Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case Number: 22STCP03798, Date: 2024-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP03798, Date: 2024-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Petitioners, Phi Hong Voong and Ngan Hong Voong dba Eddie’s Liquor & Jr. Market (Eddie’s), request a writ of administrative mandate directing Respondents, the County of Los Angeles (County) and its Department of Regional Planning (Planning Department), to set aside the final administrative decision revoking Petitioners’ deemed-approved status to sell alcohol for off site consumption at Eddie’s.

Petitioners’ Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) of Exhibits A and B is granted.

Eddie’s is a mini-market located in the unincorporated West Athens-Westmont area of the County, on the corner of South Western Avenue and West 108^th Street. (AR 67.) Eddie’s street address is 10803 and 10805 S. Western Avenue. (AR 410, 427, 429, 442, 940.)[1]

A neighborhood coin laundry business is located immediately to the south of Eddie’s. (AR 71.) Retail and other commercial businesses are located on the corners across 108^th Street and Western Avenue. (AR 71.) The area surrounding Eddie’s is mostly residential and also includes a charter high school and two churches. (AR 67, 71, 411-412.)

California’s Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) issued a license to Eddie’s to sell alcohol in 1987. (AR 262.) Petitioners’ license has never been subject to disciplinary action by the ABC. (AR 51-58 and 416.)

At the administrative hearing, Petitioners’ attorney described the history of Eddie’s, and the ongoing services it provides:

[Petitioner] Voong came to the country in 1982, worked hard and able to acquire the store and the property in 1987, 89. He has gone through a number of struggles through civil unrest in 92, where he had to rebuild, but he continued to operate and has the support of the community. . . . He has ties to it that community. He is just not a tenant and been there over 30 years . . . . [E]veryone tries to characterize this as a liquor store. 80 percent of the shelf space isn’t alcohol related product. It carries wide variety of food snacks, alcoholic beverage, dry goods, household products . . . . (AR 1029.)

Because Eddie’s began selling alcohol in or around 1987, it does not have a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County to sell alcohol. (AR 262.) While the County enacted the requirement for a CUP to sell alcohol in West Athens-Westmont in 1990, the County’s ordinance did not require Eddie’s to obtain a CUP. (AR 7-14, 262.)

In 2017, the County’s Board of Supervisors (Board) adopted the Safe Access to Alcohol and Food Establishments Ordinance (SAAFE Ordinance). (AR 263.) The SAAFE Ordinance grants “deemed-approved” status to “any legally-established use that sells alcoholic beverages without a [CUP] . . . and which did not require a [CUP] to sell alcoholic beverages, pursuant to this Title 22, at the time it was established.” (RJN Exh. A; Los Angeles County Code (LACC),

The SAAFE Ordinance also establishes performance standards for deemed-approved businesses. As relevant here, the performance standards include:

1. The use shall be operated and maintained in accordance with this Title 22 and all other applicable federal, State, or local codes, laws, rules, regulations, and statutes, including those of the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.

2. The premises shall be maintained free of garbage, trash, debris, or junk and salvage in exterior areas, except in designated trash collection containers and enclosures.

7. The operator shall not cause, allow, or permit nuisance and other unlawful activities on the premises including, but not limited to:

b. Drinking alcoholic beverages and/or possessing open alcoholic beverage containers in exterior portions of the premises, other than in a designated patio or other area approved for on-site consumption by the Department and/or California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control;

d. Creating excessive noise that does not comply with Title 12 (Environmental Protection) of the County Code to the satisfaction of the Department of Public Health, especially in the late night or early morning hours;

k. Otherwise engaging in conduct that is unlawful and/or constitutes a nuisance.

8. The operator shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the conditions and activities on the lot or parcel of land on which the use is located do not constitute a public nuisance. For purposes of this performance standard, reasonable steps include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Requesting that those persons engaging in conduct that constitutes a nuisance to cease such conduct, unless the operator has reasonable cause to believe such request may jeopardize his or her personal safety;

b. Calling the Sheriff’s Department if the operator's attempts to abate the nuisance conduct have been unsuccessful, or if the operator has reasonable cause to believe such attempts may jeopardize his or her personal safety; and

c. Timely preventive actions to address conditions that facilitate loitering and other nuisance activity on the premises, such as removing furniture from areas adjacent to the entry of the establishment, prohibiting persons from using any portion of the premises for the installation and/or operation of a temporary business or other use, and/or other preventive actions.

The SAAFE Ordinance provides the County’s Regional Planning Commission (Commission) may revoke the deemed-approved status of an establishment due to non-compliance with the ordinance’s performance standards and require a CUP for any subsequent sale of alcohol on the premises. (LACC, § 22.140.030.J.) The Commission may take such action after a public hearing.

Starting around May 2020, the County’s Sheriff’s Department and the Planning Department investigated Eddie’s compliance with the SAAFE Ordinance’s performance standards. (AR 410-423.) The County’s inspections revealed trash on the premises, failure to maintain required landscaping, and an unapproved freestanding pole sign. (AR 416.)

The Sheriff’s Department also provided data evidencing 106 calls for service dispatched to the location between October 19, 2017 (the effective date of the SAAFE Ordinance) and July 31, 2020 with 22 crime incidents documented during that period. (AR 414-415.) According to a staff report prepared by the Planning Department, the Sheriff’s Department data recorded 43 incidents of loitering during that period; 29 incidents of drinking alcoholic beverages and/or possessing open alcoholic beverage containers; 61 incidents of disturbing the peace; 6 incidents of harassing of passerby or business patrons; and other criminal activity. (AR 418-419.)

“In the review of the calls for service, the Sheriff’s Department determined that some of the 106 calls for service received between October 19, 2017 and July 31, 2020 were likely from employees of [Eddie’s]. However, due to a variety of factors, including anonymous callers or unknown employees’ names, the Sheriff’s Department cannot definitively determine the exact number of calls originated by employees of [Eddie’s].” (AR 421 [staff report].)

“During the October 28, 2020 inspection, Staff interviewed the business owner, Mr. Phi Hong Voong, in person at [Eddie’s]. Staff asked him if there were any ongoing nuisance issues at the location. He stated while he sometimes had issues with loitering from neighbors, that such nuisances have decreased since the COVID-19 pandemic. However, staff observed the presence of loiterers on the premises seated on several furniture pieces on the western portion of the property, but Mr. Voong did not address the nuisance.” (AR 421 [staff report].)

On November 25, 2020, the Planning Department sent a notice to Petitioners alleging violations of the SAAFE Ordinance’s performance standards. (AR 77-79.)

On December 8, 2020, the County initiated a public hearing and scheduled it for February 17, 2021. (AR 262-263.) Toward that end, the County mailed notice of the public hearing to Petitioners and neighbors of Eddie’s, posted it in the newspaper, online, and in the window of Eddie’s. (AR 211, AR 265-272, AR 277-405.)

The County received public comments in advance of the hearing, including hundreds of signatures on a petition supporting maintenance of Petitioners’ deemed-approved status. The County also received public comments in support of revoking Petitioners’ deemed-approved status. (AR 516-752.)

At the public hearing, Planning Department staff and a lieutenant with the Sheriff’s Department provided a presentation in support of revoking Petitioners’ deemed-approved status. (AR 1022-1028.) Petitioners’ counsel gave a presentation and rebuttal after public comment. (AR 754, 1028-1036, 1049.) At the close of the hearing, the Commission voted unanimously to revoke Petitioners’ deemed-approved status. (AR 1050-1051.)

On February 18, 2021, the Commission provided notice to Petitioners it had revoked Eddie’s deemed-approved status with eight pages of findings. (AR 788-815.) The parties agree the Commission’s decision is at issue in this proceeding. (See Opening Brief 2:1-20; RJN Exh. B; Opposition 9:25-28.)[2]

Petitioners seek relief from the court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the relevant issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

Petitioner contends judicial review of the Commission’s factual findings is pursuant to the independent judgment test. Petitioners argue independent judgment is required because “Petitioners have operated for some 34 years under vested alcohol sale authority.” (Opening Brief 4:17.)

“The courts must decide on a case-by-case basis whether an administrative decision or class of decisions substantially affects fundamental vested rights and thus requires independent judgment review.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144.) “ ‘In determining whether the right is fundamental the courts do not alone weigh the economic aspect of it, but the effect of it in human terms and the importance of it to the individual in the life situation.’ . . . The ultimate question in each case is whether the affected right is deemed to be of sufficient significance to preclude its extinction or abridgement by a body lacking judicial power.” (Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1281.)

“Administrative decisions which result in restricting a property owner’s return on his property, increasing the cost of doing business, or reducing profits are considered impacts on economic interests, rather than on fundamental vested rights.” (E.W.A.P., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 310, 325.) Where, as here, a land use decision is challenged by administrative mandate, courts will usually apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317; Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1527 (Goat Hill Tavern) [“The courts have rarely upheld the application of the independent judgment test to land use decisions.”])

“In contrast, the independent judgment test is applied to review administrative decisions that will drive an owner out of business or significantly injure the business's ability to function.” (Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at 1281; see Goat Hill, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at 1529 [independent judgment test applied because city’s decision would have resulted in the loss of owner’s 35-year-old tavern, a business in which the owner had recently spent $1.75 million to refurbish]; The Termo Co. v. Luther (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 394, 407 [fundamental vested right to extract oil from wells that had been permitted for 20 years].)

Here, the administrative decision impacts Petitioners’ deemed-approved status, but it does not revoke Petitioners’ state-issued ABC license. Thus, nothing prevents Petitioners from applying for a CUP to continue to sell alcohol at Eddie’s with their state-issued ABC license. (See AR 7-49 and RJN Exh. A.)

Petitioners do not discuss the process for obtaining a CUP or the likelihood Petitioners could obtain a CUP to sell alcohol at Eddie’s. Nor do Petitioners develop an argument the conditions that might be imposed by the County with the CUP would be unduly burdensome or expensive. Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden to show that the requirement to pursue a CUP would force them out of business. (See Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at 1282 [“plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the cost of the operating conditions that the City imposed would force Tam's out of business”].)

Petitioners also do not cite evidence of the percentage of Eddie’s revenue derived from alcohol sales. As Petitioners’ attorney admitted during the administrative hearing, Eddie’s is not properly characterized as a liquor store; it is a market and “80 percent of the shelf space isn’t alcohol related product.” (AR 1029.) “It carries wide variety of food snacks, alcoholic beverage, dry goods, household products . . . .” (AR 1029.) Petitioners themselves did not testify at the hearing and, as a result, did not present any direct testimony about the impact of the administrative decision on their business, their livelihoods, or their personal life situations. (See AR 755; 1036 at 11:59:42-57.) In such circumstances, Petitioners have not presented evidence the administrative decision will drive them out of business, significantly injure the business’s ability to function, or otherwise implicate a fundamental vested right. The court concludes the administrative decision impacts purely economic interests related to Petitioners’ operation of Eddie’s and is subject to substantial evidence review.

Petitioners’ reliance on Goat Hill Tavern is misplaced; the case is distinguishable. There, the “Goat Hill Tavern ha[d] been in operation for over 35 years as a legal nonconforming use. Ziemer [the owner] invested over $1.75 million in its refurbishment.” (Goat Hill Tavern, supra, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 1529.) The owner expanded the tavern to include a game room and obtained a temporary conditional use permit. (Id. at 1523.) When the temporary conditional use permit expired, the city would not renew the permit in response to complaints “largely related to late night noise in the parking lot and trash.” (Id. at 1524.) “The avowed purpose and result of the city’s decision is to shut down Goat Hill.” (Id. at 1528.) The Court held “[w]e cannot conclude on these unique facts that [the owner’s] right to continued operation of his business is not a fundamental vested right. This is not, as the city so strongly urges, a ‘purely economic privilege.’ It is the right to continue operating an established business in which he has made a substantial investment.” (Id. at 1529.)

In contrast to Goat Hill Tavern, Petitioners do not demonstrate the purpose or effect of the administrative decision is to close Eddie’s. Petitioners also do not cite evidence of the amount of money they have invested in Eddie’s, the percentage of revenues Eddie’s derives from alcohol sales, the specific impact on Petitioners’ business or life situations (monetarily or otherwise) of losing deemed-approved status, or the monetary and operational burden of pursuing a CUP for alcohol sales at Eddie’s. Accordingly, on this record, the court concludes the administrative decision does not impact a fundamental vested right and the substantial evidence standard applies to the administrative fact findings.

Substantial evidence is relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Board (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 575, 584-85), or evidence of ponderable legal significance which is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (Mohilef v. Janovici (1996) 51 Cal. App. 4th 267, 305 n. 28.) Under this standard of review, “[c]ourts may reverse an [administrative] decision only if, based on the evidence . . ., a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency.” (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 602, 610.)

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, the evidence does not support the administrative findings. (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (1958) 166 Cal. App. 2d 129, 137.)

“ ‘On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.’ ” (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.) “A challenge to the procedural fairness of the administrative hearing is reviewed de novo on appeal because the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.” (Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.)[3]

Petitioners assert two constitutional attacks against the SAAFE Ordinance: preemption and vagueness.

“A party claiming that a legislative enactment is invalid on its face confronts daunting obstacles to success. The first hurdle to overcome is the bedrock principle that courts are exceedingly reluctant to declare legislation unconstitutional. From this reluctance has come the oft-cited rule that ‘All presumptions and intendments favor the validity of a statute and mere doubt does not afford sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of invalidity. Statutes must be upheld unless their constitutionality clearly, positively and unmistakably appears.’ ” (Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Board of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129, 137.)

Petitioners contend the SAAFE Ordinance is pre-empted by article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23000, et seq.) because “exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the California State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to discipline authority to sell alcoholic beverages . . . .” (Opening Brief 3:18-19.)

“ ‘Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, ‘[a] county or city may make

and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations

not in conflict with general laws.’ If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void. A conflict exists if the local legislation duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. . . . Local legislation is ‘duplicative’ of general law when it is coextensive

therewith . . . . Similarly, local legislation is ‘contradictory’ to general law when it is inimical thereto.” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Carlsbad (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 785, 792-793.)

Courts “have been particularly ‘reluctant to infer legislative intent to preempt a field covered by municipal regulation when there is a significant local interest to be served that may differ from one locality to another.’ ” (Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149.) “ ‘[A]bsent a clear indication of preemptive intent from the Legislature,’ we presume that local regulation ‘in an area over which [the local government] traditionally has exercised control’ is not preempted by state law. [Citation.] ‘The party claiming that general state law preempts a local ordinance has the burden of demonstrating preemption.’ ” (Rental Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 741, 752.)

Here, other than asserting the “A.B.C. Department has constitutionally mandated exclusivity in licensing and disciplining the sale of alcoholic beverages in California,” Petitioners provide no legal analysis in support of their preemption claim. (Opening Brief 5:17-18.) Petitioners do not explain whether they contend the SAAFE Ordinance duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law. Nor do Petitioners analyze the language of article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. Accordingly, Petitioners do not meet their burden to prove preemption.

Moreover, Petitioners’ preemption arguments “have already been squarely rejected by the Court of Appeal with respect to an ordinance very similar to the SAAFE ordinance enacted in the City of Los Angeles.” (Opposition 13:19-20.) Specifically, in Korean American Local Advocacy Foundation v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 376 [Korean American Local Advocacy Foundation], owners of retail stores licensed to sell alcoholic beverages in South Central Los Angeles sued to enjoin the City of Los Angeles from enforcing ordinances that, like the SAAFE Ordinance, authorized revocation of the deemed-approved status of a business that had become a nuisance in the area. (Id. at 382-383.) The trial court sustained without leave to amend the city’s demurrer to the plaintiffs’ causes of action that challenged the ordinances on preemption grounds.

[T]he City’s ordinance is a geographic limitation which imposes conditions on restricted businesses allowed to operate within the particular area. The focus of the City’s ordinance is on the negative conduct which tends to occur on premises immediately surrounding retail establishments selling alcoholic beverages for off-site consumption. The effect of the conditions imposed under the ordinance is to reduce or eliminate the nuisance activities these businesses tend to attract. That the conditions imposed under the ordinance may have some indirect impact on the sale of alcoholic beverages does not transmute the purpose and scope of the ordinance into a regulation merely seeking to control alcohol sales. (Id. at 389.)

Because the statutory language of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act expressly allows local governments to enact supplementary legislation directed at zoning or land use, there is no preemption by implication of the City's ordinances which are directed at the land use effects of these businesses. In sum, we are persuaded state law has not completely preempted the field and the local regulation is a valid exercise of the City's authority to enact zoning and land-use regulations.” (Id. at 394.)

In reply, Petitioners do not respond to or distinguish Korean American Local Advocacy Foundation; they therefore effectively concede the issue. (See Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”].) Petitioners develop no argument the preemption analysis here should be different with respect to the SAAFE Ordinance given the similarity of the ordinances at issue in Korean American Local Advocacy Foundation. The court finds Korean American Local Advocacy Foundation to be persuasive and controlling. Thus, Petitioners do not demonstrate the SAAFE Ordinance is preempted by state law.

Accordingly, the court finds the SAAFE Ordinance is not preempted by article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution. The ordinance does not regulate alcohol sales. Instead, the SAAFE ordinance is a valid exercise of the County’s police powers to control and abate nuisances. The function of the SAAFE Ordinance is zoning, not control of the sale of alcohol.[4]

“Because the constitutional guarantee of due process generally secures the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard . . ., a law is unconstitutionally vague only it if fails to ‘give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited’ or to know ‘what conduct on [his or her] part will render [him or her] liable to [the law’s] penalties.’ ” (Diaz v. Grill Concepts Services, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal. App. 5th 859, 870.)

“This vagueness standard is hard to meet, and its stringency is not accidental. Language itself is notoriously imprecise. . . . Laws are also accorded a ‘strong presumption’ of constitutionality that is rebutted only upon a showing that they are ‘clearly, positively, and unmistakably’ unconstitutional. . . . And when the law ‘regulates business behavior,’ the general presumption of constitutionality is even stronger and, more to the point, the law ‘is subject to a less strict vagueness test’ because such laws have a narrower reach and because ‘businesses . . . can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.’ ” (Ibid.)

“A law is consequently vague only if it is impossible to give the law a ‘reasonable and practical construction.’. . . This assessment is not made in a vacuum. To the contrary, ‘[t]he particular context is all important.’ . . . This assessment therefore entails ‘consulting ‘other definable sources’—such as other statutes and regulations, legislative history, judicial opinions, legal treatises, and legal dictionaries—'that may dispel doubt and uncertainty’ appearing on the face of the law alone. . . . In light of these standards, it is not enough to show that a law lacks the precision of a laser or of mathematics. . . . Nor is it enough to show that the law ‘requires interpretation’. . ., that the law’s meaning is ‘difficult to ascertain’ . . ., or that the law is ‘difficult to apply’.” (Id. at 870-871.)

Petitioners contend the phrases “jeopardize or endanger,” “public health,” and “adverse effects” in LACC section 22.140.030.J.2.f.i-.ii) are vague. (Opening Brief 11:21-12:7.) LACC section 22.140.030.J.2.f provides:

At the close of the public hearing, the Commission may allow the use to retain its deemed-approved status, or may revoke the deemed-approved status when the information in the Director's report, or presented at public hearing, substantiates the following findings:

i. Due to non-compliance with Section 22.140.030.1 (Performance Standards for Deemed-Approved Uses), the use results in adverse effects to the health, welfare, peace, or safety of persons visiting, residing, working, or conducting business in the surrounding area; and

ii. Due to non-compliance with Section 22.140.030.1 (Performance Standards for Deemed-Approved Uses), the use jeopardizes or endangers the public health, welfare, or safety of persons visiting, residing, working, or conducting business in the surrounding area,

Our Supreme Court has held similar language in an ordinance allowing denial of a license application “ ‘if the Board finds that the said operation will not comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, and general welfare of the public’. . . furnishes adequate standards to guide the Board in licensing matters and is not unconstitutionally vague.” (Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners (1972) 7 Cal.3d 64, 71-73.) The Court explained:

It should be kept in mind that there are an infinite variety of activities or conduct which could result in potential or actual danger to the ‘peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, and general welfare’ of the public. A municipality cannot reasonably be expected to isolate and specify those precise activities or conduct which are intended to be proscribed. . . . Thus, in the absence of an ascertainable effect upon First Amendment activities, [the ordinance] provides an adequate standard to guide the Board’s discretion, namely, that it must exercise its permit powers in a reasonable, rather than arbitrary, manner to promote the interest of the public. (Id. at 73-74.)

With respect to land use ordinances, the Court of Appeal has similarly explained:

Land use ordinances precluding uses detrimental to the ‘general welfare’ are not unconstitutionally vague. In fact, a substantial amount of vagueness is permitted in California zoning ordinances: [I]n California, the most general zoning standards are usually deemed sufficient. The standard is sufficient if the administrative body is required to make its decision in accord with the general health, safety, and welfare standard. (SP Star Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 459, 473 [cleaned up].)

Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra, 7 Cal.3d at 71-73 and SP Star Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at 473 make clear the SAAFE Ordinance is not unconstitutional on vagueness grounds. Petitioners have not demonstrated otherwise, and they fail to address applicable authorities on the issue.

Further, as applied here, the SAAFE Ordinance prohibits operators with deemed-approved status from allowing a nuisance or other unlawful activities on the premises, including loitering, disturbing the peace, and other unlawful conduct. As these crimes are explicitly included in the performance standards, a person of “ordinary intelligence” would have “fair notice” that allowing these crimes to proliferate at a business may be grounds for revocation of deemed-approved status.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioners do not meet their burden of demonstrating the SAAFE Ordinance is void for vagueness.

Respondents revoked Petitioners’ vested authority without affording Petitioners a meaningful opportunity to know precisely the charges against them and a meaningful opportunity to defend against same. The Respondents thus deprived Petitioners of very basic, constitutionally protected rights under the Due Process Clause of the California Constitution. (Opening Brief 3:5-9.)[5]

“Generally, a fair procedure requires ‘notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action . . . and an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” (Doe v. University of Southern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 240.) Due process principles, as applied to administrative proceedings, are similar. (See ibid.; Gross v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565.) Procedural errors, “even if proved, are subject to a harmless error analysis.” (Hinrichs v. County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.)

Respondents provided Petitioners with adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the allegations. Respondents provided notice of the hearing by mail, newspaper, and through posting. (AR 211, 265-272, 277, 280, 401-405.) Petitioners appeared at the hearing and were represented at the hearing by an attorney, who provided a full argument and, after public comment, a rebuttal. (AR 1028-1036, 1049.)

Petitioners contend “[t]he public hearing was not conducted in compliance with Los Angeles County Section §22.222.120.” (Opening Brief 3:14-15.) However, Petitioners do not explain how the public hearing deviated from the required procedures. Nor do Petitioners suggest how they were prejudiced, if at all, by any alleged procedural error.

Petitioners have not met their burden of demonstrating Respondents denied them a fair hearing or deprived them of due process.

As discussed earlier, the substantial evidence standard of review applies to the administrative factual findings. Under such review, “[the court] do[es] not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. The administrative agency’s findings come before [the court] with a strong presumption as to their correctness and regularity. [The court] do[es] not substitute [its] judgment if the agency’s decision is one which could have been made by reasonable people. Only if no reasonable person could reach the conclusion reached by the administrative agency, based on the entire record before it, will a court conclude that the agency’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. (Doe v. Regents of the University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1073.)

Significantly, when a challenge is to “the sufficiency of the evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely [a challenger’s] own evidence.” (Toigo v. Town of Ross, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 317.) “And in doing so, the challenger cannot simply ignore the evidence in the record that was relied upon by the board . . . . Rather, the challenger must explain why that evidence is insufficient to support that finding.” (Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 513.) Failure to adequately discuss the evidence relied upon by the agency waives challenge to the administrative findings. (See ibid. and Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at 862-863 [argument waived if not raised or adequately briefed]; Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1282 [same].) This court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742; see also Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo County Board of Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14. [“We are not required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains support for [the parties’] contentions.”])

As a preliminary matter, Petitioners have not challenged the County’s findings Petitioners failed to satisfy performance standards related to maintenance of the premises. (See AR 791; LACC,

§ 22.140.030.I.1 and 2.) In any event, substantial evidence supports the findings Petitioners failed to satisfy maintenance performance standards because “Required landscaping is not being maintained”; “junk and salvage material [are] maintained on premises”; “a freestanding pole sign is displayed without [Planning Department] approval”; and “Staff has observed clothing, furniture, and junk and salvage in exterior areas, along the western boundary of the location.” (See e.g. AR 415-417, 1024-1026, 77-260.) Petitioners have developed no argument to the contrary.[6] (See generally Opening Brief 6-10 and Reply.)

Petitioners make two principal attacks on the adequacy of the evidence supporting revocation. First, they claim there is insufficient evidence of a “nexus” between any acts or omissions of Petitioners and the police calls and crime statistics relied on by the County to find violations of the SAAFE Ordinance performance standards. Second, Petitioners contend there is no comparative evidence in the record such that the number of police calls made to Eddie’s could be found “excessive.” Petitioners also generally argue “[t]here is no evidence in this record that any such [police] calls, except 12 of them, were actually made to Eddie’s Liquor itself” and the evidence does not show that certain crimes, such as loitering, alcohol consumption, or disturbances of the peace, actually occurred on Eddie’s premises. (Opening Brief 8:1-2, 8:23-10:17.)

To maintain a deemed-approved status under the SAAFE Ordinance, an operator “shall not cause, allow, or permit nuisance and other unlawful activities on the premises including, but not limited to: . . . [numerous unlawful activities].” (LACC, § 22.140.030.I.7.) Thus, the plain language of the SAAFE Ordinance requires some causal connection or nexus between the acts or omissions of the operator and the "unlawful activities,” which must occur “on the premises” to violate the SAAFE Ordinance’s performance standards. The SAAFE Ordinance is consistent with the law of nuisance. “A property owner who fails to take reasonable actions to prevent criminal activity on the owner's property may be subject to nuisance liability if that criminal activity harms the surrounding community.” (Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at 1282-1283.)

Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, however, there is no requirement in the SAAFE Ordinance or applicable law that the County establish the number of law enforcement service calls to Eddie’s was “excessive” or that the County submit “comparative evidence” of the number of police calls to a similar business establishment. (See Opening Brief 7:19-24.)

Petitioners support their “comparative evidence” position with BSA, Inc. v. King County (9^th Cir. 1986) 804 F.2d 1104 [BSA, Inc.]. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in BSA, Inc., however, is inapposite. BSA, Inc. involved a First Amendment challenge to Washington state ordinances prohibiting barroom nude topless dancing. The Court noted “[w]here a regulation places a substantial restriction on free expression, as does this ban on nude dancing, it is subject to strict scrutiny.” (Id. at 1108.) For a ban on expressive conduct to survive strict scrutiny analysis, “the government must show that the business has an impact ‘different’ than other businesses to justify the restriction was intended to accomplish its stated purposes.” (Ibid.) In this specific context, the Court criticized the government’s failure to provide “comparative statistics” with respect to other businesses. (Ibid.)[7]

Petitioners do not challenge the SAAFE Ordinance on First Amendment grounds; they also identify no reason the ordinance should be subjected to strict scrutiny review. BSA, Inc. does not hold that comparative statistics must be submitted by a local government in a land-use matter involving allegations of nuisance against a property owner. “ ‘It is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court. An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.’ ” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-155.) Therefore, the court rejects Petitioners’ “comparative evidence” claim as unsupported in the law.

Accordingly, the court considers whether substantial evidence supports Respondents’ findings

· Petitioners caused, allowed, or permitted nuisance and other unlawful activities on the premises and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent such nuisance activities on the premises; and

· Petitioners’ failure to comply with the performance standards “results in adverse effects to the health, welfare, peace, and/or safety of persons visiting, residing, working, or conducting business in the surrounding area.” (AR 791-796.)

Substantial Evidence Supports Respondents’ Findings Petitioners Caused, Allowed, or Permitted Nuisance and Other Unlawful Activities on the Premises and Failed to Take Reasonable Steps to Prevent Such Nuisance Activities on the Premises

Respondents found Petitioners failed to comply with LACC section 22.140.030.I.7.a, b, e, f, g, h, i, j, and k of the SAAFE Ordinance because Petitioners caused, allowed, or permitted nuisance and other unlawful activities on the premises between October 19, 2017 and July 31, 2020. The incidents recorded by the Sheriff’s Department included loitering; drinking alcoholic beverages and/or possessing alcoholic beverage containers in exterior portions of the premises; disturbing the peace; illegal tobacco sales, drug activity, gambling, or prostitution; trafficking in stolen goods; harassing of passerby or business patrons; panhandling; vandalism; and other conduct that is unlawful and/or constitutes a nuisance. (AR 791-793.)

Petitioners argue “[t]here is no evidence in this record that any such [police] calls, except 12 of them, were actually made to Eddie’s Liquor itself.” (Opening Brief 8:1-2.) However, Petitioners do not discuss all relevant evidence supporting the administrative findings, including the staff report to the Commission and inspection photographs and videos (AR 81-260, 409-514) and extensive crime statistics and supporting documentation from the Sheriff’s Department. (AR 439-487, 926-1018.)

Respondents cite substantial evidence from the staff report and Sheriff’s Department documentation demonstrating during the period between October 19, 2017 and July 31, 2020, there were 22 instances of a crime report or arrest at Eddie’s and 106 law enforcement calls to Eddie’s or its immediate exterior vicinity (sidewalk, street, alleyway, or parking lot). (Opposition 19:10-15; see AR 412-422, 440-442, 930-932, 940-953.) Significantly, the Sheriff’s Department Crime Incidents Report and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Report specifically differentiate between crime reports/arrests and law enforcement calls to the “Liquor Store” (10803 and 10805 S. Western Avenue and immediate exterior vicinity) and other nearby locations (e.g., adjacent business at 10815 S. Western Avenue or the intersection of West 108^th Street and South Western Avenue). (See AR 440-442.) Petitioners fail to address evidence the Sheriff’s Department excluded the nearby intersection and neighboring business from the crime statistics for Eddie’s. Thus, contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, the record contains substantial evidence the 106 police calls were made to Eddie’s.[8]

The staff report states among the 106 law enforcement service calls to and 22 crime incidents at Eddie’s[9] involved crimes that explicitly violate the performance standards in the SAAFE Ordinance, specifically: 43 incidents of loitering; 29 incidents of drinking alcoholic beverages and/or possessing open alcoholic beverage containers; 61 instances of disturbing the peace; 3 incidents of illegal tobacco sales, drug activity, gambling, or prostitution; 1 incident of trafficking in stolen goods; 6 incidents of harassing of passerby or business patrons; 1 incident of panhandling; 1 incident of vandalism; and 20 incidents of other conduct that is unlawful or constitutes a nuisance. (AR 418-20.)

The staff report provided specific descriptions of events at Eddie’s resulting in a law enforcement calls for service:

· 9/20/2018 – Group of male adults hanging out drinking alcohol and cursing at store workers.

· 10/06/2018 – Individual slouched over and motionless at the location from using narcotics

· 08/07/2019 – 10 persons loitering, drinking, arguing, harassing patrons, and refusing to leave

· 12/12/2019 – Male adult living in the location parking lot refusing to leave

· 12/28/2019 – Suspects shoplifting alcohol, cigarette, and lottery tickets and physically assaulting store workers.

In their Opening Brief, Petitioners have not provided a comprehensive discussion of the staff report or Sheriff’s Department documentation. Petitioners do not demonstrate in their Opening Brief the staff report summary is not substantial evidence in support of the administrative findings. Notably, the staff report is supported by various Sheriff’s Department reports and documentation, including a detailed “Problem Profile” report documenting numerous instances of illegal activity, including loitering, disturbing the peace, and other incidents summarized in the staff report. (AR 940-953.)[10]

For the first time in their Reply, Petitioners argue certain call records do not name “Eddie’s Liquor” as the location for the law enforcement service calls. Petitioners also argue, for the first time in Reply, “[t]he[] isolated reports [pertaining to Eddie’s] are essentially de minimus.” (Reply 3:17-4:24 [citing AR 459-487].)[11]

“The salutary rule is that points raised in a reply brief for the first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for the failure to present them before.” (Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010; see also Regency Outdoor Advertising v. Carolina Lances, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1333.) Petitioners filed their petition in October 2022 and the court set the matter for trial more than a year ago. Petitioners do not show good cause to raise these new arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence in their Reply Brief. Petitioners have deprived Respondents of a full and fair opportunity to respond to the argument. Accordingly, the court is inclined to reject them.

Even assuming the court exercises its discretion to consider the late argument, it is unpersuasive. Petitioners’ reply argument focuses on a single report before the Planning Department—the Regional Allocation of Police Services (RAPS) Report, submitted as Exhibit F to the staff report. (AR 443-487.) The administrative findings, however, are not based solely on the RAPS Report. The findings are also based on the staff report (AR 412-422); photographs of the premises, including photographs that appear to show persons loitering on the exterior premises of Eddie’s (AR 81-260); and other Sheriff’s Department crime statistics documentation, such as the detailed “Problem Profile” report, that includes incidents not documented in the RAPS Report.[12] (AR 940-953.)

Petitioners do not show they objected to any of this evidence at the administrative hearing. Because Petitioners do not address all relevant record evidence that supports the administrative findings, they do not meet their burden to show a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (See Toigo v. Town of Ross, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 317; Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd., supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at 513; Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at 862-863.) Further, as Petitioners acknowledge, the RAPS Report documents incidents of loitering (AR 449, 459), disturbing the peace (AR 466, 474, 476), and an apparent assault at the premises (AR 448 [attempted stabbing with scissors], 482). Thus, the RAPS Report, in conjunction with other evidence, supports the administrative findings. (See AR 459-487.)

The staff report and Sheriff Department’s reports document numerous incidents of illegal activity at the premises, including 43 incidents of loitering and 61 incidents of disturbing the peace. While it is true such incidents occurred over more than two years, Petitioners have a legal duty pursuant to the SAAFE Ordinance to ensure that such illegal activities do not occur with regularity on their premises and to take reasonable steps to prevent a public nuisance from occurring on the premises. In that context, the number of illegal activities occurring at the premises from October 19, 2017 and July 31, 2020, is not de minimis, as Petitioners suggest in reply. (See Reply 4:20-24.)

Petitioners also contend there is no evidence they caused, had knowledge of, or allowed the illegal activities that occurred on the premises. The staff report, photographs, Crime Incidents Report, CAD Report, Sheriff’s Department Problem Profile report, and other Sheriff’s Department documentation, as well as the testimony of the Sheriff’s Department lieutenant at the hearing, are substantial evidence in support of the administrative findings regarding the types and numbers of illegal activities occurring at the premises. (See AR 81-260, 409-514, 926-1018, 1022-1028.) Notably, Petitioners did not testify at the hearing and did not rebut this substantial evidence. Because Petitioners are the owners and operators of the premises and because the crime statistics show recurring nuisance activities for a long period of time, it may reasonably be inferred Petitioners had knowledge of the illegal activities and managed the premises in a manner that allowed such illegal activities to occur.

Photographs in the record, taken by Planning Department staff, further corroborate the Sheriff’s Department documentation of loitering at the premises. (See e.g., AR 81-95.) The photographs show chairs in the parking lot of Eddie’s (AR 168), persons sitting on those chairs and other objects on the exterior premises of Eddie’s (AR 85, 110, 122) and persons standing outside of Eddie’s (AR 110, 117). Respondents could reasonably infer from the photographs and crime statistics that Petitioners allowed or permitted loitering at the premises. Petitioners’ arguments to the contrary lack evidentiary support and are unpersuasive.

Respondents also found Petitioners failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure the conditions and activities on the lot or parcel of land on which the use is located do not constitute a public nuisance in violation of LACC section 22.140.030.I.8. (AR 793.) Respondents acknowledged at least some of the 106 calls for service “were likely from employees of the Establishment,” but noted that “due to a variety of factors, including anonymous callers or unknown employees’ names, the Sheriff’s Department cannot definitively determine the exact number of calls originated by employees of the Establishment.” (AR 794.) Respondents also cited evidence that Petitioners did not address the presence of loiterers on the premises during an inspection on October 28, 2020, and Petitioners did not provide documentation of measures they have taken to address nuisances. (AR 794.)

Petitioners do not show Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion with their factual findings. Petitioners argue they are “victims” of some of the illegal activities on the premises, and Petitioners’ employees made some of the calls for service. Petitioners also assert, in reply, LACC section “§22.140.030 (I) (9) (b) absolutely mandated that Eddie’s Liquor report any perceived misconduct in its premises to the Sheriff.” (Reply 5:1-2.) Nonetheless, even assuming Petitioners’ employees made some of the calls for service, that does not demonstrate Petitioners had taken reasonable steps to address the nuisances given the large volume of calls for service and ongoing incidents of illegal activities over more than two years. Petitioners and their employees did not testify at the administrative hearing, and Petitioners cite no evidence in the record showing Petitioners took reasonable steps to ensure nuisance activities did not occur at the premises. For example, Petitioners do not explain the photographic evidence showing persons loitering on chairs outside of the premises. (AR 81-95, 85.) They also do not cite evidence of taking reasonable operational steps such as hiring a security guard to curtail nuisance activities.

Based on the foregoing, substantial evidence supports Respondents’ findings Petitioners caused, allowed, or permitted nuisance and other unlawful activities on the premises. Substantial evidence also supports Respondents’ findings Petitioners failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure the conditions and activities on the lot or parcel of land on which the use is located do not constitute a public nuisance, in violation of LACC section 22.140.030.I.7 and 22.140.030.I.8.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding Petitioners’ Failure to Comply with Performance Standards Results in Adverse Effects to the Health, Welfare, Peace, and/or Safety of Persons Visiting, Residing, Working, or Conducting Business in the Surrounding Area

Respondents found Petitioners’ “failure to comply with the performance standards established by Section 22.140.030.I for deemed-approved uses results in adverse effects to the health, welfare, peace, and/or safety of persons visiting, residing, working, or conducting business in the surrounding area.” (AR 796.) As discussed earlier, the court rejects Petitioners’ argument this provision of the SAAFE Ordinance is void for vagueness. Petitioners otherwise do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of this finding. Based on the evidence of recurring illegal, nuisance activities on the premises, substantial evidence supports the finding Petitioners’ failure to comply with performance standards results in adverse effects to the health, welfare, peace, and/or safety of persons visiting, residing, working, or conducting business in the surrounding area.

Substantial evidence supports all of Respondents’ administrative findings. Petitioners also do not show a prejudicial abuse of discretion as to any specific finding made by Respondents.

As discussed, the court concludes the substantial evidence test applies to review Respondents’ administrative findings. However, even if the court were to conclude the revocation of Petitioners’ deemed-approved status implicated a fundamental vested right, and the court used its independent judgment test to review the administrative findings, the court reaches the same result.

Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno, supra, 4 Cal.3d at 143.) The court may draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the credibility of witnesses. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) However, “in exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angeles (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817; see also Evid. Code, § 664.)

Here, in the alternative, the court exercises its independent judgment and concludes Respondents’ administrative findings are amply supported by the weight of the evidence. (See AR 790-796.) As noted, Petitioners have not challenged the findings Petitioners failed to satisfy performance standards related to maintenance of the premises. (See AR 791; LACC,

§ 22.140.030.I.1 and 2.) The court concludes the weight of the evidence—the staff report, photographs, Crime Incidents Report, CAD Report, Sheriff’s Department Problem Profile report, and other Sheriff’s Department documentation, as well as the testimony of the Sheriff’s Department lieutenant at the hearing—support of the administrative findings concerning the types and numbers of illegal activities occurring at the premises. (See AR 81-260, 409-514, 926-1018, 1022-1028.)

Because Petitioners are the owners and operators of the premises and because the crime statistics show recurring nuisance activities for a long period of time, the weight of the evidence supports the finding Petitioners had knowledge of the illegal activities and managed the premises in a manner that allowed such illegal activities to occur. Given the large volume of recurring illegal, nuisance activities over a long period of time, the weight of the evidence supports the finding Petitioners did not take reasonable steps to address the nuisances. Further, Petitioners cite insufficient evidence of reasonable steps taken to address the nuisances, such as the hiring of a security guard or removal of chairs used for loitering. Based on the evidence of recurring illegal, nuisance activities on the premises, the weight of the evidence supports the finding that Petitioners’ failure to comply with performance standards results in adverse effects to the health, welfare, peace, and/or safety of persons visiting, residing, working, or conducting business in the surrounding area.

The weight of the evidence supports all administrative findings. Moreover, Petitioners also do not show a prejudicial abuse of discretion in any specific finding made by Respondents.

[1] While a staff report states Eddie’s address as 10803 S. Western Avenue (AR 410), certain California licensing and business records reflects Supreme Euphoria No. 43. Inc., which apparently owns Eddie’s and/or the state liquor license (see Opposition 7:25-26), has an address of 10805 S. Western Avenue. (AR 57-63.) Further, based on sheriff’s department crime statistics reports, it appears Eddie’s addresses are both 10803 S. Western Avenue and 10805 S. Western Avenue. (See AR 442 [crime statistics for both addresses]; AR 940 [map and report showing Eddie’s address as 10805 S. Western Avenue].) At the hearing, the court requests counsel confirm Eddie’s address includes both 10803 S. and 10805 S. Western Avenue.

[2] On August 23, 2022, in Case No. 21STCP03392, the Honorable James Chalfant issued a minute order stating: “Pursuant to agreement of counsel, the court issues the following oral Stipulated Judgment granting a portion of the relief sought in the Petition based on Tran v. The County of Los Angeles [74 Cal.App.5th 154]. The Board of Supervisors decision that is at issue is set aside. The operative decision will be the Planning Commission’s decision.” (RJN Exh. B.)

[3] While the court concludes substantial evidence review is required here, the court nonetheless evaluated the weight of the evidence using its independent judgment. The standard of review is not determinative here. The court’s discussion of the weight of the evidence is in the last substantive section of this order.

[4] Korean American Legal Advocacy Foundation, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at 389 quotes Justice Tobriner then writing for the Court of Appeal in Floresta, Inc. v. City Council (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 599, 605 addressing an argument similar to that made by Petitioners:

[t]he argument confuses the function of zoning with that of the control of the sale of liquor. The essence of zoning lies in metropolitan and regional planning; it is the use and treatment of public and private land and its appurtenances in the interests of the community as a whole. The factors and reasons that determine the imposition of metropolitan zoning are entirely different from those which control the regulation of the consumption of liquor. To compress zoning or city planning into the mold of liquor regulation is to reduce its compass to a single aspect of its impact. That it may cover the regulation of the sale or consumption of liquor does not mean that it merely proposes liquor control; its sweep and design are wide; its particular application in the prohibition of a cocktail lounge does not correspondingly limit its scope or purpose.

[5] Petitioners also state “Respondents . . . exceeded their jurisdiction premised upon a stereotypical bias against Petitioners and . . . revoked Petitioners’ vested authority based upon inadmissible evidence.” (Opening Brief 3:1-4.) Petitioners do not elaborate on these arguments, cite to the administrative record, or discuss relevant legal authorities. To the extent Petitioners contend decisionmakers were biased or decided the case based on “inadmissible evidence,” Petitioners have waived the claims given the lack of legal analysis. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862-863 [argument waived if not raised or adequately briefed]; see also Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934 [same].)

[6] Failure to comply with performance standards may result in revocation of deemed-approved status. (LACC, § 22.140.030.J.2.d.)

[7] Despite Petitioners’ suggestion to the contrary, BSA, Inc. does not use the word “excessive.” (See Opening Brief 7:19-25 [use of “excessive” with quotation marks].)

[8] The court acknowledges the SAAFE Ordinance states, to maintain a deemed-approved status, the operator “shall not cause, allow, or permit nuisance and other unlawful activities on the premises . . . .” (LACC, § 22.140.030.I.7 [emphasis added].) The court concludes a reasonable inference can be made that police calls to the address of Eddie’s or the “immediate exterior vicinity” pertain to potential illegal activity that originated on the premises of Eddie’s. Petitioners have developed no persuasive argument to the contrary.

[9] Despite Petitioners’ assertions to the contrary, the documentary evidence specifies the location as the “Liquor Store.” It also separately categorizes other locations. (AR 440, 442.) During the relevant time period, the general area had 308 calls for service or “proactive contacts.” Of those, Sheriff’s Department records specified 106 were specific to the “Liquor Store.” (AR 442.) While it is true some Sheriff Department records identify the location as “108TH ST/WESTERN AV, LA” (AR 457, 459), some of the service call records specify Eddie’s as the location. (AR 448 [“DP AT LIQUOR STORE WEARING DARK JACKET”], 459, 466, 473, 474, 476, 479, 482, 483, 484, 486.) Moreover, Eddie’s is located on the corner of 108^th Street and South Western Avenue. (AR 182, 184, 224, 225, 280, 412, 492.) In at least two records, there is a general reference to the parking lot at the intersection (AR 449) and a store. (AR 474.)

[10] Admittedly, it is somewhat unclear to the court how the staff report calculated the number of certain incidents for its summary, such as loitering (43) and disturbing the peace (61). (See AR 417-420.) For example, the Sheriff Department’s Crime Incidents Report shows one incident of vandalism (consistent with the administrative findings and staff report) (see AR 440), but the Crime Incidents Report and CAD Report do not specify incidents of “loitering.” The CAD Report specifies 16 incidents of “Disturbance” at Eddie’s (AR 442) but does not specify the number of incidents of disturbing the peace. (AR 440-442.) Nonetheless, the record contains other detailed Sheriff’s Department documentation addressing loitering and disturbing the peace. (See e.g., AR 940-953, 947 [“Ten to 15 people were loitering” and “Five to 6 people were loitering”].) Furthermore, absent some showing by Petitioners the staff report is inaccurate—a showing not made—the staff report is itself substantial evidence in support of the findings.

[11] In their Opening Brief, Petitioners argued generally “there is no evidence” that alleged incidents occurred on Petitioners’ premises. (See generally Opening Brief 8-10.) However, Petitioners did not discuss the record evidence, including police call records and other Sheriff’s Department documentation when they made their generalized arguments. Accordingly, the specific arguments at pages 3-4 of Petitioners’ Reply Brief are entirely new.

[12] The parties do not explain the difference between the RAPS Report (AR 444) and the Los Angeles Regional Crime Information System (LARCIS). (AR 942.) The Sherrif’s Department used LARCIS for certain information provided during the administrative hearing and the Problem Profile. The RAPS Report and LARCIS summary contain different information. For example, the RAPS Report the attempted stabbing with scissors on January 12, 2018. (AR 448-449.) The LARCIS summary contains no such entry. The same is true for a loitering incident on February 27, 2018 reflected in the RAPS Report (AR 449) but not in the LARCIS summary (AR 943).