Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: 21STCV38878, Date: 2023-01-06 Tentative Ruling

Department 71: Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff at (213) 830-0771 before the set hearing time.  See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b).   All parties are otherwise encouraged to appear by Court Call for all matters.


Case Number: 21STCV38878    Hearing Date: January 6, 2023    Dept: 71

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

KAREN BENITEZ, 

 

         vs.

 

CORRAL SIX, LLC dba GOLDEN CORRAL, et al.

 Case No.:  21STCV38878

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  January 6, 2023

 

Defendants Corral One, LLC’s, Corral Two, LLC’s, Corral Three, LLC’s, Corral Four, LLC’s, Corral Five, LLC’s, Corral Six, LLC’s, Corral Seven, LLC’s, Golden Holding Corp.’s, 645 Holding LLC’s, Direct Real Estate, LLC’s, Leonis Real Estate, LLC’s, Moonland Produce, Inc.’s, Rancho Luna, LLC’s, Hossein Manshadi’s, Hamideh Manshadi’s, and Rey Vasquez’s demurrer to Plaintiff Karen Benitez’s complaint is overruled.

 

Defendants Corral One, LLC (“Corral One”), Corral Two, LLC (“Corral Two”), Corral Three, LLC (“Corral Three”), Corral Four (“Corral Four”), Corral Five (“Corral Five”), Corral Six (“Corral Six”), Corral Seven (“Corral Seven”), Golden Holding Corp. (“Golden Holding”), 645 Holding LLC (“645 Holding”), Direct Real Estate, LLC (“Direct Real Estate”), Leonis Real Estate, LLC (“Leonis Real Estate”), Moonland Produce, Inc. (“Moonland”), Rancho Luna, LLC (“Rancho Luna”), Hossein Manshadi (“Hossein”), Hamideh Manshadi (“Hamideh”), and Rey Vasquez (“Vasquez”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the complaint (“Complaint”) of Plaintiff Karen Benitez (“Benitez”) (“Plaintiff”).  Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Complaint is defective because Corral One, Corral Two, Corral Three, Corral Four, Corral Five, Corral Seven, Golden Holding, 645 Holding, Direct Real Estate, Leonis Real Estate, Moonland, and Rancho Luna are improper parties because there is no factual nexus between the allegations in the Complaint and the entities.  (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 2; C.C.P. §430.30.)  Defendants further argue Hossein, Hamideh, and Vasquez are merely investors and had no involvement with managing or supervising Plaintiff and the California Survivor Statute excludes them from liability because they received no distribution from Corral Six when it was closed.  (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 2.)

 

          Request for Judicial Notice

 

          Plaintiff’s 12/22/22 request for judicial notice of the November 17,

2021 Articles of Organization for Corral Six LLC (Exh. 1); May 22, 2017

Articles of Organization for Corral One, LLC (Exh. 2); April 2, 2018

California Secretary of State Application to Register a Foreign Limited Liability Company for Corral One, LLC (Exh. 3); June 16, 2022, California Secretary of State Statement of Information on Corral One, LLC (Exh. 4); April 2, 2018

California Secretary of State Articles of Organization on Corral Seven, LLC (Exh. 5); June 12, 2018, California Secretary of State Statement of Information on Corral Seven, LLC (Exh. 6); January 11, 2021, California Secretary of State Statement of Information on Rancho Luna, LLC (Exh. 7); November 8, 2022, California Secretary of State Statement of Information on Moonland Produce, Inc. (Exh. 8); April 1, 2014, California Secretary of State Articles of Organization on Leonis Real Estate Holding, LLC (Exh. 9); July 22, 1998, California Secretary of State Articles of Organization on Direct Real Estate Holdings, LLC (Exh. 10); and January 11, 2021, California Secretary of State Statement of Information on Direct Real Estate Holdings, LLC (Exh. 11) is granted.  (P-RJN, Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.)

 

Meet and Confer

 

“Before filing a demurrer . . . the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.”  (C.C.P. §430.41(a).)  Defendants sufficiently demonstrated met and conferred per C.C.P. §430.41(a).  (Decl. of Crouse ¶3.)  Plaintiff argues Defendant failed to meet and confer regarding the demurrer.  (Decl. of Ben-Ari ¶11.)  However, failure to meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.  (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4).)  Accordingly, the Court will still consider Defendants’ demurrer.

 

Background and Procedural Issues

 

          On October 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint in a sexual harassment action against Defendants Corral Six, Corral Two, Hossein, Hamideh, Vasquez, and Javier Saldana (collectively, “Answered Defendants”) alleging five causes of action: (1) unlawful sex harassment in violation of Government Code §12940(j)(1); (2) failure to prevent sexual harassment and discrimination in violation of Government Code §12940(k); (3) unlawful retaliation in violation of Government Code §12940(h); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); and (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  (See Complaint.)  On January 3, 2022, Answered Defendants filed their answer (“Answer”) to Plaintiff’s Complaint.  On March 22, 2022, Plaintiff amended her complaint to substitute Doe Defendants for 645 Holding (Doe 1), Corral Five (Doe 2), Corral Four (Doe 3), Corral One (Doe 4), Corral Seven (Doe 5), Corral Three (Doe 6), Direct Real Estate (Doe 7), Golden Holding (Doe 8), Leonis Real Estate (Doe 10), Moonland (Doe 11), and Rancho Luna (Doe 12) (collectively, “Defaulted Defendants”).  Plaintiff filed requests for entry of default on May 12, 2022, as to the Defaulted Defendants, which was entered the same day.  (5/12/22 Requests for Entry of Default.)   Defendants filed the instant demurrer on September 13, 2022.  Plaintiff filed her opposition on December 22, 2022.  Defendants filed their reply on December 28, 2022.

         

As a preliminary matter, Defendants’ demurrer was untimely filed and served pursuant to C.C.P. §430.40(a) and (c).  (C.C.P. §430.40(a) [“A person against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may, within 30 days after service of the complaint or cross-complaint, demur to the complaint or cross-complaint.”]; C.C.P. § 430.40(c)[“”A party objecting to a complaint . . . may demur and answer at the same time.”(Emphasis added.)]) 

 

Alternatively, if the Court considers the merits of the demurrer, it is overruled for the reasons discussed below. 

 

          The instant action involves Plaintiff’s employment as a restaurant server for Corral Two, Corral Six, Hossein, Hamideh, and Vasquez (collectively, “Company”) and “an escalating and seemingly never-ending pattern of sexual harassment that had manifested into a hostile and abusive work environment” she was subjected to by Defendant Saldana, another employee of the Company.  (Complaint ¶¶2, 3, 7, 16, 18.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Saldana’s actions included following Plaintiff into the restrooms several times, following Plaintiff around the restaurant while leering at her body, telling Plaintiff that “she has a nice ass and a nice waist,” calling Plaintiff “mi amor (my love, mija (girl/baby), mi hermosa (my beautiful), and mi reina (my queen),” and staring and leering at Plaintiff in an inappropriate manner.  (Complaint ¶21.)  Plaintiff alleges despite her repeated requests that such actions cease, Defendant Saldana’s actions continued.  (Complaint ¶22.)  Plaintiff alleges on or around July 8, 2018, she complained to her assistant manager, Jenny, however, her complaints were ignored and rebuffed.  (Complaint ¶23.)  Plaintiff alleges she complaint to another assistant manager around July 2018, and Defendant Saldana attempted to “play it off” by telling Plaintiff “that is just how I speak to younger girls.”  (Complaint ¶24.)  Plaintiff alleges she informed Defendant Saldana that his conduct made her uncomfortable and Defendant Saldana briefly ceased his behavior, but soon continued his behavior in an escalated manner.   (Complaint ¶25.)  Plaintiff alleges around April 5, 2019, she reported Defendant Saldana’s behavior and her work environment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but “upon receiving notice of Plaintiffs [sic] complaint, Plaintiff was suspended from work for 2 weeks and then terminated from her employment.”  (Complaint ¶26.)

 

Improper Joinder

 

          A demurrer for improper joinder of parties is only proper when it appears on the face of the complaint that “there is no common question of law or fact as to the defendants.”  (C.C.P. §379; C.C.P. §430.10(d).)  “It is rare that this ground for objection appears on the face of the complaint. More frequently, defendant must raise it as a plea in abatement in the answer.”  (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide:  Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) §7:81.)

 

If a party claims that there appears to be a misjoinder of parties on the face of a complaint, “the objection must be taken by special demurrer, and if not so taken, it is waived.”  (Tennant v. Pfister (1876) 51 Cal. 511, 513.)  In contrast, “under a general demurrer . . . a question of misjoinder of parties . . . cannot be raised.”  (Id.)  California courts have consistently held that a demurrer that objects to a complaint due to a misjoinder of parties is a special demurrer.  (See California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal. App. 3d 1428, 1435 [“The statutory basis for sustaining a demurrer... is misjoinder of parties, a ground for special demurrer.”].); Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 870 [“Defendant’s special demurrer [pertaining to an indispensable party] was on the single ground of a defect or misjoinder of parties”]; South California Edison Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 744, 747 [“The demurrers of the defendant insurance companies were general-on the ground that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and special-on the grounds that there was a misjoinder of causes of action and parties defendant.”].)

 

          Defendants argue Plaintiff improperly joined Defendants Corral One, Corral Two, Corral Three, Corral Four, Corral Five, Corral Seven, Golden Holding Corp., 645 Holding, Direct Real Estate, Leonis Real Estate, Rancho Luna, Hossein, and Hamideh should be dismissed from the instant action without leave to amend because the Complaint lacks any nexus of facts sufficient to make them proper parties to the case.  (Demurrer, pgs. 1-2.) 

 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is based on her employment at a single Golden Corral restaurant and her belief that Defendant Saldana harassed her and she was fired for reporting the alleged harassment.  (Id. at pg. 2.)  Defendants argue Plaintiff alleges without specificity that entities are mere shells and a sham used to avoid individual liability.  (Id.)  Defendants argue Hossein and Hamideh are investors in several Golden Corral restaurants and unrelated food businesses and are not involved the day-to-day operations of Golden Corral restaurants, nor did they manage or supervise Plaintiff when she was employed by Corral Six.  (Id.)  Defendants argue Corral One owns a Golden Corral buffet restaurant in Concord, CA.  (Id.)  Defendants argue Corral Two is a defunct corporation that was intended to own a Golden Corral but never did.  (Id.) Defendants argue Corral Three owns a Golden Corral restaurant in Salinas, CA.  (Id.)  Defendants argue Corral Four owns a Golden Corral Buffet in Olathe, KS.  (Id.)  Defendants argue Corral Five owns a Golden Corral in Yuma, AZ.  (Id.)  Defendants argue Corral Seven is a closed corporation that has never had any business activity that was opened in hopes of opening a restaurant but never did.  (Id.)  Defendants argue Golden Holding Corp. is a holding company that was recently opened to provide medical insurance benefits for Golden Corral managers, and the corporation does not have any activity nor a bank account.  (Id.) Defendants argue 645 Holding owns the property the Golden Corral in Olathe, KS operates. (Id.)  Defendants argue Direct Real Estate owns a property in Los Angeles, CA and has never done business with any Golden Corral restaurant ever.  (Id.)  Defendants argue Leonis Real Estate owns a property in Vernon, CA and has never done business with any Golden Corral restaurant ever.  (Id.) Defendants argue Moonland is a whole produce company that provides fruits and vegetables in Southern California and has never done business with any Golden Corral restaurant ever.  (Id.) Defendants argue Rancho Luna is a dragon fruit farm in Temecula, CA that has nothing to do with Golden Corral restaurants.  (Id.) Defendants argue Corral Six formerly owned a Golden Corral restaurant in Yuma, AZ, and is a defunct corporate entity that made no distribution to Hossein, Hamideh, or Vasquez when it closed.  (Id.)

 

          Defaulted Defendants cannot demur to Plaintiff’s complaint because Plaintiff entered defaults against them on May 12, 2022.  Defaulted Defendants must first file a motion to set aside defaults prior to filing any other motion. “A defendant against whom a default has been entered is out of court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting plaintiff’s right of action; he cannot thereafter, until such default is set aside in a proper proceeding, file pleadings or move for a new trial or demand notice of subsequent proceedings.”  (Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386.)  Accordingly, Defaulted Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is overruled.

 

          Answered Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint based on improper joinder fails to demonstrate that the complaint facially lacks a sufficient claim, right, or interest adverse to them in the controversy which is the subject of the action or there is no common question of law or fact as to Defendants. (C.C.P. §379.)  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Hossein is an owner of Corral Two and Corral Six, as are Hamideh and Vasquez.  (Complaint ¶¶4-6.)  Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges Hossein, Hamideh, and Vasquez are alter egos of Corral Two, there exists a unity of interest and ownership between them, and Hossein, Hamideh, and Vasquez commingled corporate and individual funds with Corral Six and Corral Two.  (Complaint ¶¶11-12.)  Plaintiff’s complaint further alleges each named Defendant and Does 1 through 25, later substituted for Defaulted Defendants by amendments, was the agent, managing agent, principal, owner, partner, joint venture, representative, manager, servant, employee, and/or co-conspirator of each of the other defendants.  (Complaint ¶9.)  Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges factual conduct against Corral Six, Corral Two, Hossein, Hamideh, and Vasquez.  (Complaint ¶¶16-29.)

 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is overruled.

 

Dated:  January _____, 2023

                                                                                                                       

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court