Judge: Olivia Rosales, Case: 20NWCV00161, Date: 2022-09-22 Tentative Ruling
DEPARTMENT SE-C LAW & MOTION PROCEDURES ARE AS FOLLOWS: APPEARANCES: The Court will hear oral arguments on all matters at the scheduled time of hearing. If all counsel intend to submit on the Tentative Order and do not want oral argument, please advise the clerk, in Department “C”, by calling (562-345-3702). If all sides submit on the Tentative Order and the clerk is so advised, the Tentative Order will become the final order of the court and the prevailing party shall give written Notice of Ruling per CRC 3.1312. If the Moving and Responding parties do not agree to submit on the Tentative Order, the motion will be called as calendared for hearing. There is no need to contact Department “C”, as the matter will remain on calendar for hearing. If the Moving party does not call Department “C” to submit on the Tentative Order and there is no appearance by any party, then the motion(s), at the Court’s discretion, may be taken off calendar without ruling on the motion(s). ORDERS: The minute order reflecting the Court’s Order will constitute the final Order. No additional orders should be submitted to the Court for signature unless required by law or by the Court. Prevailing party shall give written Notice of Ruling per CRC 3.1312. Minute orders, which constitute the final Order of the Court, will only be sent to the parties via U.S. mail for the following: OSC re: sanctions, OSC re: contempt or matters taken under submission after oral arguments or briefing. Counsel or parties may request copies of all other minute orders/final orders either at the clerk’s office or in writing. If a request is in writing, a self-addressed stamped envelope and the appropriate fee for copies shall be submitted.
Case Number: 20NWCV00161 Hearing Date: September 22, 2022 Dept: SEC
ROBLETO v. ARANA
CASE NO.: 20NWCV00161
HEARING: 09/22/22
#1
TENTATIVE ORDER
I.
Defendant IRELA ARANA’s unopposed Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is OVERRULED
in part and SUSTAINED without leave to amend in part.
II.
Defendant IRELA ARANA’s unopposed Motion to
Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is DENIED.
Moving Party to Give Notice.
No Opposition filed as of September 20, 2022.
This action for quiet title was filed on March 3, 2020. On February
17, 2022, the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed.
The SAC alleges in pertinent part, “Defendant IRELA ARANA…
is an individual who now resides in the State of Texas and who asserts complete
ownership of the subject property…. Plaintiff alleges that he has been the
constructive partial owner of the subject property… for at least the past 20 to
25 years.” (SAC ¶2.) “Plaintiff is informed and believes… that Plaintiff’s
mother owned the property until it was (improperly) transferred in 1999 to the
sole name of Defendant Arana. Plaintiff alleges herein that he did not find out
about the quitclaim of the subject property to Arana until about the year 2010,
when his mother told him about her quitclaim to Arana and asked him to take
over all of the payments on the house, which would be 1/3rd
Plaintiffs, as each sibling would have a 1/3rd stake int eh house….
Arana told Plaintiff that he had to pay all of these costs as he/his daughter
would be living in the house. Plaintiff himself has paid the mortgage on the
Property from about early 2010 through the date hereof; the mortgage was in the
name of Plaintiff’s mother and in the
name of Defendant Arana, but from 2010 onwards Plaintiff himself paid
all of the mortgage payments, and also paid for the taxes on Property, for the
upkeep of the Property and for its utilities, Defendant Arana did not pay the
mortgage on the Property, nor the taxes (Plaintiff’s mother paid the
taxes…until about 2016, and Plaintiff has paid them since 2016)… nor the
utilities, nor the repairs to the Property; Plaintiff paid for all of these
foregoing costs based on the promises made to him by his mother and Arana. All
of the foregoing was on the verbal agreement, never recorded, between
Plaintiff, his now deceased mother, and his sister, this defendant Arana.” (SAC
¶7.) “In 2015, Arana came to Los Angeles… and the three of them discussed the
matter of the house and the ownership of the house; in those discussions; Arana
agreed… that the house belonged to all three siblings… but said that she would
only put Plaintiff on co-title… if he put the mortgage in his own name….” (SAC
¶8.) “[A]s of about November 2019, the position of Defendant Arana changed, and
she then claimed that the Property was solely hers, and she demanded of Plaintiff’s
daughter and her family who had lived in the Property for at least the last 11
years, that they vacate the property….” (Complaint ¶8.)
The SAC asserts the following causes of action: (1) Quiet
Title; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Fraud; and (4)
Restitution.
Defendant IRELA ARANA (“Defendant”) specially and generally
demurs to each cause of action.
First Cause of Action – Quiet
Title
Defendant argues that the first
cause of action for quiet title, based on a verbal agreement, is barred by the
statute of frauds and the statute of limitations.
The
elements for a quiet title action are: (1) a description of the property; (2)
Plaintiff’s title or interest and the basis; (3) defendant is asserting an
adverse claim or antagonistic property interest; (4) date as of which the
determination is sought; and (5) prayer for determination of title. (CCP
§761.020.) “[A]s a general matter an action to quiet title cannot be maintained
by the owner of equitable title as against the holder of legal title.” (Warren
v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 113.) However, where a party acquires
legal title through fraud, that party may hold the property “as a constructive
trustee for the defrauded party, and the defrauded party would “based on the
equities, [hold] superior title.” (Ibid.)
The
demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED. Plaintiff adequately
alleges Plaintiff’s equitable interest in the subject property through her
allegation of fraud for purposes of surviving demurrer. Moreover, Plaintiff’s first cause of action is not barred
by the statute of limitations. The SAC adequately alleges that Plaintiff did
not become aware of Defendant’s purported fraud until November 2019.
Second Cause of Action –
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
exists when there is: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with
the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (2) Plaintiff suffers severe or emotional distress; and (3)
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s
outrageous conduct. A defendant’s conduct is “outrageous” when it is so extreme
as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. The
defendant must either intend his or her conduct to inflict injury or engage in
it with the realization that injury will result. Liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Hughes v. Pair
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) “[T]he plaintiff must allege with great
specificity the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all
bounds of that usually tolerated in civilized community.” (Vazquez v.
Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 809,
832.)
Here, Plaintiff
bases the cause of action for IIED on the same fraudulent conduct alleged
throughout the SAC. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s fraudulent real property
transaction caused Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress. The cause of action,
as alleged, does not state sufficient facts to support a claim for IIED.
California courts decline to allow emotional distress damages when the loss is
purely economic. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6
Cal.4th 965, 985.)
The unopposed
demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Third Cause of
Action – Fraud
The elements of a cause of action for intentional fraud are
1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); 2)
knowledge of falsity (scienter); 3) intent to defraud or induce reliance; 4)
justifiable reliance; and 5) damages. (See Cal. Civ. Code §1709.)
Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of
particularity in pleading. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v.
General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.) Fraud must be pleaded with
specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations. (Small v.
Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The specificity
requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to
whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a
corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who
made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the
corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the
representation was made. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631,
645.)
The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED. Plaintiff
adequately alleges this claim for purposes of surviving demurrer. (See SAC
¶18.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made misrepresentations in 2010, 2015,
2016, 2017, and 2018 about transferring her sole interest in the subject
property to all three siblings. In return, Plaintiff allegedly continued to pay
the mortgage and all other property related fees by himself. The arguments
raised by Defendant raise factual determinations in appropriately resolved on
demurrer. Moreover,
as indicated above, the SAC adequately alleges that Plaintiff did not become
aware of Defendant’s purported fraud until November 2019. This claim is not
barred by the statute of limitations, as pled.
Fourth Cause of Action –
Restitution
The demurrer to this cause of
action is OVERRULED. Labels are not controlling. In evaluating the demurrer,
the Court disregards “erroneous or confusing labels if the complaint pleads
facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” (McBride v. Boughton
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 384-385, 387.) The question is whether the
complaint alleges “a cause of action giving rise to a right to restitution.” (Id.
at 388.) The Court finds that the SAC does.
Motion to Strike
Given the Court’s ruling with
respect to Plaintiff’s claim for fraud above, the Motion to Strike punitive
damages is DENIED.