Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case Number: BC408948, Date: 2023-10-13 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs, Michael Khorshidi and Nejatolah Rabbanian, move for an order taxing the costs, including attorney’s fees, sought by Defendants, Alexander Javaheri and David JavaherI, through a memorandum of costs filed on July 6, 2023. After certain adjustments for appellate fees and costs (see Opposition 12, fn. 4 and 5), Defendants seek recovery of $69,276.33 in fees and costs in post-judgment enforcement matters.[1]

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice (RJN) of Exhibits A through I is granted.

The background facts and long history of this litigation are summarized, in detail, in the Court of Appeal’s decision filed on August 5, 2021 and this court’s order dated April 13, 2023 denying Defendants’ motion for appointment of an elisor. (See RJN Exh. E and H.) That full summary of this action is not repeated here but is incorporated by reference. In addition, this court has been assigned to hear this matter since 2014.

On July 17, 2017, the court entered judgment in this matter finding in favor of Defendants and as well as Cross-Complainant Parviz Abdi. The judgment provides in pertinent part:

1. Declaratory judgment shall be, and hereby is, entered in favor of Cross-Complainants the Javaheris, and Abdi, and against Cross-Defendants the Majority Partners, as requested by the Javaheri Cross-Complaint, as follows:

MICHAEL KHORSHIDI and NEJATOLAH RABBANIAN are defaulting co-venturers and ALEXANDER JAVAHERI, DAVID JAVAHERI and PARVIZ ABDI are entitled to exercise their buy-out rights as against MICHAEL KHORSHIDI and NEJATOLAH RABBANIAN under Section 9 of the Joint Venture Agreement between the parties relating to 5th and L.A., a Joint Venture. No price or date for the buy-out of joint venture interests of MICHAEL KHORSHIDI or NEJATOLAH RABBIAN is being set or established by the Court, such matters not being encompassed by the pleadings and not before the Court.

C. Judgement in favor of Abdi and against Majority Partners on the Abdi Cross-Complaint

1. Judgment of specific performance shall be, and hereby is, entered in favor of Cross-Complainant Abdi and against Cross-Defendants, the Majority Partners, requiring MICHAEL KHORSHIDI and NEJATOLAH RABBANIAN to specifically perform under Paragraph 9.3 of the Joint Venture Agreement between the parties relating to 5th and L.A., a Joint Venture, by allowing PARVIZ ABDI (along with the Javaheris, if they so choose) to exercise the right to purchase the interests of MICHAEL KHORSHIDI and NEJATOLAH RABBANIAN in said Joint Venture due to those individuals being defaulting co-ventures. No price or date for the buy-out of joint venture interests of MICHAEL KHORSHIDI or NEJATOLAH RABBIAN is being set or established by the Court, such matters not being encompassed by the pleadings and not before the Court . . . .

On October 12, 2021, the Court of Appeal affirmed this court’s judgment except as to an issue related to prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to this court to determine whether Defendants were entitled to prejudgment interest.

On June 15, 2022, in an attempt to enforce the judgment, Defendants filed their motion for elisor, which argued in part:

After the Judgment was affirmed on appeal, the Javaheris sent their demand for sale at the 2013 appraisal amount to [Plaintiffs], yet [Plaintiffs] have refused to proceed. [¶] Accordingly, the Court now should use its broad equitable powers to enforce the 2017 judgment, by appointing an Elisor to execute all necessary transfer documents on behalf of [Plaintiffs] so as to effectuate the transfers of [Plaintiffs’] interests in the Joint Venture. Further, such transfers must be based on the 2013 appraisal amount, which is final and binding pursuant to the JV Agreement, to be offset by any credit due to the Javaheris. (RJN Exh. F.)

The court heard argument on the motion on October 26, 2022 and took the matter under submission. On November 23, 2022, the court issued an order indicating it was inclined to grant the motion requesting appointment of the elisor; the court set an evidentiary hearing “for purposes of determining the buy-out price given required adjustments and/or offsets.”

On April 13, 2023, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion requesting appointment of an elisor and took the matter under submission. On April 24, 2023, the court issued its order denying the motion.

On July 6, 2023, Defendants filed a memorandum of costs requesting postjudgment costs of $72,875.89, including $72,557.89 in attorney’s fees incurred between June 1, 2022 and June 30, 2023. As noted earlier, Defendants have since reduced the request to $69,276.33.

On July 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their motion to tax Defendants’ claimed costs.

The judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law. Attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney's fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.

“Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).)

“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774 [Ladas].) “On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Ibid.)

Defendants Satisfy the Threshold Requirements of Code of Civil Procedure Section 685.040 for Post-Judgment Fees and Costs

[T]here are two requirements before a motion for an award of postjudgment attorney fees may be awarded as costs: (1) the fees must have been incurred to ‘enforce’ a judgment; and (2) the underlying judgment had to include an award for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), which provides that attorney fees may be awarded when authorized by contract. (Jaffe v. Pacelli (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 927, 935.)

Defendants satisfy the two requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040. First, the claimed fees on the memorandum of costs, including attorney’s fees related to the motion for the appointment of an elisor, were incurred to enforce this court’s 2017 judgment. (See RJN Exh. F; Raucher Decl. ¶¶ 2-12.) Second, the Corrected Judgment entered by the court on June 6, 2022 found Defendants to be the prevailing parties and included an attorney’s fee award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A) in favor of Defendants. (Minute Order, 6/6/22.) That Defendants meet the threshold requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 is undisputed by Plaintiffs in their moving and reply papers.

Plaintiffs contend, however, Defendants “have provided no basis whatsoever for evaluating whether their claimed costs or attorney’s fees are proper.” (Memo 8:25-26.) In opposition, consistent with the procedure set forth in Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 774, Defendants have submitted documentation supporting their cost request, including attorney’s fees. (See Raucher Decl.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s “no basis” argument is moot.

Defendants’ Motion for Appointment of an Elisor Was a Reasonable and Necessary Litigation Tactic to Enforce the Judgment

A motion for fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 requires the trial court to exercise its discretion and determine the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney fees and costs. (Chinese Yellow Pages Co. v. Chinese Overseas Marketing Service Corp. (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 868, 885.)

Fees should not be denied simply because the moving party’s efforts to enforce a judgment were unsuccessful. “Litigation often involves a succession of attacks upon an opponent's case; indeed the final ground of resolution may only become clear after a series of unsuccessful attacks. Compensation is ordinarily warranted even for unsuccessful forays.” (City of Los Angeles v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 290, 307.) “A litigant should not be penalized for failure to find the winning line at the outset, unless the unsuccessful forays address discrete unrelated claims, are pursued in bad faith, or are pursued incompetently, i.e., are such that a reasonably competent lawyer would not have pursued them. Time not reasonably spent by counsel for the prevailing party need not be compensated and bad faith can constitute a basis for a total disentitlement.” (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1303.)

These equitable principles apply to a request for post-judgment enforcement fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040. (See Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 92 [“The trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable fee, and the award of such fees is governed by equitable principles”]; Chinese Yellow Pages, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at 885-886 [applying Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040]; Logtale, Ltd. v. IKOR, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2019) 2019 WL 12517082 at *4 [same]; PSM Holding Corp. v. National Farm Financial Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2010) 743 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1165 [same].)

Plaintiffs contend Defendants are not entitled to attorney’s fees related to the motion for appointment of an elisor because Defendants “asserted non-meritorious arguments . . . to circumvent or evade this Court’s prior judgment and thus their claimed fees related to that Motion . . . caused unnecessary litigation, . . .” through the motion. (Memo 11:20-.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the motion was unreasonable and unnecessary because “the Court had already found the 2013 appraisal price could not be enforced and therefore it was improper for the Javaheris to seek enforcement of it in the Motion for Elisor under the auspices of enforcing the 2017 Judgment.” (Memo 12:4-7.)

Although Plaintiffs ultimately convinced the court it would be error to grant the motion for appointment of an elisor, the court initially indicated it intended to grant the motion and set an evidentiary hearing to determine “the buy-out price given required adjustments and/or offsets.” (November 23, 2022 Ruling.) In the November 23, 2022 Ruling, the court rejected various arguments raised by Plaintiffs in their opposition to the motion for appointment of an elisor and now reiterated in their motion to tax costs. Among other things, the court initially ruled as follows:

Plaintiffs challenged the [2013] appraisals [of Krycler]—the foundation for the valuation of the joint venture—in this action. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ claim after hearing witness testimony and considering documentary evidence during trial. The court’s statement of decision dated June 1, 2017 reflects the court’s finding the appraisals were valid. . . . [¶]

Given the court’s final judgment, it appears it would be “reasonless for [this] court to bring about unnecessary litigation and delay an inevitable result by requiring [the Javaheris and Abdi] to initiate a new action against [Khorshidi and Rabbanian] to obtain what was already [theirs] under the existing judgment.” . . . . [¶]

Plaintiffs’ arguments—attempting to avoid complying with the 2017 Judgment—opposing the Javaheris’ motion are not persuasive.

First, the court is not modifying the now final 2017 judgment—the court is merely implementing it. Plaintiffs have been ordered to comply with the Joint Venture Agreement and its buy-out provisions. Plaintiffs acknowledge Krycler determined the fair market value of the joint venture pursuant to the terms of the Joint Venture Agreement. To the extent, Plaintiffs attempted to undermine Krycler’s opinion, they failed. The court upheld the appraisals and (after considering significant testamentary and documentary evidence) found the appraisals were unassailable. The buy-out provisions of the Joint Venture Agreement do not require the court’s involvement, but Plaintiffs have chosen to not comply with the court’s specific performance command in the 2017 Judgment necessitating enforcement measures. To adopt Plaintiffs’ position is as if the 2017 Judgment does not exist; Plaintiffs ignore the 2017 Judgment and its terms to escape the relief obtained against them in the underlying litigation. . . . [¶]

The evidentiary hearing with the particularities of establishing the buy-out price caused the court to rethink its prior expressed intent to grant the motion to appoint an elisor. Ultimately,

the court determined it would be inequitable to use an elisor in aid of enforcement of the court’s judgment. The court reasoned, in part, that “use of an elisor appears to conflict with the court’s judgment finding it inappropriate to set a buy-out price.” (RJN Exh. H.) However, that was not the only reason that the court ultimately denied the motion. The court also stated: “Having reviewed the reporter's transcript of the proceedings held before Judge Heeseman on January 10 and 31, 2012, it is not entirely clear whether [Plaintiffs] could be deemed to have consented to the appraisal process.” (Ibid.) The court denied the motion for appointment of an elisor, in part, due to the “lack of clarity concerning [Plaintiffs’] consensual participation of the appraisal process (and their related challenge to values).” (Ibid.) While Plaintiffs had been unsuccessful at trial in undermining the appraisals leading to a finding of their validity such that the appraisals could be used for the buy-out value, the court also reasoned “resolution of the matter is not as simple or straightforward as that in Blueberry Properties, LLC v. Chow (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1021 or Rayan v. Dykeman (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1629, 1635.” (Ibid.)

While the motion for appointment of an elisor was ultimately unsuccessful, it was a reasonable and necessary litigation tactic to enforce the 2017 judgment. For the reasons stated in the November 23, 2022 Ruling, the court cannot conclude the motion for appointment of an elisor was brought in bad faith or was frivolous. Given the protracted history of this case; the judgment of specific performance in favor of Defendants; and Defendants’ non-frivolous argument Plaintiffs were bound by the 2013 appraisal price and the court’s finding the appraisals were unassailable, a reasonably competent lawyer could have brought the motion for appointment of an elisor as an effort to enforce the 2017 judgment. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to their reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the motion for appointment of an elisor, including the evidentiary hearing held on April 13, 2023.

“The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . .’ [T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community. . . .” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is the rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616.) In making its calculation, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.)

“The verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) If the motion is supported by evidence, the opposing party must respond with specific evidence showing that the fees are unreasonable. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 560-63.) The court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 395.)

Defendants request hourly rates of $650 in 2022 and $695 in 2023 for seasoned and skilled attorney Stephen Raucher; $275 in 2022 and $340 in 2023 for associate Yunfie Ni; and $195 for three paralegals. (Raucher Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) Based on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorneys requesting fees, and the legal issues in the motion for the appointment of an elisor and evidentiary hearing, the court finds that these hourly rates are reasonable and well within legal community standards in Los Angeles. Plaintiffs have not developed any argument to the contrary.

For this motion, Defendants seek recovery of $64,449 in attorney and paralegal fees incurred on judgment-enforcement matters, including the motion for appointment of an elisor, between June 1, 2022 and June 30, 2023. (See Raucher Decl. ¶¶ 6 and 8-10.) Specifically, Defendants request fees for 51.20 hours of legal work performed by attorney Raucher; 90.90 hours of legal work performed by associate Ni; and 13.4 hours of paralegal work. (Ibid.)

In his declaration, attorney Raucher provides the following “breakdown” of the fees:

(1) $12,294.50 in fees preparing the moving papers of the Elisor Motion (6/8/2022 – 6/15/2022); (2) $4,690.00 in fees reviewing and analyzing [Plaintiffs’] and Abdi’s Opposition papers, and preparing the Reply in support of the Elisor Motion (6/24/2022 – 6/30/2022); (3) $2,511.00 in fees preparing for and conducting the July 8, 2022 Hearing on the Elisor Motion and posthearing related work (7/7/2022 – 8/3/2022); (4) $6,549.50 in fees reviewing and analyzing Abdi’s Supplemental Brief and [Plaintiffs’] Objection/Response thereto, and preparing the Javaheris’ Objection papers (8/18/2022 – 9/30/2022); (5) $4,617.50 in fees preparing for and conducting the October 26, 2022 Hearing on the Elisor Motion, and post-hearing related work (10/25/2022 – 11/23/2022); (6) $24,544.50 in fees preparing for and conducting the Evidentiary Hearing on the Elisor Motion (4/12/2023 – 4/13/2023); (7) $4,038.00 in fees preparing for and conducting the Evidentiary Hearing on the Elisor Motion (4/12/2023 – 4/13/2023); (8) $5,204.00 in fees in connection with Post-Evidentiary Hearing work, including analyzing judgment collection issues and tools, propounding judgment debtor discovery, researching post-judgment attorney’s fees, etc. (4/26/2023 – 6/30/2023). (Raucher Decl. ¶ 6.)

These amounts total $64,449, as do the hours specified in paragraphs 8-10 of Raucher’s declaration for the attorney and paralegal work. (Raucher Decl. ¶¶ 8-10.) Raucher has authenticated the billing records that generally corroborate the summary in Raucher’s declaration concerning the amount of legal work performed. (Raucher Decl. ¶¶ 2-5, Exh. A.)[2]

The court concludes attorney Raucher’s declaration and the corroborating billing records satisfy Defendants’ initial burden of proof to justify the request for $64,449 in attorney and paralegal fees (as well as the additional expenses discussed below). Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to respond with specific evidence and argument showing the fees are unreasonable. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 560-63.)

In reply, Plaintiffs challenge the hours requested on several grounds. (See Reply 10-13.) Plaintiffs first contend, generally, that “blocked billing” and various redactions prevent Plaintiffs or the court from determining the reasonable lodestar fee. The court is not persuaded by this general argument. “[A]n award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 995.) The court acknowledges “trial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.) Here, however, attorney Raucher has described the legal work performed and the billing records corroborate his declaration. Many of the billing entries are not “blocked” or redacted. Moreover, Plaintiffs and the court can assess the reasonableness of the work performed from the blocked entries and Raucher’s declaration. While some information is redacted, the relevant entries include sufficient unredacted information for a lodestar analysis. Significantly, Defendants do not seek recovery of the fees incurred from May 5, 2023 to June 8, 2023, the only entries completely redacted. (See Oppo. 12, fn. 4, 5.)

Plaintiffs next contend “[m]any of the claimed attorney’s fees are for unrelated matters having to do with work performed with respect to Abdi, not [Plaintiffs], for which the Javaheris should not be compensated.” (Reply 10:4-5.) Plaintiffs point out the billing records include legal work reviewing and analyzing certain papers filed by Abdi in connection with the motion for appointment of an elisor and the evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.) However, Plaintiffs do not discuss the substance of Abdi’s filings in any detail.

While Defendants and Abdi filed a joint brief “relating to the proper calculation of the buyout price,” they “disagree[d], however, about distribution between them, of the buyout rights.” (Abdi Brief filed 3/22/23.) Accordingly, Abdi filed separate briefs on issues for which he was adverse to Defendants’ interests. (See e.g., ibid.; Abdi brief filed 4/5/23.)

Apportionment of fees is not required if fee-bearing and non-fee-bearing claims or legal activities are inextricably intertwined. (See Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 227.) Plaintiffs do not discuss all the different briefs that were filed by Defendants and Abdi or explain why it was unreasonable for Defendants to review and analyze Abdi’s briefs or draft a separate brief regarding allocation, considering that Defendants’ and Abdi’s interests were not always consistent. While Plaintiffs state the “allocation issue was strictly an issue between Abdi and the Javaheris” (Reply 10, fn. 3), Defendants needed to respond to such issues in connection with the motion for appointment of an elisor—a motion brought to enforce the judgment against Plaintiffs.

On this briefing, the court concludes Defendants’ legal work related to Abdi’s briefs, and also Defendants’ separate briefing regarding allocation, were inextricably intertwined with Defendants’ enforcement efforts against Plaintiffs. In their reply brief, Plaintiffs fail to show that the fees requested for such work were unnecessary or unreasonable.

Plaintiffs also object to Defendants request fees for correspondence and collaboration between Defendants and Abdi. (Reply 10:22-23.) For the same reasons discussed earlier, Plaintiffs do not prove such legal work was unnecessary or unreasonable in the context of the post-judgment enforcement proceedings. Plaintiffs do not show such legal work can be reasonably separated from the other aspects of the motion for appointment of an elisor and related enforcement proceedings, which are compensable.

Plaintiffs object to “secretarial” work performed by paralegals, such as organizing, redacting, and highlighting trial exhibits. (Reply 11:11-17.) Plaintiffs cite no authority that such paralegal work is non-compensable. The court finds that organizing, redacting, and highlighting trial exhibits (and related paralegal work) was reasonable and necessary. (See Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 92 [“courts have approved including paralegal fees as attorney fees”].) In fact, delegating such tasks to a paralegal reduces time associated with higher billing attorney supervision of clerical staff.

Finally, Plaintiffs contend a negative multiplier should be applied to the lodestar to account for Defendants’ lack of success on the motion for appointment of an elisor. (Reply 12: 28.) A parties’ success is an equitable factor that the court may consider in determining the lodestar fee. (See Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 92 [factors to be considered in fee award include “the skill required and employed . . . [and] the success or failure”]; see also Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 [“a trial court may reduce attorney fees based on the plaintiff's degree of success”].)

In this case, Defendants brought a motion for appointment of an elisor that necessitated an evidentiary hearing and substantial legal work from Plaintiffs, Defendants, Abdi and the court. Ultimately, Defendants were unsuccessful. As discussed earlier, the court finds the motion for was not brought in bad faith and was not frivolous, and, for the reasons discussed above, was a reasonable and necessary litigation tactic.

Considering the circumstances of the case, the court agrees with Plaintiffs a reasonable fee award for the post-judgment enforcement proceedings should consider Defendants’ lack of success on the motion to appoint an elisor. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 92. [“The factors to be considered include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.”]) The award of attorney’s fees “is governed by equitable principles.” (Ibid.)

In connection with their post-judgment enforcement efforts, Defendants should assume some meaningful percentage of the risk and expense of their unsuccessful enforcement effort. Based on the court’s familiarity with the post-judgment enforcement proceedings, review of the billing records and consideration of the briefing, the court finds a 20 percent reduction in the attorney’s fees or $12,826[3] to be an appropriate reduction in the attorney’s fees award based on Defendants’ lack of success on the motion. A skilled attorney like Raucher could reasonably estimate an 80 percent likelihood of success rate on the motion thereby recognizing a lack of success rate of 20 percent.

The billing records authenticated by attorney Raucher show that $6,014.39 in expenses were incurred from June 10, 2022 to June 30, 2023. For this motion, Defendants seek recovery of $4,827.33 of those expenses and assert that the remainder relate to their appellate costs “and are more properly dealt with after the appeal.” (Opposition 12, fn. 5; Raucher Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs do not discuss or challenge these expenses in reply. As these expenses appear reasonable and necessary to the enforcement work at issue, such costs are allowed.

The memorandum of costs also requests $97 for preparing and issuing the abstract of judgment, $221 for recording and indexing the abstract of judgment and $3 for the parking needed to obtain the abstracts. Defendants have supported those costs, which appear reasonable. (Raucher Decl. ¶ 12.)

Based on the foregoing, the motion to tax is granted in part. The court reduces Defendants’ attorney’s fees award by $12,826 and allows the other expenses sought. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to $56,440.33 through their memorandum of costs filed July 6, 2023.

[1] The memorandum of costs sought recovery of $72,875.89. Defendants have reduced the request to $69,276.33 in their opposition brief. (Opposition 13:15.)

[2] Defendants represent that the $24,554.50 was actually for “Preparing briefs and supporting papers and evidence for the April 13, 2023 Evidentiary Hearing on the Elisor Motion (12/6/2022 – 4/10/2023).” (Opposition 11:22-23.) That representation seems consistent with the billing records as the billing records do not show Defendants incurred $24,554.50 in fees on April 12 and 13, 2023, as stated by Raucher.

[3] After deducting $4,827.33 and other costs ($321—see Other Costs), the attorney’s fees sought by Defendants total $64,128.