Judge: Nathan Vu, Case: 2022-01272273, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Please Note: The hearing on this matter is scheduled for 8:30 A.M.

Motion to Reclassify

Defendant Price Zone dba J&S International’s motion to reclassify this action to small claims jurisdiction or alternatively to limited jurisdiction is DENIED.

Defendant Price Zone dba J&S International moves to reclassify this action to small claims jurisdiction or alternatively, to limited jurisdiction.

The small claims courts generally have jurisdiction over suits where “the amount of the demand does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 116.220, subd. (a)(1).) The small claims court also has jurisdiction over cases “brought by a natural person, if the amount of the demand does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 116.221.)

The limited civil courts have jurisdiction in cases in which “the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 86, subd. (a)(1).)

“The defendant or cross-defendant may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the initial pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.040, subd. (a).) Section 403.040 only allows the reclassification of an action as either a limited or unlimited civil action.

Section 403.040 does not authorize the court to reclassify an action as a small claims matter nor does Defendant Price Zone point to any law that allows reclassification of a case to the small claims courts. The court therefore denies the motion to reclassify this action to small claims jurisdiction.

A matter may be reclassified as a limited civil action when the absence of jurisdiction is apparent from the complaint, petition, or related documents. (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 276.)

“The trial court, without adjudicating the merits of the underlying case, should review the record to determine whether a judgment in excess of $25,000 is obtainable. If a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict may result, (i.e., if such a verdict is not virtually unobtainable) the court should grant the motion to reclassify the case as ‘unlimited.’” (Id. at p. 279; Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262 [transfer appropriate if it becomes clear that matter will necessarily result in verdict below superior court jurisdictional amount].)

In this case, the Complaint contains no allegations against Defendant Price Zone. Plaintiff only alleges that it purchased the two gas stoves at issue in this case from Defendant San Young Market Inc.; that Defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company is the insurer of Defendant San Yong Market Inc; and that the two gas stoves were manufactured or assembled by Defendant ES Houseware Inc. (fn.1)

However, the lack of allegations against Defendant Price Zone goes to whether the action may be maintained against Defendant Price Zone at all. That issue may be raised by demurrer. This case is brought against several defendants and it would be erroneous to reclassify the entire case if it can be shown that Plaintiff’s allegations against other defendants could support a demand that exceeds $25,000.

The complaint further alleges that one of the two stoves “exploded,” causing injury to the finger of the son of Plaintiff’s owner and damage to the gas stove itself.

The Complaint also plead that the defective stove harmed Plaintiff’s business at the time of the event because Plaintiff was not able to conduct its business over a busy weekend. Plaintiff alleges loss of business income and that Plaintiff’s neighbors “estimated to make over 200k at least for the 2 days even during the Lunar New Year.”

While the Complaint is not a model of clarity, its allegations are sufficient to support a demand that exceeds $25,000, considering the personal injury, property damage, and lost income alleged. Defendant Price Zone has not presented sufficient evidence or argument to show that a verdict of $25,000 is virtually unobtainable.

At the same time, the Court encourages Plaintiff to hire counsel or to bring its claims in small claims court. The law and procedures for prosecuting an action within civil unlimited jurisdiction are complicated and failure to follow them can have serious consequences. (fn.2)

The court’s review of Plaintiff’s filings, which was necessary to rule on the instant motion, reveal that Plaintiff has had and will likely continue to have significant difficulties prosecuting this action in this court.

Among other issues:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint and filings include incorrect assertions of law, such as that the insurer of a defendant is directly liable for the conduct of a defendant, even where the court has issued judgment against the defendant. (See ROA #66 [court’s ruling on Defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company’s demurrer].)

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks damages for personal injuries to a person on behalf of a business, without explaining the legal or factual basis for doing so, such as the relationship between the injured person and the Plaintiff.

3. Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no claims against Defendant Price Zone, as stated above; appears to lack essential allegations against the remaining defendants; and is difficult to understand at best.

4. If Plaintiff is a corporation, limited liability company, or other artificial legal entity, it must be represented by counsel. (See Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284 n.5; Rogers v. Sonoma County Municipal Court (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1314, 1318.)

5. Plaintiff’s filings violate the rules of court. For example, Plaintiff filed an opposition which did not clearly state what motions it opposed and, much like the Complaint, was difficult to understand. The opposition also lacked line and page numbers, and was far in excess of the page limits. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.108 & 2.109; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113, subds. (d) & (g).)

As was stated in the Court’s ruling on Defendant Oregon Mutual Insurance Company’s demurrer, the court is mindful that Plaintiff may be self-represented. However, “mere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation. . . . . A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985, citation omitted.)

“A litigant has a right to act as his own attorney [citation] ‘but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded.’” (Doran v. Dreyer (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 289, 290, quoting Knapp v. Fleming (1953) 127 Colo. 414, 415.) The court must apply the laws equally to all parties, including Plaintiff.

(fn.1 In fact, there is nothing in the court files to show that Defendant Price Zone became a party to this action. Plaintiff did not name Defendant Price Zone in the complaint and no amendments to the complaint have been filed nor have any cross-complaints been filed.)

(fn.2 Even if the court were to reclassify this case to limited civil jurisdiction, the law and procedures that apply there are still complicated and would be no easier for Plaintiff to navigate than the law and procedures that apply in unlimited civil jurisdiction.)

The court clerk shall give notice of this ruling.