Judge Olivia Rosales, Case 19NWCV00456 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Olivia Rosales, Case: 19NWCV00456, Date: 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT SE-C LAW & MOTION PROCEDURES ARE AS FOLLOWS: APPEARANCES: The Court will hear oral arguments on all matters at the scheduled time of hearing. If all counsel intend to submit on the Tentative Order and do not want oral argument, please advise the clerk, in Department “C”, by calling (562-345-3702). If all sides submit on the Tentative Order and the clerk is so advised, the Tentative Order will become the final order of the court and the prevailing party shall give written Notice of Ruling per CRC 3.1312. If the Moving and Responding parties do not agree to submit on the Tentative Order, the motion will be called as calendared for hearing. There is no need to contact Department “C”, as the matter will remain on calendar for hearing. If the Moving party does not call Department “C” to submit on the Tentative Order and there is no appearance by any party, then the motion(s), at the Court’s discretion, may be taken off calendar without ruling on the motion(s). ORDERS: The minute order reflecting the Court’s Order will constitute the final Order. No additional orders should be submitted to the Court for signature unless required by law or by the Court. Prevailing party shall give written Notice of Ruling per CRC 3.1312. Minute orders, which constitute the final Order of the Court, will only be sent to the parties via U.S. mail for the following: OSC re: sanctions, OSC re: contempt or matters taken under submission after oral arguments or briefing. Counsel or parties may request copies of all other minute orders/final orders either at the clerk’s office or in writing. If a request is in writing, a self-addressed stamped envelope and the appropriate fee for copies shall be submitted.

Case Number: 19NWCV00456 Hearing Date: October 18, 2022 Dept: SEC

SAN JOSE v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA

CASE NO.: 19NWCV00456

HEARING: 10/18/22 @ 9:30 AM

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff San Jose’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees in the sum of $17,762.50 and costs in the sum of $4,029.43.

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

Plaintiff San Jose moves for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $144,922.00 plus costs of $4,029.43.

Plaintiff San Jose’s Complaint alleges that he purchased a 2017 Hyundai Sonata from Defendant that contained repeated problems related to engine defects. Based thereon, the Complaint asserts causes of action for:

1. Violation of CC § 1793.2(d)

2. Violation of CC § 1793.2(b)

3. Violation of CC § 1793.2(a)(3)

4. Violation of CC § 1791.2(a) and 1794

5. Violation of CC § 1791.1 and 1794

On February 14, 2022, the parties finalized a settlement for the repurchase value plus maximum civil penalties at $107,000.00. (Zhang Decl., ¶ 32.)

Prevailing Party

“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (CC § 1794(d).)

Here, Plaintiff contends that he prevailed because he obtained monetary recovery through the settlement.

In opposition, Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s prevailing party status. Instead, Defendant disputes the reasonableness of the fees. Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party under CC § 1794.

Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, n.23.)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate is $450 and Paralegal Catalina Yang’s hourly rate is $175.00. (Zhang Decl., ¶ 56.)

Plaintiff attaches the firm’s billing records for both Plaintiff’s counsel and the paralegal, totaling 164.30 hours. (Zhang Decl., ¶ 54, Ex. 18.) However, the record does not differentiate between hours expended by the attorney versus hours expended by the paralegal. This court manually added up the paralegal’s hours, which total 19.2. Therefore, by deducting 19.2 from 164.30 hours, it appears Plaintiff’s counsel’s hours were 145.10.

The court has reviewed the Billing Record submitted as Exhibit 18 to Zhang’s declaration, and finds that counsel’s hours are excessive. Reasonable hours expended should have been 73.1 hours (which includes hours expended on the instant motion).

Therefore, the lodestar calculations are: 73.1 hours x $450, totaling $32,895.

Plaintiff requests a 2.0 modifier to the lodestar. The court declines to award a modifier. This is a simple “lemon law” action, and the court does not find any abuse on the part of Defendant to justify any such modifier.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees for 73.1 hours x $450, totaling $32,895.

Costs

Plaintiff requests $4,029.43 in costs, which Defendant did not dispute. Accordingly, the court awards costs of $4,029.43.