Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: 21STCV15143, Date: 2023-03-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV15143    Hearing Date: March 9, 2023    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Specially Appearing Defendant Jeffrey Brooks’ motion to quash is denied.

Specially Appearing Defendant Jeffrey Brooks (“Brooks”) (“Defendant”) moves for an order quashing the service of summons and first amended complaint (“FAC”) by Plaintiff Impact Solutions, LLC (“Impact”) (“Plaintiff”).  (Motion, pg. 1.)

Background

On April 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Brooks and non-moving Defendants Russell Irby (“Irby”), Butler Snow, LLP (“Butler LLP”), Catalin Tutunaru (“Tutunaru”), Val Serebryany (“Serebryany”), and Alfred Luciani (“Luciani”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  On June 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC against Defendants alleging fourteen causes of action: (1) tortious interference with existing economic advantage, (2) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, (3) violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, (4) violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1933, (5) breach of contract, (6) specific performance, (7) estoppel, (8) fraud and deceit, (9) breach of fiduciary duty (I), (10) breach of fiduciary duty (II), (11) waste of corporate assets, (12) declaratory relief, (13) accounting, and (14) common counts.   Plaintiff is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its headquarters in the City of Chatsworth, Los Angeles County, California.  (FAC ¶1.)  Plaintiff alleges Brooks is an individual and resident of Alabama.  (FAC ¶9.)  Plaintiff alleges “Brooks is and was, at all relevant times, a member of Plaintiff Company with an ownership interest therein.”  (FAC ¶9.)

On August 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Proof of Service indicating Brooks was served by personal service on August 26, 2022.  On October 4, 2022, Brooks filed the instant motion.  On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  As of the date of this hearing, Brooks has not filed a reply.

Motion to Quash

C.C.P. §418.10(a)(1) provides: “[a] defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion . . . [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”

“When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.  Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.”  (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449, citations omitted.)

          “Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial . . . continuous and systematic.’ In such a case, ‘it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant’s business relationship to the forum.’ Such a defendant’s contacts with the forum are so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for jurisdiction.”  (Id. at 445-446, citations omitted.)

“If the nonresident defendant does not have substantial and systematic contacts in the forum sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, he or she still may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum, if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits, and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”  (Id. at 446, citations omitted.)

“The first element of specific jurisdiction is whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of forum benefits. Courts apply the ‘effects test’ to determine purposeful availment in the defamation context. [Citation.] Under this test, intentional conduct occurring elsewhere may give rise to jurisdiction in California where it is calculated to cause injury in California. The defendant must expressly aim or target his conduct toward California, with the knowledge that his intentional conduct would cause harm in the forum.  (Dongxiao Yue v. Wenbin Yang (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 539, 547, citations omitted.)  While mere posting of defamatory comments on the internet even with the knowledge the plaintiff is in the forum state is not enough to establish specific jurisdiction, “specific jurisdiction may be established under the effects test where a defendant sends ‘California-focused’ social media messages ‘directly’ to California residents ‘with knowledge the recipients [are] California residents’ for the alleged purpose of causing reputational injury there.”  (Id.)

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not dispute Brooks’ assertion that he is not subject to the Court’s general jurisdiction, and as such, that issue is conceded and only the matter of whether specific jurisdiction applies remains.

Brooks is subject to this court’s jurisdiction because Brooks purposely availed himself of this Court in filing a petition for an order confirming an arbitration award in connection to a party in the instant action.  (Opposition, pg. 2; Exh. A.)  Brooks’ petition to confirm the Final Award issued in Turner et al. v. Moskowitz, Case No. 22STCP04179, arises out of or directly relates to Brooks’ membership interest in Impact Solutions, LLC, such that jurisdiction is proper because Brooks’ contacts with California proximately result from actions taken by Brooks himself.  (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183-2184; see also FAC ¶13.)

Further, intentional tortfeasors can be sued in any state where their acts cause injury.  Plaintiff’s FAC alleges Brooks engaged in tortious actions to affect Plaintiff’s California-based operations, including Brooks’ involvement in a conspiracy to improperly settle a California state court lawsuit, Serebryany v. Moskowitz et al., Case No. 19STCV06028.  (FAC ¶¶21, 22, 26, 27.)

Brooks’ declaration states that he was improperly served on the basis that he was served with the original Complaint and not the operative FAC is unavailing.  Brooks declared and therefore concedes that he was served with the complaint.

          Based on the foregoing, Defendant Brooks’ motion to quash is denied.

Dated:  March _____, 2023

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court