Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 22STCP01932 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP01932, Date: 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling

Respondent, City of Palmdale, and Real Party in Interest, RdR Development Holdings LLC (Real Party), (jointly, Respondents) demur to the petition. Petitioner, Leona Valley Town Council, opposes the demurrer.

As a preliminary matter, Petitioner raises an authentication objection in response to Respondents’ request for judicial notice. Petitioner argues the Declaration of Winston P. Stromberg—attorney at the firm of Latham & Watkins LLP and counsel of record for Real Party—is inadequate to authenticate these records. (Stromberg Decl., ¶ 1.) Stromberg attests that each document for which judicial notice is sought is a true and accurate copy of what the document purports to be.

To take judicial notice of a document, the document must be properly authenticated by a qualified witness. (See Evid. Code, § 453, subd. (b) [sufficient information required].) While Respondents argue attorney authentication such as Stromberg’s is routine (citing Landale-Cameron Court, Inc. v. Ahonen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409),[1] Respondents initially provided no facts demonstrating a foundation for Stromberg’s purported authentication of the documents.

The court continued the matter and gave leave to Respondents to provide additional factual information in support of Stromberg’s authentication of the documents for purposes of judicial notice. Stromberg thereafter submitted a “revised” declaration, attempting to address the well-taken authentication objections raised by Petitioner. Stromberg now sets forth a supplemental foundation to support his authentication of Exhibits G through I and L through M. (Stromberg 10/5/22 Decl., ¶¶ 2-9.)[2]

Respondents filed the declaration of Megan Taggart—the City’s Planning Manager—to authenticate Exhibits A through F and J through K.[3]

The court considered these declarations for authentication purposes only. To be clear, the court did not consider any statements purporting to interpret or describe the contents of the various documents given the evidentiary limitations on demurrer.

The court finds the records subject to judicial notice have been properly authenticated. (Evid. Code, § 453.)

The City and Real Party requests judicial notice of Exhibits A through M. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (a), (b), (c), (d) and (h).) Petitioner opposes the requests arguing the documents are not properly subject to judicial notice.

Respondents’ request for judicial notice of Exhibits B, J, L and M is denied. The court takes judicial notice of all remaining documents.

Exhibit A: Respondents request judicial notice of Exhibit A (Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and Release by and among Leona Valley Town Council, Ritter Park Associates, and the City of Palmdale, dated December 5, 1994 (Settlement Agreement)). (Taggart Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Respondents argue the court can take judicial notice of the document pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). In support, Respondents cite several cases—including Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659 and Scott v JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743.

In Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at 659, on appeal from a demurrer, the Court determined third party beneficiary status in underlying settlement agreements. The Court ruled in relevant part: “We take judicial notice of the [underlying] settlement agreements and consider their contents even though they are outside the four corners of the complaint, as there is and can be no factual dispute concerning the contents of the agreements.” (Id. at 666, fn. 2.)

In Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 743, the Court took judicial notice of the fact and legal effect of a government contract where a party did not allege or argue in the trial court the contract was inauthentic or otherwise reasonably subject to dispute. (Id. at 754.) The case, however, is inapposite because the document being judicially noticed in was a government document created pursuant to an official act. Accordingly, subdivision (c) of Evidence Code section 452 controlled because the contract constituted an “[o]fficial act[] of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.” (Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 752.)

Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at 743 does not allow a court to take judicial notice of a contract between private parties or of a contract not created through an official act. Moreover, as noted, the plaintiff in the case “did not allege or argue in the trial court that the [judicially noticed] contract was inauthentic or otherwise reasonably subject to dispute.” (Id. at 746.)

While Petitioner concedes it “does not dispute the existence of the Settlement Agreement,” Petitioner asserts the City and Real Party “are incorrect as to [the Settlement Agreement’s] effect: [Petitioner] most certainly does dispute the effect of the Agreement . . . .” Petitioner also contends the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement “should not be addressed on a Request for Judicial Notice.” (Opposition to RJN, p. 1:24-27.)

Thus, there is no dispute the Settlement Agreement is genuine and accurate. Therefore, the court takes judicial notice of it. (Chacon v. Union Pacific Railroad (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 565, 572.) Nonetheless, the court does not take judicial notice of the effect of the Settlement Agreement, which is reasonably subject to dispute—as discussed below. (Freemont Indemnity Co. v. Freemont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-115 [explaining generally on demurrer court may not take judicial notice of proper interpretation of contract where interpretation is disputed].)

Exhibit B: Respondents seek judicial notice of the City’s Council’s special meeting minutes. Petitioner concedes the existence of the minutes is not reasonably subject to dispute. Nonetheless, Petitioner disputes the minutes “provide important confirmation of the City of Palmdale’s official approval of the Settlement Agreement.” Specifically, Petitioner challenges Respondents’ assertion the Settlement Agreement at issue here is the Settlement Agreement discussed in Exhibit B. Although the Taggart declaration purports to provide the context, as noted, such evidence cannot be considered on demurrer.

Accordingly, there is no evidence (or admission by Petitioner) before the court for a context for the minutes such that the court can deem the document relevant for judicial notice purposes today. Thus, while the court may take judicial notice of meeting minutes (Dimon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1276, fn. 11), the court agrees the relevance of the document has not been demonstrated. Accordingly, judicial notice of Exhibit B is denied.

Exhibit C: Respondents seek judicial notice of a 1995 Staff Report. None of the cases cited by Respondents suggest a Staff Report is properly subject to judicial notice. Nonetheless, assuming the court is permitted to take judicial notice of this document pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), the court may not take judicial notice of the truth of its assertions and findings. (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482 [“[w]hile we may take judicial notice of court records and official acts of state agencies [citation], the truth of matters asserted in such documents is not subject to judicial notice”].) Despite its limited utility on demurrer, the court takes judicial notice of the fact of the 1995 Staff Report.

Exhibit E: Respondents’ request for judicial notice of the Amendment to the Ritter Ranch Development Agreement, recorded on December 19, 1995, is granted. The court may take judicial notice of the recorded document but not the truth of the matters contained therein. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

Exhibit F: Respondents request for judicial notice of the Memorandum of Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and Release, recorded on February 21, 1995 is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). Again, the court may take judicial notice of the recorded document but not the truth of the matters contained therein.

Exhibit G: Respondents’ request for judicial notice of the recorded deeds for the property from 1990 to 1995 is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c). The court may also take judicial notice of the effect of the recorded deeds. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117-1118 [proper for trial court to take judicial notice of existence and effect of recorded document]; West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 803.

Exhibit H: Respondents’ request for judicial notice of the business records from the California Secretary of State is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h). (Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 37. [“Official records from the comptroller of the currency and the California Secretary of State established that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. merged into defendant Wells Fargo in May 2004 and that Wells Fargo succeeded to all of its interests.”])

Exhibit I: Respondents’ request for judicial notice of the recorded quitclaim deed from Preston Hollow Capital, LLC to Real Party dated August 28, 2020 is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h). The court may take judicial notice of these documents and the effect of these recorded documents. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at 1117-1118.)

Exhibit J: Respondents’ request for judicial notice of excerpts of the City Council’s agenda materials for the April 20, 2022 City Council meeting is denied. Contrary to Respondents’ arguments, the material is neither a legislative enactment nor an official act subject to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b) or (c).

Exhibit K: Respondents request judicial notice of (i) the City’s Ordinance No. 964 through which the City approved the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan (90-4) on March 3, 1992 and (ii) an excerpt from the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan, Exhibit 20E pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). The request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b) and (c).)

Exhibits L and M: Respondents request for judicial notice of the Second District Court of Appeal’s dockets for Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. MC002898 (Court of Appeal Case No. B082354) and Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. MC003201 (Court of Appeal Case No. B083984) pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) is denied.

While the court may take judicial notice of court records, the documents appear to be a screenshot of the court’s website—not court records. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) The court may take judicial notice of a website’s existence but not the truth of the matters contained therein. (Wood v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 562, 580, fn. 2. [“[W]e granted Crunch's request for judicial notice of several pages from DFEH's website and other DFEH public statements. While we may not judicially notice the truth of any statement in these materials, we may take notice of the fact that they were made to the public.”])

Petitioner’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit 1 is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c).

On February 27, 1992, the City certified environmental impact report (EIR) 90-4 and approved the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan for a 10,625-acre development consisting of 7,200 residences, 7,628-acres of open space and the necessary public facilities, recreational amenities, schools, and commercial uses; the approvals included a development agreement. (Pet., ¶ 12.) EIR 90-4 determined all the potential environmental impacts of the project were less than significant. (Pet., ¶ 13.) In December 1995, the City approved six vesting tentative maps; all six vesting maps expired in 2017. (Pet., ¶ 14.) In June 2012, the development agreement expired. (Pet., ¶ 15.)

In 2021, Real Party sought the City’s approval to build Phase 1A of the project, which “would allow for the development of 553 single family detached homes on approximately 115 acres within the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan area.” (Pet., ¶ 17.)

On February 10, 2022, the City’s planning commission approved Phase 1A of the Project—after determining no environmental analysis was necessary. (Pet., ¶ 18.) Petitioner appealed the approval to the City Council. (Pet., ¶ 19.) On April 20, 2022, the City Council held a public hearing and denied the appeal. (Pet., ¶ 20.)

“[there] is no evidence to support the City's erroneous conclusion that: (1) the Project will not cause any substantial changes in any portion of the Project described in EIR 90-4 because the project is not modifying the scope or intent of the Specific Plan; (2) no substantial changes have occurred to baseline conditions because no significant development adjacent to the Project area which impacts the infrastructure, services, or development potential within the City’s boundaries has occurred; and, (3) no new information of substantial importance had been provided with respect to the Specific Plan. The City Council failed to make full consideration of EIR 90-4, and recognize the adverse environmental assessment of that EIR and any overriding considerations. The City Council failed to make full consideration of EIR 90-4, and recognize the adverse environmental assessment of that EIR and any overriding considerations.” (Pet., ¶ 30.)

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.)

A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend when there is no reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) Indeed, where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law and no amendment would change the result, the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend is proper. (City of Ceres v. City of Modesto (1969) 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 554.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show how the complaint might be amended so as to cure the defect. (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.)

Respondents demur on the grounds the petition fails to state an actionable claim. Specifically, Respondents argue Petitioner has released all claims pertaining to the Ritter Ranch project at issue in its petition based upon the Settlement Agreement. Respondents also argue the Petition is barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel and/or retraxit.

Respondents argue Petitioner’s claims have been released by the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, Respondents contend Petitioner agreed in the Settlement Agreement it would:

“not institute, or cause, directly or indirectly, any third parties to institute any further legal action challenging implementation of or further approvals required for implementation of the Project Approvals or development approvals with respect to the Messer Ranch property so long as that property is developed for single-family residences substantially in accordance with the General Plan designation of Low Density Residential (1 du/ac) and the applicable standards of the Specific Plan, and at a minimum lot size of 10,000 square feet, and any commercial uses are developed in conformance with the requirements of Paragraph 3(b) (vi) of this Agreement. (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 4(b).)

Further, Petitioner agreed pursuant to the Settlement Agreement it “shall not seek to invalidate or otherwise disparage the Project Approvals.” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 4(b).)

“(d) These CITY and Waterworks actions and the Application Approvals[4] in connection with the Ritter Ranch Project and Amargosa Creek Improvement Project and any future governmental approvals with respect to the Ritter Ranch Project and the Amargosa Creek Improvement Project which are in conformance with these CITY and Waterworks actions and the Application Approvals . . ..” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 2(d) [emphasis added].)

“(i) All disputes raised relating to the Ritter Ranch Project, the Amargosa Creek Improvement Project and the Project Approvals and the Application Approvals (including future requests for approvals which are in conformance therewith) including without limitation all claims in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Actions . . . .” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 2(i).)

Respondents assert Petitioner only reserved—to the exclusion of other rights—the right to “raise in good faith environmental or other concerns before any public agency.” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 4(b).) That is, Petitioner did not reserve the right to bring a legal challenge to the Phase 1A Project Approvals.

Specifically, Petitioner argues the Settlement Agreement pertains only to and releases claims related to Project Approvals and Project Approvals, here, are only defined as approvals in conformance with the “City and Waterworks actions” (as defined by the Settlement Agreement) and the Application Approvals. Petitioner identifies the following as “Project Approvals” in the Settlement Agreement: a 404 Permit (U.S. Army Corp of Engineers), a 1601 Permit (California Dept. of Fish and Game), a 401 Permit (Water Quality Control Board), a Water Service Agreement and annexation request (Waterwork), General Plan Amendment 91-3 A and B, Specific Plan No. 89-02, EIR No. 90-04, Pre-Zone 89-12, and Development Agreement 92-1.[6] (RJN Ex. A., ¶ 2(d).)

Given the Project Approvals, Petitioner argues the Development Agreement and Water Service Agreement are both no longer in effect, and “any Ritter Ranch approvals coming after these timeframes cannot be in conformance with the Project Approvals.” (Opposition 13:12-13 [citing Pet., ¶ 15; Pet.’s RJN Ex. 1].)

Contrary to Respondents’ position, Petitioner claims the Phase 1A Project’s conformity is not now (as result of the expired Development Agreement and expired Water Service Agreement) limited only to conformity with the Specific Plan and Final EIR. Therefore, Petitioner’s claims do not fall within the scope of the claims Petitioner purportedly released in the Settlement Agreement.

Moreover, Petitioner argues Paragraph 12(h) of the Settlement Agreement does not refer to or expressly include the defined phrase "Settled Dispute" such that the "matters settled and released hereby" is ambiguous as to the scope of claims it includes.[7] The court agrees the scope of the term “Settled Dispute” is arguably unclear in the context of the Settlement Agreement as a whole.

While the court has taken judicial notice of the Settlement Agreement and its contents, the court cannot take judicial notice of the Settlement Agreement’s interpretation or effect.

“ ‘Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. [Citation.]’ ” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113 [emphasis added].) “For a court to take judicial notice of the meaning of a document submitted by a demurring party based on the document alone, without allowing the parties an opportunity to present extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the document, would be improper. A court ruling on a demurrer therefore cannot take judicial notice of the proper interpretation of a document submitted in support of the demurrer. [Citation.]” (Id. at 114-115 [emphasis added].) Accordingly, as the demurrer turns on the legal interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, the court properly overrules the demurrer.

“ ‘A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.’ [Citation.] The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable. [Citation.]” (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court of Kern County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 709; Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.)

Here, Petitioner’s contradictory interpretation creates a reasonable dispute as to the parties’ intent and the scope of the release in the Settlement Agreement. The court must allow Petitioner the opportunity to present extrinsic evidence to prove up an ambiguity about the meaning of the document. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 115.) While Respondents contend the Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous[8] and “the Court may properly take judicial notice of the contents of the agreement to determine, as a matter of law, whether the release bars the Petition,” Respondents’ position—in the context of a demurrer—provides no opportunity for Petitioner to demonstrate a latent ambiguity with extrinsic evidence assuming no patent ambiguity exists. An interpretation dispute is not properly resolved on demurrer. (Reply 7:7-9.)

Petitioner contends the Settlement Agreement is void as against public policy pursuant to Civil Code section 1668.

“All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”

Petitioner argues the Settlement Agreement seeks to bar Petitioner “in perpetuity from asserting its fundamental rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the California Constitution.” (Opposition 8:8-11.)

First, Petitioner states that the Settlement Agreement violates the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.

“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits the government's power to require one to surrender a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary benefit. . . . When receipt of a public benefit is conditioned upon the waiver of a constitutional right, the “ ‘government bears a heavy burden of demonstrating the practical necessity for the limitation.’ ” (San Diego County Water Authority v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1158–1159 [citations omitted].)

As explained in Beach & Bluff Conservancy v. City of Solana Beach (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 244:

“ ‘[A] predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.’ [Citation.] Or, in other words, the condition is one that would have constituted a taking of property without just compensation if it were imposed by the government on a property owner outside of the permit process.’ (California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 459-460 . . . .) The unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies only where the condition at issue constitutes an ‘exaction’ in the form of either the conveyance of a property interest or the payment of money; the doctrine does not apply where the government simply restricts the use of property without demanding an exaction. (Id. at pp. 457, 460, . . . .)” (Id. at 266.)

Petitioner argues the public benefits conferred to Petitioner by the City include: (1) not expanding Elizabeth Lake Road until the 5000th certificate of occupancy is issued (§ 5.(a)) and (2) refusal to issue further certificates of occupancy until construction of certain roadways is completed and approved by the City Engineer (§ 5.(d)). (Stromberg Decl., pp. 19-20.) However, Petitioner argues that “[n]either of these benefits have come to fruition as other than some mass grading and construction of a few roadways, [because] Ritter Ranch was never developed and the revised development agreement expired in June 2012.” (Opposition 9:13-16.)

In exchange for this (arguably, unfulfilled) benefit, Petitioner waived its constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Petitioner argues enforcement of CEQA is an important public right and the right to seek redress under the statutory scheme is therefore equally important. Petitioner asserts it should have the right to compel compliance with CEQA.

The court finds Petitioner’s argument unpersuasive. For purposes of the demurrer, the court finds the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not apply under these facts.

As discussed by Respondents, when the constitutional conditions doctrine has applied to settlement agreements it does so in a limited capacity so as not to allow “untoward result[s]” where “private litigants would always be able to gain the benefit of any offer to compromise litigation without any reciprocal obligation.” (Louisiana Pacific Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc. (E.D. Cal. 1994) 842 F.Supp. 1243, 1253.) Thus, a “waiver of judicial process as a condition of settlement” is reviewed only to determine whether it is “rationally and fairly related both to a legitimate government interest and to the benefit conferred.” (Ibid.)

Here, the City argues Petitioner’s “negotiated waiver of future lawsuits relating only to Project implementation is “rationally and fairly related” both (1) to the City’s legitimate government interest to conclude the previous litigation and move forward with a new housing project and (2) to the many negotiated benefits [Petitioner] received under the Settlement Agreement.” (Reply 9:3-6.)

By its terms, the City made project concessions—presumably desired by Petitioner—in exchange for Petitioner’s agreement to settle its claims. Based on the foregoing, the court is inclined to agree that conditions of the Settlement Agreement were rationally related to legitimate government interest and the benefit conferred. For purposes of demurrer, the court cannot find under the facts here the Settlement Agreement is void or unenforceable.

Respondents contend the approvals for the Project have already been the subject of prior judicial actions, and those actions have been adjudicated to final conclusion. Respondents contend Petitioner seeks to undermine the same project approvals litigated in the prior actions. Accordingly, Respondents contend Petitioner’s claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Respondents cite the petition at paragraphs 12 through 17 to support their argument. They also rely on Exhibits L and M for which they have requested judicial notice.

The court cannot find for purposes of demurrer res judicata and collateral estoppel apply here.

Neither the allegations in the Petition nor the judicially noticeable documents demonstrate the parties (or their privities) previously litigated to final judgment the same issues. First, Exhibits L and M are not properly before the court. However, even assuming they were, Exhibits L and M do not show the nature of the claims in the previous litigation. The demurrer suggests:

“no matter the nature or scope of [Petitioner’s] prior writ of mandate claims, they encompassed the validity, propriety and complete factual and legal underpinnings of the Project Approvals. These same claims, having been previously dismissed by [Petitioner] with prejudice, after denial of their writs of mandate causes of action, bar the present action.” (Demurrer 20:3-7.)

“As generally understood, ‘[t]he doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.’ ” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 252.) Res judicata applies “only if (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present action is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.” (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.) The doctrine bars a claim that could have been brought in the prior suit, “whether or not it was actually asserted or decided.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 727.)

“Traditionally, collateral estoppel has been found to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding ‘if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding].’ [¶] It is implicit in this three-prong test that only issues actually litigated in the initial action may be precluded from the second proceeding under the collateral estoppel doctrine . . . . An issue is actually litigated ‘[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined . . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.] Courts also consider whether the party to be estopped had a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the issue.” (Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 147-148.)

“[A] dismissal with prejudice is . . . [a] retraxit,” which “is a judgment on the merits preventing a subsequent action on the dismissed claim.” (Rice v. Crow (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 725, 733-734.)

Respondents ask the court to assume without judicial admissions or judicially noticeably documents that this action and the previous actions: Case Nos. MC002898 on or about April 4, 1992, and MC003201 on or about June 23, 1992 involve the same claims and issues.

Respondents also seek judicial notice of the court’s own court records in Los Angeles Superior Court Case Nos. MC002898 (Leona Valley Town Council v. City of Palmdale) and MC003201 (Leona Valley Town Council v. City of Palmdale); however, those records are not before this court as Respondents have not provided a copy of them.[9] (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1306, subd. (c).) The request for judicial notice of these court records is therefore denied.

Petitioner argues Respondents’ res judicata claim is inapplicable here because Petitioner is not challenging the original EIR. Rather, Petitioner argues the petition alleges a subsequent EIR is required under Public Resources Code, section 21166 because: (1) "[s]ubstantial changes are proposed in the Project"; (2) "[s]ubstantial changes have occurred with respect to the circumstances under which the Project is being undertaken"; and (3) "[n]ew information, which was not known and could not have been known at the time EIR 90-4 was certified . . . became available." (Pet., ¶¶ 32-34.)

Based on the foregoing allegations and on this record, the court cannot find on demurrer that Petitioner’s claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.

On June 16, 2022, Real Party filed its verified cross-complaint against Petitioner. The cross-complaint alleges a claim for breach of contract as well as a derivative declaratory relief claim. Real Party seeks damages from Petitioner of no less than $10 million. The cross-complaint does not seek writ relief.

On June 21, 2022, the City filed its verified cross-complaint against Petitioner. Like Real Party’s cross-complaint, the City alleges a claim for breach of contract as well as a derivative declaratory relief claim. The City seeks damages from Petitioner of no less than $1 million. The cross-complaint does not seek writ relief.

In response to the cross-complaints, Petitioner flied a demurrer and two special motions to strike. Those motions are fully briefed and set for hearing today.

As the cross-complaints do not seek writ relief and pray for damages, the cross-complaints are not properly heard in the writs and receivers departments of this court. Instead, the matters are properly heard in an independent calendar court. Of course, rulings made in this proceeding may inform on the cross-complaints.

Accordingly, the court orders all claims in the cross-complaints stayed pending resolution of the writ petition. At the conclusion of the proceedings on the writ petition, the court will transfer the remaining matters (the cross-complaints) to Department 1 for reassignment to an independent calendar court. At that time, Petitioner may reset for hearing before the assigned independent calendar judge its demurrer and special motions to strike.

[1] “[C]ounsel . . . sufficiently authenticated the documents when he declared that they were true and correct copies of documents sent by and received from prior counsel”; see also (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 523. [“As is routine in law-and-motion practice, most of Greenspan's exhibits were authenticated through declarations submitted by his attorneys, who had personal knowledge of how the Meieran Trust obtained the exhibits, how they had been identified, who had identified them, and their status as true and correct copies of the ‘originals.’ ”])

[2] After filing the supplemental declaration, Respondents state they discovered an error in paragraph 4 of the declaration; instead of referring to the Declaration of Megan Taggart in support of the City’s and Real Party’s Joint Demurrer, paragraph 4 erroneously referred to the non-existent Declaration of Luis Garibay. Respondents filed a corrected declaration on October 13, 2022.

[3] Respondents filed a corrected declaration on October 6, 2022, attaching the omitted Exhibit J.

[4] “In conformance with the Specific Plan and the EIR, RITTER has submitted the following applications with respect to the Ritter Ranch Project: a 404 Permit (U.S. Army Corp of Engineers), a 1601 Permit (California Dept. of Fish and Game), and a 401 Permit (Water Quality Control Board). The final actions on said applications are collectively referred to herein as ‘Application Approvals.’ ” (RJN Ex. A, ¶ 2(d).)

[5] In opposition, Petitioner also challenges the enforceability and validity of the agreement; however, the court need not address these arguments given its ruling on the demurrer.

[6] Petitioner does not include the Avek Water Agreement, the Amargosa Creek Improvement Project Final EIR, and various resolutions and ordinances for the establishment of Community Facilities District 93-1.

[7] Petitioner also suggests such language was intended to be “aspirational” insofar as it was limited to the recitals.

[8] “A court cannot determine based on only the four corners of a document, without provisionally considering any extrinsic evidence offered by the parties, that the meaning of a document is clear and unambiguous.” (Id. at 114 [citing Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37].)

[9] The documents are also not electronically available to this court.