Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 22STCP03314 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP03314, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Petitioners, N.M. and L.J., seek a writ of mandate compelling Respondent, New West Charter School (Respondent or New West), to set aside and reverse its expulsion of Petitioners. They also request the court order Respondents to remove all references of the suspensions and/or expulsions from Petitioners’ educational records. Finally, Petitioners ask that Respondent be ordered to make appropriate changes to its policies to insure future compliance with applicable laws.

Apparently as a prank, on May 20, 2022, Petitioner N.M. accessed Petitioner L.J.’s school email account and sent an inappropriate message of a sexual nature to nine female classmates. The email appeared to have been sent by Petitioner L.J. Petitioner N.M. entitled the email message, “Date Night my place” and described certain sexual acts, body parts and bodily fluids. (AR 6, 24, 60.)

On May 24, 2022, apparently as a retaliatory prank, Petitioner L.J. accessed Petitioner N.M.’s school email account and sent an equally inappropriate message of a sexual nature to 11 female classmates. The email appeared to have been sent by Petitioner N.M. (AR 7.) Petitioner L.J. entitled the email message, “My confession” and described masturbation and “cameras set up” in the recipients houses for surveillance. (AR 7, 300, 307.)

Both Petitioners admitted the conduct. (AR 8.) There is no dispute Petitioners composed and sent the email communications.

On May 31, 2022, Petitioners’ parents met with Respondent’s Executive Director/Principal, Dr. Sharon Weir, by Zoom.[1] (AR 1.)

On June 16, 2022, both Petitioners’ parents received emails from Weir, questioning their availability for an in-person administrative panel meeting on June 22, 2022 followed by a special New West Governance Council meeting on Zoom on the same day. (AR 16-18, 293-295.) The following day, on June 17, 2022, both Petitioners received invitations for administrative hearings followed by the Governance Council meetings scheduled for June 22, 2022. (AR 20-21, 302-303.)

On June 22, 2022, Respondent conducted hearings for both Petitioners before the administrative panel. Following the hearing, the administrative panel recommended the Governance Council expel both Petitioners from New West. (AR 19, 304.) The Governance Council accepted the recommendation. The Governance Council found based upon the content of the students’ emails and the email-recipients’ statements the email communications caused distress, impacted students’ academic performance and created an intimidating and hostile educational environment. (AR 22-28 [N.M.], 305-311 [L.J.].) The Governance Council expelled Petitioners from New West for one year. (AR 22-28, 305-311.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the issues for review of an administrative decision are: whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

There are two possible forms of judicial review of an agency’s factual findings: (1) independent judgment or (2) substantial evidence. (Id., subd. (c).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 does not specify which cases are subject to independent review leaving that issue to the courts. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 811.) In cases reviewing decisions which affect a vested, fundamental right, the trial court exercises its independent judgment on the evidence. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143.) In all other cases, the court determines whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).)

The parties dispute the applicable standard of review. The court finds Petitioners claims do not implicate any fundamental vested rights and the substantial evidence standard is the appropriate standard of review here. (M.N. v. Morgan Hill Unified School Dist. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 607, 616 [one year expulsion from public school]; see also Helena F. v. West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1793, 1800 [Constitutional right to free education does not encompass right to attendance at school of pupil's choice or the one “geographically convenient to the parent”].)

On substantial evidence review, “the trial court will affirm the administrative decision if it is supported by substantial evidence from a review of the entire record, resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the findings and decision.” (M.N. v. Morgan Hill Unified School Dist., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at 616.) The court must “accept all evidence which supports the successful party, disregard the contrary evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences to uphold the [administrative decision]. [Citation.] Credibility is an issue of fact for the finder of fact to resolve [citation], and the testimony of a single witness, even that of a party, is sufficient to provide substantial evidence to support a finding of fact. [Citation.]” (Doe v. Regents of the University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1074.)

Under this “deferential” standard of review, the court presumes the correctness of the administrative ruling. (Patterson Flying Service v. California Dept. of Pesticide Regulation (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 411, 419; see also Doe v. Regents of the University of California, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 1073 [substantial evidence standard is “extremely deferential standard of review”].)

Petitioners argue New West’s administrative expulsion process denied them due process and a fair hearing. Many of Petitioners’ arguments are generalized, insufficiently developed and/or unsupported by legal authority such that Petitioners fail to meet their burden on their claims.[2]

Petitioners received suspension notices on May 27, 2022 (May Notices). (AR 59 [N.M.], 348 [L.J.].) On June 17, 2022, Petitioners received invitations for administrative hearings followed by the Governance Council meetings scheduled for June 22, 2022 (June Notices). The June Notices specified “[t]he purpose of the meeting will be to review the current suspension in effect and recommend expulsion . . . from the Charter School.” (AR 20-21 [N.M.], 302-303[L.J.].)

First, Petitioners argue New West failed to comply with Education Code section 48911, subdivision (a) with the May Notices because the statute “provides that a pupil may be suspended from school for any of the reasons enumerated in Section 48900, and pursuant to Section 48900.5, for no more than five consecutive school days.” (Opening Brief 5:6-7 [emphasis in original].) Petitioners contend they were suspended for 10 days “with no stated rationale whatsoever.” (Opening Brief 5:9.)

Second, Petitioners assert the May Notices “failed to provide a specific violation enumerated under Section 48900.” (Opening Brief 5:10.) Petitioners report the May Notices reflected only that Petitioners “committed sexual harassment as defined by [Education] Code [section] 212.3.” (Opening Brief 5:11.) The May Notices also, according to Petitioners, did not recite whether means of correction, other than suspension, had failed to remediate Petitioners’ behavior. (Opening Brief 5:12-13.) Petitioners’ parents were also not offered a meeting to discuss the expulsion process prior to May 27, 2022. (Opening Brief 5:14.)

“less than 10 days prior to the hearing and did not communicate the information required by statute and were scheduled to be completed in 30 minutes. The notices completely violated [Petitioners’] due process rights as they failed to comport with the standards of the Education Code, federal and state law, and their own internal disciplinary policies on several levels. . . .¶ The notices failed to include a statement of the specific facts and charges upon which the proposed expulsion was being pursued and failed to provide copies of [New West’s] disciplinary rules/procedures. The notices failed to inform [Petitioners] of the opportunities to be represented by an attorney, to question and confront witnesses, and to question and receive copies [of] all evidence presented at the hearings.” (Opening Brief 6:6-19.)

New West correctly advises charter schools are not subject to Education Code section 48900. Education Code section 47610 provides, “A charter school shall comply with this part and all of the provisions set forth in its charter, but is otherwise exempt from laws governing school districts, . . . .”[3] New West thereby effectively undermines Petitioners’ claims based on Education Code section 48900.

Faced with the inapplicability of Education Code section 48900,[4] Petitioners pivot to Respondent’s policies and alleged violations of it by New West. Petitioners refocus their argument to New West’s alleged “violat[ions of] its own Discipline Policies and Procedures relative to suspensions and expulsions [].” (Reply, 3:12-13.)

Respondent’s Student Discipline: Suspension and Expulsion Policy (the Policy) largely mirrors Education Code section 48900. Respondent expressly acknowledges the similarity. (AR 87. [The Policy “is largely consistent with the language in Education Code section 48900, et seq.”])[5]

Focusing on the Policy, Petitioners argue their suspension could not exceed 5 days because the suspension did not include an expulsion recommendation. (AR 59 [N.M.], 98, 348 [L.J.].) Petitioners are correct. New West failed to comply with its Policy when it suspended Petitioners for more than 5 days. Nonetheless, given that Respondent ultimately expelled Petitioners for one year, Petitioners demonstrate no prejudice. (Hinrichs v. County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 921, 928 [procedural errors, “even if proved, are subject to a harmless error analysis”]. See Doe v. Occidental College (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 208, 227. [“John does not identify any prejudice he suffered by not having the information from the hearing coordinator any sooner, nor does he argue what, if anything, he would have done differently with additional time to prepare for the hearing.”]; See also Doe v. University of Southern California (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 26, 40 [delay in providing evidence of academic discipline not tied to prejudice].)

Petitioners further argue the June Notices “violated every right enumerated in [Respondent’s] Policy.” (Reply 4:22 [emphasis added].)

The Policy’s expulsion procedures require a written notice to the student and his/her parent at least 10 days in advance of the date of the hearing on the proposed expulsion. (AR 99.) The notice shall include:

· A statement of the specific facts, charges and offenses upon which the proposed expulsion is based.

· A copy of the Charter School’s disciplinary rules which relate to the alleged violation.

· Notification of the student’s or parent/guardian’s obligation to provide information about the student’s status at the Charter School to any other school district or school to which the student seeks enrollment.

· The opportunity for the student and/or the student’s parent/guardian to appear in person or to employ and be represented by counsel or a non-attorney advisor.

· The right to inspect and obtain copies of all documents to be used at the hearing.

· The opportunity to confront and cross-examine all witnesses who testify at the hearing.

· The opportunity to question all evidence presented and to present oral and documentary evidence on the student’s behalf including witnesses.” (AR 99.)

Petitioner is not entirely correct about New West’s failure to comply with the expulsion notice provisions of its Policy. First, the June Notices provide the date and place of the expulsion hearing. (AR 20 [N.M.], 344 [L.J.].) The June Notices also advise and invite the student and parents to attend the administrative panel meeting where the “decision” to expel Petitioners would be considered. (AR 20-21 [N.M.], 344-345 [L.J.].)

While the June Notices do not set out the charges against Petitioners, the June Notices reference a review of the current suspension and consideration of “extend[ing] the suspension.” (AR 20-21 [N.M.], 344-345 [L.J.].) Petitioners and their parents had been advised in the May Notices that New West suspended Petitioners because they “[c]omitted sexual harassment (Ed. Code: 212.3)[6] by directly sending a sexually explicit email to a group” of female students. (AR 59 [N.M.], 348 [L.J.].) The May Notices also advised that Petitioners’ actions “caused distress, impacted students[’] academic performance and created an intimidating and hostile educational environment.” (AR 59 [N.M.], 348 [L.J.].) The May Notices set forth the language used by Petitioners in the email communications. (AR 59-60 [N.M.], 348-349 [L.J.].)[7] Petitioners and their parents could have had no confusion about the conduct upon which the proposed expulsion was based.

Petitioners are correct that they did not receive notice of the expulsion hearing 10 days in advance of the hearing on their proposed expulsion as required by the Policy. (AR 99.) New West provided Petitioners and their parents with notice of the June 22, 2022 hearing on June 17, 2022. (AR 20 [N.M.], 344 [L.J.].) (Opening Brief 6:6-7 [Policy identical]; Reply 4:23-24 [Policy argument].) Thus, the June Notices provided only five days advance notice, and they did not comply with the Policy’s 10-day notice requirement.

The record demonstrates, however, N.M.’s parents requested an earlier hearing date based on N.M.’s father’s unavailability. (AR 17-18. [“Could at all be possible to aim for an earlier date?”]) On June 7, 2022, L.J.’s parents expressed a desire to expedite the administrative panel discussion about Petitioners’ “future at New West Charter, . . . .” (AR 279.) On June 7, 2022, L.J.’s mother advised Respondent that L.J. and his family would be traveling from June 26 until July 10, and that they “sincerely hope[d] that any panels that will require our in-person participation will take place beforehand.” (AR 285.)

Given Petitioners’ parents’ communications with Respondent about the expulsion hearings and the lack of any record of objection, Respondent’s failure to comply with its 10-day notice policy did not result in prejudice. Alternatively, Petitioners’ failure to objection operated as a waiver of the provision in the Policy. The court notes there is no evidence to suggest Petitioners required additional time to prepare for the expulsion hearings or communicated as much to Respondent.

While it does not appear Respondent provided a copy of its “disciplinary rules which relate to the alleged violation” (AR 99), the June Notices do reference Education Code section 212.5 and the parent and student handbook page explaining the offense. (AR 59 [N.M.], 90, 348 [L.J.]. [“Ref: NWC Parent and Student Handbook pp. 133/162)”.]) The student handbook page describes sexual harassment and specifies the conduct described in Education Code section 212.5 “must be considered by a reasonable person of the same gender as the victim to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to have a negative impact upon the individual’s academic performance or to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational environment.” (AR 90.)

Petitioners correctly note the June Notices do not provide the following information as required by the Policy:

· The opportunity for the student and parents to employ and be represented by counsel or a non-attorney advisor.

· The right to inspect and obtain copies of all documents to be used at the hearing.

· The opportunity to confront and cross-examine all witnesses who testify at the hearing.

· The opportunity to question all evidence presented and to present oral and documentary evidence on the student’s behalf including witnesses. (AR 99.)

Petitioners argue the failure to provide notice to them as required by the Policy meant “Petitioners were ill-prepared at the administrative expulsion hearings and were not afforded fair hearings.” (Reply 5:18-19.) Petitioners provide no further explanation of how, if at all, they suffered prejudice based on the notice deficiencies. (See Doe v. Occidental College, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at 227. [“John does not identify any prejudice he suffered by not having the information from the hearing coordinator any sooner, nor does he argue what, if anything, he would have done differently with additional time to prepare for the hearing.”])

“Reversible error requires demonstration of prejudice arising from the reasonable probability the party ‘would have obtained a better outcome’ in the absence of the error.” (Fisher v. State Personnel Bd. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1, 20.) Prejudice is not presumed; actual prejudice must be shown in order to be balanced against a due process violation. (See, e.g., People v. Belton (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1433 [delay in filing criminal charges requires balancing of prejudice against justification for delay].)

[The court invites further argument on this issue. From the court’s perspective, there is no evidentiary dispute about the content of the emails or that Petitioners sent the communications. The June Notices also referenced the applicable pages of the student handbook outlining provisions in the Policy.]

Petitioners present a number of arguments to support their claims they were denied a fair hearing. They also take issue with the time allotted for each hearing—30 minutes. (Opening Brief 7:25-26.) They contend Respondent failed to record the hearings preventing the preservation of an official record.[8] (Opening Brief 7:25.) They argue their parents “were not provided sufficient time to question or challenge any of the evidence that was submitted against either student.” (Opening Brief 7:26-27.) They contend they did not have an opportunity to review the evidence that would be used against them in advance of the hearing. (Opening Brief 7:27-28.) Finally, Petitioners argue they had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. (Opening Brief 8:1.)

To some extent, Petitioners arguments are undeveloped in their Opening Brief as well as their Reply Brief. For example, Petitioners do not specify the evidence Respondent should have provided to them prior to the hearing. There is no question Petitioners had the content of their emails, and they knew of their acts. Petitioners also do not identify how they were prejudiced or whether they requested additional time to consider the evidence that had been presented at the hearing. Administrative error alone does not justify setting aside an agency decision. There must be prejudice.

Petitioners also do not demonstrate how Respondent’s allowance of 30 minutes for the disciplinary hearings prejudiced Petitioners. Petitioners provide no evidence the time allotted was insufficient or that either Petitioner requested additional time for the hearing. The court cannot find Respondent failed to proceed in the manner required by law when it allotted 30 minutes of disciplinary hearing time for each Petitioner’s hearing.

Finally, Petitioners’ claim they were not permitted to cross-examine and confront the female students to whom they sent the emails did not violate their due process rights. Unlike sexual harassment cases where two competing witnesses tell different narratives such that credibility becomes a key issue, the evidence here was not in dispute. (Doe v. Regents of University of California (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 521, 535 [additional procedural requirements “where the credibility of witnesses is central to the disciplinary decision”].) Petitioners admitted to sending the emails. The content of the emails is clear. Credibility was not central to Respondent’s decision. (Id. at 544.)

Moreover, the email communications themselves establish the violation of the Policy.

The Policy incorporates by reference the definition of “sexual harassment” set forth in Education Code section 212.5. That section provides a finding of “sexual harassment” may be based solely on the effect of the conduct, irrespective of actor’s intent. (AR 35, 39; Ed. Code,

§ 212.5, subd. (c). [“ ‘Sexual harassment’ means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, made by someone from or in the work or educational setting, under any of the following conditions: . . . (c) The conduct has the purpose or effect of having a negative impact upon the individual’s work or academic performance, or of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work or educational environment.”])

Importantly, “For purposes of [Respondent’s] policy, the conduct described in Section 212.5 must be considered by a reasonable person as the same gender as the victim to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to have a negative impact upon the individual’s academic performance or to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational environment.” (AR 39.) Thus, Respondent is permitted to view the communication and consider its effect on a gender-specific reasonable person.

Respondent persuasively argues the Policy makes clear that “sexual harassment” need not be demonstrated by its effect on a particular person or persons but may be demonstrated by its likely creation of “an intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational environment” in general, as objectively assessed by the hypothetical reasonable person. (Opposition 7:19-24.) As such, under the Policy an individual specific victim’s testimony as to the impact on that person of the conduct at issue is not necessary to find a student has committed sexual harassment.

That the Policy relies on a “reasonable person of the same gender” standard informs on whether cross-examination is required. Cross-examination is only required where there is a material factual dispute. Whether and to what extent, if at all, Petitioners should be disciplined depended upon their emails and the effect of those emails on a “reasonable person of the same gender.” “Unlike cases that turn upon the testimony of live witnesses, cases involving documentary evidence do not carry a critical need to inquire into credibility via cross-examination.” (Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 705, 711 [emphasis in original].)

The evidence before Respondent did not turn on witness credibility. As to N.M., Respondent noted, “The language used in N.M. email was not borderline harassment, it was utterly vile and disgusting. Specific sexual acts were prescribed for specific girls.” (AR 19.) As to L.J., Respondent found, “There is no question that L.J.’s email constitutes sexual harassment, according to Education Code Section 212.5. Besides the excessively lewd language, L.J.’s email contained a threat: ‘I have an IP tracker in all of your necks, so don’t thing about leaving me.’ This is taking harassment a step further, and it makes the email even scarier for the victims.” (AR 304.)

Petitioners have not met their burden of demonstrating Respondent denied them a fair hearing.

Petitioners argue Respondent prejudicially abused its discretion because the evidence did not support the findings. In addition, Petitioners assert Respondent’s findings do not comply with Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506 (Topanga).

Petitioners challenge Respondent’s findings contending Respondent’s decision—only a single paragraph for each Petitioner—did not comply with Topanga because the decision failed to make findings on “several important issues.” (Opening Brief 9:18.)

An administrative hearing body is required to issue findings that provide sufficient explanation so parties may determine whether, and upon what basis, to seek judicial review the administrative decision. (Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 514-515.) “[I]mplicit in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency which renders the challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.” (Id. at 515.)

At the time Respondent’s Governance Council made its disciplinary decisions, it had before it: the administrative panel findings (AR 19, 304), the invitation to meeting to administrative panel hearing (AR 55-56, 344-345), the emails authored by Petitioners (AR 57, 346), the notice of suspension (AR 59-61, 348-350), Petitioners’ signed confessions (AR 63-64, 352-353), the statements made by recipients of the emails (AR 65-80, 354-370)[9] and the Policy (AR 87-106, 379-398).

Based on the evidence, Respondent’s Governance Council set forth six findings of fact, and concluded based on the findings Petitioners authored the sexually explicit and threating emails, the emails caused distress, impacted students’ academic performance and created an intimidating and hostile educational environment, and that due to the nature of the violation, the student’s presence would be disruptive to the education process. (AR 23-25, 306-308.)

Petitioners argue the evidence does not support Respondent’s findings of sexual harassment. According to Petitioners, the relevant portion of the definition of “sexual harassment” under Education Code section 212.5 requires, in part, a showing of how “[t]he conduct has the purpose or effect of having a negative impact upon the individual's work or academic performance, or of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work or educational environment.”

Petitioners argue Respondent relied on speculation and hearsay to support the findings necessary under Education Code section 212.5 and the Policy. Petitioners rely upon Respondent’s findings related to the statement of an anonymous student who stated “she would ‘no longer feel comfortable in school with the possibility of running into these students.’ She feels ‘objectified,’ ‘severely impacted,’ and ‘personally invaded.’ ” (AR 19, 304.)

As a preliminary matter, Petitioners fail to show Respondent could not rely (to some extent) on hearsay evidence to support its decision. Petitioners’ reliance on Education Code section 48918, subdivision (f)(2) is misplace since the statute does not apply to Respondent, a charter school. The Policy, however, does provide a similar provision:

“While technical rules of evidence do not apply to expulsion hearings, evidence may be admitted and used as proof only if it is the kind of evidence on which reasonable persons can rely in the conduct of serious affairs. . . . While hearsay evidence is admissible, no decision to expel shall be based solely on hearsay. . . .” (AR 101.)

Respondent did not solely rely upon hearsay evidence to support its decision to expel Petitioners. It had Petitioners’ emails and signed confessions—the evidence was undisputed. Moreover, Respondent found the emails themselves constituted sexual harassment without regard to any hearsay statements. (AR 19 [“not borderline harassment”], 304 [“no question . . . email constitutes sexual harassment”].) Thus, any hearsay statements made by the female students who received the emails is ancillary to the sexual harassment finding.

Finally, contrary to Petitioners’ position, Respondent was not required by law to consider whether “[o]ther means of correction are not feasible or have repeatedly failed to bring about proper conduct.” (See Ed. Code, § 48915, subd. (b).) The statute does not apply to Respondent, a charter school. Petitioner identifies nothing in the Policy requiring such a finding.

Finally, Petitioners argue they were prejudiced by Respondent’s failure to “to either audio record or create timely transcripts of either administrative hearing without any conceivable rationale whatsoever.” (Opening Brief 13:21-23 [citing Ed. Code, § 48918, subd. (g)].)

As noted again, Education Code Section 48918, subdivision (g), does not apply to Respondent, a charter school.

Petitioners do not address the issue in reply. Thus, they provide no legal authority requiring a transcript (or audio recording) of the proceedings.

Importantly, Petitioners proffer no evidence to suggest they were prejudiced by a lack of transcript. There is no factual dispute between the parties requiring a transcript to resolve. That Respondent did not provide a transcript of the disciplinary proceeding standing alone is insufficient to warrant setting aside Respondent’s disciplinary decision.

[1] Zoom is a video conferencing platform accessed on the internet. At Petitioners’ request, the court struck from the administrative record declarations from Weir attesting to the topics addressed in the conferences.

[2] In fact, Petitioners’ Opening Brief arguments are largely based on inapplicable Education Code sections.

[3] Enumerated exceptions to Education Code section 47610 are not applicable here.

[4] Petitioners’ silence on the issue effectively concedes Respondent’s point. (Reply 3:9-15.)

[5] Petitioners contend Education Code section 47605, subdivision (c)(5)(J) “expressly . . . applies to charter school corporations notwithstanding [Education] Code [section] 47610 . . . .” (Reply 3:20-21.) Education Code section 47605 makes no reference to Education Code section 47610. Instead, Education Code section 47605 addresses, among other things, whether a petition for a charter should be granted by a chartering authority and the requirements of a petition for a charter. Once a charter is granted, the school must “comply with . . . all of the provisions set forth in its charter.” (Ed. Code, § 47610.) Petitioners’ claim Education Code section 47605, subdivision (c)(5)(J) is somehow applicable under the circumstances here is unclear. Petitioners do not reference New West’s charter in their argument.

[6] “ ‘Sexual harassment’ means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, made by someone from or in the work or educational setting, under any of the following conditions: . . . . (c) The conduct has the purpose or effect of having a negative impact upon the individual's work or academic performance, or of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work or educational environment.” (Ed. Code, § 212.5.)

[7] Petitioners argued the May Notices were deficient under Education Code section 48900. (Opening Brief 5:9.) Petitioners appear to have abandoned that issue after Respondent pointed out Education Code section 48900 does not apply to it. To the extent Petitioners contend the May Notices did not comply with the Policy, the court rejects the claim. The May Notices sufficiently advised Petitioners and their parents of “the specific offense(s) committed by the student as well as the date the student may return to school.” (AR 59-60 [N.M.], 348-349 [L.J.].)

[8] This issue is discussed in the final section of this decision.

[9] The record notes that these statements were read aloud by Ms. Clark without identification of the students. (AR 65, 354.)