Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 22STCP02911 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP02911, Date: 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner, Alison Oley, requests the court relieve her of the claims presentation requirement of Government Code^{^[1]} section 945.4. Respondent, the County of Los Angeles, opposes the petition.

Government Code section 911.2, in the Government Tort Claims Act, provides a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)

Section 946.6 is the ultimate judicial backstop of the claim presentation process. If a claimant fails to file a timely claim and if the public entity then denies the claimant’s application for permission to file a late claim, the claimant may file a petition for relief from section 945.4’s requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit. (See also §§ 946.6, subd. (a), 911.2 and 911.4.)

The petition must be filed within six months after the application to the public entity is denied or deemed to be denied. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).) The petition must show: (1) an application was made to the public entity under section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for the failure to timely present the claim to the public entity within the time limit specified in section 911.2; and (3) the information required by section 910. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).)

The court shall grant relief only if it finds (1) the application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the claim as specified in section 911.4, subd. (b); and (2) one or more of the following is applicable:

(a) the failure to timely present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4;

(b) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was a minor during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim;

(c) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability failed to present a claim during that time; or

(d) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss died before the expiration of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim.

(§ 946.6, subd. (c); see also Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474.)

In instances where the petitioner claims the failure to timely present the claim was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the Court analyzes the petition under the principles applicable to relief from defaults under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). (Han v. City of Pomona (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 552, 557 [citing Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435].) When considering relief under section 946.6, the Court should resolve any doubts which may exist in favor of the application, preferring an outcome where the action may be heard on its merits. (Viles v. California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 28-29.)

A petitioner bears the initial burden of demonstrating his or her entitlement to relief. (Renteria v. Juvenile Justice, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 903, 910-911; Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775, 784-785.) A petitioner must prove the basis for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. (Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, 92 Cal.App.3d at 784-785; Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Dzhibinyan) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) A respondent has no burden to establish prejudice until the petitioner has satisfied the court that his or her failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence surprise or excusable neglect. (Rivera v. City of Carson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 718, 726.)

Finally, “[r]emedial statutes such as . . . section 946.6 should be liberally construed.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783.)

Petitioner contends the court should excuse her from section 954.4’s claims presentation requirement based on mistake, surprise, inadvertence and/or excusable neglect, mental incapacity and delayed discovery.

As noted, section 911.2 specifies a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person

. . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)

Petitioner’s unverified petition[2] sets forth allegations of misconduct against Mario Rangel, a County employee, from January 2019 until March 2022. (Pet., 2-7.) Petitioner provides minimal evidence to support her petition and request for relief. Petitioner describes the injury she suffered as:

“Claimant was hurt and injured in her health, strength, and activity. Claimant sustained great mental and physical pain and suffering, as was as severe emotional distress and anguish, including, but not limited to, nervousness, loss of sleep, lack of self-worthiness, insecurity, anxiety and depression.” (Claim for Damages, Pet., Ex. 1.)

In early 2019, Petitioner attended the training academy for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. Rangel served as one of Petitioner’s drill instructors. Petitioner left the training academy in March 2019 prior to completing her training. (Pet., 2.)

Shortly thereafter Rangel contacted Petitioner to tell her that “he had a crush on her and was attracted to her.” (Pet., 2.) Rangel and Petitioner “would talk and socialize with each other almost daily.” (Pet., 2.)

In July 2019, Rangel requested money from Petitioner. (Pet., 2.) Petitioner provided Rangel with gifts and money through sometime in 2021. (Pet., 2-3.)

Petitioner returned to the training academy in June 2020. (Pet., 3.) While attending the training academy, Rangel pressured Petitioner to make false allegations about another drill instructor. (Pet., 4.)

Based on stress in her relationship with Rangel, Petitioner had a “nervous breakdown” in February 2021. (Pet., 4.) Petitioner was hospitalized for 48 hours. (Pet., 4.) Petitioner had another nervous breakdown in August 2021 and “was again hospitalized.” (Pet., 4.) A third “severe breakdown” occurred in December 2021. (Pet., 4.)

Petitioner represents on January 5, 2022, Rangel physically assaulted her; she reported the incident to her supervisors the first week of February 2022. (Pet., Oley Decl., ¶ 3; Pet., Ex. A, ¶ 5(t) [Application for Leave to Present Late Government Claim, date May 18, 2022].) Petitioner attests, “After I reported his conduct, I became aware that Rangel had been involved in this type of activity with other recruits in the Department. Around that time, I also learned that other supervisors were aware of his conduct and did nothing to protect me or other female recruits from him.” (Pet., Oley Decl., ¶ 3.)

On April 7, 2022, Petitioner presented her claim to the County. (Pet., Ex. 1.) On May 2, 2022, the County responded to Petitioner’s claim. The County returned the claim as untimely to the extent Petitioner’s claim was based on conduct occurring prior to April 7, 2021. The County also found as untimely Petitioner’s claim to the extent it was based on conduct occurring from April 7, 2021 to October 6, 2021 because it was not presented within six months of the occurrence of the conduct. The County advised it was investigating Petitioner’s claim to the extent it alleged conduct from October 7, 2021 to April 7, 2022, the date of the claim. (Pet. ¶ 3, Ex. 2.)

On May 20, 2022, Petitioner applied to the County for permission to file a late claim. (Pet. ¶ 4.) (Presumably, the late claim application would cover the claim for conduct occurring from April 7, 2021 to October 6, 2021.) On July 4, 2022, the County denied Petitioner’s application.

On September 14, 2022, Petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the superior court (LACS Case No. 22STCV29986). The civil complaint seeks damages for (1) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, (2) sexual harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act,

(3) failure to take reasonable steps to prevent harassment, (4) violation of the Bane Act, and

(5) intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from Rangel’s alleged misconduct as far back as January 2019. (Opposition, Ex. 1.)

Given the lengthy period of alleged misconduct, like the County, the court addresses Petitioner’s claims in three specific time periods.

Importantly, the only evidence the court has before it concerning any conduct of Rangel is Petitioner’s declaration addressing an assault in January 2022.

For claims based on conduct occurring prior to April 7, 2021, the court finds it has no authority to consider Petitioner’s request to excuse the claims presentation requirement.

Section 911.4 required Petitioner to apply for leave to present her claim within a year of accrual of her causes of action. Petitioner waited until May 18, 2022 to apply with the County for leave to present her late claim. As result, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider her petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6. (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779 [“[w]hen the underlying application to file a late claim is filed more than one year after the accrual of the cause of action, the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Government Code section 946.6”]; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 480, 488 [same].)

Petitioner argues her claims against the County did not accrue until 2022.[3] She asserts delayed discovery of her claims. Again, there is no competent evidence before the court that could support a delayed discovery claim. Petitioner’s generalized assertion of delayed discovery is unpersuasive. Petitioner’s claims are all about injury she sustained based on Rangel’s behavior. As she noted her claim for damages filed with the County, she suffered physical and mental pain and suffering at the hands of Rangel. She admits she had a nervous breakdown based on his behavior in February 2021—she had nothing more to discover.

Under the delayed discovery exception, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, she has a cause of action. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.) A plaintiff discovers the cause of action when she at least suspects a factual basis, as opposed to a legal theory, for the elements of a cause of action. (Ibid.) A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when she has notice or information of circumstances that would put a reasonable person on inquiry notice. (Id. at 397-398.)

Petitioner attests she “did not become aware that Rangel had been involved in this type of activity with other recruits in the Department until February and March 2022. She further learned that supervisors were aware of his conduct and did nothing to protect her or other female recruits. Almost immediately after [Petitioner] learned of these other women, [Petitioner] came forth and reported the conduct.” (Pet., 8 ¶ 2; Oley Decl., ¶ 3.)

The court agrees with the County on this issue. The court finds Petitioner’s injury and claim arose when Rangel’s misconduct was complete as to her; that is, references to misconduct against other female recruits and to supervisors’ knowledge of Rangel’s misconduct are irrelevant to the injury suffered by Petitioner. Rather, Petitioner’s allegations demonstrate as of March 2019, Petitioner knew or should have known that Rangel had engaged in wrongdoing that harmed her in the workplace as well as elsewhere. (Pet., 2-3.) Petitioner knew Rangel was a County employee—he was her drill instructor. Petitioner knew Rangel’s actions occurred in the workplace because she attests Rangel would show up at her work “to make it known that he was watching” her. (Pet., Oley Decl., ¶ 3.) Her later discovery of other facts of both the County’s knowledge of Rangel’s conduct and other potential victims did not delay her discovery of her own claim. Petitioner has presented no evidence to justify her delay in presenting her claim to the County.[4]

Second: Claims Arising from Allegations Occurring from April 7, 2021 to October 6, 2021:

With respect to claims accruing within a year Petitioner’s presentation of her claim, the County argues Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. The County argues Petitioner has not demonstrated (1) mistake, surprise or excusable neglect or (2) mental incapacity.

Again, the lack of relevant evidence before the court on this particular issue impacts resolution of the petition. Subdivision (a) of section 946.6 requires a petitioner to demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect for the failure to make a timely claim. To show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, a petitioner must provide evidence. Petitioner’s brief declaration is devoid of any facts related to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect.

"The mere recital of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is not sufficient to warrant relief. Relief on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is available only on a showing that the claimant's failure to timely present a claim was reasonable when tested by the objective 'reasonably prudent person' standard." (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.)

Excusable neglect is defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435.) Under the reasonably prudent person standard, “[e]xcusable neglect is that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.” (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 1296.)

“When relief is sought based on mistake, because of the reasonably prudent person standard ‘it is not every mistake that will excuse a default, the determining factor being the reasonableness of the misconception.’ ” (N.G. v. County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 63, 74.)

The County correctly notes Petitioner has submitted no evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Without question, Petitioner has failed to meet her burden based on the minimal evidence submitted; evidence that neglects to address mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. Petitioner merely repeats her delayed discovery arguments.

Petitioner also claims she was the “victim of coercion” and suggests she was mentally incapacitated such that any cause of action was tolled. Petitioner attests she was fearful of Rangel. She feared Rangel would “do something to cause [her] to lose her job.” (Pet., Oley Decl., ¶ 2.) The court cannot find the statute of limitations for any particular cause of action was tolled. The generalized evidence is insufficient to support a tolling argument based on alleged coercion.

Specifically, Petitioner argues Rangel threatened her with harm if she reported him. (Pet., 8

¶ 6 (b).) Petitioner attests she feared Rangel would interfere with her job. (Pet., Oley Decl., ¶ 2.) Petitioner’s argument does not demonstrate she was completely disabled for the duration of the filing period. As such, even Petitioner’s argument is insufficient to demonstrate mental incapacity or coercion (to the extent coercion could serve to toll the period). (Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 475.)

Here, Petitioner’s allegations show, during the allegedly coercive period, she resumed her study in the training academy in June 2020 and graduated in July 2020. Petitioner also maintained a job with the County as a custody assistant. (Pet., 3-4.) Nothing suggests Petitioner could not have filed her claim based on mental incapacity or coercion. Her generalized claims to the contrary are unpersuasive.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not met her burden of showing entitlement to relief under section 946.6.[5] Her complete lack of evidence completely undermines her claim.

For claims occurring after October 7, 2021, the County concedes Petitioner timely presented her claims. Thus, the court need not address claims arising from conduct occurring after October 7, 2021. (See Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 827. [“A trial court hearing a section 946.6 petition cannot consider whether a claim was timely, because that issue is not within the scope of the proceeding.”] See also Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 171, 177.)

Accordingly, the court makes no determination concerning this third category of claims.

[1] All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted.

[2] An unverified petition has no evidentiary value.

[3] To the extent Petitioner contends her cause of action accrued in 2022, she needs no relief from this court. The County concedes Petitioner timely presented her claim for allegations occurring after October 7, 2021.

[4] Syzemore v. County of Sacramento (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 517 is distinguishable; the case addressed tolling during a claimant’s period of military service. (Id. at 521-524.) While the case mentioned an additional ground for relief based on mistake and excusable neglect, other courts have rejected the case’s reasoning. (See Harrison v. County of Del Norte (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1, 7, fn. 5. (“We respectfully decline to follow the Syzemore decision, because it is inconsistent with governing authority.”)

[5] Petitioner also argues the County will not be prejudiced if the court grants this petition. Lack of prejudice, however, is not considered when a petitioner has not shown entitlement to relief under section 946.6 in the first instance.