Judge Monica Bachner, Case 22STCV25657 2023-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Department 71: Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff at (213) 830-0771 before the set hearing time. See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b). All parties are otherwise encouraged to appear by Court Call for all matters.

Defendants Pinnacle Estate Properties, Inc.’s and Jeremy Rodriguez’s demurrer to Plaintiffs Teodulo Castellanos’ and Maria Castellanos’ Complaint is sustained with 20 days’ leave to amend.

Defendants Pinnacle Estate Properties, Inc.’s and Jeremy Rodriguez’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

Defendants’ 10/26/22 request for judicial notice of the Complaint filed in LASC Case No. 22STCV01063, Castellanos v. Swaner et al. (D-RJN, Exh. A); grant deed recorded at the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office, Document No. 20220818892 (D-RJN, Exh. B); and deed of trust recorded at the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office, Document No. 2022081893 (D-RJN, Exh. C) is granted.

Plaintiffs’ 3/27/23 request for judicial notice of the complaint filed in the instant case, the stipulation for restraining order and protective order and order thereon in the instant case, the stipulation for preliminary injunction and protective order and order thereon in the instant case, Plaintiffs’ notice of ruling of court denying Defendants’ request for related case, and Defendant/Cross-Complainant Jose Valentin Ramirez Solano’s (“Solano”) (“Defendant”) amended cross-complaint for damages in the instant case is denied, as there is no need to take judicial notice since the Court can review the records of the case at hand.

Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer and/or motion to strike. (C.C.P. §430.41, §435.5.)

Moving Defendants’ counsel declares on August 24, 2022, she sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel to attempt to resolve this matter without court intervention. (Decl. of Anaya ¶2.) Moving Defendants’ counsel declares on August 25, 2022, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a detailed email response in which counsel disagreed with Moving Defendants’ position, and as such, Moving Defendants filed with demurrer and motion to strike. (Decl. of Anaya ¶3.) Moving Defendants sufficiently demonstrated a good faith attempt to resolve the issues in the instant motions without court intervention.

Defendants Pinnacle Estate Properties, Inc. (“Pinnacle”) and Jeremy Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) demur to Plaintiffs Teodulo Castellanos’ (“Teodulo”) and Maria Castellanos’ (“Maria”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Complaint. (Notice of Amended Demurrer, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §430.10(e).) Specifically, Defendants demur on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by judicial estoppel, lack standing, and fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Moving Defendants for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action. (Notice of Amended Demurrer, pg. 2.)

This action arises out of Plaintiff Teodulo’s and Steve Swaner’s (“Steve”) and Cynthia Swaner’s (“Cynthia”) (collectively, “Swaners”) alleged entry into a written agreement for real property located at 8224 Geyser Avenue, Reseda, California 91335 (“Property”). (Complaint ¶¶11, 12.) Plaintiffs allege on or about April 1, 2018, Plaintiff Teodulo and the Swaners entered into a written agreement for Plaintiff to purchase the Property for $477,000.00. (Complaint ¶12.) Plaintiffs allege the essential terms of the Geyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract 040118 (“Contract”) were that Plaintiff Teodulo was to pay the mortgage, property tax, insurance on the property, an additional $1,000.00 a month, and the payments were to be made for five years, or until April 1, 2023. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiffs allege the Swaners would ask Plaintiffs to buy the Property earlier than their contract required, and Plaintiff Teodulo could not do so because he could only qualify for an ITIN loan. (Complaint ¶14.) Plaintiffs allege in or about late August and into September 2020, Steve advised Plaintiff Teodulo that he could not refinance his own residence because of the mortgage on the Property occupied by Plaintiff and asked Plaintiff to purchase the property earlier than required by the Contract. (Complaint ¶15.)

Plaintiffs allege they were contacted via email by who they believed to be a real estate agent named Efrain Florez-Yanez (“Yanez”) (“Defendant”), and Plaintiff Teodulo believed from Yanez’s representations that Yanez was a real estate agent and worked with Moving Defendants Pinnacle and Rodriguez. (Complaint ¶16, Exh. 1.) Plaintiffs allege Plaintiff Teodulo believed he was dealing with reputable real estate agency and on or about September 1, 2021, he asked Defendants to review the Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract and to advise regarding its enforceability. (Complaint ¶17.) Plaintiffs allege on September 2, 2021, at 3:29 PM. Defendant Yanez responded to Plaintiffs and advised Plaintiffs that the Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract was a good and valid contract. (Complaint ¶18.) Plaintiffs allege on September 2, 2021, after 7:52 PM, Plaintiffs asked Defendants to contact Plaintiffs for their help in going over the options regarding the Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract. (Complaint ¶20.) Plaintiffs alleges on September 7, 2021, at 2:49 PM, Plaintiff Teodulo asked Defendants for help in answering questions regarding what was needed for the purchase of the Greyer [sic] Ave Property. (Complaint ¶21.) Plaintiffs allege on or about September 9, 2021, at 10:37 AM, and September 10, 2021, at 12:08 PM, Defendants Yanez, Rodriguez, and Pinnacle sent Plaintiffs a Residential Purchase Agreement (“RPA”) and associated documents for the purchase of the Greyer [sic] Ave Property wherein they stated they were the broker and agent for Plaintiff Teodulo. (Complaint ¶22, Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs allege the RPA identified at ¶6 that Moving Defendants Rodriguez and Pinnacle as the agents and broker for Plaintiffs were to receive 2.5% of the sale proceeds from the Geyser Ave Property. (Complaint ¶23.) Plaintiffs allege the RPA Defendants drafted did not conform to the terms of the Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract. (Complaint ¶24.) Plaintiffs allege the RPA Defendants drafted contradicted the intent of, language, or wishes of Plaintiff Teodulo as it related to the purchase of the Geyser Property through the Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract. (Complaint ¶25.) Plaintiffs allege at no time did Defendants Yanez, Rodriguez, and Pinnacle ever advise Plaintiffs about the contents of or the interaction of the RPA as it relates to the RPA’s language and its terms and conditions of the purchase of the Geyser Property, how it differed from the Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract and how it limited the Plaintiffs rights from those set forth in the Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract and imposed additional and improper conditions on Plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶26.) Plaintiffs allege at no time did Defendants Yanez, Rodriguez, and Pinnacle, advise Plaintiff that the RPA as Defendants drafted changed the material terms of Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract and Plaintiffs agreement with Swaners and damaged the Plaintiffs’ ability to purchase the Geyser Property. (Complaint ¶27.) Plaintiffs allege based on Defendants’ representations, Plaintiffs then sent the RPA to the Swaners for the purchase of the Geyser Property, and on or about September 25, 2021, the Swaners signed the RPA that Defendants drafted for Plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶28.) Plaintiffs allege after an Escrow was opened for the purchase of the Geyser Property, a dispute arose as between Swaners and Plaintiffs due to the improper and inaccurate language in the RPA that Defendants drafted, and the dispute arose directly because of and due to Defendants Yanez’s, Rodriguez’s, and Pinnacle’s improper, negligent and inaccurate drafting of the RPA. (Complaint ¶¶29, 30.) Plaintiffs allege as a result of Defendants Yanez’s, Rodriguez’s, and Pinnacle’s improper, negligent and inaccurate drafting of the RPA, Plaintiff Teodulo was required to file and serve a lawsuit against the Swaners to preserve and try to save the purchase of the Geyser Property, and in retaliation, Swaner filed an Unlawful Detainer action against Plaintiff Teodulo. (Complaint ¶31.) Plaintiffs allege through protracted litigation Plaintiff Tedoulo and Swaner ultimately settled their lawsuits against each other regarding the purchase of the Geyser Property in or about June 17, 2022, upon terms that were substantially different and more difficult than the original Greyer [sic] Ave Sales Contract and the result of which was Plaintiffs were substantially damaged by Defendants’ negligence. (Complaint ¶32.)

On August 9, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Defendants Pinnacle, Rodriguez, Yanez, and Solano alleging nine causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) breach of fiduciary duty (I), (3) breach of fiduciary duty (II), (4) fraudulent concealment, (5) breach of duty, (6) aiding and abetting, (7) conspiracy, (8) declaratory relief, and (9) injunctive relief. On September 2, 2022, Moving Defendants filed their initial demurrer and accompanying motion to strike. On October 26, 2022, Moving Defendants filed the instant amended demurrer and accompanying amended motion to strike.[1] On March 27, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their oppositions to the amended demurrer and amended motion to strike. On April 3, 2023, Moving Defendants filed their replies.

Moving Defendants demur on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by judicial estoppel, lack standing, and fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Moving Defendants for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action. (Demurrer, pg. 3.)

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

C.C.P. §367 provides, “[e]very action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.”

Moving Defendants argue Plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest and have no standing to bring this action against Moving Defendants because Plaintiffs never purchased the Property or obtain any loans on the Property. (C.C.P §367; Dino v. Pelayo (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 347, 353; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1004; Demurrer, pg. 5.) Moving Defendants argue the Property was purchased by Jessica Oliva and the loan on the Property is in Jessica Oliva’s name only. (D-RJN, Exhs. B, C.) Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs never purchased, owned, or obtained a loan on the Property, they have no standing to sue Moving Defendants.

Plaintiffs do not argue the issue of standing in their opposition and therefore concede the issue that they do not have standing to bring the instant action. A complaint filed by a party who lacks standing is subject to demurrer because there is a defect in the parties, since the party named as plaintiff is not the real party in interest. (Cloud, 67 Cal.App.4th at pgs. 1004-1005, citing C.C.P. §430.10(d) [demurrer may be based on ground that there is a “defect . . . of parties”].) Although an original complaint does not state a cause of action in the plaintiff, an amended complaint by the right party restating the identical cause of action is freely allowed amendment. (See Cloud, 67 Cal.App.4th at pgs. 1004-1005, quoting Garrison v. Board of Directors (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1670, 1678.)

Moving Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of standing is sustained with 20 days’ leave to amend.

In light of the Court’s ruling on Moving Defendants’ demurrer, Moving Defendants’ motion to strike is denied as moot.

[1] Plaintiffs object to consideration of Moving Defendants’ amended demurrer and motion to strike as untimely filed. The Court, in its discretion, will consider Moving Defendants’ amended demurrer and motion to strike.