Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 22STCP01932 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP01932, Date: 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Respondent, City of Palmdale and Real Party in Interest, RdR Development Holdings, LLC, demur to the petition. Petitioner, Leona Valley Town Council, opposes the demurrer.

The City and Real Party request judicial notice of Exhibits A through M. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (a), (b), (c), (d) and (h).)

Petitioner opposes the request in part based on a failure to properly authenticate the documents for which judicial notice is sought. The court agrees. The request for judicial notice is denied in its entirety.

The court finds the documents for which judicial notice is sought are not properly authenticated; Stromberg’s generalized non-specific declaration is insufficient foundation. (Evid. Code § 453.) While the City and Real Party argue attorney authentication like Stromberg’s is routine (citing Landale-Cameron Court, Inc. v. Ahonen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409),[1] they provide no foundation to demonstrate Stromberg’s attestation the documents are what he attests them to be.

Assuming the court found the documents were properly authenticated, the court addresses the request for judicial notice as follows:

Exhibit A: The City and Real Party’s request for judicial notice of the Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and Release by and among Leona Valley Town Council, Ritter Park Associates, and the City of Palmdale, dated December 5, 1994 is granted. While the court takes judicial notice of the document, the court does not take judicial notice of the document’s interpretation or effect. (See Freemont Indemnity Co. v. Freemont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-115 [explaining that generally on demurrer a court may not take judicial notice of the proper interpretation of a contract where that interpretation is disputed].)

Exhibit B: The City and Real Party’s request for judicial notice of the City Council Special Meeting Minutes of October 19, 1994 is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) Petitioner concedes the existence of the meeting minutes is not reasonably subject to dispute, but disputes the meaning of the contents. While the court takes judicial notice of the document, it does not take judicial notice of the facts asserted therein.

Exhibit C: The City and Real Party’s request for judicial notice of a September 13, 1995 staff report to the City is denied. The City and Real Party’s authority to support judicial notice for a staff report is unpersuasive.

Exhibit E: The City and Real Party’s request judicial notice of the First Amendment to Development Agreement (Development Agreement 92-1) recorded on December 19, 1995 is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b).) The court may take judicial notice “not only of the fact of the document and its recording . . ., but also facts that clearly derive from its legal effect.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4hh 743, 754.)

Exhibit F: The City and Real Party’s request for judicial notice of the Memorandum of Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and Release recorded on February 21, 1995 is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)

Exhibit G: The City and Real Party’s request for judicial notice of the recorded deeds for the Ritter Ranch property from 1990 to 1995 is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) The court may take judicial notice of the recorded deeds and their legal effect. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117-1118.)

Exhibit H: The City and Real Party request for judicial notice of the business records from the California Secretary of State is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c) and (h). See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 37.)

Exhibit I: The City and Real Party’s request for judicial notice of the recorded quitclaim deed from Preston Hollow Capital, LLC to RdR dated August 28, 2020 is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) The court may take judicial notice of the recorded deed and its legal effect. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at 1117-1118.)

Exhibit J: The City and Real Party’s request for judicial notice of “an excerpt from the City Council agenda materials for the April 20, 2022 Palmdale City Council meeting” is denied. Contrary to the arguments of the City and Real Property, this document prepared by one private entity for another private entity is neither a legislative enactment nor an official act. Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b) and (c) do not support the request.

Exhibit K: The City and Real Party’s request judicial notice of the City’s “Ordinance 964, through which the Palmdale City Council approved the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan (90-4) on March 3, 1992” and (ii) “an excerpt from the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan 90-4, Exhibit 20E, showing Planning Area 5 is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

Exhibits L and M: The City and Real Party’s request judicial notice screenshots—not court records—of case information publicly provided by the Court of Appeal on its website is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) The truth of the matters contained therein, however, is not subject to judicial notice. (Wood v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 562, 580 n. 2. [“[W]e granted Crunch's request for judicial notice of several pages from DFEH's website and other DFEH public statements. While we may not judicially notice the truth of any statement in these materials, we may take notice of the fact that they were made to the public.”]; but see Tabarrejo v. Superior Court (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 849, 855, fn. 2 [judicial notice of docket entries on trial court's public website].)

On February 27, 1992, the City certified environmental impact report (EIR) 90-4 and approved the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan for a 10,625-acre development consisting of 7,200 residences, 7,628-acres of open space and the necessary public facilities, recreational amenities, schools, and commercial uses; the approvals included a development agreement. (Pet., ¶ 12.) EIR 90-4 determined all the potential environmental impacts of the project were less than significant. (Pet., ¶ 13.) In December 1995, the City approved six vesting tentative maps; all six vesting maps expired in 2017. (Pet., ¶ 14.) In June 2012, the development agreement expired. (Pet., ¶ 15.)

In 2021, Real Party sought the City’s approval to build Phase 1A of the project, which “would allow for the development of 553 single family detached homes on approximately 115 acres within the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan area.” (Pet., ¶ 17.)

On February 10, 2022, the City’s planning commission approved Phase 1A of the Project—after determining no environmental analysis was necessary. (Pet., ¶ 18.) Petitioner appealed the approval to the City Council. (Pet., ¶ 19.) On April 20, 2022, the City Council held a public hearing and denied the appeal. (Pet., ¶ 20.)

“[there] is no evidence to support the City's erroneous conclusion that: (1) the Project will not cause any substantial changes in any portion of the Project described in EIR 90-4 because the project is not modifying the scope or intent of the Specific Plan; (2) no substantial changes have occurred to baseline conditions because no significant development adjacent to the Project area which impacts the infrastructure, services, or development potential within the City’s boundaries has occurred; and, (3) no new information of substantial importance had been provided with respect to the Specific Plan. The City Council failed to make full consideration of EIR 90-4, and recognize the adverse environmental assessment of that EIR and any overriding considerations. The City Council failed to make full consideration of EIR 90-4, and recognize the adverse environmental assessment of that EIR and any overriding considerations.” (Pet., ¶ 30.)

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.)

A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend when there is no reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) Indeed, where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law and no amendment would change the result, the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend is proper. (City of Ceres v. City of Modesto (1969) 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 554.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show how the complaint might be amended so as to cure the defect. (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.)

The City and Real Party demur on the grounds the petition fails to state an actionable claim. Specifically, the City and Real Party argue Petitioner has released all claims pertaining to the Ritter Ranch project at issue in its petition based upon an Agreement of Settlement, Compromise, and Release (Settlement Agreement). The City and Real Party also argue that the Petition is barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel and/or retraxit.

The City and Real Party argue Petitioner’s claims have been released by the terms of the 1994 Settlement Agreement. Specifically, the City and Real Party note in the Settlement Agreement Petitioner agreed it would:

“not institute, or cause, directly or indirectly, any third parties to institute any further legal action challenging implementation of or further approvals required for implementation of the Project Approvals or development approvals with respect to the Messer Ranch property so long as that property is developed for single-family residences substantially in accordance with the General Plan designation of Low Density Residential (1 du/ac) and the applicable standards of the Specific Plan, and at a minimum lot size of 10,000 square feet, and any commercial uses are developed in conformance with the requirements of Paragraph 3(b) (vi) of this Agreement. (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 4(b).)

Further, Petitioner agreed it “shall not seek to invalidate or otherwise disparage the Project Approvals.” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 4(b).)

“(i) All disputes raised relating to the Ritter Ranch Project, the Amargosa Creek Improvement Project and the Project Approvals and the Application Approvals (including future requests for approvals which are in conformance therewith) including without limitation all claims in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Actions . . . .” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 2(i).)

“(d) These CITY and Waterworks actions and the Application Approvals[2] in connection with the Ritter Ranch Project and Amargosa Creek Improvement Project and any future governmental approvals with respect to the Ritter Ranch Project and the Amargosa Creek Improvement Project which are in conformance with these CITY and Waterworks actions and the Application Approvals . . ..” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 2(d).)

The City and Real Party further argue the Settlement Agreement reserved only the right—to the exclusion of other conduct—to “raise in good faith environmental or other concerns before any public agency.” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 4(b).) That is, Petitioner did not reserve the right to bring a legal challenge to the Phase 1A project approvals.

Petitioner disputes the interpretation of Settlement Agreement.[3] Specifically, Petitioner argues that actions not in conformity with the City and Waterworks actions and the application approvals do not meet the definition of Project Approvals under the Settlement Agreement and therefore are not subject to the scope of release in the Settlement Agreement.

An “Application Approval” in the Settlement Agreement consists of the following: a 404 Permit (United States Army Corps of Engineers), a 1601 Permit (California Department of Fish and Game), a 401 Permit (Water Quality Control Board), a Water Service Agreement and annexation request (Waterworks), General Plan Amendment 91-3 A and B, Specific Plan No. 89-02, EIR No. 90-04, Pre-Zone 89-12, and Development Agreement 92-1. (RJN Ex. A., ¶ 2(d).)

Petitioner argues the Development Agreement and Water Service Agreement are both no longer in effect and “any Ritter Ranch approvals coming after these timeframes cannot be in conformance with the Project Approvals.” (Opposition 13:12-13.) Contrary to the position of the City and Real Party, Petitioner claims the Phase 1A Project’s conformity is not merely limited to the Specific Plan and Final EIR. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim do not fall within the scope of the claims Petitioner released.

Moreover, Petitioner argues Paragraph 12(h) of the Settlement Agreement does not refer to or expressly include the defined phrase "Settled Dispute" such that the "matters settled and released hereby" is ambiguous as to the scope of claims it includes.

Finally, Petitioner interprets the Settlement Agreement to apply only to the “Messer Ranch property.” The argument is unpersuasive. The plain, unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement specifically defines “Project Approvals” to include nay “future approvals with respect to the Ritter Ranch Project . . . in conformance with these [approvals].” (RJN Ex. A.)

As noted above (assuming the authentication issue is ignored), the court has taken judicial notice of the Settlement Agreement and its contents only—not the Settlement Agreement’s interpretation or effect. Thus, while the court rejects Petitioner’s argument that the release in the Settlement Agreement only applies to Messer Ranch property, the court finds for purposes of demurrer Petitioner’s other interpretation arguments—although fairly anemic—are sufficient to survive demurrer.

“ ‘A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.’ [Citation.] The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable. [Citation.]” (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court of Kern County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 709; Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

Accordingly, Petitioner’s contradictory interpretation of the Settlement Agreement creates a reasonable dispute as to the parties’ intent and the scope of the release in the Settlement Agreement; such a dispute is not properly resolved on demurrer.

The City and Real Party contend the Project Approvals for the project have already been the subject of prior judicial actions and have been finally adjudicated. Therefore, they claim Petitioner’s claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.

The City and Real Party argue Petitioner challenges the same Project Approvals ligated previous actions. The City and Real Party cite paragraphs 12 to 17 of the petition as well as Exhibits L and M in their request for judicial notice to support their position.

The court cannot find on demurrer res judicata and/or collateral estoppel apply here.[4]

Neither the allegations in the petition nor the judicially noticeable documents demonstrate the same issues were previously ligated by the parties. Exhibits L and M do not show the nature of the claims in the previous litigation. The demurrer suggests “no matter the nature or scope of [Petitioner’s] prior writ of mandate claims, they encompassed the validity, propriety and complete factual and legal underpinnings of the Project Approvals. These same claims, having been previously dismissed by [Petitioner] with prejudice, after denial of their writs of mandate causes of action, bar the present action.” (Demurrer 20:3-7.)

“As generally understood, ‘[t]he doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.’ ” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 252.) Res judicata applies “only if (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present action is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.” (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.) The doctrine bars a claim that could have been brought in the prior suit, “whether or not it was actually asserted or decided.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 727.)

“Traditionally, collateral estoppel has been found to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding ‘if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding].’ [¶] It is implicit in this three-prong test that only issues actually litigated in the initial action may be precluded from the second proceeding under the collateral estoppel doctrine. . . . An issue is actually litigated ‘[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined . . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.] Courts also consider whether the party to be estopped had a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the issue.” (Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 147-148.)

The City and Real Parties request the court to assume without allegations or judicially noticeably documents to assume this action and the previous actions (MC002898 on or about April 4, 1992 and MC003201 on or about June 23, 1992) involve the same claims and issues

While Petitioner concedes the “old case adjudicated the sufficiency of EIR 90-4” (Opposition 16:4), Petitioner argues it is not challenging the EIR 90-4. Instead, Petitioner explains it alleges a subsequent EIR is required under Public Resources Code, section 21166. Petitioner contends a new EIR is required because (1) "[s]ubstantial changes are proposed in the Project";

(2) "[s]ubstantial changes have occurred with respect to the circumstances under which the Project is being undertaken"; and (3) "[n]ew information, which was not known and could not have been known at the time EIR 90-4 was certified . . . became available." (Pet., ¶¶ 32-34.)

The court cannot conclude on demurrer Petitioner’s action is precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel.

[1] “[C]ounsel . . . sufficiently authenticated the documents when he declared that they were true and correct copies of documents sent by and received from prior counsel.” (Ibid. See also Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 523. [“As is routine in law-and-motion practice, most of Greenspan's exhibits were authenticated through declarations submitted by his attorneys, who had personal knowledge of how the Meieran Trust obtained the exhibits, how they had been identified, who had identified them, and their status as true and correct copies of the ‘originals.’ ”])

[2] “In conformance with the Specific Plan and the EIR, RITTER has submitted the following applications with respect to the Ritter Ranch Project: a 404 Permit (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), a 1601 Permit (California Dept. of Fish and Game), and a 401 Permit (Water Quality Control Board). The final actions on said applications are collectively referred to herein as ‘Application Approvals.’” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 2(d).)

[3] Petitioner also challenges the enforceability and validity of the agreement; however, the court need not address the arguments given its ruling on the demurrer.

[4] “[A] dismissal with prejudice is . . . [a] retraxit,” which “is a judgment on the merits preventing a subsequent action on the dismissed claim.” (Rice v. Crow (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 725, 733-734.)