Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP02467, Date: 2023-03-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCP02467    Hearing Date: March 22, 2023    Dept: 86

SMITH v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Case Number: 22STCP02467

Hearing Date: March 22, 2023

 

 

[Tentative]       ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM CLAIM FILING

 


 

Petitioner, Karen Smith, requests the court relieve her of the claim presentation requirement of Government Code[1] section 945.4. Respondent, the County of Los Angeles, has not appeared.

 

The court requests Petitioner explain how service on Lillian Harwell of the notice of hearing is appropriate. It is unclear how the court can determine Ms. Harwell is representing the County in this matter.

 

The petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement is DENIED.

 

APPLICABLE LAW

 

Government Code section 911.2, in the Government Tort Claims Act, provides a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)

 

Section 946.6 is the ultimate judicial backstop of the claim presentation process. If a claimant fails to file a timely claim and if the public entity then denies the claimant’s application for permission to file a late claim, the claimant may file a petition for relief from section 945.4’s requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit. (See also §§ 946.6, subd. (a), 911.2 and 911.4.)

 

The petition must be filed within six months after the application to the public entity is denied or deemed to be denied. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).) The petition must show: (1) an application was made to the public entity under section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for the failure to timely present the claim to the public entity within the time limit specified in section 911.2; and (3) the information required by section 910. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).)

 

The court shall grant relief only if it finds (1) the application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the claim as specified in section 911.4, subd. (b); and (2) one or more of the following is applicable:

 

(a)    the failure to timely present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4;

(b)   the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was a minor during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim;

(c)    the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability failed to present a claim during that time; or

(d)   the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss died before the expiration of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim.

 

(§ 946.6, subd. (c); see also Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474.)

 

In instances where the petitioner claims the failure to timely present the claim was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the court analyzes the petition under principles applicable to relief from defaults under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). (Han v. City of Pomona (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 552, 557 [citing Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435].) When considering relief under section 946.6, the court should resolve any doubts which may exist in favor of the application, preferring an outcome where the action may be heard on its merits. (Viles v. California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 28-29.)

 

A petitioner bears the initial burden of demonstrating his or her entitlement to relief. (Renteria v. Juvenile Justice, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 903, 910-911; Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775, 784-785.) A petitioner must prove the basis for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. (Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, 92 Cal.App.3d at 784-785; Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Dzhibinyan) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) A respondent has no burden to establish prejudice until the petitioner has satisfied the court that his or her failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence surprise or excusable neglect. (Rivera v. City of Carson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 718, 726.)

 

Finally, “[r]emedial statutes such as . . . section 946.6 should be liberally construed.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783.)

 

ANALYSIS

 

Petitioner argues the court should relieve her of the claim presentation requirement based on mistake, surprise, inadvertence and/or excusable neglect.

 

As noted, pursuant to section 911.2, a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)

 

As alleged in her unverified petition, on August 24, 2021, Petitioner sustained an injury after she tripped and fell in the parking lot of the George Lance Park, located at or about 5520 West Avenue L-8, in the City of Lancaster.

 

Petitioner concedes she failed to submit a claim with the County within six months of her injury. Instead, Petitioner filed an application to allow her to file a late claim on or around May 20, 2022, almost nine months after her injury. (Fiore Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Ex. A)

 

On June 6, 2022, the County denied her application. (Fiore Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. B.) The County’s claims administrator advised the application “has been deemed denied by operation of law pursuant to Section 911.6 of the California Government Code.” (Fiore Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. B.)

 

Petitioner now seeks relief from the claim presentation requirement based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Subdivision (a) of section 946.6 requires a petitioner to demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect for the failure to make a timely claim. To show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, a petitioner must provide evidence. Petitioner’s brief declaration submitted to the County with her application to file a late claim is devoid of any facts related to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect.

 

"The mere recital of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is not sufficient to warrant relief. Relief on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is available only on a showing that the claimant's failure to timely present a claim was reasonable when tested by the objective 'reasonably prudent person' standard." (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.)

 

Excusable neglect is defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435.) Under the reasonably prudent person standard, “[e]xcusable neglect is that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.” (Dzhibinyan, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 1296.)

 

“When relief is sought based on mistake, because of the reasonably prudent person standard ‘it is not every mistake that will excuse a default, the determining factor being the reasonableness of the misconception.’ ” (N.G. v. County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 63, 74.)

 

In her application to file a late claim with the County, Petitioner reports her attorney’s office “mis-calendared the statute of limitations as one that was actually 2 years, not the 6 months that is the actual statute when you are dealing with a government entity like the County of Los Angeles.” (Fiore Decl., Ex. A.) She explains her attorney “mistakenly identified” the park as private property. Petitioner provides no real detail to support her claims. She also does not provide any foundation for the statements. The court has no facts from which it could judge whether the alleged error was one a reasonably prudent person might make—the court cannot judge whether the alleged misconception was reasonable.

 

Petitioner also submits a letter from her counsel from November 2021 addressed to “Georgelane Park” on West Avenue L8 in the City of Quartz Hill. The letter indicates Petitioner is represented by her counsel, the date of Petitioner’s injury and a request for information regarding insurance coverage. (Fiore Decl., Ex. A.)

 

Other than the letter itself, there is no evidence about it or context for it. Nothing in the letter suggests whether and to what extent, if at all, Petitioner acted diligently in pursuing her claim or the identity of the property owner. There is no explanation for the delay of any action by Petitioner from November 11, 2021 to February 2022, the deadline for Petitioner to file her claim with the County.

 

Based on the lack of any credible evidence addressing Petitioner’s claim of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, the court has no grounds for granting Petitioner relief.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

March 22, 2023                                                                      ________________________________

                                                                                                                   Hon. Mitchell Beckloff

                                                                                                                   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 



[1] All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted.