Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 22STCV04767 2023-01-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCV04767, Date: 2023-01-20 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner, Angela Sherick-Bright, initiated these proceedings on February 7, 2022 when she filed her petition for writ of administrative mandate. She filed her operative first amended petition on August 26, 2022.[1]

Respondent, the County of Los Angeles, moves to bifurcate the writ and writ-related claims from non-writ claims and have the non-writ claims transferred to a general jurisdiction civil courtroom, an independent calendar (IC) court.

A trial judge has broad case management discretion, which includes the authority “to order separate trials of issues and determine the order in which those issues are to be decided.” (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 762.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 authorizes a judge to “order a separate trial of any cause of action . . . or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (b).) The judge may bifurcate causes of action or issues “when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy.” (Ibid.)

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 598 allows a judge—on his/her own motion and at any time—to bifurcate any issue for trial “when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted.” The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 598 “to encourage the trial court, on its own motion, to make orders to try any issue or any part thereof prior to the trial of any other issue in the interest of ‘the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation.’ ” (Buran Equipment Co. v. H & C Investment Co. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 338, 343.)

Respondent moves to bifurcate Petitioner’s non-writ claims and have these claims transferred “prior to the writ hearing.” (Notice 2:7.) Specifically, Respondent argues Petitioner’s first and fourth causes of action for declaratory relief and the second cause of action for inverse condemnation are non-writ-related claims that should be bifurcated and transferred to Department 1 for assignment to an IC court.[2]

The court is inclined to grant the motion by staying the non-writ claims pending resolution of the writ and writ-related claims. At the conclusion of the proceedings involving the writ, the court will transfer the stayed non-writ causes of action to Department 1 for assignment in an IC court.

The court requests the parties input on designated the writ and writ-related and non-writ claims. Certainly, the second cause of action for inverse condemnation is a non-writ claim. The third cause of action alleging a violation of CEQA is a writ claim. The declaratory relief claims within the first and fourth causes of action are less clear; it appears, however, the fourth cause of action is a non-writ claim.

Respondent demurs to the first amended petition. Petitioner opposes the demurrer with an oversize opposition.[3] Petitioner also filed her opposition late. The court nonetheless considers the opposition on this occasion.

The demurrer is sustained as to the third cause of action and parts of the first cause of action.[4] The court does not consider the second and fourth causes of action having stayed them.

Respondent’s request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 through 5 is granted. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d), (h).) While Petitioner objects to the court taking judicial notice of the Zoning Conformance Review (ZCR), the court notes Petitioner attached the document to her first amended petition as Exhibit A (albeit in an excerpted version). Petitioner’s dispute related to the ZCR appears to be its meaning, and whether it constitutes a permit issued by the County. The issue of the ZCR’s meaning is discussed below.

Petitioner requests judicial notice of Exhibits A through D. Respondent objects to exhibits A, C, and D. Respondent’s objection to Exhibits C and D is sustained on foundation grounds. The court takes judicial notice of Exhibit A pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c).

Petitioner's claims arise from Respondent’s November 8, 2021 ministerial approval an application by Crown Castle (Crown) for the placement of a steel pole for wireless communications. Respondent approved the application through a ZCR. The ZCR sets forth a project number as well as a permit number. The project description on the face of the ZCR states:

“CROWN CASTLE PROPOSES TO INSTALL A NEW WIRELESS INSTALLATION LOCATED IN THE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY.

Also on the face of the ZCR is information concerning the project site. The ZCR lists 5007 Escalon Avenue as the “NEAREST ADDRESS.” The same address is listed in very large font size on the top half of the face of the ZCR with other information:

Petitioner alleges the pole and small cell facility is on her private property and disputes Respondent’s contention the pole is on a public right of way (PROW). Petitioner also alleges the County failed to comply with its duty when it changed the application permitting process for such projects, granted Crown’s ZCR and permitted Crown to install the pole and small cell facility on her Property. Petitioner also argues the County failed to perform any required environmental review of the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code section 21000, et seq.

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civil Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “We assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.)

A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend when there is no reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) Indeed, where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law and no amendment would change the result, the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend is proper. (City of Ceres v. City of Modesto (1969) 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 554.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show how the complaint might be amended to cure the defect. (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.)

Respondent demurs to the petition on multiple grounds. Specifically, the County argues the petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, fails to join an indispensable party, and fails to state a claim for relief.

As a preliminary matter, as discussed with the motion to bifurcate, the court will address the writ causes of action only; non-writ claims are stayed pending the resolution of the writ claims.

Respondent argues Petitioner’s entire petition is defective based on Petitioner’s failure to file this proceeding within the time limitations prescribed by Government Code section 65009.

Government Code section 65009 is entitled: “Actions or proceedings challenging local zoning and planning decisions; legislative findings; limitation of issues; time limitations; application of section.” The statute states in relevant part:

“(c)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (d), no action or proceeding shall be maintained in any of the following cases by any person unless the action or proceeding is commenced and service is made on the legislative body within 90 days after the legislative body's decision:

(E) To attack, review, set aside, void, or annul any decision on the matters listed in Sections 65901 and 65903, or to determine the reasonableness, legality, or validity of any condition attached to a variance, conditional use permit, or any other permit.”

Government Code section 65009, subdivision (F), further limits actions “[c]oncerning any of the proceedings, acts, or determinations taken, done, or made prior to any of the decisions listed in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E).”

Here, Crown submitted its ZCR application to Respondent’s Department of Regional Planning (Regional Planning) on March 8, 2021. (Pet., Ex. A; Respondent’s RJN, Ex. 1) The application sought approval for "installation of a small wireless facility on an existing Crown Castle steel pole in the public ROW [right of way]" near Petitioner’s property. (Pet., Ex. A; Respondent’s RJN, Ex. 1) On November 8, 2021, Regional Planning approved Crown's application and allowed the construction and installation of the pole and small cell facility. (FAP, Ex. A; County’s RJN, Ex. 1)

Petitioner filed the subject action on February 7, 2022—94 days after Regional Planning's approval of the Zoning Conformance Review. Thus, if Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) applies, certain of Petitioner’s claims are time barred.

First, there is no dispute Petitioner challenges Respondent’s November 8, 2021 action approving the ZCR thereby authorizing the project. (Pet., ¶ 13. [“Petitioner contends that the county’s November 8, 2021 stamping of the plans ‘Approved’ cannot represent full or final permission to proceed with construction under state and local law.”; see also Pet., ¶ 25; Pet. Prayer [“a writ vacating any purported authorizations for the pole and wireless facility in front of . . . Petitioner’s home at 5007 Escalon Avenue, View Park CA 90043 and requiring that no further authorizations can be granted for that site unless and until the county follows all required notice and hearing procedures, the substantive mandates in the LAC code and, in particular, complies with all CEQA requirements”.) That is, Petitioner appears to challenge the project approval and permitting process—Respondent’s ministerial approval of the project through the ZCR instead of requiring Crown to obtain a discretionary conditional use permit as Respondent had done in the past.

The issue then is whether this challenged action falls within Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1).

The court finds Regional Planning’s approval of the project through the ZCR is subject to the limitations period of Government Code section 65009.

Here, the court finds the action is a challenge to the County’s issuance of a permit and “decision on the matters listed in Sections 65901.”

First, Petitioner’s allegations specifically contend Respondent issued a permit and approved the project through the ZCR; Petitioner expressly challenges the legitimacy of the permit. Specifically, Petitioner alleges Regional Planning’s approval of the ZCR resulted in the issuance of a “ineffective” permit. (Pet., ¶ 25. [“The county appears to believe that it can take final action approving a permit by placing a ‘Zoning Conforming Review’ approval stamp on the applicant's planning document without other documentation or explanation of the purported action.”] [“Petitioner requests that Court declare that the county’s ‘approval’ stamp on an interim ZONING CONFORMANCE REVIEW containing applicant’s plans for the pole application and the wireless facility application was not a final action that gave rise to an effective permit . . . .”]) Further, the ZCR on its face (attached to the petition) recites a specific permit number for a specified project and notes an approval “in compliance with the Los Angeles County Zoning Code and is subject to the requirements noted therein.” (Pet., Ex. A [ZCR, Permit No.: RPPL2021002562, project description].)

Moreover, Petitioner argues the ZCR and Respondent’s claim it is a permit is the very basis for Petitioner’s claim—“as a matter of law the ZCR is not a permit.” (Opposition 8:19.) Petitioner’s challenge to Respondent’s action falls within a “decision on the matters listed in Government Code Section 65901.”

Under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(E)(1), the 90-day rule applies to “any decision on the matters listed” in section 65901, and one of the “matters listed” in that section is a zoning administrator's decision on “conditional uses or other permits” or variance applications, or its “exercise [of] any other powers granted by local ordinance.” (Gov. Code,

§ 65901, subd. (a); Weiss v. City of Del Mar (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 609, 620.) Government Code, section 65901, subdivision (a) states:

“The board of zoning adjustment or zoning administrator shall hear and decide applications for conditional uses or other permits when the zoning ordinance provides therefor and establishes criteria for determining those matters, and applications for variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance. The board of zoning adjustment or the zoning administrator may also exercise any other powers granted by local ordinance, and may adopt all rules and procedures necessary or convenient for the conduct of the board's or administrator's business.”

Relying on Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton [Stockton] (2012) 210 Cal. App.4th 1484 Respondent argues: “The Stockton court's liberal application of section 65009 demonstrates that if a letter from the Director of a Community Development Department approving a development project triggers the 90-day limitations under section 65009, the stamped and dated Zoning Conformance Review approving the wireless installation is sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations.” (Reply 3:27-4:3.) Although Respondent correctly argues Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(E)(1) must be liberally construed, Respondent’s characterization of Stockton is oversimplified; nevertheless, Stockton is instructive.

The Stockton court's liberal application of Government Code section 65009 extended the statute of limitations to a letter approving a development sent by the city’s director of a community development department. Government Code section 65009’s application, however, did not turn on the letter as a “permit.” Rather, the statute applied because of the director’s authority under the city’s zoning code. Stockton explained the city had vested the director “with the authority to review development projects ‘in compliance with’ section 65901,” and found there was “no question the Director was exercising ‘powers granted by local ordinance’ when he approved the [store] construction” because the ordinance gave the director the authority to approve changes to development and implementing plans. (Stockton, supra, 210 Cal. App.4th at 1492, 1493.) The Stockton court also rejected an argument the 90-day limitations period applies only to the decisions of a legislative body, explaining that reading the statutory language “as a whole,” the Legislature did not intend to exclude decisions by zoning boards or administrators. (Id. at 1495.)

Regional Planning’s approval of the ZCR, like the director’s approval in Stockton, falls within Government Code section 65901, subdivision (a).[5]

Respondent reports it relies on Title 22 of the Los Angeles County Code (LACC) to guide its land use decisions. In pertinent part, “Chapter 22.226 - Type I Review – Ministerial” authorizes a ministerial process for reviewing applications. The process requires the Director of Regional Planning (Director) to verify that a proposed use, structure, or development of land complies with all applicable provisions of Title 22. (LACC, § 22.226.010.)[6] “The Director of Regional Planning (Director) is appointed by the Board [of Supervisors] pursuant to Chapter 2.106 (Department of Regional Planning) in Title 2 of the County Code.” (LACC, § 22.220.050.) Pursuant to this ordinance, the Director has the power to “[p]erform[] initial reviews of ministerial and discretionary applications and notifies the applicant if additional information is necessary to complete review of the application,” “[a]pprove[] or den[y] ministerial applications” and “[r]eview[] applications subject to CEQA and the County's environmental review requirements and prepare[] CEQA documentation.” (LACC, § 22.220.050.)

Further, the County requests for judicial notice of Exhibit 3 is a list of Department of Regional Planning’s filing fees which identifies ZCR as ministerial. The schedule of filing fees bolsters Respondent’s argument the ZCR falls within the Director’s authority.

Therefore, the court finds, the County, by local ordinance, created the Director of the County Department of Regional Planning and vested him or her with the authority to review ministerial application “in compliance with” section 65901. (LACC, § 22.220.050.)

Accordingly, Petitioner’s challenge to the validity of the ZCR is time barred—it was filed 4 days beyond the statute of limitations. The demurrer is sustained.

Respondent also argues the entire petition is defective pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 389. Specifically, Respondent challenges Petitioner’s failure to name Crown as a Real Party in Interest. Respondent contends Petitioner has failed to name an indispensable party.

Subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure section 389 defines persons who should be joined in a lawsuit if possible and deemed necessary to the action. (County of San Joaquin v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1149.) A person subject to service of process whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction “shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.” (Civ. Proc. Code, § 389, subd. (a).) The inquiry under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a)(2) is “whether the person is one whose rights must necessarily be affected by the judgment in the proceeding.” (Save Our Bay, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 686, 696.)

“A petition for writ of mandate must name the real party in interest, who thereafter has a right to notice and to be heard before a trial or appellate court issues a peremptory writ.” (Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone '86 v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 167, 173.)

The court rejects Petitioner’s contention “no rights of Crown Castle are now at legal stake for determination . . . .” (Opposition 11:25.) The petition alleges Crown Castle applied to Respondent for approval of the installation of a “pole designed to accommodate wireless facilities in front of [] Petitioner’s home at 5007 Escalon Avenue, View Park, CA 90043.” (Pet., ¶ 2.) It also alleges Crown owns the pole “if the pole is in right of way as Crown Castle and the county appear to believe.” (Pet., ¶ 27.) The petition asserts Crown is “trespassing, pursuant to an invalid and illegal purported grant of real property interest by the County.” (Pet., ¶ 31.) The remedy sought by Petitioner includes removal of the pole. (Pet., WRITS, ¶ B.)

Based on the allegations in the petition, there is no question Crown is a necessary party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a)(2). Petitioner challenges Respondent’s actions granting Crown’s application. Crown applied through the ZCR to install the steel pole on the property for which ownership is disputed. (FAP ¶ 5 [“Crown Castle’s application wrongly contends that it is the ‘owner’ even though all it truly ‘owns’ is the pole.”]) If Petitioner obtains the relief she seeks, the judgment would necessarily affect Crown’s property interest (and rights flowing from it) in the permit issued by Respondent.

“If a person [or entity] is determined to qualify as a ‘necessary’ party under one of the standards outlined above [under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subd. (a)], courts then determine if the party is also ‘indispensable.’ ” (City of San Diego v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 69, 83-84.)

If a necessary person cannot be joined as a party, the trial court considers specific factors to “determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 389, subd. (b).) Those factors are: “(1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.” (Ibid.)

A necessary person cannot be made a party to the action when the statute of limitations has expired.

A dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party is reviewed for an abuse of discretion when the trial court makes fact-specific determinations on the factors listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 389. (Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1178-1179; Kaczorowski v. Mendocino County Board of Supervisors (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 564, 568.)

Petitioner seeks to set aside the ZCR (and related permit) granted to Crown and approving Crown’s project. If Petitioner obtained judgment in this proceeding in Crown’s absence, Crown’s interests in the ZCR (and related permit) would be prejudiced. (Sierra Club, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 495, 501-502 [developer of project indispensable, and dismissal appropriate].) The second and third factors also weigh for dismissal. Should Petitioner prevail on its claims against Respondent related to the ZCR (and related permit), the court would issue a writ commanding Respondent to set aside the ZCR (and related permit). The court cannot fashion a writ that would avoid prejudice to Crown if Petitioner is successful in this proceeding. Further, absent Crown, a judgment would be inadequate because Crown could collaterally attack the judgment. (Id. at 502.) Finally, while Petitioner may not have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder, Petitioner knew Crown was the project applicant at the time it filed its petition (February 7, 2022). Given Petitioner’s knowledge, that Petitioner would be left with no adequate remedy does not outweigh the other considerations. In balance, the factors weigh in favor of dismissal of any claims where Petitioner’s success would necessarily prejudice Crown.

The County also contends the first and fourth causes of action for declaratory relief are defective because Petitioner’s sole form of relief to challenge Respondent’s action on the ZCR is administrative mandamus.

Respondent argues an action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision. (Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149. ["The declaratory relief provisions do not independently empower the courts to stop or interfere with administrative proceedings by declaratory decree."]; see Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 663.)

The court finds it need not decide the issue raised by Respondent as the writ-related declaratory relief claims are time-barred based on the statute of limitations arguments addressed above. “To determine which statute of limitations applies to a particular action, we consider the ‘gravamen’ of the action rather than its form or the relief demanded. [Citation.] The gravamen of an action depends on the nature of the right sued upon or the principal purpose of the action. [Citation.] . . . A claim for declaratory relief is subject to the same statute of limitations as the legal or equitable claim on which it is based.” (Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943.)

The court has stayed the fourth cause of action. Respondent may renew its demurrer to this cause of action upon reassignment to an IC court.

The court has stayed this cause of action. Respondent may renew its demurrer to this cause of action upon reassignment to an IC court.

Respondent argues the third cause of action for “failure to consider full environmental impacts as required by CEQA” is also barred by the time limitations prescribed by Guidelines[7] section 15112.[8]

Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b) sets forth certain statutory exemptions from CEQA, including an exemption for ministerial projects. (Pub. Resource Code, § 21080, subd. (b)(1); see Guidelines, § 15369 [definition of “ministerial”].) If a local agency determines a project is exempt from CEQA as a ministerial project pursuant to subdivision (b) of Public Resources Code section 21080 and the local agency approves the project, “the local agency . . . may file a notice of determination with the county clerk of each county in which the project will be located.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21152, subd. (b).) The statute uses the term “notice of determination,” but the Guidelines reference such filing as a “notice of exemption.” (Guidelines, §§ 15062, 15374, 15112, subd. (c)(2); see Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 481, 488 [type of notice of determination is otherwise known as a notice of exemption or NOE].)

“The benefit that a public agency and project proponent receive from filing a notice of exemption is a shorter statute of limitations.” (Coalition for Clean Air v. City of Visalia (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 408, 420.) Public Resource Code section 21167, subdivision (d) provides for a 35-day limitations period when a notice of exemption is filed; however, the limitations period is extended to 180 days if a notice of exemption is not filed. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 44, n. 9.)

Respondent issued a Notice of Exemption on November 8, 2021. The registrar-recorder/County Clerk posted the notice on November 30, 2021. (Respondent RJN Ex. 4.) The notice described the nature of the project as: “The applicant is proposing the installation of small wireless facilities on existing Crown Castle steel poles in the public ROW at the following three locations near: . . . and 5007 Escalon Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90043.” (Respondent RJN Ex. 4.) The notice also provided the “nearest corresponding parcels” assessor parcel numbers. (Respondent RJN Ex. 4.) The notice advises the project will be carried out by Crown Castle Fiber LLC. (Respondent RJN Ex. 4.) For purposes of CEQA, Respondent reported the project was exempt as ministerial citing Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b)(1) and Guidelines section 15268. (Respondent RJN Ex. 4.)

Petitioner appears to contend the ZCR did not constitute a permit. (Opposition 8:2-3.) According to Petitioner, as Respondent legally did not issue a permit, the notice of exemption (referred to by Petitioner as a negative declaration) was a nullity. (Opposition 8:26-9:1.) Petitioner cites no authority to support her position.

There is no question the County registrar-recorder posted the Notice of Exemption for a project allowing Crown to install small wireless facilities near Petitioner’s home. That Respondent caused the Notice of Exemption to be posted meant Petitioner had 35 days from November 30, 2021 (or until December 30, 2021) to initiate an action alleging Respondent violated CEQA. Petitioner provides no authority otherwise.

Petitioner filed her petition on February 7, 2021—well more than 35 days after posting the Notice of Exemption.

Based on the foregoing, (1) the motion to bifurcate is granted, (2) the court stays all non-writ claims and (3) the demurrer is sustained in part.

[1] For ease of reference, the court refers to the first amended petition herein as the petition.

[2] Respondent acknowledges some of Petitioner’s declaratory relief allegations arise from and are related to the writ claims.

[3] The County argues Petitioner filed an untimely opposition. Nonetheless, the court considers the opposition.

[4] The court recognizes a demurrer cannot be sustained as to part of cause of action. Nonetheless, the first cause of action for declaratory relief appears to set forth multiple, segregable claims or counts within the cause of action.

[5] Pursuant to section 65900, “[t]he legislative body of a city or county may, by ordinance, create and establish either a board of zoning adjustment, or the office of zoning administrator or both.” Government Code section 65902 provides the “planning commission shall exercise all of the functions and duties” of a board of zoning adjustment or the office of a zoning administrator when such board or administrator has not been created.” Respondent created Regional Planning pursuant to Government Code sections 65902 and 65101. (See LACC, § 22.220.030.)

[6] The Type I Review is a ministerial process for reviewing applications. This process requires the Director to verify that a proposed use, structure, or development of land complies with all applicable provisions of this Title 22.

[7] “Guidelines” refers to the Guidelines for Implementation of CEQA, which are found in the California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15000 et seq. All subsequent citations to the Guidelines are to title 14 of the California Code of Regulations.

[8] Respondent also demurs on the grounds Petitioner has failed to state a claim pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b)(1).