Judge Nathan Vu, Case 22-01243449 2022-08-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Nathan Vu, Case: 22-01243449, Date: 2022-08-29 Tentative Ruling

Demurrer

The demurrer of Defendants True North Detox, LLC dba First Steps Recovery, Joshua Beauchaine, and Benjamin Beauchaine is OVERRULED in its entirety. Moving Defendants shall have 21 days to file an answer.

In ruling on a demurrer, a court must accept as true all allegations of fact contained in the complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the affected pleading, not the truth of the factual allegations in the pleading or the pleader’s ability to prove those allegations. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404-05.)

Questions of fact cannot be decided on demurrer. (Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1556.) Because a demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the complaint, a court will not consider facts that have not been alleged in the complaint unless they may be reasonably inferred from the matters alleged or are proper subjects of judicial notice. (Hall v. Great W. Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 713, 718 n.7.)

Second Cause of Action (Dependent Adult Abuse)

Plaintiffs Michael Hansen, as administrator of the Estate of Michele Hansen, Michael Hansen, an individual, Hailee Hansen, and Leah Hansen’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) allege that Michele Hansen (“Decedent”) admitted herself to a prescription drug detoxification facility, True North Detox, LLC dba First Steps Recovery (“First Steps”). (FAC ¶¶ 1-2.) The FAC further asserts that, inter alia, First Steps failed to provide care to Decedent during her stay at the facility. (FAC ¶ 4.)

Moving Defendants demur on the basis that Decedent was not a “dependent adult” within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657 et seq.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.23(a) defines a dependent adult as follows as “any person between the ages of 18 and 64 years who resides in this state and who has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights, including, but not limited to, persons who have physical or developmental disabilities, or whose physical or mental abilities have diminished because of age.”

The FAC alleges that Decedent suffered from prescription drug dependence and substance use disorder when she was admitted to First Steps. (FAC ¶ 32.) It further asserts that Decedent’s addiction limited or stripped Decedent of her ability to exercise the degree of self-care and self-regulation that a reasonable person without that condition would have exercised. (FAC ¶ 32.) The FAC also alleges that Decedent did not eat or leave her bed during her stay at First Steps, with the exception of using the restroom and taking her medication, and that a co-resident described Decedent’s demeanor as “zombied.” (FAC ¶ 8.)

Plaintiffs have sufficiently plead that Decedent was a dependent adult under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.23. Whether Decedent was actually a dependent adult is a question of fact that is not ripe for determination at this pleading stage.(fn.1)

Moving Defendants next contend that the FAC’s allegations are insufficient to state a dependent adult abuse cause of action because the facts plead do not amount to egregious abuse or neglect.

For purposes of the Elder Abuse Act, neglect is the “negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57(a)(1).) Neglect includes “[f]ailure to assist in personal hygiene,” “[f]ailure to provide medical care for physical and mental health needs,” “[f]ailure to protect from health and safety hazards,” and “[f]ailure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57(b)(1)-(4).) Neglect incorporates “the failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations.” (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 34.)

Thus, to state a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must allege facts “establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene, or medical care [citations]; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs [citations]; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult’s basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if a plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if a plaintiff alleges recklessness) [citations].” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407.)

These facts must be alleged with particularity. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.) A plaintiff must also allege, with particularity, that the neglect caused the dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain, or mental suffering. (Carter, 198 Cal.App.4th at 407; Worsham v. O'Connor Hospital (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 331, 336–338 [“Absent specific facts indicating at least recklessness, any failure to provide adequate supervision would constitute professional negligence but not elder abuse”].)

Finally, a plaintiff cannot bring a claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse Act unless the defendant health care provider has a caretaking or custodial relationship with the elder or dependent adult. (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 165.) Under Winn, a caretaking or custodial relationship is established “where a person has assumed significant responsibility for attending to one or more of those basic needs of the elder or dependent adult that an able-bodied and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of managing without assistance,” (Winn, 63 Cal.4th at 155), and the “distinctive relationship contemplated by the Act entails more than casual or limited interactions.” (Id. at 158.)

The FAC alleges First Steps personnel failed to appropriately monitor Decedent and her symptoms during the detoxification process, failed to select and hire appropriate personnel to provide detoxification services; failed to provide proper training to its personnel providing detoxification services to Decedent; failed to appropriately supervise its personnel; and failed to transfer Decedent to urgent or emergent care when her vital signs clearly indicated the Decedent was in danger. (FAC ¶ 27.) The FAC alleges First Steps violated its own policies and the law by failing to observe Decedent every 30 minutes and fabricated documentation concerning its monitoring of Decedent. (FAC ¶ 5(a), (b).) The FAC also alleges that First Steps knowingly hired personnel with no detoxification training to run its detox facility, labeled them “detox specialists,” failed to provide any medical care to Decedent upon her admission, fabricated records to cover up the failure. (FAC ¶ 6.) Specifically, First Steps failed to perform any physical check on Decedent between 9:00 p.m. on June 19, 2021, and the morning of June 20, 2021. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 34.)

Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state a claim for dependent adult abuse based on neglect. The actions alleged involve more than “inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precaution” and “rise to the level of a ‘conscious choice of a course of action ... with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it.’ [Citation.]” (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 31-32.)

To the extent a plaintiff seeks to hold a corporate defendant liable for the acts or omissions of its employees, the plaintiff must satisfy the standards set forth in Civil Code section 3294(b). (Welf. and Inst. Code, § 15657(c).) As relevant here, that section provides: “An employer shall not be liable for damages ... based upon the acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer ... authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294(b).)

Allegations regarding authorization or ratification must also be pled with particularity. That means “the plaintiff must set forth facts in his complaint sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of liability is satisfied. General allegations are regarded as inadequate.” (Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5; see also Covenant Care, 32 Cal.4th at p. 790 [also citing “the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity”].)

The FAC alleges First Steps failed to select and hire appropriate personnel to provide detoxification services; failed to provide proper training to its personnel providing detoxification services to Decedent; and failed to appropriately supervise its personnel. (FAC ¶ 27.) The FAC further alleges First Steps’ owners, including Joshua Beauchaine and Benjamin Beauchaine, hire former clients to operate the facility and provide care to First Steps’ dependent clients while knowing that these persons have no medical training and that they further cut costs by choosing not to have licensed medical professionals present at their facilities. (FAC ¶ 11.)

The FAC’s allegations are pled with sufficient particularity to hold First Steps liable for the acts and omissions of its employees. The FAC identifies owners Joshua Beauchaine and Benjamin Beauchaine and alleges they were aware of and authorized the hiring of unqualified staff. Knowledge of staffing guidelines and knowingly flouting those guidelines to cut costs “could infer recklessness, i.e., a ‘conscious choice of a course of action ... with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it.’” (Fenimore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350, quoting Delaney, Cal.4th at 31–32.)

Uncertainty

The court will only sustain a demurrer for uncertainty if it is so poorly drafted that defendants cannot reasonably respond. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty must identify by line and page number, the language that creates the uncertainty. (Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)

Here, the FAC is not “so incomprehensible that [moving defendants] cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2010) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) Any “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Motion to Strike

The Motion to Strike of Defendants True North Detox, LLC dba First Steps Recovery, Joshua Beauchaine, and Benjamin Beauchaine is DENIED. Moving Defendants shall have 21 days to file an answer.

A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading or strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant” matters include allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or a demand for judgment requesting relief not support by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10(b).) A motion to strike may also strike legal conclusions. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:179 (2010).) Conclusory allegations are permitted, however, if they are supported by other factual allegations in the complaint. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)

Motions to strike are disfavored. Pleadings are to be construed liberally with a view to substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:197 (2010).) The allegations of the complaint are presumed true; they are read as a whole and in context. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

Defendants True North Detox, LLC dba First Steps Recovery, Joshua Beauchaine, and Benjamin Beauchaine move to strike the punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief allegations in the FAC. Moving Defendants also move to strike references to deficiencies and/or citations by the California Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”) that relate to the care rendered to the Decedent by Defendants.

Punitive Damages and Attorney’s Fees

The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protective Act (the “Act”) sets forth a scheme of heightened remedies – punitive damages (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657(c)), attorney’s fees and costs (id. at § 15657(a)), and exemption from certain limitations on recoverable damages in survivorship actions (id. at § 15657(b)) – designed to provide incentives for “interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons . . . .” (id. at § 15600(j).) These remedies are available only where the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that “the defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of this abuse.” (Id. at § 15657.)

The punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294(b), which is incorporated into the Act by Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657(c), requires a plaintiff to plead facts establishing an employer’s liability for the conduct of its employees. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721-722.) Those facts must be pled with particularity. (See Covenant Care, 32 Cal.4th at 790.)

As discussed in the court’s concurrent ruling on Moving Defendant’s demurrer, the FAC sufficiently alleges the element of recklessness necessary to plead a dependent adult abuse case and facts establishing First Steps’ liability for the conduct of its employees. Because Plaintiffs have adequately plead a dependent adult abuse cause of action, punitive damages and attorney’s fees remain available remedies.

Injunctive Relief

Moving Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief should be stricken because the requested relief is unnecessarily burdensome and because a comprehensive state regulatory scheme already exists.

The doctrine of equitable abstention allows a court to abstain from adjudicating a suit that seeks equitable remedies if “granting the requested relief would require a trial court to assume the functions of an administrative agency, or to interfere with the functions of an administrative agency. [Citations.]” (Alvarado v. Selma Convalescent Hospital (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1298.) Abstention may be appropriate if “the lawsuit involves determining complex economic policy, which is best handled by the Legislature or an administrative agency,” or if “granting injunctive relief would be unnecessarily burdensome for the trial court to monitor and enforce given the availability of more effective means of redress. [Citation.]” (Id.)

Abstention is not warranted at this time. Moving Defendants have not shown that the analyses required to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claim would be overly complex, nor is there any indication that enforcing the requested injunctive relief against First Steps and enjoining First Steps’ business practice of making false and misleading statements to California consumers (FAC ¶ 58) would be unduly burdensome.

DHCS Conclusions

Moving Defendants seek to strike the FAC’s references to the DHCS’s investigative conclusions. (See FAC ¶ 5.) Moving Defendants contend that the DHCS’s findings are not relevant.

However, the DHCS allegations are relevant to Plaintiffs’ False Advertising Law claim, whether Defendants neglected to monitor Decedent, and whether Defendants had a conscious disregard of the high probability of injury.

Plaintiffs shall give notice of this ruling.

(fn.1) The parties do not address the issue of whether Decedent was a dependent adult pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.23(b). In light of the court’s ruling that Plaintiffs have sufficiently plead that Decedent was a dependent adult pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.23(a), the Court need not take up this issue.