Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP03313, Date: 2023-05-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCP03313 Hearing Date: May 5, 2023 Dept: 86
ESTRADA v. CITY
OF BALDWIN PARK
Case
Number: 22STCP03313
Hearing
Date: April 5, 2023
[Tentative] ORDER GRANTING PETITION FINDING CLAIM
TIMELY FILED
Petitioner,
Jose Estrada, requests the court relieve him of the claim presentation requirement
of Government Code[1]
section 945.4. Petitioner also suggests he timely submitted his government claim
to Respondent, the City of Baldwin Park. (Pet., ¶ 2.)
Respondent
opposes the petition. Petitioner filed a reply. (The reply is timely based on
the notice provided to him by Respondent of the hearing.)
The
court finds Petitioner timely presented his claim to Respondent. The court
therefore need not address Petitioner’s request he be relieved of the claims
presentation requirement.
APPLICABLE
LAW
Government Code section 911.2, in the Government Tort Claims Act,
provides a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . .
. shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual
of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose
of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have
accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)
Section 946.6 is the ultimate judicial backstop of the claim
presentation process. If a claimant fails to file a timely claim and if the
public entity then denies the claimant’s application for permission to file a
late claim, the claimant may file a petition for relief from section 945.4’s
requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit. (See also §§ 946.6,
subd. (a), 911.2 and 911.4.)
The petition must be filed within six months after the application
to the public entity is denied or deemed to be denied. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).)
The petition must show: (1) an application was made to the public entity under
section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for the failure
to timely present the claim to the public entity within the time limit specified
in section 911.2; and (3) the information required by section 910. (§ 946.6,
subd. (b).)
The court shall grant relief only if it finds (1) the application
to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was made within a
reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the claim as specified
in section 911.4, subd. (b); and (2) one or more of the following is
applicable:
(a)
the failure to timely present the claim was through
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, unless the public entity
establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the
court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4;
(b)
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or
loss was a minor during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the
presentation of the claim;
(c)
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or
loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified
in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that
disability failed to present a claim during that time; or
(d)
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or
loss died before the expiration of the time specified in section 911.2 for the
presentation of the claim.
(§ 946.6, subd. (c); see also Tammen v. County of San Diego
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474.)
In instances where the petitioner claims the failure to timely
present the claim was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect, the Court analyzes the petition under the principles
applicable to relief from defaults under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (b). (Han v. City of Pomona (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 552, 557
[citing Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435].) When considering
relief under section 946.6, the Court should resolve any doubts which may exist
in favor of the application, preferring an outcome where the action may be
heard on its merits. (Viles v. California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 28-29.)
A petitioner bears the initial burden of demonstrating his or her
entitlement to relief. (Renteria v. Juvenile Justice, Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 903, 910-911; Toscano
v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775,
784-785.) A petitioner must prove the basis for relief by a preponderance of
the evidence. (Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, 92
Cal.App.3d at 784-785; Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County (Dzhibinyan) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) A
respondent has no burden to establish prejudice until the petitioner has
satisfied the court that his or her failure to file a timely claim was due to
mistake, inadvertence surprise or excusable neglect. (Rivera v. City of
Carson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 718, 726.)
Finally, “[r]emedial statutes such as . . . section 946.6 should
be liberally construed.” (Munoz v. State
of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783.)
ANALYSIS
Petitioner
argues the court should relieve him of the claim presentation requirement because
he timely filed his claim. Alternatively, Petitioner argues he is entitled to
relief based upon mistake, surprise, inadvertence and/or excusable neglect.
The
City argues the petition should be denied. The City labels the petition
“procedurally improper because it fails to identify a hearing date, time, or
place and fails to include the proposed amended complaint.”[2]
(Opposition 1:26-28.) The City further alleges Petitioner failed to comply with
section 911.2 because he did not submit his claim to the City within six months
of the accrual of his cause of action. (Opposition 2:1-3.) Finally, the City
argues Petitioner “fails to show that [his] failure to present a timely claim
was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . .”
(Opposition 2:6-8.)
As
noted, pursuant to Government Code section 911.2, a “claim relating to a cause
of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later
than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis
added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the
date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the
statute of limitations. (§ 901.)
Petitioner
alleges in his unverified petition that he sustained injuries on November 24,
2021 while riding his motorcycle. Petitioner contends his injury is based on a
dangerous condition located at 5195 Rivergrade Road in the City.
Petitioner
provides evidence he timely presented his claim to the City by depositing it in
the mail on January 5, 2022. (Estrada Reply Decl., ¶ 2.) Petitioner also provides
evidence the City received the claim after Petitioner mailed it. (Estrada Reply
Decl., ¶ 8.) The City stamped the claim form on June 5, 2022. (Pet., Ex. 3.) As
noted by Petitioner, the City “had in its possession the Claim [he] mailed on January
5, 2022 . . .” on June 5, 2022. (Estrada Reply Decl., ¶ 8.)
As
Petitioner did not submit his application to file a late claim with the City, until
July 1, 2022, there is no explanation for how the City had a claim form from
Petitioner (dated January 5, 2021) that it stamped received on June 5, 2022. (Estrada
Reply Decl., ¶¶ 3, 4, 8; Pet. Ex. 3.)
The
evidence supports a finding Petitioner submitted his claim form to the City on
January 5, 2022. Petitioner submitted the claim within six months of his injuries.
Petitioner timely submitted his claim to the City. (Gov. Code, § 915.2, subd.
(a). [“The claim, amendment, application, or notice shall be deemed to have
been presented and received at the time of deposit.”]) While the evidence about
Petitioner’s mailing process is unclear, the evidence supports a finding the
City had the claim form in its possession after Petitioner mailed the form.[3]
In
this proceeding, there is authority permitting the court to consider the
timeliness of Petitioner’s claim. The court acknowledges the Courts of Appeal
are split on the issue. The appellate courts have differing views of whether a
petitioner under section 946.6 may alternatively request a determination he or
she presented a timely claim or must wait until the action where her or she may
allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (Compare, e.g., Ngo v. County of Los Angeles
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 946, 951-952 [Ngo] [must be raised in a complaint
alleging compliance] and Rason v. Santa Barbara City
Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 827-828 [same] with Santee v. Santa Clara County
Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 711 [Santee] [may be addressed in a
claim-relief proceeding] and Reyes v. County of Los Angeles
(1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 584, 593-594.)
Most
recently, in Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare District (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 391 [Simms], the Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District
noted a preference for resolving the timeliness issue on a petition under section
946.6.
Santee
explained:
“Of course,
this is not to say that the question of timely filing must be determined
in a claim-relief proceeding or that the court in all cases may make factual
determinations regarding compliance with the claim presentation requirements.
We can envision certain cases, such as where the date of the accrual of the
cause of action is disputed . . . .” (Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at 711.)
To
resolve the timeliness issue here, the court need only address one issue—did Petitioner
mail his claim, as he attests, on January 5, 2022? That the City was in
possession of his claim on June 5, 2022, prior to any further written
communication from Petitioner, supports Petitioner’s testimony he properly
mailed the claim form to the City on January 5, 2022.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, the petition is granted to the extent Petitioner has
requested the court find his claim timely presented to the City.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
May
5, 2023 ________________________________
Hon. Mitchell
Beckloff
Judge of the
Superior Court
[1] All
further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted.
[2] The
City appears to have referenced a proposed amended complaint in error.
[3] The
petition is unverified. Therefore, the court cannot rely on the facts alleged within
it. The court notes, however, the petition alleges Petitioner telephoned the clerk’s
office with the City on May 27, 2022 “and was told that City Clerk’s office was
closed and someone would contact Petitioner.” (Pet., ¶ 5.) Petitioner further
alleges, “On June 6, 2020, Lourdes Morales, from the City Clerk’s office
contacted petitioner and on behalf of the City denied being in receipt of any
Claim by Petitioner.” (Pet., ¶ 6.) There is competent evidence the City stamped
Petitioner’s original January 5, 2022 claim “Received” on June 5, 2022.