexual harassment policy.” (Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at 1277-1276.) Caldecott v. Superior Court involved facts that were “strikingly similar” to those in BRV, and involved allegations of a hostile work environment and a superintendent. After in camera review of investigatory records, the trial court denied disclosure. The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning in part:

Here, as in BRV, there is a strong public interest in judging how [the superintendent] responded to Caldecott's claims, especially in light of his decision to almost immediately terminate Caldecott without cause. Likewise, there is the same strong public interest in assessing how School District's elected board treated the serious misconduct allegations against its highest ranking administrator. The numerous newspaper articles and blogs included in the record confirm that. Disclosure will shed light on School District's performance of its duties.

Bakersfield, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at 1041, BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 742, Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at 1250 and Caldecott v. Superior Court, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at 212 provide the framework for analysis here.

The court finds the investigation report is a personnel record or similar file within the meaning of section 7927.700. Petitioner has developed no argument to the contrary. (See Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at 539-540. [“The scope of personnel records generally covers records ‘relating to the employee's performance or to any grievance concerning the employee.’ ”])

“A public sector employee, like any other citizen, is born with a constitutional right of privacy. A citizen cannot be said to have waived that right in return for the ‘privilege’ of public employment. . . .” (Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist., supra, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 1271. See Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1. See also Los Angeles Administrative Code, § 12.21(c).)

In Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist., a school district prepared “disposition letters” in response to complaints made against a teacher. The Court of Appeal held the “disposition letters,” which included investigatory findings, implicated the teacher’s right to privacy: “They identify allegations of Doe's misconduct as a volleyball coach and [the district’s] findings based on an investigation.” (Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at 541.)

Here, the investigation report is similar to the “disposition letters” in Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist. Specifically, the investigation report identifies allegations against Deputy Chief Mathis (i.e., intoxication on duty; improper access to CTS) and against Chief Terrazas (i.e., cover up of Mathis’ misconduct), and the investigator’s findings about the allegations. (Pet. Exh. K; see also Opposition fn. 3 [summarizing the investigation process].) There is no evidence before the court whether court whether the investigation report was placed in the personnel files of either employee. Even if the City did not place the report in their personnel files, the investigation report summarizes the results of a disciplinary investigation into acts of both Mathis and Terrazas. Accordingly, disclosure of the investigation report involves privacy interests that must be weighed and balanced against the public’s right to know. (Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at 541.)

The City also argues “the Investigation Report contains highly sensitive and confidential medical information about Mathis and his family, and his medical privacy rights are protected the under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (‘CMIA’).” (Opposition 12:15-17.) The City argues the investigation report contains “highly sensitive and confidential medical information about Mathis and his family” but provides no evidence for support.

Further, Respondent has made no effort to generally describe the nature of the medical information purportedly contained in the investigation report. Nor has Respondent discussed the provisions of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act or explained how the provisions are applicable to this dispute. On this evidentiary record and briefing, the City’s contention the investigation report contains private medical information lacks evidentiary support and legal analysis. Accordingly, the City has not met its burden; the contention is therefore unpersuasive.[6]

Based on the foregoing, the court finds public disclosure of the investigation report implicates the privacy interests of Mathis and Terrazas because the report contains confidential information about a disciplinary investigation into complaints of misconduct against the two LAFD employees. Because Mathis and Terrazas were high-ranking public officials at the time, their privacy interests are somewhat lessen compared to other public employees. (See BRV, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 757-759.) Resolution of this dispute requires the court to balance the private interests of Mathis and Terrazas against the public interest in disclosure.

On this evidentiary record and briefing, the City has not demonstrated the investigation report contains private medical information, or the nature of any such medical information, about Mathis and his family. Further, even if the investigation report contains some private medical information, disclosure under the CPRA may still be required. Under such circumstances, the court would balance the private interests in non-disclosure, including any medical privacy rights, against the public’s interests in disclosure. (See e.g., Civil Code, § 56.20, subd. (c) [medical information may be disclosed “if the disclosure is compelled by judicial or administrative process or by any other specific provision of law”].) Ultimately, the court couldl order any private medical information be redacted from the investigation report prior to its public release. (See Gov. Code, § 7922.525, subd. (b).)

Are the Allegations Substantial in Nature and Well Founded? If so, How Do Competing Interests Balance?

Public release of the investigation report under the CPRA turns on whether the five allegations and findings in it are “substantial” and “well founded” based on the evidence before the court. The court also considers below whether there is a “clear overbalance” on the side of confidentiality with respect to each of the five allegations and findings in the investigation report. The court’s analysis is based on the evidence before it which does not include the investigation report.

Allegation 1 - Deputy Chief Fred Mathis was intoxicated on Duty on or about May 18, 2021.

This allegation is clearly substantial in nature. On May 18, 2021, Mathis held the position of Chief Deputy for LAFD; he was the top LAFD administrative commander. (Pet. ¶ 1; Ans. ¶ 1; Pet. Exh. M; Pringle Decl. ¶ 2.) Mathis’ salary was more than $350,000 a year, and he eventually retired “with a roughly $1.4-million payout, on top of his annual pension of about $225,000.” (Pet. Exh. M at p. 4 of 18; see also Ans. ¶ 1.) Pringle reported that “[a]s commander of the department’s administrative bureau, Mathis [was] responsible for responding ‘to major emergencies and other incidents as head of an Incident Management Team’ . . . according to the agency’s website.” (Pringle Decl. Exh. N at 63.) Respondent has not disputed Pringle’s reporting in its Opposition Brief. Based on the evidence, the court finds Mathis was a “high-ranking” public official on May 18, 2021.

At the time of the incident on May 18, 2021, the LAFD battled a major wildfire in the Pacific Palisades area of Los Angeles that threatened lives and property. (See Pet. ¶¶ 1, 9-21, Exh. A-M; see also Pringle Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. M-P [Pringle’s reporting regarding the incident].) Pringle reported almost a year later reported Mathis was “overseeing the agency’s operations center during the Palisades fire” when he appeared to be intoxicated. (Pet. Exh. M.) Clearly, and as the City appears to concede, the public has a substantial interest in learning whether a high-ranking officer and public official for the LAFD was intoxicated, while on duty, and while overseeing the LAFD’s operations during the Palisades fire. (See Opposition 14:15-17 [public has interest in whether Mathis was “intoxicated while on duty”].)

The City argues “the findings did not substantiate that Mathis was under the influence of alcohol while on duty.” (Opposition 14:11-12 [emphasis in original].) The investigation report states “[t]he evidence also supports a finding that Mathis was technically off duty while he was likely intoxicated as he had put himself out sick on May 18, and an Acting Deputy Chief was in place managing AOPS.” (Pet. Exh. K [emphasis added].) The evidentiary basis for the Law Firm’s finding is entirely unclear. The phrase “technically off duty” is vague and suggests the possibility that Mathis was, at least arguably, on duty and present at the LAFD (in a P4 dorm in
City Hall East) the fire event. The investigation report findings do not disclose what, if anything, Mathis was doing at an LAFD facility on May 18, 2021, at the time of a major fire, if he was not “on duty” and performing his usual operational functions.

Further, and contrary to the City’s suggestion, “neither the imposition of discipline nor a finding that the charge is true is a prerequisite to disclosure.” (Bakersfield, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at 1044.) The court must “examine the documents presented to determine whether they reveal sufficient indicia of reliability to support a reasonable conclusion that the complaint was well founded.” (Id. at 1047.) When allegations of serious misconduct are made against a high-ranking public official, courts apply a “lesser standard of reliability than we otherwise would for a nonpublic official under the rule of Bakersfield.” (BRV, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 759.)

Here, the investigation report reveals “the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Mathis was most likely under the influence of alcohol or intoxicated on the morning of Tuesday, May 18, [2021] in his P4 dorm [in City Hall East].” (Pet. Exh. K.) That the report found Mathis was intoxicated while at a LAFD facility, at the time of a major fire, in itself provides some indicia of reliability for Allegation # 1. Thus, the serious allegations appear well founded.

In addition, the record contains some evidence suggesting Mathis’ time records were changed after the fact to show he was off duty on May 18. Specifically, Pringle reported “[t]he Times’ copy of Mathis’ timekeeping record shows that he was on sick leave May 18 and May 19, entries that were made May 22.” (Pringle Decl. Exh. N at 63.) Pringle also reported complaints from Los Bomberos, an organization of Latino firefighters, and the Stentorians, a group of Black firefighters, that Chief “Terrazas gave Mathis, who is white and one of two chief deputies in the department, special treatment that is not granted to nonwhite employees accused of similar misconduct.” (Pringle Decl. Exh. N at 60-61.) “ ‘It’s a total cover-up and a double standard, and the chief protects his own,’ said Assistant Chief Patrick Butler, who wrote a letter to the Fire Commission about the affair in his capacity as president of Los Bomberos, an organization of Latino firefighters.” (Pringle Decl. Exh. N at 60-61.)

The City has not submitted any evidence, or any redacted parts of the investigation report, responding to Pringles’ report. Of course, the court does not necessarily take Pringle’s reporting as factually true. Nonetheless, in the absence of any responsive evidence, Pringle’s reporting along with the investigation findings provide sufficient indicia of reliability for the allegation that Mathis was intoxicated while on duty, and while overseeing LAFD operations for a major fire on May 18, 2021. That is, the serious allegations appear well founded.

The City contends “as soon as allegations were made about Chief Mathis being intoxicated on duty and Chief Terrazas covering it up, these allegations (and others) were promptly and fully investigated by an outside counsel/investigator in accordance with the LAFD’s Special Investigation Process.” (Opposition 14:19-21.) While that may be true, the public has a substantial interest in learning how such serious allegations against high-ranking LAFD officials were investigated by the LAFD and the evidence upon which LAFD exonerated Mathis and Terrazas of any wrongdoing.

The City also argues “as in Associated Chino Teachers, 30 Cal.App.5th at 536, both Chiefs have retired from the LAFD and any concern about their return to the LAFD would be speculative.” (Opposition 15:1-2.) Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist. is distinguishable. The volleyball coach in the case, who was alleged to have yelled at students and held practice at their homes, was not a high-ranking public official. Further, the Court concluded “[t]he same complaints could most likely be made and found true of every successful high school athletic coach across the nation.” (Id. at 543.) Also, “because [the district] handled the investigation into the complaints internally, they were not egregious enough to warrant the retention of an outside party to independently conduct the investigation.” (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, the investigation report concerns allegations that a high-ranking LAFD public official was intoxicated while on duty, and while overseeing operations for a major fire. The allegations were substantial enough to justify an investigation by an outside law firm. Such circumstances are not remotely comparable to Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist.

Instead, this case is similar to Bakersfield, BRV, Caldecott v. Superior Court, and Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. where the Courts of Appeal held the CPRA required disclosure of investigatory/disciplinary records. Like those cases, the court here cannot conclude the allegations that Mathis was intoxicated while “on duty” are “so unreliable the accusations could not be anything but false.” (BRV, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 759.)

Further, “the public's interest in understanding why [Mathis] was exonerated and how the [LAFD] treated the accusations outweighs [Mathis’] interest in keeping the allegations confidential.” (Ibid.) As a former, high-ranking LAFD public official, Mathis has a lessened expectation of privacy in LAFD’s investigations of such serious allegations against him. (See id. at 757-759.) On this evidentiary record, the court finds Allegation 1 is substantial in nature and well-founded and the balancing of interests, including Mathis’ privacy interests, weighs in favor of disclosure of all contents of the investigation report related to Allegation 1. The City has not shown a “clear overbalance” on the side of confidentiality for Allegation 1.

The court acknowledges the balancing of the interests depends on the specific evidence presented and could plausibly change depending on the full contents of the investigation report. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, the City has not provided sufficient (or any) evidence about the nature of any medical information about Mathis or his family that might be contained in the investigation report. The City has the burden of proof on the exemption and, therefore, any deficiencies in the record weigh in favor of public disclosure, not against disclosure.

Allegation 2 - Cover Up: Los Bomberos and the Stentorians allege Chief Deputy Mathis was given “special privileges” by other high-ranking officers in how the alleged May 15-19, 2021 incident involving Mathis was addressed in an effort to cover up the situation. An anonymous “whistleblower complaint” email also asserts that “Chief Terrazas and his executive staff are covering this scandal up.”

For similar reasons outlined above as to Allegation 1, Allegation 2 is clearly substantial. Chief Terrazas was the highest-ranking public official for LAFD in May 2021. The public has a substantial interest in learning whether the LAFD Chief and his executive staff participated in covering up alleged intoxication of a chief deputy, while the chief deputy was on duty and overseeing operations for a major fire. As the former, highest-ranking LAFD official, Terrazas has a lessened expectation of privacy in the serious allegations against him.

The City argues “the public has no interest in knowing that someone made an allegation that Chief Terrazas participated in a ‘cover up’ when that allegation is unfounded.” (Opposition 14:1-17.) The investigation report found “[o]ther than [a newly appointed Chief] initially viewing Mathis’s situation as a personal crisis and failing to immediately report his condition, there is no evidence that ‘high-ranking officers’ afforded Mathis any privileges, or tried to cover-up, Mathis’s alleged conduct.” (Pet. Exh. K.) The evidentiary basis for the Law Firm’s finding is not disclosed in the record. Further, the finding does not address the allegation that LAFD backdated Mathis’ records to show him being off duty at the time of the May 18, 2021 incident. The finding also acknowledges some delay by Terrazas in reporting Mathis’ unspecified “condition.”

As with Allegation 1, the court cannot conclude, on this evidentiary record, the allegations Mathis was given special privileges and Terrazas participated in a “cover up” were “so unreliable the accusations could not be anything but false.” (BRV, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 759.) Further, “the public's interest in understanding why [Mathis and Terrazas were] exonerated and how the [LAFD] treated the accusations outweighs [Mathis’ and Terrazas’] interest in keeping the allegations confidential.” (Ibid.) On this record, the court finds Allegation 2 is substantial in nature and well-founded and the balancing of interests, including Mathis’ and Terrazas’ privacy interests, weighs for disclosure of all contents of the investigation report related to Allegation 2.

Allegation 3 - Los Bomberos and the Stentorians, also allege that Chief Terrazas’s appointment of the new Chief Deputy of Administrative Operations (AOPS) was “hasty” and appears to have been influenced by Chief Mathis’s alleged misconduct.

Neither party discusses Allegation 3 in any detail in their briefing. Accordingly, the court is inclined to reach the same conclusion for Allegation 3 as it did for Allegations 1 and 2.

We have become aware that a high-ranking member of the Fire Chief’s staff may have been unfit for duty and under the influence while serving in their official capacity and on city property as witnessed by other high-ranking staff. It was also alleged that other members of his command staff may have facilitated special privileges to this high-ranking member to circumvent the investigatory process, including timely notifications, and deviations from policies which would have included mandatory testing. [¶] An equally concerning aspect is that soon after the Fire Chief was made aware of the fitness for duty issue, he immediately made what appears to be a hasty appointment of a new Chief Deputy of Administrative Operations, contrary to his public statements to the stakeholder groups that he would wait several months before the final selection was made. While the character and credentials of those who were considered for the position are not in question – it is the timing and motives for the hasty selection that are suspect. (Pet. Exh. C.)

The allegations of Los Bomberos and the Stentorians are necessarily intertwined with those allegations made in Allegations 1 and 2. Specifically, Terrazas’ alleged “hasty” selection of a new Chief Deputy of Administrative Operations could possibly be viewed as part of a cover up of the allegations against Mathis regarding the May 18, 2021 incident. While the investigation report concluded Allegation 3 was unfounded, the evidentiary basis for such conclusion is unclear. (Pet. Exh. K.) On this evidentiary record, the court cannot find that Allegation 3 was “so unreliable the accusations could not be anything but false.” (BRV, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 759.) Given the relatedness of Allegations 1 and 2, the court finds, on this record, Allegation 3 is substantial in nature and well-founded and the balancing of interests, including Mathis’ and Terrazas’ privacy interests, weighs for disclosure of all contents of the investigation report related to Allegation 3.

Allegation 4 - Alleged unusual activity on Mathis’s City Issued Voyager Fuel Card between July 3 and July 25, 2021.

The court’s analysis for Allegation 4 is largely the same as that set forth above for Allegation 3. Importantly, Respondent has not specifically analyzed Allegation 4 or developed an argument that Allegation 4 is not substantial or not well founded.

The investigation report concluded “[the reporting party] . . . deemed Mathis’s use of the fuel card as inappropriate solely because of his incorrect belief that Mathis was administratively detailed home for substance abuse. In addition, there is no evidence that Mathis used the Voyager Card to fuel his personal vehicles, or otherwise improperly used the Voyager Card.” (Pet. Exh. K.) The evidentiary basis for the finding in the investigation report is unclear. The investigation report suggests Mathis may have used his Voyager Fuel Card while on leave. Further, there is evidence Mathis was on paid injury leave starting June 30, 2021. (See Pet. Exh. M at 76; Exh. H at 26.) The investigation report, and Respondent in opposition, do not explain why Mathis would have properly used his Voyager Fuel Card while on leave.

Standing alone, the alleged use of the Voyager Fuel Card while on leave might not be “substantial.” However, the allegation is made in context of other alleged misconduct, summarized above, which is substantial. The court also notes the allegation was investigated by Law Firm as part of the same investigation into the serious allegations of misconduct. On this record, the court cannot find that Allegation 4 was “so unreliable the accusations could not be anything but false.” (BRV, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 759.) Given the relatedness with Allegations 1, 2 and 3, the court finds, on this record, Allegation 4 is also substantial in nature and well-founded and the balancing of interests, including Mathis’ privacy interests, weighs for disclosure of all contents of the investigation report related to Allegation 4.

Allegation 5 - Mathis accessed the Complaint Tracking System (CTS) file via his office computer while on IOD leave.

The court’s analysis for Allegation 5 is similar to that set forth above for Allegations 1 and 2. Importantly, Respondent has not specifically analyzed Allegation 5 or developed an argument that Allegation 5 is not substantial or not well founded.

The allegation that Mathis accessed CTS through his office computer, while on IOD leave and while being investigation for serious misconduct, is clearly “substantial.” Indeed, the investigation report acknowledged that such conduct was “certainly suspicious, and not good optically or ethically.” (Pet. Exh. K.) Given the serious allegations against Mathis, the public has a substantial interest in learning why Mathis accessed CTS while on leave, whether he engaged in any misconduct in doing so, and how the LAFD investigated and exonerated Mathis for such conduct.

On this record, the court also finds sufficient indicia of reliability as to Allegation 5. The investigation report found Mathis admitted “to coming to the office during non-business hours to work, and that he accessed CTS.” (Pet. Exh. K.) The investigation report states “without evidence that Mathis misused the information he gleaned from his CTS file to influence the investigation, it is also unclear what LAFD rules or regulations his admitted conduct violated.” (Pet. Exh. K.) The evidentiary and legal basis for such conclusion is unclear. The apparent purpose of the investigation was to determine if Mathis violated LAFD rules or regulations in accessing CTS while on leave. The investigation findings that have been disclosed, and Respondent in opposition, fail to explain why investigators could not determine if Mathis violated LAFD rules and regulations when he accessed CTS while on leave and under investigation. That the investigators were apparently unable to make such determination is not convincing evidence that the allegation was unfounded. For these reasons, the investigation report, in itself, provides indicia of reliability for Allegation 5. Notably, Respondent has not developed any argument in opposition that Allegation lacks sufficient indicia of reliability. On this record, the court cannot find that Allegation 5 was “so unreliable the accusations could not be anything but false.” (BRV, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 759.)

Accordingly, the court finds Allegation 5 is substantial in nature and well-founded and the balancing of interests, including Mathis’ privacy interests, weighs for disclosure of all contents of the investigation report related to Allegation 5.

Based on the foregoing, Respondent has not met its burden of proof to establish the investigation report, or any part therefore, should be withheld from disclosure pursuant to the personnel record exemption of the CPRA.

Section 7922.000 authorizes “a government agency to withhold [public] records if it can demonstrate that, on the facts of a particular case, the public interest served by withholding the records clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at 1017.) The test under the catchall exemption is “essentially the same” as that for the personnel record exemption. (BRV, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at 755.) For the reasons discussed above, Respondent has not demonstrated a “clear overbalance” on the side of confidentiality for the investigation report or any part thereof. Accordingly, to the extent Respondent also relies on the catcall exemption to justify its decision not to disclose the investigation report, it has not met its burden of proof.

In her February 24, 2022 email, Getuiza asserted the City was withholding the investigation report, in part, “based on attorney-client privilege.” (Pet. Exh. K.) Respondent also cited the deliberative process privilege in response to the May 28, 2021 and January 19, 2022 CPRA requests. (Pet. Exh. B, E, J.) In its opposition brief, however, Respondent has not argued the attorney-client privilege or deliberative process privilege apply to any parts of the investigation report. Indeed, the attorney-client privilege or deliberative process privilege are not analyzed at all in Respondent’s opposition. Accordingly, on this briefing, Respondent has not met its burden to withhold the investigation report, or parts thereof, based on the attorney-client privilege or deliberative process privilege. (See Getz v. Superior Court (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 637, 650 [“the burden is on the public agency to show that the records should not be disclosed”]; Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at 862-863 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point . . . we treat the point as waived.”])

Based on the foregoing, the court finds Petitioner is entitled to the requested unredacted investigation report.

The May 28, 2021 CPRA Request sought disclosure of numerous public records, including “all communications involving the conduct and employment status of Chief Fred Mathis, including reports that he was under the influence at City Hall East and any other location, from May 16 to the date you fulfill this request”; the identification numbers and license plate numbers of the LAFD vehicle assigned to Chief Mathis; “vehicle entry and exit logs and security camera footage for the parking structure at City Hall East used by L.A.F.D. employees for the dates of May 16 through May 20”; and “security camera footage of the interior and pedestrian entrances and exits of the L.A.F.D. backup operations and dispatch centers beneath City Hall East for the dates of May 16 through May 20.” (Pet. Exh. A.)

In responses dated June 21 and July 19, 2021, the “City produced the letters from the two employee groups expressing concern about how the incident was handled.” (Pringle Decl. ¶ 8.) The City “refused to produce any other documents, claiming all other responsive records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Government Code sections 6254(c), 6254.3, 6254.20, and 6255.” (Pringle Decl. ¶ 8; see also Pet. Exh. B-E.)

To establish Respondent’s duty of further disclosure under the CPRA, Petitioner must show the records qualify as “public records” and are “in the possession of the agency.’” (Anderson-Barker v Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at 538.) All records requested in the May 28, 2021 CPRA Request appear to qualify as “public records” as they relate to the conduct of the public’s business. (See § 7920.530.) Respondent develops no argument to the contrary.

Petitioner also sufficiently shows Respondent has possession of at least some additional, responsive records. As discussed earlier, Petitioner need only show the LAFD or another department of the City has actual or constructive possession of the responsive records. In her June 21, 2021 response to the CPRA Request, Teitelbaum wrote: “The Office has determined, in part, that your Request seeks copies of disclosable public records that are in its possession.” (Pet. Exh. B.) In her July 19, 2021 response, Deputy Legal Counsel Teitelbaum wrote:

With respect to the remaining categories outlined in your request, other City of Los Angeles Departments may be in possession of additional records that are responsive to your request, including the Los Angeles Fire Department.

These responses appear to acknowledge some additional, responsive records exist and are in possession of the mayor’s office, the LAFD, or some other City department. Further, “[b]ecause the agency has full knowledge of the contents of the withheld records and the requester has only the agency's affidavits and descriptions of the documents, its affidavits must be specific enough to give the requester ‘a meaningful opportunity to contest’ the withholding of the documents.” (American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 83.) In opposition, Respondent has not cited any evidence showing it produced all responsive records for the May 28, 2021 CPRA Request that are in the possession of the City or any of its departments, including the LAFD. Respondent also has not described the contents of the withheld records in a declaration or privilege log.

The court finds Respondent has at least some additional records in its possession that are responsive to the May 28, 2021 CPRA Request. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Respondent to justify non-disclosure. (See Getz v. Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 650.) In opposition, Respondent has not argued the records responsive to the May 28, 2021 CPRA Request, or any parts thereof, may be withheld under any specific CPRA exemption. Respondent, therefore, has not met its burden to show that any responsive records that it has withheld may, in fact, be withheld from disclosure under the CPRA.

Additionally, based on Teitelbaum’s response, the court finds Respondent has not conducted a reasonably diligent search for the responsive records in all City departments, such as the LAFD, that may have possession of the records.

The petition is granted. Respondent shall conduct a reasonably diligent search amongst all its departments, including the LAFD, and produce all records in its actual or constructive possession responsive to the May 28, 2021 CPRA Request. Respondent has not met its burden of justifying any exemption to withhold the responsive documents.

It appears Petitioner no longer seeks writ relief related to its January 19, 2022 CPRA Request.[7]

If Petitioner still seeks disclosure of records for the January 19, 2022 CPRA Request, the court’s analysis is largely the same as that set forth above for the May 28, 2021 CPRA Request. The request seeks disclosure of a public record (“worker compensation claim approved for Fred Mathis of the Los Angeles Fire Department”). (Pet. Exh. I.) Petitioner submitted evidence Respondent did not produce the responsive records. (Pringle Decl. ¶ 11 [“no one produced any responsive records”].)

In her January 28, 2022 response, Teitelbaum wrote: “After a diligent search, we have determined that the Office does not have possession, custody, or control of any records that are responsive to your Request. Other City Departments, such as the Los Angeles Fire Department or the Personnel Department, may be in possession of responsive records.” (Pet. Exh. J [emphasis added].) The City’s response suggests it has actual or constructive possession of responsive records that it has not produced. At the very least, the City’s response shows Respondent did not conduct a reasonable, diligent search for the responsive record at departments other than the mayor’s office, such as the LAFD. In opposition, Respondent has not cited any evidence showing it produced all responsive records for the January 19, 2022 CPRA Request in the possession of the City or any of its departments, including the LAFD, or that Respondent conducted a reasonably diligent search for the responsive records.

The court finds Respondent has at least some additional records in its possession that are responsive to the January 19, 2022 CPRA Request. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Respondent to justify non-disclosure. In opposition, Respondent has not argued the records responsive to the January 19, 2022 CPRA Request, or any parts thereof, may be withheld under any specific CPRA exemption. Respondent, therefore, has not met its burden to show any responsive records may be withheld from disclosure under the CPRA.

The petition is granted. Respondent shall conduct a reasonably diligent search amongst all its departments, including the LAFD, and produce all records in its actual or constructive possession responsive to the January 19, 2022 CPRA Request. Respondent has not met its burden of justifying any exemption to withhold the responsive documents.

The writ petition also seeks a judicial declaration the “City has violated the CPRA by refusing to release disclosable public records.” (Pet. Prayer ¶ 1.) Given the court’s orders providing writ relief, the court need not issue a judicial declaration—the claim is entirely derivative of Petitioner’s CPRA claim.

The court will issue a writ directing Respondent to conduct a reasonably diligent search for and produce all records in its actual or constructive possession, including in the possession of the LAFD or other any other City department, that are responsive to the May 28, 2021 CPRA Request. If Petitioner is pursuing relief based upon its January 19, 2022 CPRA Request, the court will issue the same relief as with the May 28, 2021 CPRA Request.

Finally, a writ shall issue commanding Respondent to release the investigation report to Petitioner.

[1] All undesignated statutory references are to this code.

[2] In this request, Pringle wrote: “I am submitting this request to the Mayor's Office because I have had significant problems with the [LAFD] complying with the act in a timely and forthright matter. The act mandates that your office must respond to this request because it has access to and ultimate control and custody of the records.” (Pet. ¶ 9, Exh. A.)

[3] In paragraph 18 of the verified petition, Petitioner summarizes the conversation: “On February 22, 2022, Pringle called the City’s Director of Communications, Alex Comisar, to complain about the City’s violations of the CPRA in refusing to turn over the requested investigation records concerning Mathis. Comisar did not provide a response.” (Pet. ¶ 18.) To be clear, Pringle orally requested the investigation report.

[4] The City has not attacked the sufficiency of Petitioner’s pleading. Certainly, the petition could have been more clear. Nonetheless, the allegation sufficiently put the City on notice of Petitioner’s claim the City failed to produce the investigation report in response to Pringle’s CPRA request. (See Pet. ¶ 18.) Further, the City’s own communications and discovery responses demonstrate the City understood Petitioner requested the investigation report through the CPRA and the request was at issue in this litigation. (See Pet. Exh. K, L; and Respondent’s Third Supp. Responses to Pet.’s Special Rogs, Set One, at Interrogatory No. 16 found at Aviles Decl.

¶ 8, Exh. V at 801 [“the core issue . . . is whether the City violated the CPRA by withholding the Investigation Report”].) The City elected to ignore Petitioner’s evidence of Pringle’s oral request for the investigation report.

[5] Section III.B of the City’s Opposition focuses on “Mathis’ Significant Privacy Rights,” not those of Chief Terrazas. The court nonetheless interprets the City’s position as suggesting Chief Terrazas has a privacy interest in the investigation report to the extent it analyzes, if at all, whether Chief Terrazas engaged in a “cover up” or other wrongdoing.

[6] While Getuiza’s February 24, 2022 email refers to “Chief Mathis’ medical background, including his substance struggles” (Pet. Exh. K), and while Pringle’s March 15, 2022 article states Mathis has “acknowledged that he was struggling with alcoholism” (Pet. Exh. M at p. 6 of 18), the City has not cited or discussed such evidence in its opposition or argued the investigation report contains medical information concerning alcoholism or substance abuse. The court declines to speculate about possible medical information that might be found in the investigation report, and whether such information is private given the disclosures already made.

[7] Section VI of Petitioner’s reply appears to suggest Petitioner no longer seeks relief based on the request. (See Reply 10:11-22 [Petitioner asserts “the City’s opposition fails to address any of these records responsive to Pringle’s May 28, 2021 CPRA request,” but Petitioner does not make such assertion as to the January 19, 2022 CPRA Request].)