Judge: Nathan Nhan Vu, Case: 2022-01295844, Date: 2023-08-14 Tentative Ruling

Motions to Compel Discovery

Plaintiff Placentia-Linda Hospital, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further Responses from Defendant Centene Corporation to Special Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, Requests for Production of Documents, and Form Interrogatories, Set One is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Defendant Centene Corporation is ORDERED to serve full, complete, and verified substantive responses to Special Interrogatory Numbers 3-4, 8-10, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 22-24 24; Form Interrogatory Number 17.1; Request for Admission Numbers 1, 2, and 4-7; and Request for Production Numbers 1-3, 6-11, 23-25, and 28, within 21 days of service of the notice of ruling.

The Motion to Compel Further Responses is DENIED as to all other discovery requests.

Plaintiff Placentia-Linda Hospital, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Further Responses from Defendant Superior Health Plan, Inc. dba Ambetter from Superior Healthplan to Special Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, Requests for Production of Documents, and Form Interrogatories, Set One is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Defendant Superior Health Plan, Inc. dba Ambetter from Superior Healthplan is ORDERED to serve full, complete, and verified substantive responses to Special Interrogatory Numbers 3-4, 8-10, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 22-24 24; Form Interrogatory Number 17.1; Request for Admission Numbers 1, 2, and 4-7; and Request for Production Numbers 1-3, 6-11, 23-25, and 28, within 21 days of service of the notice of ruling.

The Motion to Compel Further Responses is DENIED as to all other discovery requests.

Plaintiff Placentia-Linda Hospital, Inc. moves to compel further responses from Defendants Centene Corporation (Defendant Centene) with respect to Special Interrogatory Numbers 3-24; Form Interrogatory Numbers 15.1 and 17.1; Request for Admission Numbers 1, 2, 4-7, 10; and Request for Production Numbers 1-4, 6-14, 19-25, and 28.

Plaintiff also move to compel further responses from Defendant Superior Health Plan, Inc. dba Ambetter from Superior Healthplan (Defendant Superior) with respect to the same discovery requests propounded on Defendant Superior.

Standard to Compel Further Responses to Discovery

A party may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories on the grounds that: (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

“Parties must state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in answering written interrogatories.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 76; see Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (f) [making evasive response to discovery is misuse of discovery process].) Where the question is specific and explicit, it is improper to provide only a portion of the information sought or “deftly worded conclusionary answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.) “If a person cannot furnish details, he should set forth the efforts made to secure the information. He cannot plead ignorance to information which can be obtained from sources under his control.” (Id. at p. 782.)

The Civil Procedure Code instructs the responding party that: “(a) Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (b) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. (c) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220) 

If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer the interrogatories. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

A party also may move for an order compelling further responses to requests for admissions on the grounds that: (1) an answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete or (2) an objection to a particular request is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a).)

The Civil Discovery Act requires that responses to requests for admission be “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (a).)

In addition, each response to a request for admission must:

(1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party.

(2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue.

(3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (b).)

Finally, a party may move for an order compelling further responses to requests for the production of documents on the grounds that: (1) a statement of compliance with the request is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).)

Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses must include a meet and confer declaration consistent with Civil Procedure Code section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).)

Civil Procedure Code section 2016.040 requires that the moving party have made “a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

The meet-and-confer requirement “is designed ‘to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order . . . .’ This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, quoting McElhaney v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 285, 289.)

This “requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution” and “that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Townsend v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1438-1439.)

As the Court of Appeal has explained:

A determination of whether an attempt at informal resolution is adequate also involves the exercise of discretion. The level of effort at informal resolution which satisfies the “reasonable and good faith attempt” standard depends upon the circumstances. In a larger, more complex discovery context, a greater effort at informal resolution may be warranted. In a simpler, or more narrowly focused case, a more modest effort may suffice. The . . . nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, the prospects for success and other similar factors can be relevant. Judges have broad powers and responsibilities to determine what measures and procedures are appropriate in varying circumstances. Judges also have broad discretion in controlling the course of discovery and in making the various decisions necessitated by discovery proceedings.

. . .

A single letter, followed by a response which refuses concessions, might in some instances be an adequate attempt at informal resolution, especially when a legitimate discovery objective is demonstrated. The time available before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which the responding party was complicit in the lapse of available time, can also be relevant. An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered. Although some effort is required in all instances, the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circumstances, and may vary with the prospects for success. These are considerations entrusted to the trial court’s discretion and judgment, with due regard for all relevant circumstances.

(Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431-433, citations omitted.)

In this case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith because Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter was not sent until March 31, 2023; demanded a response by the following business day; and did not specify which discovery responses were deficient.

However, Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter was sent a little over 3 weeks after the discovery responses were served. That is not an unreasonable length of time to review 8 sets of discovery responses and prepare a met and confer letter regarding deficiencies in those responses.

The court agrees that sending a meet and confer letter with a deadline to respond within 1 business day does not normally constitute a reasonable effort to meet and confer. However, Defendants’ Motion to Quash was set to be heard on April 24, 2023. Thus, Defendants had little time to get a response to their meet and confer letter and file motions to compel if they were going to get discovery responses in time to use to respond to the Motion to Quash. Further, Plaintiff specifically requested that Defendants stipulate to continue the hearing on the Motion to Quash, which would have relieved the time pressure and Defendants did not agree to do so.

The court also agrees that a meet and confer letter usually should designate which discovery responses are deficient. The lack of such specificity may have been due to the limited time available to Plaintiff. In any case, Defendants were able to provide a full response to the meet and confer letter in which they made clear which discovery responses they were willing to supplement and which they would not. There does not appear to be any prejudice to Defendants from this issue.

The court therefore finds that the parties met the meet and confer requirement. However, in the future, the court expects both parties to engage in more substantial meet and confer process.

Personal Jurisdiction

In this case, Defendants have filed a Motion to Quash for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. (See ROA #15.) Thus, the parties agree that Plaintiff is limited to conducting discovery only on the jurisdiction issue prior to the hearing on the motion to quash. (See Factor Health Management v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.)

Under California law, the courts of this state have personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed under the United States Constitution and California Constitution. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10). Thus, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445.)

“A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial . . . continuous and systematic.’” (Ibid. quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437, 445, 446.) Where the defendant’s contacts are so substantial, continuous, and systematic to grant general jurisdiction, “it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant's business relationship to the forum.” (Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147.)

The courts of this state have specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant where (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities toward residents of the forum state or otherwise established contacts with the forum state, and thereby invoked the benefits and protections of local law; (2) plaintiff's cause of action arises out of, or results from, the defendant's forum-related contacts; and (3) the forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in the particular case is reasonable. (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-473.)

“Factors to be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the state's markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there.” (Elkman v. National States Ins. Co. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1315.) In that case, the Court of Appeal looked at the fact that:

[Defendant] is not, and never has been, licensed or authorized to do business in California. [Defendant] maintains no office or bank account in California, nor does it have any agents licensed to sell its insurance products in California. Further, [Defendant] has never advertised its insurance products for sale in California. [Defendant] has never sought or received approval from the California Department of Insurance for the issuance or delivery of its insurance products in California, nor has [Defendant] ever issued or delivered its insurance products in California.

(Id. at pp. 1316-1317.)

The court also may examine whether the defendant sends mail to the forum state, whether defendant issued an insurance policy through the mail to a California resident, and whether the California resident paid premiums by mailing them to defendant’s Texas office. (See Pennsylvania Health & Life Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 477, 483-484 [these contacts sufficient to create personal jurisdiction over Texas defendant].) In addition, a party could present evidence that an insurance company accepted premium payments from California, and processed and paid claims submitted by California insureds for services rendered in the state, even though these also may not be sufficient. (See Elkman v. National States Ins. Co., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1309, 1318, 1321.)

Examples of purposeful availment by an insurer include, but are not limited to: (1) solicitation of, and receipt of premiums for, the insurance contract being sued on, (2) the negotiation of a contract with an employer client, where the insurer knows the employer client employed people nationwide, and (3) where multiple employees were enrolled in the out-of-state insurer’s plan when they were already California residents (as opposed to employees who moved to California after enrolling in the insurance plan). (Id. at pp. 1317-1318, 1321.)

Thus, a wide variety of contacts may constitute evidence of purposeful availment and the reasonableness of this court exercising jurisdiction over a defendant. And given that the Civil Discovery Act was intended to provide the right to broad discovery and must be liberally construed in favor of allowing discovery, (see Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. vs. Pacific Healthcare Consultations (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 402), the court cannot limit discovery over matters that by themselves are not sufficient to convey personal jurisdiction because the court must consider all contacts together.

Special Interrogatories

With these considerations in mind, the court finds that Special Interrogatory Numbers 3, 9, 16, 19, 20, 22, and 24 seek discovery regarding possible contacts Defendants had or have with California. In addition, Special Interrogatory Numbers 4, 8, 10, 14, and 23 go to the magnitude of those potential contacts. Defendants must provide substantive responses to these special interrogatories.

The court also finds that Special Interrogatory Numbers 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, and 21 seek information regarding possible contacts, but would yield discovery that is duplicative of other special interrogatories. Defendants do not need to respond to these special interrogatories.

Form Interrogatories

Form Interrogatory 15.1 requests facts, persons, and documents relating to each denial of a material allegation in the Complaint or each affirmative defendant raised in the Answer. First, this form interrogatory does not seek discovery regarding Defendants’ contacts with California. Second, Defendants cannot respond to this form interrogatory because Defendants have not filed an answer and thus, have not denied the allegations of the Complaint or asserted any affirmative defenses.

Form Interrogatory 17.1 requests facts, persons, and documents relating to each response to a request for admission which is, in whole or in part, a denial of that request for admission. To the extent that a request for admission is proper, then Form Interrogatory 17.1 is also proper as to that request for admission.

Request for Admissions

Request for Admissions Numbers 1, 2, and 4-7 seek admission of a fact that goes to Defendants’ contacts with the state of California. Defendants must provide a substantive response to these requests for admission.

Request for Admission Number 10 also seeks an admission that goes directly to the issue of the court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendants. However, Defendants have already provided a substantive and code-compliant response to this request for admission.

Request for Production

Request for Production Numbers 1-3, 6-11, 23-25, and 28 seek documents that could assist Plaintiff in opposing Defendants’ Motion to Quash and determining whether Defendants engaged in any purposeful acts in California.

Request for Production Numbers 4, 12, 13, 14, and 19-22 are overbroad in that they are likely to include a substantial number of documents that do not relate to the issue of personal jurisdiction, even if they might yield some documents that are related.

Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling.