Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: 21STCV36045, Date: 2023-03-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV36045 Hearing Date: March 1, 2023 Dept: 71
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
CARLA BARBOZA, vs. SUSAN DEVALL, et al. |
Case No.:
21STCV36045 Hearing Date: March 1, 2023 |
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Carla
Barboza’s demurrer to the cross-complaint
of Cross-Complainant H&E Builders Services, Inc. is sustained with leave to
amend in 10 days.
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s
motion to strike is denied as moot.
Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Carla Barboza (“Barboza”) (“Cross-Defendant”)
demurs generally to the cross-complaint (“CC”) of Cross-Complainant H&E
Builders Services, Inc. (“H&E”) (“Cross-Complainant”) and demurs specially to
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th causes of action of the CC on the grounds
that the various causes of action fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute
viable causes of action. (Notice of
Demurrer, pg. 1; C.C.P. §430.10.)
Request for Judicial Notice
Cross-Defendant’s 7/13/2022 request for judicial notice is
denied as to Exhibits A-F, as this Court does not need to take judicial notice
of filings made in the instant case. Cross-Defendant’s 7/13/2022 request for
judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits G (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 16 §832.53),
H (C-53 Specialty License for Swimming Pool description), I (H&E Builders
Services, Inc.’s contractor’s license “B”), J (Class B Contractors License
meaning), and K (Fast Facts “B” General Contractor (Can Do, Cannot Do)).
Background
On June 10, 2022, Cross-Complainant
filed its CC against Cross-Defendant in the instant action alleging six causes
of action: (1) breach of oral contract, (2) breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of implied duty to perform with reasonable
care, (4) intentional interference with contractual relations, (5) common count
for goods and services rendered, and (6) false promise arising from an alleged
oral agreement between Cross-Complainant and Cross-Defendant regarding
construction of Cross-Defendant’s pool.
(See Cross-complaint.)
Cross-Complainant alleges in
or around November 2021, Cross-Complainant, Cross-Defendant, and Defendant
Susan Devall (“Devall”) entered into an oral agreement regarding the
construction of the Pool (the “Contract”).
(CC ¶12.) Cross-Complainant
alleges The terms of the Contract were that Cross-Complainant would build the
Pool at the Property; the Pool design would be based on a photograph that
Devall presented to Cross-Defendant of another pool, and thus, a design that Cross-Defendant
approved; Cross-Defendant would pay $100,000.00 for the construction of the
Pool, by remitting money to Devall, to pay Cross-Complainant; and Devall would
charge a separate design fee that Cross-Defendant would pay to Devall directly.
(CC ¶13.) Cross-Complainant alleges it, Cross-Defendant,
and Devall subsequently orally modified the Contract to raise the Construction
Fees to $108,000.00, after Cross-Complainant also agreed, upon Cross-Complainant’s
request, to install a deck for the Pool.
(CC ¶14.)
Cross-Complainant alleges it
advised Cross-Defendant that building permits needed to be obtained before
construction could begin. (CC ¶15.) Cross-Complainant alleges Cross-Defendant
insisted that Cross-Complainant not apply for building permits. (CC ¶15.) Cross-Complainant alleges
Cross-Defendant told Cross-Complainant’s owner, Defendant Henry Garcia, that
for years, construction was performed at the Property without permits, and Cross-Complainant
is informed and believes that Livan Cartaya (“Cartaya”) performed the prior
unpermitted construction. (CC ¶15.) Cross-Complainant alleges in or around
December of 2020, Cross-Defendant falsely promised Cross-Complainant that she
would honor the terms of the Contract if Cross-Complainant constructed the Pool
without building permits, that this promise was false, as evidenced by the fact
that even though Cross-Complainant built the Pool to 100% completion, and even
though Cross-Complainant did not apply for building permits, Cross-Defendant
refused to pay Cross-Complainant all monies owed under the Contract, and at the
time Cross-Defendant made the promise, she knew she did not intend to honor it.
(CC ¶¶16, 17.) Cross-Complainant alleges Cross-Defendant’s
lack of intention to honor the promise is evidenced from the fact that Cross-Defendant
“then did a 360 turn and falsely claimed that Cross-Complainant insisted on
doing unpermitted work.” (CC ¶17.)
Cross-Complainant alleges
Cross-Defendant only paid Cross-Complainant approximately $55,000.00 of the
$108,000.00 owed under the Contract, even though Cross-Defendant enjoyed the
use of the pool. (CC ¶18.) Cross-Complainant alleges at all times Cross-Defendant
acted fraudulently and oppressively, knowingly made false promises to Cross-Defendant
to induce Cross-Defendant to construct the Pool without permits, and induced Cross-Defendant
to build the Pool while intending to place the blame on Cross-Defendant if she
was cited for unpermitted construction. (CC ¶19.)
Cross-Complainant alleges that consistent with these fraudulent and
oppressive intentions, Cross-Defendant immediately blamed Cross-Complainant for
the unpermitted work even though such work was done at her insistence. (CC ¶19.)
A. Demurrer
On July 13, 2022, Cross-Defendant
filed the instant demurrer, which was scheduled for February 7, 2023. On February 3, 2023, Cross-Defendant filed a
notice of non-opposition by Cross-Complainant to the instant demurrer. Later that day, Cross-Complaint late-filed a
first amended cross-complaint. On
February 7, 2023, the Court conducted its first hearing. Cross-Complainant appeared, and counsel
indicated that he had believed he was entitled to file the FAC at the time he
answered the First Amended Complaint. At
that time, the Court struck the first amended cross-complaint as untimely, and
allowed counsel to file briefing regarding the timing of the filing. Thereafter, Cross-Complainant timely filed a
supplemental brief on February 15, 2023, regarding the timeliness of its
cross-complaint. Cross-Defendant timely
filed her response on February 22, 2023.
Timeliness
of Amended Cross-Complaint
C.C.P.
§426.30 provides that a cross-complaint is compulsory if the causes of action
against plaintiff are related to the subject matter of the complaint, and mandates
that such cross-complaints be filed “at the time of serving his answer to the
complaint.” The statute is silent as to when
an amended cross-complaint may be filed.
C.C.P.
§428.50 provides:
(a) A
party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the
complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as
the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint.
(b) Any
other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date
for trial.
(c) A
party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one
filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted
in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.
(C.C.P.
§428.50, emphasis added.) The statute
does not provide for the filing of an amended cross-complaint without leave of
the court.
C.C.P. §472(a) provides that a party may amend its pleadings once, as a matter of right,
under the following scenarios: before
defendant files an answer, demurrer or motion to strike a complaint or cross-complaint; before
the plaintiff files a demurrer or motion to strike; and, before the date for filing an opposition to a demurrer or
motion to strike, if the opposing party files a demurrer or motion to strike a
complaint, cross-complaint, or answer. (C.C.P. §472(a), emphasis added.)
Cross-Complainant failed to oppose Cross-Defendant’s
demurrer by timely filing either an opposition or an amended pleading, as required by C.C.P. §472(a).
Accordingly, Cross-Complainant’s cross-complaint was untimely. However, forfeiture of a cause of action is
justified only when the cross-complainant has acted in bad faith. If this were presented to the Court as a
motion to file a cross-complaint, the motion must be granted “unless bad faith
of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise
result. Factors such as oversight, inadvertence,
neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion
unless accompanied by bad faith.” (Silver
Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100.)
Summary of Demurrer
In support of her general
demurrer to Cross-Complainant’s CC, Cross-Defendant argues Cross-Complainant’s
causes of action fail because Cross-Complainant cannot allege it complied with Business
and Professions Code §7031 and therefore cannot seek compensation for illegal
unlicensed contract work. (Demurrer,
pgs. 3-5.) In support of her specific
demurrer to the 4th cause of action in the CC, Cross-Defendant argues the cause
of action fails because there are no allegations specifying whether the
contract between parties was written, oral, or implied by conduct, no
ascertainable terms are alleged which Cross-Defendant could have known about or
breached, the allegations are inchoate and uncertain, and Cross-Complainant
fails to state a cause of action because there is no breach, no ascertainable
causation, and no damages. (Demurrer,
pgs. 5-6.)
Failure to State a Claim
Breach of Oral Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, Breach of Implied Duty to Perform with Reasonable Care,
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, Common Count for Goods and
Services Rendered, and False Promise (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, & 6th COAs)
Business and Professions Code
§7026 defines a “contractor” as:
[A]ny person, who undertakes to or offers to undertake to,
or purports to have the capacity to undertake to, or submits a bid to, or does himself
or by or through others, construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from,
improve . . . any building . . . or other structure, project, development or
improvement, or to do any part thereof . . . .
(Bus.
& Prof. Code §7026.)
Business and Professions Code §7025 defines “person,” as
used in §7026, to include an “individual, a firm, partnership, corporation, limited
liability company, association or other organization, or any combination
thereof” who enters into a construction contract. (Bus. & Prof. Code §7025(b).)
Business & Professions Code §7031 provides:
(a) Except
as provided in subdivision (e), no person engaged in the business or acting
in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover
in law or equity in any action, in any court of this state for the collection
of compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a license is
required by this chapter without alleging that they were a duly licensed
contractor at all times during the performance of that act or contract
regardless of the merits of the cause of action brought by the person,
except that this prohibition shall not apply to contractors who are each
individually licensed under this chapter but who fail to comply with Section
7029.
. . .
(e) The
judicial doctrine of substantial compliance shall not apply under this section
where the person who engaged in the business or acted in the capacity of a
contractor has never been a duly licensed contractor in this state. However,
notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 143, the court may determine that
there has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements under this
section if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged in
the business or acted in the capacity of a contractor (1)
had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance
of the act or contract, (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain
proper licensure, and (3) acted promptly and in good faith to remedy the
failure to comply with the licensure requirements upon learning of the failure.
(Bus.
& Prof. Code §§7031(a), (e), emphasis added.)
Cross-Defendant argues Cross-Complainant
fails to allege in its CC for recovery of damages for “building the pool” that
it is a duly licensed contractor, per Business & Professions Code §7031(a). (See CC.) Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark
held §7031 bars all actions, however they are characterized, which effectively
seek “compensation” for illegal unlicensed contract work and is dispositive. (Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis
Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 988, 997 [“[A]n unlicensed contractor may not
circumvent the clear provisions and
purposes of section 7031
simply by alleging that when the illegal contract was made, the other party had
no intention of performing.”].) Cross-Complainant has not alleged it is
subject to the exception stated in §7031(e) and has not requested this court
set an evidentiary hearing to show it (1) had been duly licensed as a
contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract, (2)
acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, and (3) acted
promptly and in good faith to remedy the failure to comply with the licensure
requirements upon learning of the failure.
Under Business & Professions Code §7031(a), as alleged, Cross-Complainant
cannot allege damages under its causes of action.
Accordingly,
Cross-Defendants’ demurrer to CC is sustained with leave to amend.
B.
Motion to Strike
In light of the demurrer,
Cross-Defendant’s motion to strike is denied as moot.
Dated: March ____, 2023
Hon. Monica Bachner
Judge of the Superior Court