Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: 20STCV45291, Date: 2022-11-14 Tentative Ruling

Department 71: Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff at (213) 830-0771 before the set hearing time.  See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b).   All parties are otherwise encouraged to appear by Court Call for all matters.

Case Number: 20STCV45291    Hearing Date: November 14, 2022    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is granted.

Plaintiff Angela Chon Lee (“Angela”) (“Plaintiff”) moves for leave to file a first amended complaint (“FAC”) in this action.  Plaintiff seeks to file the FAC to (1) reinstate Charles M. Lee as Defendant due to his personal and individual liability for all debts and obligations against Defendant The Byung Moon Lee and Han Soon Lee Family Limited Partnership Dated May 17, 2002 (“FLP”) (“Defendant”) by virtue of his status as the general and sole partner of Defendant FLP as well as due to his control over the wages, hours, and working conditions of Plaintiff during her employment for Defendants and each of them; and (2) to narrow the scope of this action to the wage and hour claims of Plaintiff against Defendants.  (Notice of Motion, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§473(a)(1), 576.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant FLP’s 10/31/22 request for judicial notice of the pleadings and records in the present action is denied, as there is no need to take judicial notice since the Court can review the records of the case at hand.

Background & Procedural History

On November 25, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendants Charles M. Lee DDS (“DDS”), Charles M. Lee (“Charles”), Jessica R. Novotny (“Novotny”), and Zachary Scott Dresben (“Dresben”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging eight causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wage, (2) statutory penalty under Labor Code §226, (3) statutory penalty under Labor Code §226.7, (4) attorney malpractice, (5) violation of unfair competition laws, (6) declaratory/injunctive relief, (7) fraud, and (8) breach of fiduciary duty. On December 23, 2020, Plaintiff dismissed DDS. On December 29, 2020, Defendants 2324 Hunter LLC (“2324 Hunter”), Young Joon Kim (“Joon Kim”), and Jung Ah Lee (“Jung”) were doe amended to the Complaint.  Charles filed his answer (“Answer”) to the Complaint on January 4, 2021.  On February 17, 2021, Plaintiff dismissed Novotny and Dresben. On February 23, 2021, Charles filed a motion for sanctions against Plaintiff, which this Court denied.  (7/26/21 Minute Order.)  On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff dismissed Charles without prejudice.  

  On December 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to file an FAC.  FLP filed its opposition on October 31, 2022.  Plaintiff filed her reply on November 7, 2022.

Motion for Leave to Amend

“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”  (C.C.P. §473(a)(1).)

“Trial courts are vested with the discretion to allow amendments to pleadings ‘in furtherance of justice.’ That trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has been established policy in this state since 1901.”  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489.)

CRC Rule 3.1321(a) requires that a motion to amend must: “[i]nclude a copy of the proposed… amended pleading… [and] state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be [deleted and/or added], if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the [deleted and/or additional] allegations are located…”

CRC Rule 3.1324(b) provides, as follows: “[a] separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify: (1) The effect of the amendment; (2) Why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Plaintiff’s motion complies with CRC Rule 3.1324(a). The motion includes a copy of the proposed FAC and sets forth the allegations to be added and/or deleted along with the corresponding page numbers.  (Motion, pgs. 9-13; Decl. of Florence ¶¶4-5, Exhs. 3 [Redline FAC], 4 [FAC].)

Plaintiff’s motion also substantially complies with CRC Rule 3.1324(b). Plaintiffs submitted a separate declaration of their counsel that specifies the effect of the amendment and explains why the amendment is necessary and proper.  (Decl. of Florence ¶2.)  Plaintiff asserts the amendment is necessary because Defendant FLP’s verified discovery response to Form Interrogatories—General Set one and printout of the Amendment to Certificate of Limited Partnership filed by FLP on September 1, 2020, confirming Charles is the general and sole partner of FLP, necessitates reinstating Charles as a party to this action.  (Motion, pgs. 7-8; Decl. of Florence ¶2.)  Plaintiff asserts she learned through the discovery process there are additional facts and theories upon which Charles as the general and sole partner of FLP is individually liable for all Labor Code violations pleaded against FLP as a matter of law pursuant to the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 2008.  (Motion, pg. 7, citing Corp. Code §15904.04(a) [“[A]ll general partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the limited partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.”].)  Plaintiff argues FLP intentionally concealed from the Court Charles’s status as a general partner of FLP and his individual liability for all liabilities against FLP, and has promptly sought Defendant’s stipulation to file the FAC.  (Motion, pgs. 7-8.)  Plaintiff asserts the theory that Charles is individually liable for all debts and obligations of FLP is not novel theory because it is the law.  (Motion, pgs. 8-9, citing Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [“[E]ven if the proposed legal theory is a novel one, ‘the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.’”].) 

Plaintiff argues granting leave to amend is in the furtherance of justice and judicial economy because she seeks to dismiss her causes of action for attorney malpractice, declaratory/injunctive relief, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.  (Motion, pg. 8.)  Plaintiff asserts Defendants will not be prejudiced by the amendments.  (Motion, pg. 8.)

In opposition, FLP argues Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because it is a sham pleading.  (Opposition, pg. 6; Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946; Amid v. Hawthorn Community Medical Group, Inc. (1989) 212 Cal.App.4d 1383, 1390.)  FLP argues Plaintiff’s Complaint claimed Charles, in his individual capacity, was her employer, and Plaintiff undercut her entire case when she abandoned that theory and dismissed Charles in April 2021.  (Opposition, pg. 6.)  FLP argues Plaintiff’s proposed FAC contradicts her Complaint because Plaintiff claims Charles, in his individual capacity and in his capacity as general partner of FLP was her employer, despite Plaintiff’s claim that she was not aware of FLP’s existence until her deposition in November 2021.  (Opposition, pgs. 6-7.)  Further, FLP argues that even if Charles is the general partner of FLP, it does not mean he personally employed Plaintiff or is liable for her wages, and Plaintiff does not offer legal authority to suggest as much.  (Opposition, pg. 7.)  FLP argues it will be prejudiced if the motion is granted because Plaintiffs did not act diligently to amend her Complaint and FLP has not been able to obtain the information it needs from discovery to file its dispositive motion or prepare for trial in March 2023. (Opposition, pg. 9; Rainer v. Community Memorial Hospital (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 240, 258.)  FLP argues if this Court is inclined to grant Plaintiff’s motion, this Court should impose conditions on Plaintiff, such as continuing the trial date to at least six to eight months to enable FLP to conduct necessary discovery and file a dispositive motion, limit Plaintiff’s ability to conduct discovery about Charles, and order Plaintiff to pay the costs and fees incurred by FLP and Charles from the date of Charles’s dismissal to the present.  (Opposition, pg. 10.)

As a preliminary matter, as discussed above, the motion substantially complies with CRC Rule 3.1324(b); as such, the motion shall not be denied for being procedurally deficient. 

The Court finds Defendants will not be substantially prejudiced by the amendment and Plaintiffs are entitled to an order granting leave to amend.  Plaintiff did not unnecessarily delay: Plaintiff’s motion to amend was filed December 23, 2021, with an initial hearing date on June 8, 2022, which was continued because counsel for FLP requested a continuance due to ongoing settlement negotiations.  (Supp. Decl. of Florence, Exh. 1.)  Counsel for FLP also requested the second continuance for this hearing.  (Supp. Decl. of Florence, Exh. 2.)  FLP had notice of Plaintiff’s intent to amend her pleading since December 2021, and as such, does not merit a continuation of the trial date or for this Court to impose limits on Plaintiff’s ability to conduct discovery as to Charles.  FLP’s assertion that granting leave to file the FAC will prejudice FLP because they will be required to defend two new causes of action is not persuasive, as the causes of action are based on the same general facts relating to an employment relationship.  FLP’s citation to Rainer is also inapposite unpersuasive because the plaintiff in Rainer waited until the third day of trial, and more than ten months after she learned of a new theory for her case until she moved to amend her pleading.  (Rainer, 18 Cal.App.3d at pg. 258.)  Unlike Rainer, Plaintiff filed her motion to amend within a month of developing a new theory of her case, which is also months before trial has begun.  FLP’s arguments in opposition do not establish FLP will be so prejudiced by the amendment such that leave to amend should be denied.  Finally, the Court acknowledges the trial date may need to be continued, however the Court declines to place limits on the discovery or impose attorney’s fees and costs. 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a FAC is granted.

Dated:  November _____, 2022

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court