Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP02509, Date: 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCP02509    Hearing Date: February 15, 2023    Dept: 86

SAMUEL G. v. JOHNSON

Case No. 22STCP02509

Hearing Date: February 15, 2023

 

 

[Tentative]       ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

 

 

                                                                                                                                                                                           

 

Petitioner, Samuel G., by and through his guardian at litem, Stacey Seeley, filed his petition to require Respondent, Kim Johnson, in her official capacity as Director of the California Department of Social Services (DSS), to set aside the decision of DSS denying him protective supervision benefits. Petitioner contends he is entitled to relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. More specifically, Petitioner contends DSS did not proceed as required by law when it considered Petitioner’s entitlement to protective supervision benefits. Petitioner alleged:

 

“5. On information and belief, Respondent did not proceed in a manner required by law in rendering the decision, including because the decision misinterpreted applicable IHSS statutes and regulations, applied improper standards for authorizing IHSS services, and employed improper fair hearing procedures by failing to develop the record on the issues.”

 

Respondent brings her motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing “there is no longer a case or controversy to adjudicate in this matter.” (Motion 3:9-10.) Respondent advises she “agrees that this Court should issue a peremptory writ of mandate commanding [her] to set aside [the decision] and conduct a new hearing to determine whether Petitioner [is] entitled to In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) protective supervision benefits.” (Motion 3:4-7.)

 

Respondent’s unopposed request for judicial notice (RJN) of Exhibits 1 and 2 is granted.

Petitioner’s unopposed RJN of Exhibit 1 is granted.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

“The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Bezirdjian v. O’Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321.)

 

ANALYSIS

 

Relying on her answer to the petition, Respondent argues she agrees with Petitioner—the decision should be set aside and the matter remanded for further proceedings. (Motion 5:21-23, 6:23-25.) Respondent asserts, “Therefore, there is no case or controversy before the Court.” (Motion 6:25.) Respondent explains further:

 

“Despite Respondent’s offer to remand this matter for further proceedings, Petitioner declines this proposal on the basis that he is seeking additional relief. The additional relief sought by Petitioner, however, is improper pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (1094.5). Accordingly, as the appropriate relief pursuant to 1094.5 is to direct Respondent to set aside the underlying decision and remand the matter for further proceeding[s], and Respondent is ready, willing and able to take these actions, there is no case or controversy to adjudicate between the parties.” (Motion 6:25-7:3.)

 

At issue from the pleadings is whether DSS proceeded as required by law when considering Petitioner’s request for supportive services. As noted, Petitioner specifically alleged DSS failed to proceed as required by law by misinterpreting applicable statutes and regulations. Respondent expressly denied the allegation. (Answer, 5.)

 

The allegations in the petition at paragraph 5 and Respondent’s corresponding denial create a controversy. Resolution of the controversy may lead to a remedy of remand with an “order [] reconsideration of the case in light of the court’s opinion and judgment . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 1094.5, subd. (f) [emphasis added].) A remand order issued by the court is not as limited as Respondent argues. While “remand is the only remedy available to Petitioner here” (Reply 2:16-17), this court has the authority to order DSS to reconsider in light of the court’s resolution of the controversy raised in paragraph 5 of the petition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (f).)

 

The court cannot grant judgment on the pleadings here. There is a dispute between the parties concerning whether DSS deviated from statutes and regulations when it denied Petitioner supportive services. If the court finds Petitioner is correct, the appropriate remedy flowing from his petition will be in issue.

 

Finally, the court notes Respondent’s “prayer” in her answer—from which she obtained the foundation for her motion for judgment on the pleadings—is improper matter that the court is inclined to strike on its own motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a) and (b).) “Affirmative relief may not be claimed in the answer.” (Id., § 431.30, subd. (c).) An answer to a petition merely sets forth denials necessary to controvert the material allegations in the petition as well as affirmative defenses. (Id., § 431.30, subd. (b).) Given the improper “prayer” in Respondent’s answer, there is no basis for granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

 

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

 

 

February 15, 2023                                                                 ________________________________

                                                                                                                   Hon. Mitchell Beckloff

                                                                                                                   Judge of the Superior Court