Judge: Nathan Vu, Case: 2019-01101730, Date: 2023-08-14 Tentative Ruling

Motions for Attorney’s Fees

Defendant Julie A. Woodall’s Motion for Award of Mandatory Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiff Timothy J. Woodall is ORDERED to pay to Defendant Julie A. Woodall reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $193,317 and costs of $2,638.81 within 30 days of service of the notice of ruling.

Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr.’s and Allegiant PI’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiff Timothy J. Woodall is ORDERED to pay to Defendants Ronnie Dean Exchavarria, Sr. and Allegiant PI reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $166,308 within 30 days of service of the notice of ruling.

Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr.’s and Allegiant PI’s request for costs is DENIED.

Defendant Julie A. Woodall seeks an award of $258,503 in attorney’s fees, $4,775.00 in anticipated attorney’s fees and $60.00 in anticipated costs from Plaintiff Timothy J. Woodall relating to the appeal of the court’s rulings on Defendant Julie A. Woodall’s Anti-SLAPP special motion to strike in this case.

Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr. and Allegiant PI seek an award of $336,030.30 in attorney’s fees, $166,308 in enhanced attorney’s fees, and $2,520.94 in costs against Plaintiff Timothy J. Woodall relating to the appeal of the court’s rulings on Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr.’s and Allegiant PI’s Anti-SLAPP special motion to strike in this case.

Basis for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Civil Procedure Code section 425.16 states that “a prevailing defendant on a [Anti-SLAPP] special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant's attorney's fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) Under this provision, “any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)

The purpose of the statute is “compensating the prevailing defendant for the undue burden of defending against litigation designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights.” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 328.)

In addition, a prevailing party generally is entitled to recover some of their costs and, under certain circumstances, some of their expert witness fees. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subds. (c), (d).)

Prevailing Party

“The term ‘prevailing defendant,’ as used in section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), is not defined, and it is unstated whether a defendant who prevails on some, but not all, of the claims challenged in his or her anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to fees and costs. (Maleti v. Wickers (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 181, 232.)

“But as a general rule, a defendant who prevails in part in bringing a special motion to strike is entitled to fees and costs, subject to the trial court's determination of the appropriate amount awardable based upon the defendant's partial success.” (Ibid.)

In this case, the Defendants are the prevailing parties. This court granted Defendant Julie A. Woodall’s special motion to strike as to 10 of the Plaintiff’s 12 causes of action (the 3rd through 12th Causes of Action). (See ROA #281.) This court also granted Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr.’s and Allegiant PI’s special motion to strike in its entirety. (See ibid.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed this court’s rulings on the special motions to strike, except that it held that Defendant Julie A. Woodall’s special motion to strike should have been granted as to the 1st and 2nd Causes of Action. (See ROA #578.) Essentially, the Court of Appeal ruled that both special motions to strike were granted in their entirety.

Finally, the Court of Appeal held that Defendants were the prevailing parties and “entitled to recover their attorney fees on appeal as a matter of right.” (ROA #578 at p. 18.)

Lodestar Calculation of Attorney’s Fees

The lodestar method for calculating attorneys’ fees applies to any statutory attorney’s fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1089; K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.)

When using this method, the court begins by determining the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplying that number by the reasonable hourly rate. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-34; Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)

However, the prevailing party should not receive a “windfall” through an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. (Ketchum vs. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

Thus, the prevailing defendant [in an Anti-SLAPP motion] who seeks attorney’s fees “’bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’” (Computer Xpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020, quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 437.) “To that end, the court may require defendants to produce records sufficient to provide ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’” (Computer Xpress, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020, quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart , supra, 461 U.S. at p. 437, fn. 12.)

However, once an attorney has presented evidence of her or his actual time spent and hourly rate charged, the time and hourly rate are presumed to be reasonable. (Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 747, 761.)

The court also has the discretion to increase or decrease the lodestar figure by applying a positive or negative multiplier based on a variety of factors that the court did not consider when determining the lodestar figure. (Northwest Energetic Servs., LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 841, 879-82; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 154.)

However, the court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (See Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241.) “The trial judge is ‘the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.’” (Ketchum v. Moses , supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) 

Reasonable Hourly Rate

The reasonable hourly rate is based on the reasonable market value of the attorney’s services. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095.) This standard applies regardless of how much the attorney actually charged the client. (See ibid.) Thus, the same reasonable hourly rate will apply whether the attorney charged nothing for their services, charged below-market or discounted rates, represented the client on a contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel paid a fixed salary.

To determine the reasonable market value of the legal services provided, the court must look to the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded to comparable attorneys for comparable work. (See Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 740, 783; see also see also PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095 [“[The] reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” ].)

“In making its calculation [of a reasonable hourly rate], the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 41, citations omitted; see also Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter of which the trial court has its own expertise.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.)  The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony.  (Ibid.) “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)

“[A] court reasonably could [ ] reduce[ ] rates based on its finding that the matter was not complex; that it did not go to trial; that the name partners were doing work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys; and that all the attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 41.)

In this case, Defendants provide billing statements to support their motions for attorney fees. (Decl. of John S. Clifford (Clifford Decl.), ¶ 12, Exhs. C, D, and E; Declaration of German Marcucci (Marcucci Decl.), ¶ 8, Exh. G [second paragraph 8].)

Defendant Julie A. Woodall seeks the following hourly rates for her counsel:

Judge Lewis previously ruled that rates of $500 per hour for John S. Clifford, $290 per hour for Michael Cooper, and $150 per hour for paralegals was reasonable for handling this action and bringing the Anti-SLAPP special motion to strike. (See ROA #491, Exh. A at p. 27:11-15.)

The court agrees with Judge Lewis’ assessment. The court also sees no reason to apply enhanced rates when the attorneys handled the same or similar issues on appeal. Therefore, the reasonable rate shall be the rates set by Judge Lewis previously. For Stephanie Alexander the reasonable rate shall be $400 per hour; for Nate Tarvin the reasonable rate shall be $350 per hour; and for Tesleem Azeez and Celeste Motaghedi the reasonable rate shall be $225 per hour.

Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr. and Allegiant PI seek the following hourly rates for their counsel:

Judge Lewis previously ruled that rates of the billed rate of $295 per hour plus $100 per hour for German Marcucci and $275 per hour plus $100 per hour for Terry Anastassiou was reasonable for handling this action and bringing the Anti-SLAPP special motion to strike. (See ROA #491, Exh. A at p. 33:5-15; see also Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 701 [there is no requirement that losing party may take advantage of discounted rate offered to prevailing party as “[t]here is no requirement that the reasonable market rate mirror the actual rate billed.”].)

Again, the court agrees with Judge Lewis’ assessment. As with counsel for Defendant Julie A. Woodall, the court also sees no reason to apply enhanced rates when the attorneys for Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr. and Allegiant PI handled the same or similar issues on appeal. Therefore, the reasonable rate shall be the rates set by Judge Lewis previously. For Brigit Huber and Farid Zakaria the reasonable rate shall be $375 per hour.

Hours Reasonably Expended

In determining the number of hours to be used in calculating an award of attorney’s fees, the court need not include inefficient or duplicative efforts. (See Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 553, 579-580.) Thus, the court may reduce the number of hours based on considerations of “whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor , supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)

Further, the defendant may recover fees and costs “only for the motion to strike, not the entire litigation.” (Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor, supra, 165 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1320.) As explained by the Court of Appeal in 569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426: 

[A] fee award under the anti-SLAPP statute may not include matters unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion, such as ‘attacking service of process, preparing and revising an answer to the complaint, [or] summary judgment research.’ . . . Similarly, the fee award should not include fees for ‘obtaining the docket at the inception of the case’ or ‘attending the trial court's mandatory case management conference’ because such fees ‘would have been incurred whether or not [the defendant] filed the motion to strike.’ . . . In short, the award of fees is designed to ‘reimburs[e] the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extracting herself from a baseless lawsuit’ . . .rather than to reimburse the defendant for all expenses incurred in the baseless lawsuit.

(Id. at p. 433, citations omitted.)

In challenges to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Premier Medical Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Ibid.)

The prevailing party’s verified time records should be “entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) However, “[a] trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271-272.)

Plaintiff has not opposed the motions for attorney’s fees nor has Plaintiff pointed to any time spent that was unreasonable, duplicative, or excessive. In any case, the court has independently reviewed the billing records provided by Defendants and finds that they substantiate the hours claimed. (fn.1)

The only exception is for the 6 hours of time by Michael Cooper and 20 hours of time by German Marcucci that were anticipated to be spent on an anticipated opposition, anticipated reply, and the hearing. (See Clifford Decl., ¶ 18; Marcucci Decl., ¶ 13 [second paragraph 13].) Given that Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, no review of the opposition was necessary nor were Defendants required to file replies, and the Court will reduce the attorney’s fees accordingly.

The attorney’s fees awarded to Defendant Julie A. Woodward are thus:

Total                                           $193,317.00

The attorney’s fees awarded to Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr. and Allegiant PI are thus:

Total                                           $166,308

Costs

“Within 40 days after issuance of the remittitur, a party claiming costs awarded by a reviewing court must serve and file in the superior court a verified memorandum of costs under rule 3.1700.” (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.278(c)(1).)

On February 27, 2023, remittitur issued in the appeals in this case. (See ROA #592, #593.)

On March 24, 2023, Defendant Julie A. Woodward filed a Memorandum of Costs on Appeal requesting costs of $2,578.81. (See ROA #596.)

On April 28, 2023, Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr. and Allegiant PI filed a Memorandum of Costs on Appeal requesting costs of $2,520.94, (see ROA #632.)

Here, Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr.’s and Allegiant PI’s Memorandum of Costs on Appeal was filed more than 40 days after remittitur issued and was untimely. Rule 8.278(c)(1) speaks in mandatory terms – “a party claiming costs must serve and file in the superior court a verified memorandum of costs”. Further, failure to file a memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of the request for costs. The court thus denies Defendants Ronnie Dean Echavarria, Sr.’s and Allegiant PI’s request for costs on appeal.

In response to a memorandum of costs on appeal, “[a] party may serve and file a motion in the superior court to strike or tax costs claimed under (1) in the manner required by rule 3.1700.” (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.278(c)(2).) California Rules of Court rule 3.1700 requires that a motion to tax costs be filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. ((Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1700(b)(1).)

Plaintiff has not filed a motion to strike or tax costs within 15 days of being served with the Memorandum of Costs on Appeal, nor has Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant Julie A. Woodall’s Motion for Award of Mandatory Attorney Fees and Costs. The court will therefore award Defendant Julie A. Woodward her claimed costs.

(fn.1) In the notice of motion, Defendant Julie A. Woodward requests an additional $4,775 and $2,100 in attorney’s fees relating to this motion. (See Notice of Mot. and Mot. for Award of Mandatory Att’y Fees and Costs at p. 2:2-9; see also Clifford Decl., ¶ 28.) However, the evidence submitted by Defendant Julie A. Woodward fails to substantiate these requests. The number of hours spent on the motion is not clear, the amount of fees do not add up to the fees incurred ($3,360) when the hours are multiplied by the hourly rate, and the fees incurred ($3,360) bear no relation to the fees requested ($4,775 and $2,100). (See Clifford Decl., ¶ 18 [stating that “Mr. Cooper . . . spent “no less than nine and half hours (11.5) [sic] in drafting and preparing this motion”; “Ms. Canaan has spent no less than five hours (5.0) hours preparing the exhibits to this motion”; and “Defendant has incurred $3,360 fees in preparing submitting this motion”].)

Defendants shall give notice of this ruling.