Judge: Nathan Vu, Case: 2021-01233000, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling
Please Note: The hearing on this matter is scheduled for 8:30 A.M.
Motion to Strike
Defendants Tammy Ray’s and Ian Ray’s motion to strike is DENIED.
Defendants Tammy Ray and Ian Ray move to strike the prayer for punitive damages contained in the First Amended Complaint (FAC) filed by Plaintiffs Christine McLaughlin and Jess Hartmann.
Standard for Motion to Strike
A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading or strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)
“Irrelevant” matters include: allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or a demand for judgment requesting relief not support by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)
A motion to strike also may strike legal conclusions. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:179 (2010).) Conclusory allegations are permitted, however, if they are supported by other factual allegations in the complaint. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)
A motion to strike may seek to strike punitive damages allegations or requests in a complaint lacking factual foundation. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) However, motions to strike are disfavored. Pleadings are to be construed liberally with a view to substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:197 (2010).) The allegations of the complaint are presumed true and are to be read as a whole and in context. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
Timeliness and Pleadings Already Filed
Plaintiffs argue that Civil Procedure Code section 435(b)(1) states that “[a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof” and that the time to file a pleading has passed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) However, Section 435(b)(1) uses the word “may” and thus, the deadline stated in that provision is not mandatory.
This is made clear by Civil Procedure Code section 436, which allows the court to strike pleadings “at any time.” The Court of Appeal has held that a trial court may “consider [a motion to strike] on the merits even though the motion was filed after defendant had filed its responsive pleading [because] Code of Civil Procedure section 436 grants the trial court discretion to consider striking improper matter from pleadings ‘at any time in its discretion.’” (CPF Agency Corp. v. R&S Towing (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)
Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants already filed their responsive pleadings many months ago and may not file another responsive pleading now. However, a motion to strike is not a pleading and may be filed even after a responsive pleading has been filed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (a)(2) [“The term ‘pleading’ means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint.”].)
Of course, the court is concerned that Defendants have filed the instant motion to strike many months after filing their answers and without providing good cause for the delay. Nonetheless, the court is mindful of the policy that favors deciding matters on the merits whenever possible. The court will exercise its discretion and consider Defendants’ motion to strike on the merits.
Punitive Damages in Trespass Cases
To obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead and prove one of the following: malice, oppression, or fraud. (See Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is specifically defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a)(1).)
In the context of a trespass case, “[p]unitive damages may be awarded when a trespass is committed from malicious motives or reckless disregard of the rights of others.” (Armitage v. Decker (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 887, 907.) In Armitage v. Decker, the court held that evidence that a cross-defendant (1) erected fences which encroached on cross-complainant’s property, (2) caused fill to be placed in the drainage course and creek between cross-complainant’s property and cross-defendant’s property, and (3) failure to remove that fill from cross-complainant’s property after a demand was made to do so, was sufficient to support a finding of intentional conduct taken in reckless disregard of the cross-complainant’s rights. (Id. at pp. 401 & 411.)
Here, Plaintiffs similarly have alleged that Defendants’ conduct encroached on Plaintiffs’ property, caused damage to Plaintiffs’ property, and despite demands, failed to abate that damage. (See FAC, ¶¶ 7, 29, & 31.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants took actions that could be construed as harassing behavior to Plaintiffs (e.g., hanging a toilet seat from plaintiff’s oak tree, yelling obscenities at Plaintiff, etc.), which may be construed as both malicious conduct and evidence of malicious motive or reckless disregard. If found to be true, such conduct is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages under Armitage v. Decker.
Plaintiffs shall give notice of this ruling.