Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: 21STCV19792, Date: 2023-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV19792    Hearing Date: March 6, 2023    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Jennifer Antillon’s motion for attorney fees and costs is granted in the amount of $30,000.00 as well as costs and expenses in the amount of $2,362.36 for a total amount requested by this motion of $32,362.36.

          Plaintiff Jennifer Antillon (“Antillon”) (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order awarding attorney fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code §1794(d) against Defendant Kia America, Inc. [fka Kia Motors America, Inc.] (“KA”) (“Defendant”).  (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; Civ. Code §1794(d).)  Specifically, Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $34,727.00 with no lodestar multiplier as well as costs and expenses in the amount of $2,362.36 for a total amount requested by this motion of $37,089.36.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 1.)

          Background

          On May 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action for violation of the Song-Beverly Act, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, negligent repair, and misrepresentation in connection with her purchase of a 2020 Kia Forte GT-Line (“Subject Vehicle”). On June 23, 2022, parties reached an agreement by which Defendant agreed to repurchase the Subject Vehicle and pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees by motion or agreement; the parties formalized their agreement in writing, which was executed by Plaintiff on August 2, 2022.

          Plaintiff filed the instant motion on January 31, 2023.  Defendant filed its opposition on February 21, 2023.  Plaintiff filed her reply on February 28, 2023.

Attorneys’ Fees

Civil Code § 1794(d) provides, as follows: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

The calculation of attorneys’ fees under the Song-Beverly Act is based on the lodestar method, which multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.  (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154; Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817-819.)  “The lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.”  (Graciano, 144 Cal.App.4th at pg. 154.)

“The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.”  (Id.) “In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.”  (Id.)  An attorney’s time spent and hourly rate are presumed to be reasonable.  (Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 747, 761.)  ¿Reasonable hourly compensation does not include inefficient or duplicative efforts, aka “padding.” ¿(Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579-580) ¿ 

Further, prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. ¿(Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635). ¿A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. ¿(Id.) ¿The Supreme Court stated:  

A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.  ‘If . . . the Court were required to award a reasonable fee when an outrageously unreasonable one has been asked for, claimants would be encouraged to make unreasonable demands, knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such misconduct would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked in the first place. To discourage such greed, a severer reaction is needful . . ..’ [Citation.]

(Id.) ¿ 

          Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Plaintiff’s counsel declares his hourly rate is $605.  (Decl. of Davoodi ¶54.)  Defendant argues Plaintiff’s hourly rate should be reduced to $400.  (Opposition, pg. 6.)  Defendant does not support its argument with case law.  Plaintiff’s counsel has sufficiently demonstrated his hourly rate is reasonable in his community of practice in his specialized area of law.  (Decl. of Davoodi ¶¶54-59, Exh. V.)  Based on the Court’s experience, Plaintiff’s counsel’s rate is reasonable.  However, although these rates are reasonable, these rates come with “an expectation that [counsel] will complete tasks efficiently.” (Banas v. Volcan Corporation  (2014) 47 F.Supp.3d 957, 966.)

Reasonableness of Hours for Actual Work Performed

Although detailed time records are not required, California Courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney’s testimony must be based on the attorney’s personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred.  (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].)  Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.”  (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.)

Here, Plaintiff submitted documentation supporting the work performed by Plaintiff’s counsel for 57.4 hours.  (Decl. of Davoodi ¶25, Exh. A.)

In opposition, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s counsel billed approximately 20.5 hours, for a total of $12,402.50 for client communications that are excessive, including 5.4 hours before the lawsuit was filed, 6.7 hours to discuss updates about repair orders, 3.3 hours to communicate damages/settlement options and the settlement offer to Plaintiff, and 1 hour to update Plaintiff about the status of payment.  (Opposition, pg. 5.)  Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing entries for client communications appear reasonable, and Defendants have not met their burden to explain why such entries are unreasonable.   (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s billed hours for client communications are reasonable and supported.

However, the amount of billing for research, reviewing technical documents, researching NHTSA complaints should be reduced given that Plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced lemon law lawyer and accordingly, the final attorney’s fee determination will reflect a reduction.  

          Costs

          Plaintiff argues pursuant to Civil Code §1794(d), she is entitled to costs and expenses necessarily incurred and included in the submitted Memorandum of Costs.  (Motion, pg. 14.)  Defendant does not argue Plaintiff’s costs are unsupported or unreasonable and therefore concedes the issue that Plaintiff’s costs should be awarded.

          Final Lodestar Determination

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of  $30,000.00 as well as costs and expenses in the amount of $2,362.36 for a total amount requested by this motion of $32,362.36.

Dated:  March _______, 2023

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court