Judge: Nathan Nhan Vu, Case: 30-2022-01287416, Date: 2023-08-21 Tentative Ruling
Motions to Compel Discovery
Defendants Jessica Anne Blackwell’s and Deborah Blackwell’s Motion to Compel Further Responses from Plaintiff, Irene Ragan, re Special Interrogatories, Set One IS GRANTED.
Defendants Jessica Anne Blackwell’s and Deborah Blackwell’s Motion to Compel Further Responses from Plaintiff, Cynthia Honore, re Special Interrogatories, Set One IS GRANTED.
Plaintiff Irene Ragan is ORDERED to serve full, complete, and verified substantive responses to Special Interrogatories Numbers 1, 2, and 3 within 21 days of service of the notice of ruling.
Plaintiff Cynthia Honore is ORDERED to serve full, complete, and verified substantive responses to Special Interrogatories Numbers 1, 2, and 3 within 21 days of service of the notice of ruling.
Plaintiff Irene Ragan is ORDERED to pay to Defendants Jessica Anne Blackwell and Deborah Blackwell sanctions in the amount of $1,050 (5.0 hours x $210 per hour in reasonable attorney’s fees) within 21 days of service of the notice of ruling.
Plaintiff Cynthia Honore is ORDERED to pay to Defendants Jessica Anne Blackwell and Deborah Blackwell sanctions in the amount of $1,050 (5.0 hours x $210 per hour in reasonable attorney’s fees) within 21 days of service of the notice of ruling.
Defendants Jessica Anne Blackwell and Deborah Blackwell move to compel further responses to their Special Interrogatories Numbers 1-3 served on Plaintiff Irene Ragan (Plaintiff Ragan) and Plaintiff Cynthia Honore (Plaintiff Honore). Defendants also seek sancations against Plaintiff Ragan and Plaintiff Honore in relation to the motions to compel further responses.
Defendants’ Proofs of Service
As an initial matter, the proofs of service attached to the instant motions are not code compliant as they do not contain the electronic service address of the person making the electronic service, Marianne Fogle. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1013b, subd. (b) [party serving by electronic service must include in proof of service “[t]he electronic service address . . . of the person making the electronic service”].)
This does not appear to have caused any actual prejudice as neither Plaintiff Ragan nor Plaintiff Honore claim that they were not able to contact the person making the electronic service. However, Defendants should change the form of the proofs of service in the future to ensure that the proofs are code compliant.
Standard to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories
A party may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories on the grounds that: (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)
“Parties must state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in answering written interrogatories.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 76; see Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (f) [making evasive response to discovery is misuse of discovery process].) Where the question is specific and explicit, it is improper to provide only a portion of the information sought or “deftly worded conclusionary answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.) “If a person cannot furnish details, he should set forth the efforts made to secure the information. He cannot plead ignorance to information which can be obtained from sources under his control.” (Id. at p. 782.)
The Civil Procedure Code instructs the responding party that: “(a) Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (b) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. (c) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220)
If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer the interrogatories. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)
Special Interrogatories Numbers 1-3
By Special Interrogatories Numbers 1-3, Defendants seek information regarding the Plaintiff Ragan’s and Plaintiff Honore’s physician or health care providers at the time of the accident, at the current time, and for the last ten years.
Plaintiffs objected to all of the Special Interrogatories on teh basis that they invaded the right to medical privacy, were impermissible overborad and oppressive, burdensome, and irrelevant.
However, Plaintiffs are claiming personal injuries resulting in past and future hospital and medical expenses, wage loss, and loss of earning capacity. (See Compl., ¶¶ 8, 11, & at p. 5). Thus, Plaintiffs have put their physical and health conditions at issue and cannot now refuse to provide evidence on these same issues. (See City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 232 [“The patient-litigant exception precludes one who has placed in issue his physical condition from invoking the privilege on the ground that disclosure of his condition would cause him humiliation. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.”].)
Further, Defendants only seek information about Plaintiffs’ physicians and healthcare providers, not information about Plaintiffs’ actual physical and health conditions or their medical records. Thus, the requests are not overbroad, oppressive, or unduly brudensome.
Plaintiffs filed late Oppositions to the instant motions on August 16, 2023, only 3 court days before the hearing in this matter. (See ROA #51, #53.) Oppositions are required to be filed at least 9 court days before the hearing on this matter and the court may ignore the oppositions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Ct. Rule 3.1300(d).)
However, Defendants were able to file Replies to the Oppositions that addressed all the arguments presented in the Oppositions. The court therefore will consider the Oppositions but Plaintiffs are informed that in the future, the court may not consider late-filed papers which prejudice the Defendants.
Plaintiffs argue that each of them should not be subject to a “fishing expedition into her private medical history simply because she is involved in a car accident.” For the reasons stated above, this argument lacks merit.
Plaintiffs also claim that that some of the physicians or healthcare providers that fall under the discovery requests did not treat Plaintiffs’ injuries in this case and threfore, do not need to be disclosed.
However, the Civil Discovery Act does not allow a party to refuse to provide the information without allowing Defendants the opportunity to test the Plaintiffs’ allegations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010 [“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”], italics added.) The Civil Discovery Act was intended to provide the right to broad discovery and must be liberally construed in favor of allowing discovery. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. vs. Pacific Healthcare Consultations (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 402.)
Plaintiffs also request “a Protective Order limiting the time and body parts to which Defendant can subpoena her medical records to those claimed as injured herein.” However, the issue of Plaintiffs’ medical records is not before the court as the Defendants are not seeking to compel the production of Plaintiffs’ medical records by these motions. Thus, this request is premature.
Here, Defendants filed timely motions to compel and Plaintiff Ragan and Plaintiff Honore failed to meet their burden to justify the objections asserted. The court will grant the motions to compel.
Sanctions
The Civil Procedure Code requires the court to impose monetary sanctions against a party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further responses, “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)
Plaintiffs argue that monetary sanctions are not warranted because they were justified in asserting their right of medical privacy and “there is a legitimate dispute warranting court intervention and an order narrowing or somehow defining any perceived righ to discovery sought.”
The court agrees that there is a dispute warranting court intervention in this case. However, Plaintiffs did not act with substantial justification in this case. Plaintiffs have provided no legal authority that would support their refusal to provide information about the identity of their physicians and healthcare providers when they had placed their physical and medical condition at issue.
Further, Plaintiffs have not shown that they were justified in their response to the discovery requests because the right to discovery should have been narrowed. In fact, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a protecitve order at this time.
In any case, in their efforts to meet and confer, Defendants attempted to discuss how to limit discovery to specific physical and medical conditions and Plaintiffs refused to engage in these discussions in any meaningful way. (See Decl. of Joel S. Poremba, ¶¶ 6-8, Exhs. 2-4.) The court must grant sanctions requested by Defendants.
The court reduce the amount of the sanctions since the Motion to Compel Further Responses, Oppositions, and Replies for both Plaintiff Ragan and Plaintiff Honore were essentially identical. In addition, the time spent at the hearing will be for both motions so that allowing 1 hour for one motion and 1 hour for the other motion would consittute double counting.
Defendants shall give notice of this ruling.