Judge Monica Bachner, Case 22STCV20256 2023-03-10 Tentative Ruling

Department 71: Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff at (213) 830-0771 before the set hearing time. See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b). All parties are otherwise encouraged to appear by Court Call for all matters.

Defendants Alisha Talamates’ and Teresa Talamates’ demurrer to Plaintiff Leticia Gonzalez’s entire Complaint and 8th cause of action is overruled.

Defendants Alisha Talamates (“Alisha”) and Teresa Talamates (“Teresa”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to Plaintiff Leticia Gonzalez’s (“Gonzalez”) (“Plaintiff”) Complaint. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-2.)

This action arises out of Plaintiff’s alleged tenancy at residential property located at 430 Sloat Street, Los Angeles, California, 90063 (“Subject Property”). (Complaint ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges at all times she satisfied her respective lease and was in lawful possession of her apartment. (Complaint ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges for the past several years the Subject Property has been neglected by Defendants, giving rise to abysmal living conditions that include improper construction practices leading to exposure to noxious fumes, paint, construction, dust, termination of electrical supply, improper ventilation, inoperable windows, and an illegal unit converted without permits and proper construction practices. (Complaint ¶47.) Plaintiff alleges the Subject Property has exposed and/or continues to expose Plaintiff to serious health and safety hazards in violation of building, health, and safety code violations. (Complaint ¶47.)

On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed her complaint alleging nineteen[1] causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code §1942.4, (2) tortious breach of the warrant of habitability, (3) private nuisance, (4) Business and Professions Code §§17200 et seq., (5) negligence, (6) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, (7) intentional influence to vacate, (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (9) FEHA Gov. Code §§12955 et seq., (10) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, (11) violation of tenant anti-harassment ordinance, (12) negligence per se, (13) violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act, (14) trespassing, (15) violation of retaliatory eviction and anti-harassment ordinance, (16) termination of estate Civil Code §789.3, (17) violation of Los Angeles Civil and Human Rights Ordinance, (18) retaliatory eviction Civil Code §1942.5, and (19) Welfare and Institutions Code §§15600 et seq. On July 25, 2022, Defendants filed the instant demurrer and accompanying motion to strike. On August 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed her oppositions to the demurrer and motion to strike. As of the date of this hearing, Defendants have not filed a reply.

In support of their demurrer to Plaintiff’s entire Complaint, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Defendants and the entire Complaint is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. (Demurrer, pg. 3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).)

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Complaint refers to several vague notices, complaints, and alleged negligent and intentional conduct which gave rise to the nineteen causes of action that are not adequately alleged, no facts or information support Plaintiff’s allegations, and specific facts such as dates and when the notices or complaints allegedly communicated to Defendants either orally or in writing were omitted from the pleading.

Defendants’ demurrer on the basis of uncertainty indicates allegations from Plaintiff’s Complaint, identified by paragraph number, to argue Plaintiff’s complaint is uncertain. Demurrers for uncertainty must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears (by reference to page and line numbers of the complaint). (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services District (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809, disapproved on other grounds by Katzberg v. Regents of University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, 328.) While Defendants correctly identified as uncertain allegations by paragraph number, Defendants fail to analyze the allegations in the context of the individual claim where the alleged uncertain allegations appear, and specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain. (See Id.)

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant's conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051; CACI 1600.)

“‘Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position that gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interests; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. . . .’” (Molko v. Holy Spirit Association (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1122; CACI 1602.) Landlords may be held liable for abuse of their position. (Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281-282).

Plaintiff alleges as a result of complaints made by the Plaintiff to the Defendants’ managers, and the fact that these complaints were followed up by numerous inspections conducted by the Defendants and their agents over the duration of the tenancy at the Subject Property, the Defendants were all placed on notice of the defective and substandard conditions at the Subject Property. (Complaint ¶134.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant landlord’s practice/conduct of ignoring these conditions and/or otherwise failing to make any repairs, under the circumstances, is extreme and outrageous, and as landlords and managers of the Property in question, Defendants were in a position of authority and power which they consistently and systematically abused by, among other things: failing to maintain the Property in a habitable condition; refusing to abate numerous disgusting and dangerous conditions and hazards; blatantly ignoring, not only [Plaintiff’s] repair requests and complaints, but upon information and belief, government agency orders to comply with building, health, and safety codes; lying to [Plaintiff] about repairs and maintenance, all while collecting full rent despite having actual knowledge that the conditions of the Property were affecting the physical and mental health of their residents. (Complaint ¶135.) Plaintiff alleges the acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute extreme and outrageous conduct because the Defendants failed to properly maintain the property after all of the repair requests made by the [Plaintiff], and because the Defendants forced [Plaintiff] to live in inhumane and substandard conditions. (Complaint ¶136.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants acted with reckless disregard of the rights of the [Plaintiff], and the probability that the [Plaintiff] would suffer emotional distress, knowing that the [Plaintiff] was present and living in the leased property that was substandard and had untenantable conditions that have been so alleged throughout this complaint. (Complaint ¶137.) Plaintiff alleges [Defendants’] conduct in intentionally or negligently failing to make repairs within a reasonable time of being informed of the substandard and inhabitable issues subsisting in the [Plaintiff] leased apartment was a substantial factor in causing the [Plaintiff] severe emotional distress. (Complaint ¶138.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants shockingly disregarded the horrific conditions at the Property in question, including conditions that have an immediate impact on their tenants’ physical health, such as the improper construction practices and exposure to dust and fumes dangerous for a vulnerable respiratory system, and Defendants understood the severity of this exposure at the Property in question considering Plaintiff’s disability, yet refused to take corrective action. (Complaint ¶139.) Plaintiff alleges as a direct and proximate result of [Defendants’] conduct and the conditions alleged, [Plaintiff] has suffered and/or continue to suffer illness, physical injury, property damages, emotional harm, anguish, depression, fearfulness, anxiety, nightmares, difficulty sleeping, embarrassment, shame, and other economic damages in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial. (Complaint ¶140.)

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claim for IIED fails to allege extreme and outrageous conduct by the Defendants with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress.

Plaintiff’s 8th cause of action for IIED sufficiently alleges extreme and outrageous conduct in ¶¶53-61, ¶135, and ¶¶138-139. Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Defendants’ conduct that gave rise to habitability issues at the Subject Property and the impact Defendants’ conduct had on the disabled Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff alleges a special relationship between herself, a tenant, and Defendants, her landlords. Plaintiff also alleges her disability rendered her particularly susceptible to injury from the conditions of the Subject Property, including the improper ventilation and improper construction practices leading to prolonged exposure to dangerous dust and fumes. Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Defendants were aware that these conditions and conduct would likely distress Plaintiff.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s 8th cause of action is overruled.

Defendants move to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Notice of MTS, pg. 1; C.C.P. §435, §436, §437.) Defendants move to strike the following paragraphs from of the Complaint: (1) ¶37 which states, “Defendants, and each of them, individually and or by and through an officer, director, or managing agent, including but not limited to Defendants and DOES 1-100, authorized or ratified the conduct for which punitive damages are sought and/or are personally guilty of oppression and malice”; (2) ¶68 which states, “Accordingly, Plaintiff are entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial”; (3) ¶116, which states “Defendants’ conduct in refusing to maintain the Property in question is despicable, malicious, willful, knowing, cruel, unjust and oppressive, and shows an extreme indifference to the Plaintiffs' rights, health, and safety, thereby entitling each Plaintiff to punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294 in an amount to be proven at trial”; (4) ¶132 , which states “The conduct of Defendants, as alleged hereinabove, was malicious, oppressive and despicable in that said conduct was ongoing and was designed to force Plaintiffs to give up their possession of the Subject Property at substantial economic harm to Plaintiffs’ herein, for the sole economic benefit of Defendant, and was done in retaliation for Plaintiffs asserting their legal rights. As a result of said conduct, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive and exemplary damages”; (5) ¶161, which states “The conduct of Defendants, as alleged hereinabove, was malicious, oppressive, and despicable, in that said conduct was ongoing and was designed to force Plaintiffs to give up their possession of the Subject Property at substantial economic harm to Plaintiffs’ herein, for the sole economic benefit of Defendant, and was done in retaliation for Plaintiffs asserting their legal rights. As a result of said conduct, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive and exemplary damages”; (6) ¶181, which states “Defendants conduct has been despicable, intentional, malicious, unjust, and oppressive. Defendants actions and omissions as alleged herein were done with the intent to cause Plaintiffs harm with disregard to Plaintiffs’ civil rights. Thus, Plaintiff: were entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial”; (7) ¶183, which states “Plaintiffs are also entitled to special and general damages in addition to reasonable attorney’s fees and statutory, punitive and exemplary damages pursuant to California Civil Code Section 52 in an amount according to proof at trial. Plaintiffs are requesting attorney’s fees”; (8) ¶200, which states “The conduct of Defendants, as alleged hereinabove, was malicious, oppressive, and despicable, in that said conduct was ongoing and was designed to force Plaintiffs to give up their possession of the Subject Property at substantial economic harm to Plaintiffs’ herein, for the sole economic benefit of Defendant, and was done in retaliation for Plaintiffs asserting their legal rights. As a result of said conduct, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive and exemplary damages”; (9) ¶204, which states “The conduct of Defendants, as alleged hereinabove, was malicious, oppressive, and despicable, in that said conduct was ongoing and was designed to force Plaintiffs to give up their possession of the Subject Property at substantial economic harm to Plaintiffs’ herein, for the sole economic benefit of Defendant, and was done in retaliation for Plaintiffs asserting their legal rights. As a result of said conduct, Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive and exemplary damages”; (10) ¶220, which states Defendants’ conduct has been intentional, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling each Plaintiff to punitive damages. Further, pursuant to Civil Code §1942.5, subdivision (1), each Plaintiff is entitled to statutory punitive damages in an amount not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 for each retaliatory act, as shall be determined at trial”; (11) ¶221, which states “Each of Defendants’ retaliatory acts were fraudulent, oppressive, and/or malicious, entitling Plaintiffs each of $2,000 in punitive damages under Civil Code §1942.S(h) for each retaliatory act”; (12) Prayer ¶11, which states “For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial”; and (13) Prayer ¶13, which states, “For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.” (MTS, pgs. 2-3.)

C.C.P. §436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to C.C.P. §435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” and/or “strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”

A motion to strike should be applied cautiously and sparingly because it is used to strike substantive defects. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matter which the court may judicially notice. (C.C.P. §437.) Conclusory allegations will not be stricken where they are supported by other, factual allegations in the complaint. (See Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 [“The distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree.” (Citations.)].)

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Id.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Id.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

Defendants are not entitled to a motion to strike Plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages because Plaintiff has pleaded the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief. Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges habitability issues at the Subject Property which Defendants allowed to continue in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s disability sufficient to demonstrate malice and oppression. (See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶26-30, 32, 39-40, 52-61, 71-77, 113, 129, 135, 146 158, 186-188, 194, 203, 209, 216-217, 229-233; Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 916-917, 922; Garcia v. Myllyla (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 990, 999; Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299.) Plaintiff’s causes of action for IIED, trespass, tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability also support prayers for punitive and exemplary damages. (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055; Erlach, 226 Cal.App.4th at pg. 1299.)

[1] Plaintiff’s case caption on her Complaint only indicates seventeen causes of action, whereas Plaintiff alleges nineteen causes of action in the body of her Complaint.