Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP01932, Date: 2023-03-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCP01932    Hearing Date: March 22, 2023    Dept: 86

LEONA VALLEY TOWN COUNCIL v. CITY OF PALMDALE

Case Number: 22STCP01932

Hearing Date: March 22, 2023

[Tentative]       ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CORRECT AND RECERTIFY THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

Respondent, City of Palmdale, moves for an order permitting it to correct and re-certify the administrative record for this proceeding to include additional records omitted from the administrative record it previously certified. The City explains “good cause for doing so” exists because “the City’s originally certified record inadvertently omitted various documents that the California Environmental Quality Act (‘CEQA’) statutorily requires to be included in the administrative record.”[1] (Motion 3:12-15.) Petitioner, Leona Valley Town Council, opposes the motion.

The motion is granted.

ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION

On February 27, 1992, the City certified environmental impact report (EIR) 90-4 and approved the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan for a 10,625-acre development consisting of 7,200 residences, 7,628-acres of open space and the necessary public facilities, recreational amenities, schools, and commercial uses; the approvals included a development agreement. (Pet., ¶ 12.) EIR 90-4 determined all the potential environmental impacts of the project were less than significant. (Pet., ¶ 13.) In December 1995, the City approved six vesting tentative maps; all six vesting maps expired in 2017. (Pet., ¶ 14.) In June 2012, the development agreement expired. (Pet., ¶ 15.)

In 2021, Real Party sought the City’s approval to build Phase 1A of the project, which “would allow for the development of 553 single family detached homes on approximately 115 acres within the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan area.” (Pet., ¶ 17.)

On February 10, 2022, the City’s planning commission approved Phase 1A of the Project—after determining no environmental analysis was necessary. (Pet., ¶ 18.) Petitioner appealed the approval to the City Council. (Pet., ¶ 19.) On April 20, 2022, the City Council held a public hearing and denied the appeal. (Pet., ¶ 20.)

This proceeding ensued.

The petition challenges the City’s action on the following grounds:

“[there] is no evidence to support the City's erroneous conclusion that: (1) the Project will not cause any substantial changes in any portion of the Project described in EIR 90-4 because the project is not modifying the scope or intent of the Specific Plan; (2) no substantial changes have occurred to baseline conditions because no significant development adjacent to the Project area which impacts the infrastructure, services, or development potential within the City’s boundaries has occurred; and, (3) no new information of substantial importance had been provided with respect to the Specific Plan. The City Council failed to make full consideration of EIR 90-4, and recognize the adverse environmental assessment of that EIR and any overriding considerations. The City Council failed to make full consideration of EIR 90-4, and recognize the adverse environmental assessment of that EIR and any overriding considerations.” (Pet., ¶ 30.)

ANALYSIS

The City moves to correct its previously certified administrative record. Specifically, the City seeks to add relevant (and required under CEQA) documents the City contends it inadvertently omitted from the administrative record. Despite its prior certification of the administrative record, the City requests the administrative record be permitted to include (1) the exhibits to Ordinance No. 964—the 1992 ordinance adopting the Ritter Ranch Specific Plan, (2) Resolution No. 92-22—the 1992 City Council resolution certifying the EIR; (3) the staff report for the City Council’s April 20, 2022 hearing on the Phase 1A approvals; and (4) one additional email attachment. (Barlow Decl., ¶ 10.) 

Petitioner opposes the motion on several grounds.[2]

First, Petitioner argues the “City cites no authority on point that permits it to re-do and re-certify the [administrative record] at this point in the litigation.” (Opposition 13:2-3.) Petitioner therefore suggests the City’s motion to recertify the administrative record fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1010 which requires a notice of motion “state when, and the grounds upon which it will be made.” Petitioner argues “[t]he City cannot rely on the absence of statutory authority to justify its request.” (Opposition 14:5-6.)

The court is unpersuaded. As noted by the City, the administrative record under Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (e),[3] is required to include the records the City previously omitted. That is, the statutory language is mandatory—all items described in any of the enumerated categories shall be included in the administrative record. (Pub. Resources Code, § 15 [Public Resources Code references to “shall” are mandatory].)

Moreover, Petitioner does not identify any authority precluding the City from seeking relief to add documents inadvertently omitted from the administrative record after certification. Certainly, “[a]fter an administrative record is certified and lodged, disputes over its contents at times arise.” (Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v. County of Madera (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 48, 63 [overruled other grounds in Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439].)

“Neither CEQA nor the Guidelines specify the procedures parties should follow in presenting these disputes. It is clear, nonetheless, that the Legislature anticipated that such disputes would arise. The CEQA provision that establishes the briefing schedule permits the trial court to extend the schedule for ‘good cause,’ which includes the ‘determination of the completeness’ of the administrative record. [Citations.]

Though the statute does not identify who makes the ‘determination of the completeness’ of the administrative record, we interpret the statutory phrase to include the action taken by the trial court to resolve disputes between the parties over what should be included in, or excluded from, the administrative record. This interpretation necessarily implies that trial courts have the authority to resolve those disputes.” (Ibid.)

Thus, the court—in its authority to determine the completeness of the record—may determine whether an omitted record is properly included in the administrative record.

Petitioner also characterizes the City’s omission of certain documents from the certified administrative record as “gross negligence.” (Opposition 14:8.) Petitioner suggests the “City believes it is only compelled and obligated to include some, but not all of the documents required to be in the record.” (Opposition 14:16-18.) Petitioner argues after the last hearing it provided a list of other documents missing from the administrative record that the City should have included. Petitioner reports the City rejected Petitioner’s claim indicating the records were not required as part of the administrative record or are already included therein. (Opposition 14:26-28 [citing Barlow Decl., ¶ 13.) The parties’ conflict about other records, however, does not inform on the disposition of this motion—a request to include documents in the administrative record that no party disputes should have been included in the administrative record pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (e). Other records, if improperly excluded, could be considered through a motion to augment the administrative record. Thus, granting the City’s motion does not foreclose Petitioner its available remedies as to other documents.

Finally, Petitioner also argues it will suffer prejudice if the court grants the City’s motion. Specifically, Petitioner argues “[i]t is . . . fundamentally unfair for the City to now submit new administrative record materials after [Petitioner] prepared and filed its opening brief.” (Opposition 15:24-25.) Petitioner asserts the time spent it spent on the opening brief it filed will have been wasted. While Petitioner does not more specifically define the prejudice it will suffer, it appears Petitioner’s concern suggests additional attorney time will be expended to revise its opening brief.

As noted at previous hearing, the court reviewed Petitioner’s Opening Brief. Petitioner used very little of its briefing to argue about documents not contained in the administrative record. By correcting the administrative record to include all documents required by law, Petitioner has not demonstrated some prejudice concerning its ability to prosecute this proceeding. While it will likely incur additional attorneys’ fees, the court finds such prejudice insufficient to deny the City’s motion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted.

Given its ruling, the court need not resolve whether the City is also entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 22, 2023                                                                      ________________________________

                                                                                                                   Hon. Mitchell Beckloff

                                                                                                                   Judge of the Superior Court