Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: 19STCV14497, Date: 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV14497    Hearing Date: February 15, 2023    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Larchmont Place, LLC’s, and Massco Investments, Inc.’s, motion to set aside and/or vacate Plaintiffs Coffee + Food, LLC’s, and Art Works Studio & Classroom, LLC’s, requests for dismissal is granted. 

Defendants’ request that this Court enter an order of dismissal with prejudice of Defendants is granted.

          This action is a commercial landlord-tenant dispute.  Plaintiffs Coffee + Food, LLC, (“Coffee”) and Art Works Studio & Classroom, LLC, (“Art”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on August 12, 2019, alleging breach of contract (1st and 2nd causes of action), specific performance (3rd and 4th causes of action), intentional interference with prospective economic relations (7th and 8th causes of action), and negligent inference with prospective economic relations (9th and 10th causes of action).  This Court granted Defendants Larchmont Place, LLC’s, (“Larchmont”) and Massco Investments, Inc.’s, (“Massco”) (collectively, “Defendants”) special motion to strike (“anti-SLAPP motion”) as to 1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th causes of action and denied as to allegations of alter ego.  On February 20, 2020, Plaintiffs appealed from the anti-SLAPP Order.  (Notice of Appeal.)  On March 14, 2022, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion deeming the anti-SLAPP order moot.  (Court of Appeal Opinion, pgs. 2, 20.)  On June 30, 2022, the Court of Appeal issued a remittitur to this Court.  (6/30/22 Remittitur.)  On June 30, 2022, Plaintiffs requested dismissal of Defendants without prejudice from the action, which was granted on July 1, 2022.  (Request for Dismissal Larchmont; Request for Dismissal Massco.)  About 40 days later, Defendants filed the instant motion on August 10, 2022.  Plaintiffs filed their opposition on February 1, 2023.  Defendants filed their reply on February 7, 2023.

          C.C.P. §473(d) provides, “[t]he court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”  (C.C.P. §473(d).) 

“It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the order. [Citations.]”  (Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194; accord Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761 [“a default that is void on the face of the record when entered is subject to challenge at any time irrespective of lack of diligence in seeking to set it aside within the six-month period of section 473”].)

C.C.P. §581(b)(1) provides that a plaintiff can dismiss an action without prejudice “before the commencement of trial” and C.C.P. §581(a)(6) defines the commence of trial as the beginning of the opening statement or courts.  (C.C.P. §§581(a)(6), (b)(1).)  

 However, “[a] plaintiff’s right to dismiss an action under section 581 is not absolute.”  (Guttman v. Guttman (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 396, 409.)  Indeed, “a plaintiff’s right to voluntary dismissal ends when resolution in favor of the defendant is inevitable, even absent a ruling by the court.”  (Cole v. Hammond (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 921, 924, citing Franklin Capital Corp. v. Wilson (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 187, 202-203 [collecting cases].)

The Court of Appeal stated in its opinion,

Each of the causes of action struck by the trial court (and indeed every cause of action) in the operative complaint is premised on appellants having an ongoing possessory interest in the properties. Because the issues litigated and decided in the unlawful detainer actions have rendered moot appellants’ claims of possession, appellants did not appeal the final judgments in the unlawful detainer actions and appellants have since vacated the properties, we reverse the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and remand to the trial court to vacate the order. . . .

(Court of Appeal Opinion, pg. 2.)

          Here, the Court of Appeal formally indicated that each cause of action in the FAC was moot.  (Court of Appeal Opinion, pg. 2.)  Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted to the Court of Appeal that “all their causes of action are premised on the continued validity and enforceability of their leases,” resolving all issues in Defendants’ favor and rendering resolution inevitable.  (Court of Appeal Opinion, pg. 14; Cole v. Hammond  (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 912, 924.)

          Under the doctrine of the law of the case, Plaintiffs and this Court became bound by the Court of Appeal’s conclusions of law that (1) all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action against Defendants are moot and (2) the unlawful detainer action’s determination of the effect of the estoppel certificates on the lease termination date precludes Plaintiffs from now, again disputing the termination date of their lease agreement.  (Court of Appeal Opinion, pgs. 11-19.)  The doctrine is explained as follows:  “[t]hat where, upon an appeal, the supreme court, in deciding the appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . . .”  (Tally v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal. 418, 421.)  Both mootness and issue preclusion are conclusions of law.  (K.G. v. Meredith (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 164, 174 [“Trial court rulings on mootness are reviewed de novo where, as here, they are decided on undisputed facts.”]; Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1507 [“the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is a question of law subject to de novo review”].)

          The Court of Appeal’s reliance on Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. and Coalition for a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa in electing to reverse the anti-SLAPP Order based on mootness with directions to this Court establishes that the “reversal, of course, [did] not imply approval of a contrary judgment, but [was] merely a procedural step necessary to a proper disposition of this case,” which was the inevitable dismissal.  (Opinion, at pgs. 2-3 n.3; Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 135; see e.g., Yucaipa, Coalition for a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 939, 947 [“This reversal does not imply that the judgment was erroneous on the merits, but is solely for the purpose of returning jurisdiction over the case to the superior court by vacating the otherwise final judgment solely on the ground of mootness.”].)

This Court has authority to set aside and/or vacate Plaintiffs’ requests for dismissal and enter an order dismissing the action against Defendants with prejudice under C.C.P. §§128(a), 629, and 1008.  

C.C.P. §§128(a) provides that every court has the power to control its process and orders to make them conform to law and justice.  (C.C.P. §§128(a).)  

C.C.P. §629 provides the Court, on motion of a party against whom a verdict has been rendered and before its power to rule on a motion for new trial expires, must render judgment in favor of an aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for directed verdict for the aggrieved party should have been granted had a previous motion been made.  (C.C.P. §629.) The primary requirement for the granting of the motion is that there is no substantial conflict in the evidence.  (Robinson v. North American Life & Casualty Co. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 111, 118.). 

C.C.P. §1008 provides that any party affected by a court’s order may request that the court “reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order” when the party presents new or different facts, circumstances, or law.  (C.C.P. §1008(a).)

Here, relief under C.C.P.§§128(a) and 1008, is warranted As discussed above, the Court of Appeal resolved all factual issues in Defendants’ favor, making dismissal a foregone conclusion.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs were without the right to request dismissal of Defendants without prejudice under §581(b)(1) on June 30, 2021.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to set aside and/or vacate Plaintiffs’ requests for dismissal is granted.  Defendants’ request that this Court enter an order of dismissal with prejudice of Defendants is granted.

Dated:  February _____, 2023

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court