Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: 20STUD00431, Date: 2022-09-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STUD00431    Hearing Date: September 12, 2022    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

DEPARTMENT 71 

TENTATIVE RULING 

Defendant’s motion for entry of judgment on settlement is denied.  

Defendant Sylvia Tidwell (“Defendant”) moves to enter judgment on the stipulation that was orally entered between her and Plaintiff Art Colony Property, LLC (“Plaintiff”) before the court on April 8, 2022, that is reflected in Exhibit C to the Declaration of Simon Sherred (“Sherred”).  (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; Motion, pg. 6; Decl. of Sherred ¶8, Exh. C [Attachment to 4/28/22 Email].)  

Background 

On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed its initial complaint against Defendant alleging a single cause of action for unlawful detainer.  On February 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant. On June 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), erroneously titled “First Amended Complaint.”

On June 28, 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion requesting the Court enter judgment, pursuant to C.C.P. §664.6, on the stipulation entered into by the parties orally before the Court on April 8, 2022, at a Mandatory Settlement Conference (“MSC”).  (Motion, pgs. 2, 5.)  On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed its Opposition. On July 1, 2022, the Court granted Defendant’s Ex Parte Application to shorten time on the hearing and advanced the hearing date to September 12, 2022.  (7/1/22 Minute Order.) Defendant has not filed a reply. Neither party has submitted a transcript of the hearing from the April 8, 2022 MSC to determine the degree to which a stipulated settlement was entered between Plaintiff and Defendant on the record.

Motion for Entry of Judgment

C.C.P. §664.6 provides, as follows: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Emphasis added.)

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate… orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”  (C.C.P. §664.6.)  The trial court may enter judgment pursuant to a stipulated agreement to settle in one of two ways: (1) in a writing signed by the parties; or (2) by oral agreement made “before the court.”  (Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707, 711–712.)  If, however, there are disputed facts on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement pursuant to section 664.6, the trial court has the authority to determine whether the parties have entered into a valid and binding settlement of all or part of the case.  (In re Marriage of Hasso (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1174; Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989.)

The ultimate issue whether the parties formed an enforceable contract, since a settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.  (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 815, rev. denied, April 22, 1998.)  The essential element of any contract is “consent,” which must be mutual, and whose existence is determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, i.e., what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe.  (Id. at 811.)

           Defendant argues that the parties entered an alleged stipulation orally before the Court at the April 8, 2022 MSC.  (Motion, pgs. 2, 5; Decl. of Sherred ¶¶6, 9, 10, 11, Exhs. A, D, E, F [emails].)  Defendant cites Plaintiff’s counsel’s emails that refer to a stipulated settlement agreement as support for her assertion that the parties entered into the oral stipulation.  Defendant asserts the terms of the stipulated settlement were effectively agreed upon because on April 28, 2022, counsel submitted a Draft Stipulation to Plaintiff’s counsel, as to which Plaintiff’s counsel raised only an objection to language in paragraph 5 including language stating the stipulation would be void if the Housing is Key money did not come in, which Defendant’s counsel removed and sent and updated version doing so.  (Motion, pg. 3.)  Defendant asserts the updated stipulation, which removed the offending language, attached as Exhibit C to the Sherred Declaration (hereinafter referred to as “Updated Stipulation”) reflects the agreement made during the parties at the April 8, 2022 MSC.  (Motion, pg. 3.)  

The Updated Stipulation sets forth the following terms: (1) judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant; (2) Defendant’s rights under the lease or rental agreement are forfeited; (3) Defendant’s security deposit shall be retained by Plaintiff and Defendant waives a claim thereto; (4) judgment shall be entered now and stay enforcement of judgment by a writ of possession which may be issued by no final lockout prior to July 2, 2022; (5) Defendant agrees to vacate the subject premises by June 30, 2022; and (6) 11 other terms set forth in Attachment A.  (Decl. of Sherred ¶8, Exh. C, pgs. 1-3.)  Paragraph 5 provides: “Defendant has been approved for $80,874 in rental assistance funds through the Housing is Key Program, $4,493 of which has already been disbursed to Plaintiff.  If the remaining $76,381 is disbursed to Plaintiff, Plaintiff will notify Defendant of such disbursal within five days of receipt.  Plaintiff waives all rent and daily rental damages, attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this tenancy that are not funded by Housing is Key . . .”  (Decl. of Sherred ¶8, Exh. C, Attachment A ¶5.)  Plaintiff’s counsel never responded to the April 28 email with the updated stipulation, and on May 9, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated there were still “some issues with the wording” of the updated stipulation.  (Motion, pgs. 3-4; Decl. of Sherred ¶¶12-13.)

           In opposition, Plaintiff argues the parties reached a tentative agreement on April 8, 2022, wherein Defendant agreed to vacate by June 30, 2022, and pay Plaintiff approximately $80,000 by Housing is Key.  (Opposition, pg. 2.)  Plaintiff asserts “the parties reached a tentative agreement wherein Defendant agreed to vacate by 06/30/2022 and pay Plaintiff approximately $80k via Housing is Key.  However, the parties had not discussed nor agreed to any of the details regarding the payment. Indeed, the agreement was completely nebulous as to when, how, if the money did not come in what would happen.”  (Decl. of Hogan, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff presents evidence that several proposed drafts of the agreement were circulated, but the parties never came to a meeting of the minds on the details.  (Decl. of Hogan, ¶ 4.)  Plaintiff presents further evidence that the stipulation “state[s] that if HIK does not pay, the agreement will need to be renegotiated.”  (Decl. of Hogan, ¶ 4, Exh.1.)   (Opposition, pg. 5.)  Finally, Plaintiff submitted evidence that the Housing is Key payment never came in.   (Decl. of Hogan ¶6.)   

           Plaintiff’s counsel’s emails suggest a settlement agreement was placed on the record. (Decl. of Sherred ¶¶6, 9, 10, 11, Exhs. A, D, E, F.)  However, there is insufficient evidence to determine that the terms of the stipulated settlement entered into by the parties at the MSC are set forth in Exhibit C. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel stated in the April 28, 2022 email that led to the new paragraph 5: “Hi Simon.  We need to take out the language about housing is key sending Sylvia Tidwell an email about receiving funds.  That was never part of the agreement put on the record.  If you want to include that you must include a sentence that states that the plaintiff could not cooperate due to legal reasons as the defendant has been facing eviction for failure to pay her rent since January 2020.” (Decl. of Sherred, Exh. A.)  The proposed language in ¶ 5 does not include these limitations.  (Decl. of Sherred ¶8, Exh. C, Attachment A, ¶5.) 

Finally, given evidence that the Housing is Key payment has not been received by Plaintiff, Defendant seeks to enforce judgment for possession only based on terms set forth in the Updated Stipulation.  However, there is insufficient evidence that Plaintiff’s oral consent to a stipulated settlement before the Court at the MSC is equivalent to consenting to being bound by the Updated Stipulation which does not include payment of the $80,000. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to enforce judgment is denied.  

Dated:  September _____, 2022                               

Hon. Monica Bachner 

Judge of the Superior Court