Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case Number: 22STCP04143, Date: 2023-12-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP04143, Date: 2023-12-08 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner, Ronald Rodriguez, requests a writ of mandate directing Respondent, Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (Commission), to set aside the administrative decision discharging Petitioner from his position as Senior Detention Services Officer with the probation department (Department) for Respondent, the County of Los Angeles. The County opposes the petition.

At the time of the incident leading to Petitioner’s discharge, Petitioner “was employed by the Department as a Senior Detention Services Officer (SDSO) at the Nidorf (Sylmar) Juvenile Facility.” (AR 450.)[1] Starting around 2012, Petitioner was assigned to Unit W, which housed high-risk offender minors at the facility. (AR 547.) Among other duties, Petitioner worked with volunteers who came to the compound to work with such minors. (AR 547-548.) Petitioner also supervised other probation officers, supervised the minors and ensured they followed the unit’s rules, and helped to deescalate any issues with the minors that would arise. (AR 554.) At the time of his discipline, Petitioner had approximately 29 years of service with the Department. (AR 451.)

In February 2016, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence while off duty. (AR 549.) On July 25, 2016, Petitioner pleaded no contest to “California Vehicle Code Section 23152(B), drunk driving” and was sentenced to three years of summary probation. (AR 365.) The Department imposed a 15-day suspension on Petitioner because of the conviction. (AR 363-367, 549.) The Department explained the incident leading to Petitioner’s suspension constituted “Conduct incompatible with peace officer status” and “Failure to exercise sound judgment.” (AR 364.) Petitioner did not appeal the suspension. (AR 550.)

Petitioner’s excessive use of alcohol did not end with his arrest and conviction in 2016. Petitioner’s wife, Kristine Rodriguez, testified in the administrative hearing conducted here that Petitioner became verbally abusive with her while he was under the influence of alcohol in December 2015 and January 2017. (AR 457, 1366.)

The events resulting in Petitioner’s discharge from the Department also occurred while Petitioner was under the influence of alcohol. Specifically, on February 25, 2018, Petitioner attended a baby shower for Mrs. Rodriguez, who was then eight months pregnant. (AR 451.) Before and during the event Petitioner consumed 10 to 15 containers of beer. (AR 451, 460.) Upon returning home, Petitioner “became belligerent, questioning Mrs. Rodriguez about her interaction with a male guest at the shower.” (AR 451.)

“The argument escalated and Mrs. Rodriguez went into the closet of the master bedroom, shutting the door. [Petitioner] banged on the door repeatedly, telling Mrs. Rodriguez to come out of the closet. At that point, Mrs. Rodriguez’ (then) minor daughter, came into the master bedroom and tried to intervene. [Petitioner] pushed the minor out of the master bedroom and into the hallway. Mrs. Rodriguez exited the closet and walked down the hall to her daughter’s bedroom. [Petitioner] followed and entered the daughter’s bedroom. . . . [¶] [Petitioner] told Mrs. Rodriguez to return to the master bedroom. When Mrs. Rodriguez refused [Petitioner] grabbed her by the back of the head and hair and pushed her towards the master bedroom. At that point Mrs. Rodriguez asked her daughter to call 911.” (AR 451-452; see also AR 1370-1401 [testimony of Mrs. Rodriguez].)

Los Angeles County Sheriff deputies responded and arrested Petitioner without further incident. Petitioner spent the night in jail and timely notified his supervisor of the arrest and incarceration. Petitioner was subject to a restraining order following the February 25, 2018 incident. (AR 461.) After about three months, the restraining order was withdrawn and Petitioner moved back into his home with Mrs. Rodriguez and his stepdaughter. (AR 461.)

On May 21, 2018, Petitioner pleaded no contest to a charge of disturbing the peace based on the domestic violence incident. The court placed Petitioner on 36 months of probation and ordered him to attend 52 weeks of domestic violence prevention classes. In addition, the court required Petitioner to attend six months of mandatory Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and to use an alcohol detention monitor for four months. Petitioner complied with all of the court’s orders. (AR 461.)

After an administrative investigation, the Department gave Petitioner notice of its intent to discharge him from his employment for misconduct related to the February 25, 2018 incident. (AR 227-235.) On July 3, 2019, after a Skelly hearing,[2] the Department issued a notice of discharge to Petitioner. (AR 462, 2-10.)

Petitioner appealed his discharge and an administrative hearing was held before a hearing officer for the Commission. On August 9, 2021, the hearing officer issued a proposed decision finding the allegations of the Department’s July 3, 2019 to be true. The hearing officer also found that various mitigating factors, including Petitioner’s length of service, service record, admission of guilt, cooperation in the investigation, expression of remorse, and demonstrated potential for rehabilitation, merited a reduction of the penalty from a discharge to a 30-day suspension. (AR 463.)

After considering the Department’s objections to the hearing officer’s proposed decision, the Commission issued a new proposed decision with revised conclusions of law finding the various mitigating factors did not merit a reduction in the penalty of discharge. (AR 492-493.) On August 31, 2022, the Commission, by a three to two vote, overruled Petitioner’s objections and adopted the new proposed decision to impose the discharge. (AR 744.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the issues for review of an administrative decision are: whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

The termination of Petitioner’s employment with the County as a SDSO concerns a fundamental vested right. Accordingly, the court exercise its independent judgment on the administrative findings. (See Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) However, as noted earlier, the Commission’s factual findings have not been challenged by Petitioner.

Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) The court may draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its determinations as to the credibility of witnesses. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) Exercise of independent judgment “does permit (indeed, [] requires) the trial court to reweigh the evidence by examining the credibility of witnesses.” (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 652, 658.) Under independent judgment, “abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

“In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817; see also Evid. Code, § 664.)

Finally, while the weight of the evidence standard applies to the court’s review of administrative factual findings, a more deferential standard applies to the court’s review of the agency’s selection of penalty. “With respect to the question of penalty, the superior court’s powers of review are quite limited, and are exercised only with great deference to the administrative agency’s findings.” (Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 45.) “The propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative agency is a matter vested in the discretion of the agency, and its decision may not be disturbed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Williamson v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1343, 1347.)

Petitioner “does not contest the findings of fact of the Hearing Officer, all of which were adopted by the Commission. Accordingly, the only issue presented is the appropriateness of the penalty.” (Opening Brief 5:3-5.) Even assuming there was a challenge to the Commission’s findings, however, exercising its independent judgment on the whole record, the court concludes the weight of the evidence supports the Commission’s findings. (AR 460-462.)

As noted, “[t]he propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative agency is a matter vested in the discretion of the agency, and its decision may not be disturbed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Williamson v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at 1347.) “If reasonable minds may differ with regard to the appropriate disciplinary action, there is no abuse of discretion.” (County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Commission (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 620, 634.)

In considering whether an abuse of discretion occurred, the “overriding consideration . . . is the extent to which the employee’s conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in, ‘[h]arm to the public service.’ [Citations.] Other relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.” (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 218.)

Petitioner contends the Department did not prove his misconduct on February 25, 2018 caused harm to the public service and/or was sufficiently related to his job to justify his discharge. In Blake v. State of Personnel Board (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 541, the Court of Appeal explained the requirement of a relationship between misconduct, an employee’s job and the penalty imposed:

The nature of the misbehavior and its effect on the public service rather than the time or place of its occurrence should be the determinative factors. If the misconduct bears some rational relationship to the employment and is of a character that can reasonably result in the impairment or disruption of public service, it should be no less a cause for discipline . . . simply because it occurred outside of duty hours. In determining whether an employee should be disciplined, whatever the cause, the overriding consideration is whether the conduct harms the public service. (Id. at 550-551.)

The Department and the Commission could reasonably conclude, as they did, that Petitioner’s second, alcohol-related off-duty offense harmed the public service and had a “job nexus” because it showed poor judgment; conflicted with the core mission of the Department to “protect and teach” troubled youth in the Department’s custody; reflected poorly on the Department given Petitioner’s arrest by the Sheriff’s Department and Petitioner’s no contest plea to disturbing the peace; and was “conduct unbecoming” of, and incompatible with, being a peace officer. (AR 2-3, 1250-1252.) Notably, the Department’s Guidelines for Discipline provide discharge is the only recommended penalty for a second occurrence of a “conviction of any crime which constitutes a job nexus to County employment.” (AR 395.) Consistent with the guidelines, the Department and the Commission could reasonably conclude discharge was the appropriate penalty.

The Department and the Commission could also reasonably conclude that Petitioner’s egregious conduct on February 25, 2018, in context of a prior conviction for driving under the influence, demonstrated that Petitioner could not meet the standard of behavior required of peace officers working for the Department. “[A peace officer’s] job is a position of trust and the public has a right to the highest standard of behavior from those they invest with the power and authority of a law enforcement officer. Honesty, credibility and temperament are crucial to the proper performance of an officer's duties.” (Talmo v. Civil Service Com. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 210, 231.)

Petitioner’s wife was eight months pregnant at the time of the February 25, 2018 incident. The incident also involved Petitioner’s minor stepdaughter. Petitioner pushed his minor stepdaughter and later grabbed his wife by the back of the head and hair and pushed her. Petitioner caused both his wife and his minor stepdaughter to fear for their safety and resulted in an emergency call to 911 for assistance. (See AR 451-452; see also AR 1370-1401 [testimony of Mrs. Rodriguez].) As testified by Chief Mark Garcia, the Department’s decisionmaker who imposed the discipline, the Department oversees child offenders who are “traumatized,” “damaged,” and “have had drug abuse/substance abuse/alcoholism.” (AR 1276.) As Chief Garcia further testified, even though Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence in February 2016 and thereafter was placed on probation, he nonetheless failed to control his behavior while under the influence of alcohol and jeopardized his eight-month pregnant wife, unborn child, and minor stepdaughter during the February 2018 incident. (AR 1277.) On those facts, the Department and the Commission could reasonably conclude, in light of Petitioner’s job duties supervising troubled youth, Petitioner’s repeated alcohol-related misconduct harmed the public service because it demonstrated that Petitioner lacked the ability to use good judgment, maintain control, and risked the safety of children in the Department’s custody. (AR 1277-1278.)

Petitioner challenges the testimony of decisionmaker Chief Garcia, and the Commission’s decision to uphold the discharge, on several grounds. First, Petitioner argues throughout his employment, Petitioner “received numerous letters of appreciation and commendation that recognized his hard work, integrity, dedication, leadership skills, and his unique ability to communicate with minors.” (Opening Brief 6:14-16.) Second, Petitioner’s performance evaluations “document [his] sound judgments and effective communication with the minors for whom he was responsible.” (Opening Brief 11:1-2.) Last, Petitioner’s work performance, as described by his supervisors, undermines Chief Garcia’s opinion Petitioner could put minors in jeopardy and could not make good judgments and teach minors. (Opening Brief 11:7-10.)

The court has considered each of Petitioner’s record citations in support of these arguments. Among other evidence, Petitioner cites a letter from a school principal at Nidorf Juvenile Hall dated March 5, 2018, after the February 2018 domestic violence incident. The principal wrote:

Mr. Rodriguez is patient, helpful, and a problem-solver. When we have difficult students he is the first person to respond and deescalate the student. He is not only a great Probation Officer but a great friend to all of our students. On many occasions he volunteers his own time in order to assist the school and it’s [sic] students. That kind of dedication and good will cannot be found in many employees. (AR 58.)

Various performance evaluations also acknowledge Petitioner’s skill in communicating and interacting with minors. (See e.g., AR 112-115, 1134.) Petitioner’s most recent, immediate supervisor testified positively about Petitioner’s job performance. (AR 678-692.)

Petitioner’s evidence does not show a “manifest abuse of discretion” as to the penalty imposed by the Commission. (Williamson v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at 1347.) Petitioner’s discharge from employment was based on off-duty, alcohol-related misconduct that harmed the public service. When assessing Petitioner’s performance evaluations and work performance, the Commission could reasonably give more weight to the egregiousness of Petitioner’s misconduct and the temporal proximity to Petitioner’s 15-day suspension for another off-duty, alcohol-related incident. Stated another way, the Commission could reasonably determine Petitioner’s recent disciplinary history shows substantial and ongoing risk of harm to the public service given his employment with the Department. The Commission could also reasonably find Petitioner’s mitigating evidence did not outweigh the other relevant discipline factors.

Petitioner also argues there is “little likelihood of the recurrence” of his misconduct because Petitioner participated in an Alcoholics Anonymous program, demonstrated a “sincere desire to stop drinking,” and “has ceased drinking.” (Opening Brief 12:16-17, 13:21.) Relatedly, Petitioner cites a definition of “alcoholism” (from extra-record evidence not properly before the court) and the following statement of the hearing officer: “There are no guarantees of permanent sobriety for an alcoholic, but over three years of abstinence is a positive indicator of rehabilitation.” (Opening Brief 13:21-23 [citing AR 458].) In a footnote, Petitioner also reports:

While no medical testimony was present, it is safe to say that Rodriguez’ conduct meets the definition of alcohol use disorder (‘AUD’). The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism defines AUD as ‘a medical condition characterized by an impaired ability to stop or control alcohol use despite adverse social, occupational, or health consequences.’ [website citation].” (Opening Brief 13, fn. 5.)

Finally, Petitioner explains his “alcoholism caused his aberrant behavior,” and he “did not realize that he had a problem with alcohol until the domestic violence incident.” (Reply 3:18, 4:12-13.)

Assuming Petitioner was an alcoholic at the time of his driving under the influence conviction and the domestic violence incident,[4] and considering the testimony that Petitioner has remained sober since the February 25, 2018 incident (see AR 458), the Commission could nonetheless reasonably conclude that the likelihood of recurrence was significant and the penalty of discharge was reasonable in light of the risk of recurrence. As discussed earlier, Petitioner was arrested for an off-duty driving under the influence incident in February 2016, pleaded no contest in July 2016, received three years of probation, and received a 15-day suspension from the Department for the conviction in November 2016. (AR 549, 460, 365.) Shortly after the Department imposed the 15-day suspension, Petitioner became verbally abusive with his wife while under the influence of alcohol in December 2016 and January 2017. (AR 457, 1366.) At the administrative hearing, Petitioner admitted he was aware of the dangers of drinking alcohol excessively prior to February 25, 2018, and he had attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings after his arrest in 2016. (AR 612-614.) Despite his recent problems with alcohol and participation in Alcoholics Anonymous, Petitioner drank 10 to 15 alcoholic beverages at the baby shower on February 25, 2018 and then engaged in a domestic violence incident involving his eight-months pregnant wife and minor stepdaughter. Given the timeline of events, the Commission could reasonably view the February 2018 incident as part of a pattern, that the prior 15-day suspension had not deterred further alcohol-related misconduct, and there was an unreasonably high likelihood of recurrence, despite Petitioner’s testimony that he had not consumed alcohol since the February 2018 incident.

Petitioner contends Blake v. State Personnel Board (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 541 [Blake] and Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 194 support a conclusion the Commission abused its discretion with the penalty it imposed. The court disagrees.

In Blake, a divided Court of Appeal held the discharge of a supervising deputy labor commissioner for an off-duty incident was an abuse of discretion. The labor commissioner had not previously suffered disciplinary action of any kind in approximately 19 years of state service. (Blake, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d at 553-554.)

Here, the circumstances are readily distinguished from those in Blake in that Petitioner received a 15-day suspension for a driving under the influence conviction in November 2016, and the County has disciplinary guidelines recommending discharge as the only penalty for a second off-duty offense of this nature. (AR 395.) Further, the employee in Blake was not a peace officer and there was no showing his misconduct harmed the public service as severely as Petitioner’s domestic violence incident, which involved a minor and a call to 911 for assistance.

In Skelly, “the punitive dismissal was based upon the doctor's conduct in extending his lunch break beyond his allotted one hour on numerous occasions, generally by five to fifteen minutes, and in twice leaving the office for several hours without permission.” (Skelly, 15 Cal.3d at 218.) The petitioner in Skelly was not a peace officer and he did not engage in off-duty crimes. Skelly is also distinguishable.

The court finds guidance in cases where the courts have affirmed the administrative agency’s selection of penalty as a proper exercise of discretion. (See e.g. Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755, 769-773 [Cranston] and Talmo, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at 229-232.) Although Petitioner’s misconduct was not the same as that of the officers in Cranston and Talmo, it was similarly egregious and followed prior discipline for an alcohol-related incident. For the reasons discussed earlier, the Commission could reasonably find Petitioner’s such misconduct harmed the public service and was likely to recur.

Given the egregiousness of Petitioner’s misconduct, his prior 15-day suspension for a conviction for driving under the influence, and the County’s disciplinary guidelines for a second offense of this nature, the penalty of discharge was well within the Commission’s discretion. That reasonable minds could differ on the penalty, as reflected in Commission’s three to two vote, further supports the conclusion the Commission did not abuse its discretion. Finally, considering all the facts and circumstances before the Commission, the court cannot find the Commission committed a manifest abuse of discretion when it discharged Petition from his employment with the Department.

[1] As discussed infra, Petitioner does not contest the administrative findings. The only issue presented by his petition is the appropriateness of the penalty. (Opening Brief 5:3-5.) Accordingly, as the factual findings are not in issue, the court may sometimes cite to the hearing officer’s proposed decision when summarizing the evidence.

[2] Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 [Skelly].

[3] The County is litigating this matter; the Commission has filed a notice of no beneficial interest in the outcome of the litigation.

[4] As the County argues, Petitioner has cited no medical evidence he is/was an alcoholic. (Opposition 13, fn. 4.) Further, the hearing officer did not make any formal factual finding that Petitioner is/was an alcoholic, or that the disease of alcoholism caused Petitioner to engage in the his driving under the influence conviction or the domestic violence incident that led to his discipline. (AR 460-462.) Nonetheless, the court acknowledges the hearing officer suggested in the “Discussion” section of his decision that Petitioner may have suffered from alcoholism. (AR 458-459.) The County also seems to concede the record supports a conclusion that “Petitioner is an alcoholic.” (Opposition 4:13.)