Judge: Nathan Vu, Case: 21-01197515, Date: 2022-08-29 Tentative Ruling

Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication

The Motion for Summary Judgment, or Summary Adjudication, is DENIED.

Defendant Target Corporation moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication on the Complaint of Plaintiff Hahn Thi Da Luu.

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at 851.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his or her initial burden by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Civil Proc. Code, § 437c(p)(2).) A cause of action “cannot be established” if the undisputed facts presented by the defendant prove the contrary of the plaintiff’s allegations as a matter of law. (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1597.)

Once the moving party meets that burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to show, by reference to specific facts, the existence of a triable issue as to an affirmative defense or cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855; Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App. 4th 562, 575.)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court must “consider all of the evidence” and all of the “inferences” reasonably drawn therefrom [citing Civil Procedure Code section 437c(c)] and must view the evidence and inferences “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence on a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, and all evidentiary conflicts are to be resolved against the moving party. (McCabe v. American Honda Motor Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1119.) The moving party’s papers are to be strictly construed, while the opposing party’s papers are to be liberally construed. (Committee to Save Beverly Highland Homes Ass’n v. Beverly Highland (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1260.)

Negligence and Premises Liability

The Complaint alleges that on or about 09/06/2019, Plaintiff slipped and fell as a result of Defendant allowing a spilled liquid to exist on a common walkway. (Compl. ¶ 10.)

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)

To assess the existence and scope of a defendant’s duty, courts balance several factors specified by the Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, partially superseded by statute on a different issue, Greenberg v. Superior Ct. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1352 n.8:

The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

(Id. at p. 113.)

A court’s focus in determining duty is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party. (Friedman v. Merck & Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 454, 465.) Courts look to the circumstances of the case to see if the defendant was on notice of facts making the harm at issue foreseeable.  (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.)  A consideration, when assessing the liability of a defendant arising from a contractual relationship to a third party not in privity, is “the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff.” (Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650.)

“[L]andowners are required ‘to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition’ [citation], and to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on their property [citations].” (Taylor v. Trimble (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 934, 943-44.) The plaintiff has the burden to prove the owner had actual or constructive notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1203 [holding that owner’s failure to inspect premises within reasonable period of time may establish inference that defective condition existed long enough for reasonable person exercising ordinary care to discovery it].) “A store owner exercises ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the portions of the premises open to customers, and the care required is commensurate with the risks involved.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205 [citing Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 448].)

A plaintiff need not show actual knowledge where the presented evidence suggests that the dangerous condition was present for a sufficient period of time to charge the owner with constructive knowledge of its existence. (See Ortega v. Kmart Corp., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) “Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it is a question of fact for the jury, and the cases do not impose exact time limitations.” (Id. at p. 1207.)

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff Huu slipped and fell after encountering a liquid on a common walkway on the premises of Defendant Target.

There are, however, disputed material facts as to whether the dangerous condition existed for a sufficient time to charge Defendant Target with constructive knowledge of its existence. Plaintiff submitted surveillance video showing no spill taking place in the 18 minutes before Plaintiff’s fall. (See Pltf.’s Sep. St. No. 12; Navab Decl., Pltf.’s Notice of Lodging, Exh. 1 at 2:50:00-3:07:58.) Although Defendant submitted evidence that the spill may have occurred in 2-3 minutes prior to Plaintiff’s fall, this only creates a disputed issue of fact.

In addition, there are disputed facts as to whether Defendant Target inspected the area in the timeframe prior to the incident, and if it did, whether that inspection was sufficient to fulfill its duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. There is evidence to support Plaintiff’s position: Defendant’s employee Wendy Rodriguez testified that she did not observe on the surveillance footage any Target employees performing an inspection of the floor for slip hazards. (Navab Decl., Ex. 5 [Rodriguez Depo.] at 26:11-16.)  While a different employee of the Defendant testified that he “was inspecting the floors in the area” (Trejo Decl. ¶¶ 6-7), this was not conclusive either,  but the surveillance video shows his primary job was organizing carts within the area adjacent to the exit (Pltf.’s Notice of Lodging, Ex. 1 at 3:28:15-32, 3:03:52-58 [surveillance video showed that Trejo’s primary job was organizing cars in area adjacent to exit]; (Pltf.’s Sep. St. No. 12(d) [citing Ex. 4 (Trejo Depo.) at 87:9-88:18] [Trejo’s duties did not include actively looking for safety hazards or preventative maintenance]).

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be denied.

In addition, Plaintiff has asserted only one cause of action for negligence and premises liability.  The elements of and Defendant’s arguments against negligence and premises liability are the same.  Therefore, Defendant’s alternative motion for summary adjudication must be denied as well.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is denied as unnecessary.  (See Zucchet v. Galardi (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1474, fn. 5 [citing Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6] [court may deny request for judicial notice where material requested is not “necessary, helpful, or relevant”].)

The court declines to rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections, as they were not material to the disposition of this motion, and they are preserved for appellate review. (See Civil Proc. Code, § 437c(q).)

Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling.