Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP03432, Date: 2023-01-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCP03432 Hearing Date: January 13, 2023 Dept: 86
SINGLETON v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Case Number: 22STCP03432
Hearing Date: January 13, 2023
[Tentative] ORDER DENYING RELIEF TO FILE A LATE CLAIM
Petitioner, Yvonne Singleton, moves for relief from the court to file a late government claim. Respondent, State of California, opposes the petition. Respondent, Los Angeles County of Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), also opposes the petition.
The petition to file a late claim is DENIED.
APPLICABLE LAW
Government Code[1] section 911.2, in the Government Tort Claims Act, provides a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)
Section 946.6 is the ultimate judicial backstop of the claim presentation process. If a claimant fails to file a timely claim and if the public entity then denies the claimant’s application for permission to file a late claim, the claimant may file a petition for relief from section 945.4’s requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit. (See also §§ 946.6, subd. (a), 911.2 and 911.4.)
The petition must be filed within six months after the application to the public entity is denied or deemed to be denied. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).) The petition must show: (1) an application was made to the public entity under section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for the failure to timely present the claim to the public entity within the time limit specified in section 911.2; and (3) the information required by section 910. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).)
The court shall grant relief only if it finds (1) the application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the claim as specified in section 911.4, subd. (b); and (2) one or more of the following is applicable:
the failure to timely present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4;
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was a minor during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim;
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability failed to present a claim during that time; or
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss died before the expiration of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim.
(§ 946.6, subd. (c); see also Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474.)
In instances where the petitioner claims the failure to timely present the claim was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the Court analyzes the petition under the principles applicable to relief from defaults under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). (Han v. City of Pomona (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 552, 557 [citing Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435].) When considering relief under section 946.6, the Court should resolve any doubts which may exist in favor of the application, preferring an outcome where the action may be heard on its merits. (Viles v. California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 28-29.)
A petitioner bears the initial burden of demonstrating his or her entitlement to relief. (Renteria v. Juvenile Justice, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 903, 910-911; Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775, 784-785.) A petitioner must prove the basis for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. (Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, 92 Cal.App.3d at 784-785; Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) A respondent has no burden to establish prejudice until the petitioner has satisfied the court that his or her failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence surprise or excusable neglect. (Rivera v. City of Carson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 718, 726.)
Finally, “[r]emedial statutes such as . . . section 946.6 should be liberally construed.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783.)
ANALYSIS
Petitioner argues the court should grant her leave to file a late claim with Respondents based on mistake, surprise, inadvertence and/or excusable neglect.
Pursuant to Government Code section 911.2, a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (Gov. Code § 901.)
On July 29, 2021, Petitioner alleges she was injured when she slipped on an unknown substance as she was exiting a restroom located near Union Station, 800 North Alameda Street in Los Angeles. (Pet., Singleton Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) Based upon the incident date, Petitioner’s deadline to file a timely government tort claim with both Respondents was January 29, 2022.
On July 28, 2022, one day prior to the one year anniversary of the date Plaintiff was injured, Petitioner sought leave to submit a late claim for damages with the City of Los Angeles, MTA and the State. On August 18, 2022, the City denied Petitioner’s application for leave to file a late claim; on August 12, 2022, the MTA denied Petitioner’s application for leave to file a late claim. On August 12, 2022, Petitioner’s application for leave to file a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law as to the State.
Petitioner filed her petition seeking relief from the requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit on September 20, 2022.
In the petition, Petitioner alleges her claims were not filed within the statutory period of section 911.2 “because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect.” (Pet. 2:10-11.) In Petitioner’s declaration filed with her petition, without explanation, Petitioner attests she miscalculated the six-month deadline for filing her claim and thought her deadline was February 28, 2022.[2] (Pet., Singleton Decl., ¶ 3 [“I, SINGLETON, miscalculated this six-month deadline to be February 28, 2022.”]).) Petitioner provides not evidence of when she realized she made a mistake and no evidence of any claim filed by February 28, 2022.
Petitioner’s attorney’s declaration, also submitted with the petition, advises Petitioner’s prior attorney “mis-calendared” the “government claim form[’]s deadline” and the “initial six-month period” expired prior to Petitioner retaining her current attorneys. (Gazaryan Decl., ¶ 3.) Petitioner’s attorney’s declaration does not provide the foundation for his statement. In fact, Petitioner’s attorney’s statement indicates his “office realized” the operative deadline had been mis-calendared. (Gazaryan Decl., ¶ 3.) Petitioner’s attorney provides no further explanation concerning the Petitioner’s former attorney’s alleged mis-calendaring.
To be sure, the petition and its supporting documents provide no evidence on the nature of the mis-calendaring. The court cannot conclude how or why the alleged mis-calendaring occurred.
"The mere recital of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is not sufficient to warrant relief. Relief on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is available only upon a showing that the claimant's failure to timely present a claim was reasonable when tested by the objective 'reasonably prudent person' standard." (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 1293 [emphasis added].) Excusable neglect is defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435.)
“When relief is sought based on mistake, because of the reasonably prudent person standard ‘it is not every mistake that will excuse a default, the determining factor being the reasonableness of the misconception.’” (N.G. v. County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 63, 74 [quoting Shank v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 152, 157] [emphasis in original].)
Thus, merely suggesting an attorney made a mistake is insufficient to obtain relief from the requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit. There must be some evidence from which the court can gauge whether the mistake was reasonable.
In response to Petitioner’s moving papers, Respondents both assert Petitioner submitted no evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect sufficient to obtain relief here. The court agrees. As Petitioner failed to meet her burden on the petition based on the evidence in her case-in-chief, she is not entitled to relief from the court through her petition.
Petitioner—in her reply papers—responds to Respondents’ claims she failed to submit evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect with new evidence. Petitioner’s attempt to meet her burden with evidence submitted in reply—evidence to meet her burden—precludes Respondents from a having a meaningful opportunity to respond. As Petitioner failed to submit such evidence as part of her case-in-chief, the petition is denied on the basis that Petitioner failed to meet her burden on the petition.
Even assuming, however, the court considered the evidence Petitioner submitted with her reply papers, the result would be no different. The evidence submitted does not address in any meaningful way mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Petitioner has not submitted any evidence from which the court could gauge the reasonableness of the alleged mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. As noted earlier, “[r]elief on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is available only upon a showing that the claimant's failure to timely present a claim was reasonable when tested by the objective 'reasonably prudent person' standard." (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 1293.)
The evidence Petitioner submitted in reply is scant.
Petitioner’s supplemental declaration explains she hired her current attorneys on April 19, 2022. (Supp. Singleton Decl., ¶ 4.) She explains her prior declaration “was poorly written . . . .” (Supp. Singleton Decl., ¶ 5.) She advises she had hired the law firm of Adamson Ahdoot to represent her interests, and the firm concluded its representation of her in March 2022. (Supp. Singleton Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6.” Petitioner reports she “did not know of the six-month deadline” and did not “attempt to calendar” it herself. (Supp. Singleton Decl., ¶ 7.) Thus, Petitioner has no percipient knowledge of any alleged mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Petitioner “relied on . . . Adamson Ahdoot” to properly represent her interests. (Supp. Singleton Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7.)
Petitioner’s (current) counsel’s declaration is similarly unhelpful to meeting Petitioner’s burden on this petition. As Petitioner’s counsel makes clear, he lacks any first-hand knowledge of the reasons for the failure to timely submit a government claim. Petitioner’s counsel did not seek to obtain the relevant information about the failure to file a claim until November 23, 2022; that is, Petitioner’s counsel waited to contact Adamson Ahdoot until the day he filed Petitioner’s reply papers. (Gazaryan Decl., ¶¶ 10-12.)
Petitioner’s counsel advises Petitioner retained his firm on April 19, 2022.[3] Petitioner represents “Petitioner’s previous attorneys (Adamson Ahdoot) had mis-calendared the six-month deadline to submit the government claim forms.”[4] (Gazaryan Decl., ¶ 8.) Again, that the date was mis-calendared is insufficient to obtain relief. The evidence is nothing more than a recitation there was an error. The court must have sufficient evidence before it from which it can find the mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect was reasonable under the circumstances.
Subdivision (a) of section 946.6 requires Petitioner to demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect for the failure to make a timely claim and the claim was presented to the public entity within a reasonable period of time. (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 1293.) Petitioner must do show by a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner has failed to make that showing here.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 13, 2023 ________________________________
Hon. Mitchell Beckloff
Judge of the Superior Court
[1] All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted.
[2] Evidence submitted in reply indicates the statement in Petitioner’s declaration was in error.
[3] The court notes there is no explanation for the more than three months delay from Petitioner’s retention of her counsel to the day Petitioner filed her request to file a late claim with the City, MTA and the State. There is no evidence to suggest the three-month delay (or the 364-day delay) between the injury and the request to file a late claim with the City, MTA and the State was reasonable.
[4] Petitioner’s counsel did not speak with Petitioner’s former attorney. Petitioner’s counsel reports his firms “internal files state” the date had been mis-calendared. The foundation, if any, for Petitioner’s former counsel’s mis-calendaring is not stated.