Judge: Olivia Rosales, Case: 18STCV05258, Date: 2022-08-02 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT SE-C LAW & MOTION PROCEDURES ARE AS FOLLOWS: APPEARANCES: The Court will hear oral arguments on all matters at the scheduled time of hearing. If all counsel intend to submit on the Tentative Order and do not want oral argument, please advise the clerk, in Department “C”, by calling (562-345-3702). If all sides submit on the Tentative Order and the clerk is so advised, the Tentative Order will become the final order of the court and the prevailing party shall give written Notice of Ruling per CRC 3.1312. If the Moving and Responding parties do not agree to submit on the Tentative Order, the motion will be called as calendared for hearing. There is no need to contact Department “C”, as the matter will remain on calendar for hearing. If the Moving party does not call Department “C” to submit on the Tentative Order and there is no appearance by any party, then the motion(s), at the Court’s discretion, may be taken off calendar without ruling on the motion(s). ORDERS: The minute order reflecting the Court’s Order will constitute the final Order. No additional orders should be submitted to the Court for signature unless required by law or by the Court. Prevailing party shall give written Notice of Ruling per CRC 3.1312. Minute orders, which constitute the final Order of the Court, will only be sent to the parties via U.S. mail for the following: OSC re: sanctions, OSC re: contempt or matters taken under submission after oral arguments or briefing. Counsel or parties may request copies of all other minute orders/final orders either at the clerk’s office or in writing. If a request is in writing, a self-addressed stamped envelope and the appropriate fee for copies shall be submitted.
Case Number: 18STCV05258 Hearing Date: August 2, 2022 Dept: SEC
TAYLOR v. TEEN CHALLENGE OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC.
CASE NO.: 18STCV05258
HEARING: 8/2/22 @ 1:30 PM
JUDGE: MARGARET M. BERNAL
#ADD-ON
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant Teen Challenge of Southern California, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment of the Plaintiff’s complaint for damages is DENIED.
Opposing Party to give NOTICE.
Defendant Teen Challenge of Southern California, Inc. (“Teen Challenge”) moves for summary judgment pursuant to CCP § 437c.
OBJECTIONS
Defendant’s Objections 1-24 to Preston Declaration are overruled.
PLEADINGS
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Sara Taylor fell out of the window of her second story bedroom while residing at an apartment building owned by Defendant Teen Challenge of Southern California, Inc. The Complaint assets a single cause of action for Negligence – Premises Liability.
STANDARD
A defendant moving for summary judgment/adjudication has met its burden of showing a cause of action has no merit if the defendant can show one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).)
MERITS
Teen Challenge contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because the placement of the bunk bed adjacent to the window did not constitute an unreasonably dangerous condition; Plaintiff failed to prove Defendant was a substantial factor in causing her fall; the placement was open and obvious; and Defendant had no knowledge or notice of the dangerous condition.
Teen Challenge submits the following evidence:
· Teen Challenge is a non-profit that provides help to adults by providing drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs. (Defense Separate Statement (DSS) 1.) Teen Challenge owns and operates Teen Challenge Ministry Institute (“TCMI”), a one-year program that trains participants for leadership in ministry positions. (DSS 2.)
· Plaintiff entered TCMI in June 2016 (DSS 4) and resided at an apartment building owned by Teen Challenge (DSS 5).
· The bunk bed was positioned adjacent to the window, and as Plaintiff was pulling her comforter, she fell backwards through the second-floor bedroom window and onto the concrete below. (DSS 7, 8, 10, 12.)
· Plaintiff slept in the bed for over five months without issue prior to her fall. (DSS 14, 35.)
· The bunk bed had been in the same location since at least 2009 without any prior falls, and no previous resident had expressed any problem with the placement to Teen Challenge. (DSS 15.)
· Plaintiff did not complain about the placement of the bunkbed or any dangerous condition in her residential unit. (DSS 17, 24, 38, 43, 47.)
· Plaintiff testified that alternative places to sleep, including another bunk bed in her same assigned bedroom, were available to her. (DSS 21, 23, 26, 44.)
· The head of the bed was not exposed to any section of the window that could open, much of the remainder of the bed was situated next to the rightmost half of the window that remained shielded by glass, and the foot of the bed did not even reach the leftmost frame from which the window began to open. (DSS 42)
· Since 2009, many TCMI residents slept in the same bunkbed without any issue. (DSS 46.)
In opposition, Plaintiff presents the following evidence:
· When the window was open, the exposed screen was about 18 inches above Ms. Taylor’s mattress and 34 inches wide. This was more than enough to allow her to fall through the screened opening. (Preston Decl., ¶ 12; Plaintiff’s Separate Statement (PSS) 1.)
· The screen was insufficient to contain Plaintiff. (PSS 2.)
· “Inspections were oriented toward cleanliness only. No safety instruction. No safety meetings. No safety inspections.” (Preston Decl., ¶ 22.)
· In violation of the Consumer Product Safety Standards for safety of bunkbeds, the bunkbed being used by Plaintiff had no side or lateral rails on either side. Such a rail on the sides would have sufficiently closed off the window as to prevent the fall that Plaintiff experienced. (Preston Decl., ¶ 16; PSS 3.)
· The actual measurements on scene show that the 70-inch-wide window began 31 inches from the north wall and the head of the bed. The open screen was 35 inches from there. (PSS 6.)
· The bunkbed covered approximately ¾ of the window. (PSS 29.)
· Residents of the units, including Plaintiff, were not allowed to move furniture. (PSS 30.)
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) “A finding of negligence depends on two determinations. The first determination, a question of law for the court, is this: Does the defendant have a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular type of harm? The second determination, necessary only if a duty is found to exist, is this: Did the defendant's conduct satisfy the standard of care that the duty imposes?” (Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.).
Duty
Under CC § 1714(a), “everyone is responsible... for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property.” The existence of a duty is a question of law within the exclusive province of the court. (Kane v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 350, 355.) Courts consider the following factors when determining whether a duty exists: 1) the foreseeability that the conduct at issue would result in harm to the plaintiff; 2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; 3) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; 4) the policy of preventing future harm; 5) the burden on the defendant and on the community of imposing the duty; 6) the cost and availability of insurance to cover the liability associated with the proposed duty; 7) the certainty that plaintiff suffered an injury; and 8) the consequences to the community of imposing such a duty. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)
“‘[I]n cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high degree of foreseeability may be required. On the other hand, in cases where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.’” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 415.) Here, the burden of preventing future harm is low and could have been easily prevented by moving the bunk bed to a different location in the room, so a lesser degree of foreseeability is required. It was foreseeable that harm could result if someone fell from a bunkbed that had no rails, and placed next to a window. Defendant’s placement of the bunk bed next to the window was closely connected with the injury suffered by Plaintiff. Defendant owned the apartment building where Plaintiff resided, and assigned her the top bunk of the bed from which she fell. Defendant also provided the bunk bed without lateral rails. As such, moral blame should attach to Defendant’s conduct. Further, there are strong policy reasons to prevent future harm from falling out of the top bunk and out the window. There are minimal consequences to the community if such a burden was imposed.
Accordingly, the court finds that Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to prevent the particular type of harm suffered.
Causation
“Causation is generally a question of fact for the jury, unless reasonable minds could not dispute the absence of causation.” (Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656, 666.) “It may be that more than one person's negligence, including the plaintiff's, has been a substantial factor in causing a plaintiff's injuries. (CACI No. 406.)
The court finds that triable issues exist regarding whether the placement of the bed by the window was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries.
Open and Obvious Danger Defense
When considering whether an unsafe condition is “open and obvious,” the determinative question is whether the unsafe condition is discoverable by one who is acting with ordinary care under the circumstances. (Shanley v. American Olive Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 552, 555.) Even if the danger was obvious, “the obvious nature of a danger is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish that the owner of the premises on which the danger is located is not liable for injuries caused thereby, and that although obviousness of danger may negate any duty to warn, it does not necessarily negate the duty to remedy.” (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix, 224 Cal. App. 3d 104, 119.).
The court finds that triable issues exist regarding whether the unsafe condition was open and obvious. The bunkbed covered ¾ of the length of the window; the window is covered by blinds; and the window had a screen that was insufficient to contain Plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s Evidence, Ex. 5; PSS 5.) Taylor also slept in the same top bunk for five months and was not aware that the bunk was in an unsafe location. (DSS 17).
Accordingly, the court finds that triable issues exist regarding whether the danger was open and obvious.
Notice
“An owner must have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition before incurring liability. The plaintiff has the burden to prove the owner had actual or constructive notice of the defect in sufficient time to correct it.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1203.)
“[A] plaintiff may prove a dangerous condition existed for an unreasonable time with circumstantial evidence, and that, ... ‘evidence that an inspection had not been made within a particular period of time prior to an accident may warrant an inference that the defective condition existed long enough so that a person
exercising reasonable care would have discovered it.’” (Ortega v. KMART Corp. (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1210.) The mere fact that a particular kind of accident has not happened in the past does not show that such an accident is one that might not be reasonably anticipated. (Becker v. IRM Corp. (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 454.)
“Where the dangerous or defective condition of the property which causes the injury has been created by reason of the negligence of the owner of the property or his employee acting within the scope of the employment, the owner of the property cannot be permitted to assert that he had no notice or knowledge of the defective or dangerous condition in an action by an invitee for injuries suffered by reason of the dangerous condition. Under such circumstances knowledge thereof is imputed to him.” (Hatfield v. Levy Bros., 18 Cal. 2d 798, 806).
The court finds that triable issues exist regarding whether Defendant had constructive notice of the dangerous condition. According to Plaintiff, “Inspections were oriented toward cleanliness only. No safety instruction. No safety meetings. No safety inspections.” (Preston Decl., ¶ 22.) Therefore, knowledge may be imputed if safety inspections were not made. Further, Defendant contends that the danger was open and obvious, and because Defendant placed the bunk bed with the top bunk overhanging 3/4th of the window (PSS 29), knowledge may be imputed on Defendant.
Based on the foregoing, motion for summary judgment is DENIED.