Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case Number: 22STCP04020, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP04020, Date: 2023-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Respondent, Palmdale School District,[1] demurs to the amended verified petition for writ of mandate (AP) filed by Petitioner, Sandra McCoy. Petitioner opposes the demurrer.

Preliminarily the court notes the AP alleges a cause of action for violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) at Government Code section 12940 et seq. As the cause of action seeks damages, proceedings on the fourth cause of action are stayed pending resolution of Petitioner’s writ-related causes of action. At the conclusion of the writ-related proceedings, the court will transfer the action to Department 1 for reassignment to an independent calendar courtroom. Respondent may renew its demurrer to the fourth cause of action upon reassignment.[2]

Respondent’s request for judicial notice (RJN) is granted in part. The court takes judicial notice of Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G. As noted herein, the court does not take judicial notice of reasonably disputable facts contained within the documents.

Petitioner alleges she was an employee of Respondent. As an employee of Respondent, Petitioner was entitled to certain health benefits from Respondent after she ceased working in all California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) employment. Petitioner is entitled to the benefits because Respondent hired her before June 30, 2004, and she is under the age of 75. Petitioner alleges Respondent denied the health benefits to her because she did not apply for retirement benefits from CalPERS “when or after she left the Respondent Palmdale School District on or about April 2018, but instead continued employment without a break in service employed by the Santa Ana School District which like Respondent was a CalPERS covered employer. (AP ¶ 4.)

Petitioner further alleges when she left Respondent’s employ, Respondent “did not require her to apply for and receive benefits from CalPERS in order to qualify for Respondent School District retiree Health and Welfare benefits.” (AP ¶ 4.)

Respondent’s policy “regarding health and welfare benefits for employees hired before June 30, 2004, [is] as follows:”

7. Health and Welfare benefits Employees hired before 6/30/04 and who have continuous District employment thereafter, and their dependents, will receive District-provided health, vision and dental benefits (including orthodontia benefits), and life insurance for the employee, consistent with the District's then existing plan, during the employee's employment with the District. The District reserves the right to change or discontinue the plan. Early retirees and retirees as defined under the particular employee's applicable retirement program (either Cal PERS or STRS), who were hired before 6/30/04 and have continuous employment thereafter, and their dependents, shall receive District-provided health and welfare benefits consistent with the District's then existing plan, until each early retiree, retiree or dependent becomes eligible for Medicare, reaches age seventy-five (75), or dies, whichever occurs first. Whenever an employee, early retiree, retiree or his or her dependent reaches the age when he or she qualifies to participate in Medicare, he or she shall be required to take whatever actions are required to participate in Medicare, and whether or not he or she does so, the District's health and welfare benefit obligation to that employee, early retiree, retiree or dependent from that time through age seventy-five (75) shall be limited to the purchase of a Medicare Supplemental Policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the District's obligation to provide an early retiree, retiree ad his or her dependent(s) health and welfare benefits (and the District's life insurance obligation to the early retiree or retiree) shall terminate on the date the early retiree/retiree reaches age seventy-five (75), discontinues coverage prior to age seventy-five (75), or dies, whichever occurs first" (See Palmdale School District Personnel Policies for leadership team as Exhibit 1).

Petitioner contends Respondent has a mandatory duty to provide her with health benefits through the age of 75. Petitioner alleges Respondent has failed to comply with its mandatory duty.

Petitioner alleges she is entitled to a traditional writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, a preliminary and permanent injunction and declaratory relief. As the declaratory relief cause of action is derivative of Petitioner’s writ claim and the injunction cause of action addresses a remedy, the court need only address Petitioner’s first cause of action for a writ of mandate.

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The allegations in the petition must be liberally construed in favor of a petitioner on demurrer. (See Mobil Oil Corp. v Exxon Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 942, 947.)

“A demurrer on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily barred.’ [Citations.] It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred.” (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881.)

Respondent argues its demurrer should be sustained for three reasons. First, Respondent contends Petitioner’s own admissions and judicially noticeable documents establish Petitioner does not qualify for the benefits she seeks. Second, Respondent argues Petitioner may not properly proceed in mandate on a claim grounded in a contract. Finally, Respondent asserts Petitioner’s claims are time barred.

Petitioner posits Respondent’s demurrer “is nothing more than a thinly disguised attempt to obtain judgment on the merits and not the pleadings.” (Opposition 1:24-25.)

At issue in this proceeding is the interpretation of the following sentence from Respondent’s policy:

Early retirees and retirees as defined under the particular employee's applicable retirement program (either Cal PERS or STRS), who were hired before 6/30/04 and have continuous employment thereafter, and their dependents, shall receive District-provided health and welfare benefits consistent with the District's then existing plan, until each early retiree, retiree or dependent becomes eligible for Medicare, reaches age seventy-five (75), or dies, whichever occurs first.

There is no dispute Respondent hired Petitioner prior to June 30, 2004. There is also no dispute Respondent’s Personnel Policies applied to Petitioner. (Opposition 5:19-23.) It is also undisputed after Petitioner left Respondent’s employ, she “switched to Santa Ana School District where she remained continuously employed (without interruption) under CalPERS retirement and then ultimately retired to receive her retirement . . . .” (Opposition 2:7-9.)

Petitioner argues “[t]here is nothing in the policy that says Petitioner had to retire from the Respondent School District[.] It only requires continuous employment with a CalPERS employer which Petitioner satisfied . . . .” (Opposition 2:20-22.)

Respondent would have this court read additional language into the applicable policy. Respondent contends to obtain the health benefit Petitioner must have been continuously employed by Respondent. Respondent would read:

While Respondent’s interpretation appears reasonable, it does not explain other provisions in the Personnel Policies that specifically include such language—unlike the provision applicable to Petitioner. For example, section 5.2 of the policies provides for those employed “between 6/30/04 and 6/30/05, are at least fifty-five (55) years of age, and who had continuous employment with the District for at least ten (10) full years at the time of their retirement, . . . .” (RJN Ex. A p. 3 [emphasis added].) Section 5.3 is similar for employees hired between July 1, 2005 and June 30, 2008 with “continuous employment with the District for at least ten (10) full years . . . .” (RJN Ex. A p. 3 [emphasis added]. See also RJN Ex. A p. 4 [section 5.4].)

Respondent makes no effort to explain why other provisions in the Personnel Policies specifically provide for continuing employment with Respondent while the provision governing Petitioner does not. Moreover, Respondent provides no justification for adding the language “with the District” into the policy provision governing Petitioner’s claim. (Memo 5:2-3 [“therefore she had not been continuously employed by the District at the time of her actual retirement in 2021”], 5:7-8 [“continuous employment with the District at the time or retirement”].)

“ ‘[W]here an ambiguous contract is the basis of an action, it is proper, if not essential, for a plaintiff to allege its own construction of the agreement. So long as the pleading does not place a clearly erroneous construction upon the provisions of the contract, in passing upon the sufficiency of the complaint, we must accept as correct plaintiff's allegations as to the meaning of the agreement.’ ” (Aragon-Haas v. Family Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 232, 239.) “Where a complaint is based on a written contract which it sets out in full, a general demurrer to the complaint admits not only the contents of the instrument but also any pleaded meaning to which the instrument is reasonably susceptible. [Citation.] While plaintiff's interpretation of the contract ultimately may prove invalid, it [is] improper to resolve the issue against her solely on her own pleading. ‘In ruling on a demurrer, the likelihood that the pleader will be able to prove [her] allegations is not the question.’ ” (Ibid.)

Given that Petitioner has posited a reasonable interpretation of the applicable policy based on the plain language of the policy, the demurrer is overruled.

Respondent contends Petitioner has “an adequate remedy at law, via a civil contract action arising from the District’s performance under the Personnel Policies.” (Memo 6:12-13.) Respondent argues: “When a contract is in issue, a petitioner has an adequate legal remedy when it can enforce the contract through a civil action.” (Memo 6:24-25.)

As a general proposition “mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for enforcing a contractual obligation against a public entity.” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (July 27, 2023) 2003 WL 5341628 at *26 [ALADS] [quoting 300 DeHaro Street Investors v. Department of Housing and Community Development (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1254].) Mandate does “not lie to enforce a purely contractual obligation.” (Id. at *27.)

Circumstances exist in a contractual setting, however, where “mandamus is proper insofar as public officials would need to undertake certain ministerial duties to implement a contract with a public employee.” (Ibid.) Here, Petitioner seeks an order compelling Respondent to provide Petitioner with the health benefits to which she is entitled under Respondent’s policy. Such remedy—if ordered—would necessarily require preliminary steps by public officials giving rise to mandamus claims. (See id. at *28.)

Accordingly, Respondent’s demurrer is overruled as to Respondent’s claim Petitioner improperly cloaked her breach of contract claim as one for traditional mandate.

Respondent argues Petitioner’s claim is barred by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to contract claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 337, subd. (a).) Relying on Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination purportedly filed with the California Department of Fair Employment & Housing (DFEH) (see RJN Ex. B), Respondent argues Petitioner initiated this proceeding more than four years after Respondent notified her Respondent had changed her separation with Respondent from retired to resigned. (Memo 8:20-26.) Respondent also claims Petitioner’s original unverified petition alleged Respondent improperly denied her retirement in 2018, and Petitioner has not attempted to recharacterize her allegations in an attempt to overcome Respondent’s demurrer.

First, a demurrer is based on the pleadings and judicially noticeable facts. A demurrer cannot be converted into a motion for summary judgment to determine contested factual issues. “Questions of fact generally require consideration and weighing of evidence, which makes them unsuitable for resolution on demurrer.” (M.F. v. Pacific Pearl Hotel Management LLC (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 693, 703.)

While the court can judicially notice the fact of a charge of discrimination submitted to DFEH on or about November 23, 2021, the court cannot take judicial notice of facts within the document which could be disputed. To wit, whether the statement about Respondent notifying Petitioner on or about April 2018 about her separation with Respondent as a resignation. On demurrer, Petitioner has no opportunity to explain or deny the statement, the circumstances of the alleged statement and/or whether she even made the electronically submitted statement.

The same is true of Respondent’s letter purportedly sent to Petitioner on May 15, 2018. While the court may take judicial notice of the fact Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner on a particular date and advised Petitioner of certain facts, the court cannot find on demurrer Petitioner received, read or understood the letter.

Finally, paragraph 14 in Petitioner’s original unverified pleading does not assist Respondent. Respondent correctly notes Petitioner alleged: “Respondents/Defendants disputes this contention and contends that the unilateral denial of benefits was because Petitioner did not retire because the District and Board of Education and Does 1-20 changed without permission her retirement in April 2018 to a resignation, . . . .” The statement, however, does not indicate when Petitioner learned of the change made by Respondent.

Accordingly, Respondent’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds is overruled.

[1] Petitioner has also named the Board of Education for the Palmdale School District. For ease, the court references a single respondent.

[2] While it is not entirely clear, it appears Petitioner’s estoppel claim (fifth cause of action) seeks damages. It appears the fifth cause of action should also be stayed pending resolution of the writ-related causes of action.