Judge: Nathan Vu, Case: 2022-01252924, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Please Note: The hearing on this matter is scheduled for 8:30 A.M.

Motion to Strike

Defendants Angels Baseball LP’s, Moreno Baseball LP’s, Moreno Baseball Companies Inc.’s, and Keynan Middleton’s (Doe 1) motion to strike is GRANTED, with 15 days leave to amend.

The Court ORDERS that paragraph 42, paragraph 43, and Prayer for Relief 7 “[f]or punitive damages according to proof against defendants” of the Second Amended Complaint shall be STRICKEN.

Defendants Angels Baseball LP, Moreno Baseball LP, Moreno Baseball Companies Inc., and Keynan Middleton (Doe 1) move to strike the punitive damages allegations of the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) filed by Plaintiffs Bryson Galaz and Beatrice Galaz.

Standard for Motion to Strike

A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading or strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

“Irrelevant” matters include: allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or a demand for judgment requesting relief not support by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)

A motion to strike also may strike legal conclusions. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:179 (2010).) Conclusory allegations are permitted, however, if they are supported by other factual allegations in the complaint. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)

A motion to strike may seek to strike punitive damages allegations or requests in a complaint lacking factual foundation. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) However, motions to strike are disfavored. Pleadings are to be construed liberally with a view to substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:197 (2010).) The allegations of the complaint are presumed true and are to be read as a whole and in context. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

Timeliness

Plaintiffs point out that the motion to strike was filed on 10/05/2022, one day after the last day to file a responsive pleading. Plaintiffs argue that the motion to strike is therefore untimely pursuant to Civil Procedure Code section 435(b)(1), which states that “[a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)

Defendants respond that Civil Procedure Code section 12(a) extended their time to file a responsive pleading to 10/05/2022. However, Section 12a extends the time “[i]f the last day for the performance of any act provided or required by law to be performed within a specified period of time is a holiday . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 12, subd. (a), emphasis added). Pursuant to Civil Procedure Code section 1010.6(a)(4)(B), the last day for Defendants to respond fell on Tuesday 10/04/2022. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6(a)(4)(B) [“Any period of notice . . . shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days”].) Because the last date to file a responsive pleading did not fall on a holiday, Section 12(a) is not applicable.

Nonetheless, Section 435(b)(1) uses the word “may” and thus, the deadline stated in that provision is not mandatory. This is made clear by Civil Procedure Code section 436, which allows the court to strike pleadings “at any time.” The Court of Appeal has held that a trial court may “consider [a motion to strike] on the merits even though the motion was filed after defendant had filed its responsive pleading [because] Code of Civil Procedure section 436 grants the trial court discretion to consider striking improper matter from pleadings ‘at any time in its discretion.’” (CPF Agency Corp. v. R&S Towing (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

The court is mindful of the policy that favors deciding matters on the merits whenever possible. The court will exercise its discretion and consider Defendants’ motion to strike on the merits.

Standard for Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases

To obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead and prove one of the following: malice, oppression, or fraud. (See Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is specifically defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a)(1).)

Conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, but that is not “despicable,” will not support an award of punitive damages. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) “Despicable conduct” refers to circumstances that are so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. (Ibid.; Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.) Such conduct has been described as “having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 715.)

“Consequently, to establish malice, ‘it is not sufficient to show only that the defendant's conduct was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless.’” (Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1044, quoting Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.) “The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages. . . . Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210, citations and quotation marks omitted.)

In addition, to plead a claim to recover punitive damages against an employer based on the acts of an employee, that plaintiff must plead facts showing the employer “had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or [wrongful] act must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civil Code, § 3294(b).)

Defendant Middleton (Doe 1)

The SAC alleges no despicable conduct by Defendant Middleton. The SAC only alleges Defendant Middleton decided to throw a baseball at a high velocity in the direction of the six-year-old plaintiff and other persons in the seating area, knowing there was no protective netting to prevent the high velocity baseball throw from striking plaintiff. (SAC ¶ 42.) The SAC also alleges that Middleton knew the spectators in the stand were not aware that a high velocity baseball was being thrown in their direction and could do nothing to protect themselves from being struck. (SAC ¶ 42.)

Throwing a baseball at a high velocity toward another person who was unable to catch the ball may be negligent or arguably reckless, but does not constitute despicable conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people.

Corporate Defendants

Here, the SAC fails to allege any “despicable conduct” by the Defendants Angels Baseball LP, Moreno Baseball LP, Moreno Baseball Companies Inc. (Corporate Defendants), and also fails to allege facts supporting the punitive damages claim against Defendants Angels Baseball LP or Moreno Baseball LP.

The SAC alleges that the Corporate Defendants had actual knowledge and were aware of multiple incidents where spectators and guests in the seating areas of the stadium were hit by baseballs thrown by players on the field, and that those thrown baseballs resulted in serious injuries to those spectators and guests. (SAC ¶ 11.)

The SAC further pleads that the Corporate Defendants made the decision not to extend protective netting and allowed players to warm up in areas without such netting or other protective measures, choosing not to follow MLB’s encouragement to all clubs to extend the protective netting along the base lines. (SAC ¶¶ 13 & 42.)

The SAC further alleges that two individuals, Arturo R. Moreno and Jerel Campbell, were responsible for making these decisions and thus, acted with conscious disregard for the rights and safety of fans. (SAC ¶ 43.)

The SAC does not plead specific facts to show that the Corporate Defendants had advance knowledge of the unfitness of Moreno or Campbell and employed them with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are sought.

Further, the SAC does not allege specific facts to show that any of the Corporate Defendants were personally guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. The decision not to extend protective netting or other protective measures in those alleged circumstances does not constitute despicable conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people.

Even under a liberal reading of the SAC, Plaintiffs’ allegations do no more than assert that the Corporate Defendants’ conduct was negligent, grossly negligent, or reckless. Although motions to strike are disfavored, the court is constrained to grant the instant motion.

In ruling on a motion to strike, the court employs the same liberality to amend as used for demurrers. As long as there is a reasonable possibility that plaintiffs can cure the defects, leave to amend is appropriate. (See Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 168; Price v. Dames & Moore (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 355, 360.)

Plaintiff requests leave to amend and claims that amendments could be made to save the request for punitive damages. However, Plaintiff has already amended the complaint twice. The court will therefore grant leave to amend one final time.

Defendants shall give notice of this ruling.