Judge: Monica Bachner, Case: BC643861, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Department 71: Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff at (213) 830-0771 before the set hearing time.  See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b).   All parties are otherwise encouraged to appear by Court Call for all matters.

Case Number: BC643861    Hearing Date: October 17, 2022    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff A.C.A. LLC’s motion for an order requiring Defendants to deposit with the Court “rents” is denied.

Plaintiff A.C.A. LLC (“ACA”) (“Plaintiff”) moves an order requiring: (1) Defendants Paola Caldera (Doe 101), Jessica Caldera (Doe 115), Mian Guo (Doe 102), Jia Shen (Doe 103), Yunying Li (Doe 104), Min Zhou (Doe 105), Daniel Sacilotto (Doe 120), Ganchimeg Oyunchimeg (Doe 119), Paul Luigi (Doe 118), Arnaud Larousse (Doe 121), Lebiba Saban (Doe 117), Nadia Saban (Doe 116), Ali Razfar (Doe 114), Nima Razfar (Doe 113), and Yavuz Ertas (Doe 112)  (collectively, “Defendants”) to deposit with the Court the “rent” payments Plaintiff argues are owed under the alleged “tenancies” Defendants claim to be held until further order of the Court; and (2) that if any Defendant fails to make the required deposit with the Court within five (5) Court days of the Court’s order, that Defendant will be deemed to have waived any and all rights claimed under their alleged “tenancy” as of January 1, 2017.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; C.C.P. §572.)

Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed the instant motion on March 22, 2022. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was recently heard on September 21, 2022. This court’s tentative ruling was to grant Defendants’ motion as to all causes of action. After oral argument, the court took the matter under submission and has not yet issued a final ruling.  In the event this Court denies summary judgment, the instant motion filed by Plaintiff is not moot.  Defendants filed their opposition on October 4, 2022.  Plaintiff filed its reply on October 10, 2022.

C.C.P. §572 provides:

When it is admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the examination of a party to the action, that he or she has in his or her possession, or under his or her control, any money or other thing capable of delivery, which, being the subject of litigation, is held by him or her as trustee for another party, or which belongs or which is due to another party or which should, under the circumstances of the case be held by the court pending final disposition of the action, the court may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited in court or delivered to such party, upon those conditions that may be just, subject to the further direction of the court.

(C.C.P. §572.)  Plaintiff argues C.C.P. §572 grants this Court authority to order a party to deposit funds with the Court pending final disposition of the action. (See Michal v. Adair (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 382, 388; Agoure v. Peck (1912) 17 Cal.App. 759, 762.)  Plaintiff argues because Defendants claim valid “tenancies,” they are holding the amounts sought by Plaintiff as trustees for Plaintiff. (See Frey v. Superior Court (1913) 22 Cal.App. 421, 425 [“[T]he right to make the order [under C.C.P. §572] depends upon the facts shown to the court, an essential being that the party from whom the payment is asked has no right or title to hold the money, and that it belongs to or is due another.”].)

Courts will impose a resulting trust when the circumstances surrounding a conveyance, or the acts and expressions of the parties, make it clear that the parties intended such a result, or raise the inference that the parties intended to create a trust. (90 C.J.S. Trusts § 128 [emphasis added].)

In reply, Plaintiff cites Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. v. Shroeder (2009) 179 Cal. App. 4th 834, 847-48 in support of its argument that a resulting trust should be inferred from parties’ course of conduct because a resulting trust “carries out and enforces the inferred intent of the parties.” However, a resulting trust “arises by implication of law to enforce the inferred intent of the parties to a transaction.” (Calistoga Civic Club v. City of Calistoga 143 Cal. App. 3d 111, 117 (1983).  Plaintiff’s argument that a resulting trust exists runs counter to the central thrust of its argument that Defendants’ tenancies were invalid.

Unlike Frey, which involved enforcement of a mechanic’s lien, the Defendants here have not been adjudged by this Court to be the subjects of a constructive or resulting trust, and therefore do not hold the money for rent checks “as trustees.” “A court ought not to require a litigant to surrender his property to another, or for his benefit, until there has been a judicial hearing and determination that he has no right to such property.”  (Green v. Duvergey (1905) 146 Cal. 379, 385-386 [reversing dismissal of a case for rescission of a property sale prior to trial when plaintiffs refused to comply with an order to deposit a sum of money equaling amounts allegedly paid by defendants for the property finding the order violated C.C.P §572.]; see Frey, supra, 22 Cal.App. at pg. 425 [citing Green].)  “[I]f money is ordered to be brought in, which is not clearly due, very gross injustice may be done, as the defendant may be put to great inconvenience, and afterwards be told that his view of the case was correct.” Green, supra, 146 Cal. at pg. 385-386.)  

           Plaintiff has not established it is entitled to a deposit of rents. “[I]n all cases when [an order under §572] may be made it must appear that the party holds the money as trustee, or that it ‘belongs or is due to another party.’” (In re Elias (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 262, 273-274.)  In Elias, the court held that where there was no admission in the pleadings, no proof that defendants owed any amount to the plaintiff or anyone else, and no proof that any trust existed, “the court was without jurisdiction to order the deposit with the clerk.” (Id. at 275.)  Here, as in Elias, there has been no showing that Defendants hold monies as trustees or that the rents are due to another party.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for an order requiring Defendants to deposit with the Court “rents” is denied. 

Dated: October _____, 2022

Hon. Monica Bachner

Judge of the Superior Court