Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: 21STCV31914, Date: 2022-10-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31914    Hearing Date: October 28, 2022    Dept: 71

 

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

FLORINDA VILLATORO ARIAS,

 

         vs.

 

CHARTWELL STAFFING SERVICES INC. and JAEMAR, INC.

 Case No.:  21STCV31914

 

 

 

Hearing Date:  October 28, 2022

 

Defendant Chartwell Staffing Services Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Florinda Villatoro Arias’s claims in this action is granted.  The case is stayed pending arbitration.

 

The Court sets a non-appearance case review for October 27, 2023.  The parties are directed to submit a joint statement five calendar days in advance, apprising the Court of the status of the arbitration.

 

Defendant Chartwell Staffing Services Inc. (“Chartwell”) (“Defendant”) moves for an order compelling arbitration of all claims asserted by Plaintiff Florinda Villatoro Arias (“Villatoro Arias”) (“Plaintiff”) and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims or alternatively staying the action pending completion of arbitration.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; 9 U.S.C. §§1 et seq.; C.C.P. §1281.4.) 

 

CRC Violations

 

Plaintiff’s opposition was not timely served in violation of C.C.P. §1105(a).  Plaintiff’s opposition was due September 27, 2022, but Plaintiff did not actually file her opposition with this Court until September 28, 2022, or serve on Defendants until September 28, 2022.  (C.C.P. §1105(a); Decl. of Horwitz ¶2, Exh. E.)  The Court, in its discretion, will consider Plaintiff’s opposition.  (C.R.C., Rule 3.1300(d).)

 

Evidentiary Objections

 

Plaintiff’s 9/28/22 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Lupe Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) are overruled as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, and sustained as to No. 10.

 

Defendant’s 10/3/22 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Plaintiff is overruled as to Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20. The Court notes Defendant’s list of objections included declaration paragraphs 1 and 2 that were not subject to objection.

 

Background

 

On August 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action for employment disability discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) against Chartwell and Jaemar, Inc. (“Jaemar”) (collectively, “Defendants”) in connection with Defendant’s August 15, 2020, alleged termination of Plaintiff’s employment in discrimination of Plaintiff’s disabilities, including a shoulder injury and COVID, and in retaliation for Plaintiff’s engagement in protected activities, including Plaintiff’s complaints about health and safety issues in the workplace related to the amount of chemicals used around employees and Defendants ignoring COVID safety protocols.  (Complaint ¶¶16-19.)  Defendant filed the instant motion on March 10, 2022.  Jaemar filed a notice of non-opposition on September 27, 2022.  Plaintiff filed her opposition on September 28, 2022, which was not timely filed.  (C.R.C., Rule 3.1300(d).)  Defendant filed its reply on October 3, 2022.  This Court continued the hearing on the instant motion and required Defendant to submit a court-certified interpretation of the purported arbitration agreement.  Defendant filed its certified translation on October 17, 2022.

 

Motion to Compel Arbitration

 

In deciding a motion to compel arbitration, trial courts must first decide whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine the second gateway issue of whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement. (See Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.)  “The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.  [Citation] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.  [Citation] No jury trial is available for a petition to compel arbitration. [Citation]”  (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972; see also Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 [“The court’s role under the [FAA] is therefore limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.] [Citations].”)  The party opposing the petition to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.  (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.) 

 

Accordingly, under both the FAA and California Law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract.  (Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) 

 

A.  Arbitration Agreement

 

Defendant proved the existence of an arbitration agreement with Plaintiff.  Defendant submitted evidence that on December 3, 2019, Plaintiff electronically acknowledged acceptance of the Arbitration Agreement (“Arbitration Agreement”).  (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶¶4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, Exh. A.)  [The Court notes Defendant submitted a Notice of Errata Lupe Gonzalez Declaration on October 3, 2022, indicating ¶¶8-9 of the original declaration, submitted on March 10, 2022, inadvertently contained incorrect dates.  The Court relies on the Declaration of Gonzalez submitted on October 3, 2022, and attached exhibits.]  Plaintiff acknowledged the Spanish version of the Arbitration Agreement, and Defendant includes both the signed Spanish version as well as the English Arbitration Agreement.  (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶¶7, 8, Exh. A; Notice Certified Translation, Exh. A.)

 

The Arbitration Agreement includes a provision allowing Plaintiff to opt-out of the Arbitration Agreement.  The section provides:

 

Right to Opt-Out. The Employee understands that Employee may submit an “Opt Out of the Arbitration Agreement” form, which states that the Employee wishes to be excluded and not be subject to Arbitration. The Employee understands that the Employee may obtain the “Opt Out of Arbitration Agreement” form by contacting the Legal Department at legal@chartwellstaff.com. To opt for the exclusion, the Employee must submit the completed “Opt Out of Arbitration Agreement” form to the Legal Department at legal@chartwellstaff.com. For it to come into effect, the opt-out form must be received by Chartwell no later than fifteen (15) days after the Employee signs this Agreement. The Employee further understands that the Employee will not be subject to any adverse employment action if the Employee chooses to opt for the exclusion. If the Employee does not opt out of this Agreement, the Employee and the Company will continue to be bound by the terms of this Agreement.

 

(Decl. of Gonzalez, Exh. A; Notice Certified Translation, Exh. A.)  Defendant argues at no point after executing the Arbitration Agreement did Plaintiff seek to revoke her assent to resolve claims between her and Defendant by way of arbitration.  (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶9, Exhs. A; Notice Certified Translation, Exh. A.)  Plaintiff denies having seen the purported arbitration agreement before.  (Decl. of Villatoro Arias ¶2.)  Plaintiff further argues the purported Spanish arbitration agreement appears suspicious because the document contains an extra signature in the middle of the Spanish Arbitration Agreement over the text of the document, and it appears as though the purported signatures on the purportedly signed Spanish arbitration agreement were copied and pasted onto the document (and not placed on the document by the Able program) as if the document was manipulated outside of the Able program.  (Opposition, pg. 5, Decl. of Schulman ¶2.)

 

Defendant has met its burden to show the signature on the arbitration agreement was signed by Plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 [“Ruiz”].)  Civil Code §1633.7 requires this Court give an electronic signature the same legal effect as a handwritten signature.  (Civ. Code §1633.7(a); Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1061 [“Espejo”], citing Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pg. 843.)  “An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.”  (Civ. Code §1633.9(a).)

 

In Ruiz, the Court held that the employer was unable to establish that the signature of the plaintiff was an “act of” the Plaintiff; and provided instructions on how to establish same:

 

Main did not explain that an electronic signature in the name of “Ernesto Zamora Ruiz” could only have been placed on the 2011 agreement (i.e., on the employee acknowledgement form) by a person using Ruiz’s “unique login ID and password”; that the date and time printed next to the electronic signature indicated the date and time the electronic signature was made; that all Moss Bros. employees were required to use their unique login ID and password when they logged into the HR system and signed electronic forms and agreements; and the electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was, therefore, apparently made by Ruiz on September 21, 2011, at 11:47 a.m.

 

(Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pg. 844 [emphasis added].)

 

Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate her employment claims on December 3, 2019, when she electronically acknowledged acceptance of the Arbitration Agreement, as authenticated by the declaration of Lupe Gonzalez.  (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶¶ 3-5, 7-10; Decl. of Gillespie ¶3.)  The IP audit trail shows that Plaintiff did login and sign the documents on December 3, 2019.  (Decl. of Gillespie, Exh. F.)  Furthermore, Plaintiff’s declaration admits, “When I was in Chartwell’s office on December 3, 2019, I was set up at a Chartwell computer by a Chartwell employee.” (Decl. of Villatoro Arias ¶3.)  Gonzalez further authenticates the signature of Plaintiff as an act of “Florinda Arias” by explaining that Chartwell uses a third-party vendor called Able, employees create a password to access and complete the documents via Able, and the Able system recorded the acknowledgment of the agreement with a date and time entry on the agreement.  (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶¶3-4; Decl. of Gillespie ¶¶ 3-5.)   If Plaintiff did not login with her unique login and password, and review and acknowledge the Arbitration Agreement, there would not be a date and time entry for the employee’s acknowledgement of the Arbitration Agreement.  (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶¶ 3-4, Exh. A; Decl. of Gillespie ¶¶ 3-5.)

 

  1. The Arbitration Agreement is enforceable

 

Federal law provides for enforcement of this Arbitration Agreement. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1, et seq. (“FAA”), establishes a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration of disputes where a written arbitration agreement exists. Section 2 of the FAA provides, in pertinent part that “[a] written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . .  shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” (9 U.S.C. §2.)  The purpose of the FAA is to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” (Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20, 24.)  The FAA places arbitration agreements “on an equal footing with other contracts and [requires courts] to enforce them according to their terms.”  (AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339; see also Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 67 [“The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”].)  The FAA will preempt not only a state law that “discriminat[es] on its face against arbitration,” but also a state law that “covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration agreements.” (Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark (2017) 137 S.Ct. 1421, 1426.)

 

The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that the FAA applies to employment contracts: “[A]s a matter of law the answer is clear.  In the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.”  (Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1619, [holding that employees must submit to arbitration agreements including those with collective action waivers].)  “We have been clear in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitration process somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context.”  (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 123.)  Accordingly, “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”  (Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24-25.)

 

Here, the FAA is applicable to the Arbitration Agreement executed by Plaintiff because Plaintiff’s employment with Chartwell, along with Chartwell’s business operations themselves, affect interstate commerce. Chartwell, a New York corporation, is a staffing agency which places employees throughout the country, including in California, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶6.)

 

The FAA restricts a court’s inquiry related to compelling arbitration to two threshold questions: (1) whether there was an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute.  (Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84.)  Here, both criteria are satisfied. First, Plaintiff agreed to arbitration when she electronically executed the Arbitration Agreement.  (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶¶ 3-4, 7-10; Exh. A.)  Second, the Arbitration Agreement expressly covers employment claims between Plaintiff and Chartwell. (Decl. of Gonzalez, Exh. A; Notice Certified Translation, Exh. A.)

 

California law also favors arbitration for dispute resolution. The California Arbitration Act (“CAA”), codified at C.C.P. §1281 et seq., provides, “A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (C.C.P. §1281; see also Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 944, 955 [“[U]nlike predispute jury waivers, predispute arbitration agreements are specifically authorized by statute.”].)  The statute mandates arbitration when agreement to do so exists:

 

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.

 

(C.C.P. §1281.2.)

 

“California law, like federal law, favors enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97, 99 [“Armendariz”].) The public policy in favor of arbitration is so strong that California courts have held that an employee is “bound by the provisions of the [arbitration] agreement regardless of whether [he] read it or [was] aware of the arbitration clause when [he] signed the document.”  (Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1667, citing Macaulay v. Norlander (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 1.)  The only prerequisite for a court to order arbitration is a determination that the parties have entered into an agreement to arbitrate the dispute.  (United Transportation Union v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit District (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 804, 808.) Thus, arbitration must be ordered “unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question.” (Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189.)

 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant proved the existence of a valid Arbitration Agreement that is enforceable by Defendant. 

 

B. Unconscionability

 

Plaintiff argues the arbitration agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable. (Opposition, pgs.9.)  “[P]rocedural and substantive unconscionability must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.”  (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pg. 102.)  Courts invoke a sliding scale which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves, i.e., the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to conclude that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.  (Id., at pg. 114.)  Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the provision at issue is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 

 

  1. Procedural Unconscionability

     

    “Procedural unconscionability focuses on the elements of oppression and surprise. [Citations] ‘Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice . . . Surprise involves the extent to which the terms of the bargain are hidden in a ‘prolix printed form’ drafted by a party in a superior bargaining position.’ [Citations]” (Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.)

     

    Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because: (1) Plaintiff was never told that agreeing to any arbitration provision was voluntary, that she could negotiate any of the terms, or that she could opt out and any documents were presented to Plaintiff on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with no negotiation or discussion of any kind, and were an express condition for her employment with Defendant; (2) neither the advantages/disadvantages of arbitration were explained to Plaintiff, nor do they appear on the face of the purported agreement and the purported agreement fails to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of arbitration; (3) Defendant failed to give Plaintiff any time to read and understand the documents or consult an attorney, and did not give her a copy of the purported agreement or the arbitration rules; and (4) Plaintiff was never even given a copy of the purported arbitration agreement after the fact so that she had the ability to enforce it should the need arise, or even comply with its terms.  (Opposition, pgs. 11-12.)

     

    Procedural unconscionability “focuses on the unequal bargaining positions and hidden terms common in the context of adhesion contracts.” (24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1212-1213.)  Although standard employment agreements offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are generally considered contracts of adhesion, this alone is not enough to equate to unconscionability. (See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 817-819 [“To describe a contract as adhesive in character is not to indicate its legal effect. It is, rather, ‘the beginning and not the end of the analysis insofar as enforceability of its terms are concerned.’”].)  Adhesion contracts are “fully enforceable . . . unless certain other factors are present which under established legal rules—legislative or judicial—operate to render it otherwise.” (Id. at 819-820; Harper v. Ultimo (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1409 [adhesion alone does not render arbitration agreements unconscionable]; see also Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 114; Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105 [discussing many authorities upholding arbitration agreements contained in adhesion contracts].)

     

    Here, Plaintiff voluntarily executed an Arbitration Agreement and while she could have opted out, did not. (Decl. of Gonzalez, Exh. A.)  The terms of the Arbitration Agreement do not appear hidden or obscure, and the Arbitration Agreement was presented as a separate document to review, with the words “I understand that this agreement requires me to arbitrate any and all disputes arising from my application for employment and/or my employment,” written in bold capital letters, at standard-sized font directly above Plaintiff’s signature. (Id.) The arbitration agreement is one of the documents, each employee electronically acknowledged and signed by Plaintiff.  (Decl. of Gonzalez ¶4.)  Accordingly, the Arbitration Agreement’s duty to arbitrate was not hidden from Plaintiff in a manner as to make her unaware of the agreement to arbitrate.

     

    Plaintiff alleges that she did not actually read the Arbitration Agreement, but this argument is not a basis to invalidate the Arbitration Agreement as a matter of law. (See Decl. of Villatoro Arias ¶¶2-3; Brookwood, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at 1674 [“Reasonable diligence requires the reading of a contract before signing it. A party cannot use his own lack of diligence to avoid an arbitration agreement;”] 24 Hour Fitness, Inc., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at 1215 [employee could not invalidate arbitration agreement against employer, despite fact that employee did not read the arbitration agreement and that the arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion.])  Further, any after-the-fact claim that Plaintiff did not understand the agreement does not render it invalid. “When a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he may not, in the absence of fraud, coercion or excusable neglect, avoid its terms on the ground he failed to read it before signing it.”  (Bolanos v. Khalatian (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1590.)  The failure to read or understand an arbitration clause is therefore generally no defense.  (See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710.)

     

    Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Arbitration Agreement is at most minimally procedurally unconscionable.  However, as discussed below, the Court finds the arbitration agreement is not substantively unconscionable. 

     

  2. Substantive Unconscionability

     

    “Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create ‘overly harsh’ or ‘‘one-sided’ results’ [Citations] that is, whether contractual provisions reallocate risks in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.  [Citation] Substantive unconscionability ‘may take various forms,’ but typically is found in the employment context when the arbitration agreement is ‘one-sided’ in favor of the employer without sufficient justification, for example, when ‘the employee’s claims against the employer, but not the employer’s claims against the employee, are subject to arbitration.’ [Citations]” (Roman, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pgs. 1469-1470.) In determining whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, the Court considers whether the agreement: (1) provides for a neutral arbitrator; (2) provides for reasonable discovery; (3) requires a written award; (4) provides for the same remedies that otherwise would be available in court; and (5) does not require employees to bear costs unique to arbitration. (See Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pgs. 102-103.)

     

    Plaintiff argues the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because (1) it does not provide for written discovery at all and is vague about what it permits regarding documents and witnesses; (2) the Agreement grants to much authority to the arbitrator with regard to remedies and unlawfully renders fees and costs to a prevailing Plaintiff discretionary; and (3) the agreement is permeated by unconscionability.  (Opposition, pgs. 12-13.)

     

    The Arbitration Agreement satisfies the requisite elements set forth in Armendariz to determine the Agreement is not substantively unconscionable.  First, the Arbitration Agreement provides for a neutral arbitrator; the Agreement states, “If the parties do not agree to a particular neutral arbitrator, a neutral arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the procedures set for in the [JAMS] Rules.” (Decl. of Gonzalez, Exh. A; Notice Certified Translation, Exh. A.)  The JAMS Rules provide a process that ensures the selection of a neutral arbitrator. (Decl. of Horwitz, Exh. D.)  Second, the court in Armendariz explicitly acknowledged an arbitrator’s authority to determine what constitutes sufficient discovery adequate to arbitrate an employee’s claims. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pg. 106 [employees are “entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate their statutory claim, including access to essential documents and witnesses, as determined by the arbitrator.”)  Here, the Arbitration Agreement states each party “shall have the right to substantial and adequate discovery of essential documents and witnesses.” (Decl. of Gonzalez, Exh. A; Notice Certified Translation, Exh. A; Decl. of Horwitz, Exh. D.)  Therefore, the parties remain entitled to conduct all relevant discovery.  Third, Under Armendariz, an employee cannot be required to pay any type of expense that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pgs. 110-111.)  Here, the Arbitration Agreement provides that “Chartwell will bear the cost of the arbitrator and any one-time cost of arbitration that would not have been incurred if the case were litigated in a court of law.” (Decl. of Gonzalez, Exhs A; Notice Certified Translation, Exh. A.)  Accordingly, Plaintiff would not be required to bear expenses she would not be required to bear if she were to bring the action in court.

     

    Based on the evidence before the Court, the terms of the Arbitration Agreement do not create overly harsh or one-sided results, satisfying the requirements for a substantively conscionable agreement.

     

    Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Arbitration Agreement is not substantively unconscionable. 

     

  1. Stay of Current Action

 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4, if an application has been made to a court involving order to arbitrate a controversy and such application is undetermined, the court where the application is pending shall, upon motion of a party to the action, stay the action until the application for an order to arbitrate is determined. (C.C.P. §1281.4.)

 

Accordingly, this case is stayed pending arbitration.

 

  1. Conclusion

 

          Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted.  The case is stayed pending arbitration. The Court sets a non-appearance case review for October 27, 2023.  The parties are directed to submit a joint statement five calendar days in advance, apprising the Court of the status of the arbitration.

 

Dated:  October _____, 2022

                                                                                                                       

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court