Judge Olivia Rosales, Case 21NWCV00645 2022-09-13 Tentative Ruling

DEFENDANTS TONYA SZERDAHELYI AND PAUL SZERDAHELYI’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES FROM PLAINTIFFS JEFF CAPT AND RHONDA ALGER-CAPT IS GRANTED ONLY AS TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE, NOS. 1, 3, 6-7. PLAINTIFFS ARE TO SERVE FURTHER RESPONSES WITHIN 20 DAYS. THE MOTION IS OTHERWISE DENIED. THE COURT DENIES THE REQUESTS FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS.

PLAINTIFFS JEFF CAPT AND RHONDA ALGER-CAPT’S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER IS GRANTED ONLY AS TO THE NOTICED DEPOSITION OF UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD’S PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE ON THE TOPICS AS IDENTIFIED IN THE DEPOSITION NOTICE (PAUL DECL. EX. 3 AT ATTACHMENT 4). ALL OTHER REQUESTS ARE DENIED.

This is a property dispute case between Plaintiffs Jeff Capt (“Jeff”)^{^[1]} and Rhonda Alger-Capt (“Rhonda”) collectively “Plaintiffs”) and Defendants Tonya Szerdahelyi (“Tonya”) and Paul Szerdahelyi (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs live at 4969 Deeboyar Avenue, Lakewood, California and Defendants live at 4973 Deeboyar Avenue, Lakewood, California. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs have an easement to an approximate 26.5-foot strip of land measured from the western property line of Defendants’ property (the “Access Easement”), which Plaintiffs have used to drive their cars and boats over to enable them to park on the western side of Plaintiffs’ property. (See generally Complaint Ex. 1-2 [pictures of Access Easement].)

On October 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.

On October 27, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction. In its ruling, the Court found that Plaintiffs established the existence of a prescriptive easement and restrained Defendants from interfering with Plaintiffs’ access to the Access Easement.

On April 21, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to compel further responses (“Compel Further Motion”) to: (1) Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (“RPD”), Nos. 1, 3, 6-8, 14-15; (2) Special Interrogatories, Set One (“SROG”), Nos. 1-2, 9-25; (3) Form Interrogatories, Set One (“FROG”), No. 17.1; and (4) Requests for Admission, Set One (“RFA”), Nos. 6, 9-10, 12-13, 16-17, 21. Defendants also seek $3,885 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs and their counsel.

On May 16, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a protective order (“Protective Order Motion”) precluding Defendants from deposing Plaintiffs and the Person Most Knowledgeable (“PMK”) at Union Pacific Railroad. Plaintiffs also seek $3,400 in monetary sanctions against Defendants and their counsel.

On June 23, 2022, the Court granted Defendants’ ex parte application permitting them to file an untimely separate statement for the Compel Further Motion. The Court allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs.

On July 13, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental opposition to the Compel Further Motion.

On July 19, 2022, Defendants filed a supplemental reply to the Compel Further Motion.

These motions are now before the Court. The Court first addresses the Compel Further Motion and then the Protective Order Motion.

Multiple motions should not be combined into a single filing. (See Govt. Code, § 70617, subd. (a)(4) [setting forth the required filing fee for each motion, application, or any other paper or request requiring a hearing]; see also Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, [8:1140.1] at 8F-7 (The Rutter Group 2022) [“Motions to compel compliance with separate discovery requests ordinarily should be filed separately.”].)

Here, Defendants improperly combined four motions to compel further responses into one filing. The Court will overlook this issue for the purposes of this hearing only. The Court admonishes the defendants against combining multiple motions into one, and orders the Defendants in the future to file separate motions and to pay the appropriate filing fees.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to a demand for inspection when the court finds that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive[; or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

The burden is on the moving party to “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).)

This burden “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to an interrogatory when the court finds that: “(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete[;] (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate[; or] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.”

If a timely motion to compel a further response to an interrogatory has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer the interrogatories. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

Failure to timely respond to requests for admissions does not result in automatic admissions. Rather, the propounder of the requests for admissions must “move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction” under § 2023.010 et seq. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).)

Where responses to requests for admissions have been timely served but are deemed deficient by the requesting party (e.g., because of objections or evasive responses), that party may move for an order compelling a further response. (Id., § 2033.290, subd. (a).)

Plaintiffs object to portions of the Foote Declaration. The Court overrules all the objections. Nevertheless, the Court notes that certain portions contain legal argument, e.g., whether discovery responses are deficient (Objection Nos. 1 and 3), and the Court disregards any characterizations accordingly.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should deny the motion because: (1) insufficient meet and confer; and/or (2) insufficient admissible evidence.

First, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants did not adequately meet and confer in good faith. The Court disagrees and finds sufficient evidence in the record to show that there was a good faith effort to resolve this issue informally. The parties served meet and confer letters. (Paul Decl. Ex. I-K.) The last meet and confer letter (id. Ex. K) could have better addressed the nature of Plaintiffs’ objections but is sufficient here considering there is some earlier reasoned discussion of the purported discovery deficiencies.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should deny the motion because Defendants did not present sufficient admissible evidence. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ argument depends on the Court sustaining the evidentiary objections, which the Court did not do.

Defendants propounded discovery to evaluate Plaintiffs’ historical use of the Access Easement, communications with third parties, and whether Plaintiffs’ use of the Access Easement violates public policy because use of the Access Easement violates traffic laws and creates a safety hazard.

The instant motion concerns certain responses by Plaintiffs, which Defendants contend are deficient and needed to oppose Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

Before addressing each set of discovery individually, the Court addresses the parties’ primary dispute regarding the relevance of certain requests.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 states that the permissible scope of discovery depends on three factors of whether the information is: (1) “relevant to the subject matter involved;” (2) admissible or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence;” and (3) privileged. Additionally, courts should construe discovery statutes liberally in favor of discovery. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540-541.)

For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 (Gonzalez).)

Defendants argue that the sole purpose and use of the Access Easement is illegal, and Plaintiffs cannot be awarded something that is illegal. Therefore, information regarding the illegal nature of the easement is relevant because the injunction Plaintiffs seek is for equitable permission for Plaintiffs to engage in an illegal use and a restraint on Defendants’ lawful use of their property in favor of Plaintiffs’ illegal use. The Court disagrees.

To prove a prescriptive easement, “[t]he party claiming such an easement must show use of the property which has been open, notorious, continuous and adverse for an uninterrupted period of five years.” (Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 570.)

The issue of access to the claimed area is not relevant to a prescriptive easement claim. In other words, it is irrelevant whether an illegal entry on a third party’s land, here Union Pacific Railroad, is required for access to the Access Easement. Defendants identify no supporting authority showing that the purpose and use of an easement is relevant to Plaintiffs’ prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief awarding them a prescriptive easement. Instead, Plaintiffs cite supporting authority that supports their argument. (Guerra v. Packard (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 272, 290 [“The means by which entry is made is of no relevance in determining a prescriptive right.”]; see also Opposition 7:24-8:7 [discussing same caselaw].) The Court can award declaratory and injunctive relief solely based on whether Plaintiffs demonstrate an entitlement to the easement through their “open, notorious, continuous and adverse” use. Therefore, to the extent the sought discovery requests information in order to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ use of the easement is illegal or endangers the public, the Court denies the motion. In making this ruling, the Court acknowledges Defendants’ citation to Gonzalez, which the Court itself does above. However, this evidence is irrelevant for evaluation of a case, preparation for trial, or facilitating settlement because it is not a required element as part of a prescriptive easement claim.

Defendants’ arguments in the Supplemental Reply regarding the “relative hardship doctrine” is not persuasive. “The “relative hardship” test helps courts assess whether to deny injunctive relief to a property owner and instead grant an¿equitable¿easement¿to the encroaching¿user.’ (Tashakori v. Lakis¿(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1009.) Three factors must be present to deny an injunction against the encroacher: (a) the defendant must be innocent, not willful or negligent; (b) the plaintiff must not suffer irreparable injury from denial of an injunction; and (c) the hardship to the defendant from an injunction must be greatly disproportionate to the hardship to the defendant from continued encroachment. (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 759.) The Court already evaluated these concerns when awarding a preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs. In any event, Plaintiffs have used the Access Easement for nearly two decades continuously and by restricting from using the Access Easement now would place a significant burden on their ability to park their recreational vehicles on their own property in comparison to the minimal harm suffered by Defendants allowing Plaintiffs to use the Access Easement for a limited purpose.

The Court also notes that this is not a case where it is an open issue whether a third party, here Union Pacific Railroad, may have an ownership right to the Access Easement as well. The Access Easement is located on Defendants’ property. To the extent that Plaintiffs’ use of the Access Easement requires a separate trespass on Union Pacific Railroad’s land in violation of its rights, that creates a question of trespass liability that does not involve the creation of an easement. Therefore, evidence regarding Plaintiffs’ purported trespass on Union Pacific Railroad’s land is also irrelevant.

Plaintiffs also make a series of objections on the purported vagueness and ambiguity of certain requests, including objecting to certain terms like, “Identify,” “Easement,” and “Property Line.” The Court generally overrules these boilerplate objections except as noted below, i.e., SROG No. 1. The terms are not so confusing that Plaintiffs are unable to respond to the requests. Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ meet and confer correspondence does not contain reasoned argument about how most of these terms are confusing and render Plaintiffs unable to respond to the requests. (See generally Paul Decl. Ex. I.)

No. 6: All documents reflecting communications between you and any governmental agency regarding or relating to the Access Easement, the Gate, or the Property Line.

No. 7: All documents reflecting communications between you and any utility companies regarding or relating to the Access Easement, the Gate, or the Property Line.

No. 8: All documents reflecting communications between you and any prior owners of DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY regarding or relating to the Access Easement, the Gate, or the Property Line.

No. 14: All documents reflecting communications from Union Pacific directing you to stop crossing over the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way.

No. 15: All documents showing that you have permission or authority to cross over the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way for the purpose of utilizing the Access Easement and/or public roads.

No. 1: GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ production is limited to a time period starting on January 1, 2016, and Defendants seek responsive documents based on Plaintiffs’ alleged use of the Access Easement starting in 2013. Plaintiffs cannot decide to narrow the scope of the request without any reasoned explanation.[3] The term “Easement” is not vague and ambiguous.

No. 3: GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ production is limited to a time period starting on January 1, 2016 and Defendants seek responsive documents based on Plaintiffs’ alleged use of the Access Easement starting in 2013. Plaintiffs cannot decide to narrow the scope of the request without any reasoned explanation.[4] The term “Property Line” is not vague and ambiguous.

No. 6: GRANTED. The existence of communications is relevant to demonstrate the nature of the use of the Access Easement, i.e., when Plaintiffs’ use was “open, notorious, continuous and adverse.

No. 7: GRANTED. The existence of communications is relevant to demonstrate the nature of the use of the Access Easement, i.e., when Plaintiffs’ use was “open, notorious, continuous and adverse.

No. 8: DENIED. This individual request though in the notice of motion is not in the separate statement, nor do Plaintiffs discuss this request in their motion papers. (Compare Compel Further Motion 2:7 [identifying No. 8] with Separate Statement 20:19-21:9 [going from RPD No. 7 to No. 14, i.e., skipping No. 8].)

No. 14: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 15: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 1: Identify all facts regarding or relating to your use of the Access Easement.

No. 2: Identify all persons with knowledge of facts regarding or relating to your use of the Access Easement.

No. 10: Identify all persons over the age of 18 who currently reside at Plaintiff’s Property.

No. 11: Identify all persons over the age of 18 who have resided at Plaintiff’s Property in the last five (5) years.

No. 12: Identify all persons who currently have your authorization to utilize the Gate.

No. 13: Identify all persons who currently have your authorization to utilize the Access Easement.

No. 14: Identify all persons who have utilized the Access Easement in the last five (5) years.

No. 15: Identify all vehicles that have been used to access the Access Easement in the last five (5) years.

No. 17: Identify all owners of any vehicles that are stored on Plaintiffs’ Property.

No. 18: Identify all vehicles that are stored on your property which can only access public roads by virtue of utilizing the Access Easement.

No. 19: Do you contend that you are authorized or have permission to drive vehicles (including cars, trucks, rv’s and boats) across the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way?

No. 20: If your response to Special Interrogatory No. 19 was “yes”, identify all facts in support of your contention that you are authorized or have permission to drive vehicles (including cars, trucks, rv’s and boats) across the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way.

No. 21: If your response to Special Interrogatory No. 19 was “yes”, identify all persons with knowledge of facts in support of your contention that you are authorized or have permission to drive vehicles (including cars, trucks, rv’s and boats) across the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way.

No. 22: If your response to Special Interrogatory No. 19 was “yes”, identify all documents in support of your contention that you are authorized or have permission to drive vehicles (including cars, trucks, rv’s and boats) across the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way.

No. 23: Identify all permits you hold regarding the storage of vehicles on Plaintiffs’ Property.

No. 25: Identify all documents evidencing communications that you have received from the Union Pacific Railroad, including any of its agents or representatives.

No. 1: DENIED. The term “identify” is vague and ambiguous in this context. The subject interrogatory is too general and does not contain a specific focus allowing Plaintiffs to reasonably respond.

No. 2: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion.

No. 9: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion.

No. 10: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion.

No. 11: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion.

No. 12: DENIED. The response states that “[Plaintiffs] do not authorize the utilization of the Gate.” This response answers the subject interrogatory, and therefore, no identification of any people is necessary. To the extent that Defendants claim that this response is inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ other position in this case, Defendants can identify this inconsistency as appropriate in dispositive motion practice, trial, or settlement discussions.

No. 13: DENIED. The response states that “[Plaintiffs] do not authorize the utilization of the Access Easement.” This response answers the subject interrogatory, and therefore, no identification of any people is necessary. To the extent that Defendants claim that this response is inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ other position in this case, Defendants can identify this inconsistency as appropriate in dispositive motion practice, trial, or settlement discussions.

No. 14: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion.

No. 15: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion.

No. 16: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion.

No. 17: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion.

No. 18: DENIED. Plaintiffs’ claim a prescriptive easement, not an easement by necessity. It is irrelevant whether certain vehicles can only access public roads using the Access Easement. Therefore, the Court sustains the relevancy objection.

No. 19: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 20: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 21: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 22: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 23: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 24: DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs have served a supplemental response (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1). To the extent that Defendants contend that his request is deficient, Defendants should file a proper motion..

No. 25: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section..

No. 17.1: Is your response to each request for admission served with these interrogatories an unqualified admission? If not, for each response that is not an unqualified admission:

(d) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your response and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT or thing.

No. 17.1: DENIED. The Court sustains the objections to the RFA as stated below. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not need to supplement their response to FROG No. 17.1

No. 6: Admit that your use of the Access Easement necessarily entails passing across land of Union Pacific railroad in order to access public roads.

No. 9: Admit you do not have Union Pacific’s permission to access the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way.

No. 10: Admit that Union Pacific authorized you in writing to access the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way in order to utilize the Access Easement.

No. 12: Admit you do not have permission from the City of Lakewood to access public roads from the Union Pacific Right of Way.

No. 13: Admit that Union Pacific has directed you to stop crossing over the Union Pacific Railroad Right of Way.

No. 16: Admit that no officers or directors of Pacific Pipeline authorized the construction of the Gate.

No. 17: Admit that Pacific Pipeline has directed to you stop accessing the Gate.

No. 21: Admit that, but for your claim of prescriptive easement, your use of Defendant’s Property would constitute a trespass.

No. 6: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 9: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 10: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 12: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 13: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 16: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 17: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

No. 21: DENIED. The Court sustains the relevancy objection as stated in the beginning of the merits section.

In conclusion, the Court orders a further response only to RPD No. 1, 3, 6-7. Plaintiffs are to serve further responses within 20 days. All other requests are denied, though some may be subject to more motion practice based on Defendants’ supplemental response served on June 23, 2022. (Paul Supplemental Opposition Decl. Ex. 1.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030, subdivision (a) provides that a court may impose a monetary sanction for misuse of the discovery process unless a court finds that the one subject to sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, subdivisions (e) and (f) provide that misuse of the discovery process includes making an unmeritorious objection to discovery and making an evasive response to discovery.

The Court finds monetary sanctions are inappropriate for either side. Notably, although Plaintiffs generally prevail on most of the requests, they also had supplemented their responses resulting in the Court denying some of the motion as moot. Additionally, the Court finds that Defendants operated in good faith regarding what they believed was information relevant to their defenses.

Any party may obtain discovery, subject to restrictions, by taking the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.) A properly served deposition notice is effective to require a party or party-affiliated deponent to attend and to testify, as well as to produce documents for inspection and copying. (Id., § 2025.280, subd. (a).)

“Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. . . . .” (Id., § 2025.420, subd. (a).)

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Id., subd. (b).)

The burden is on the moving party to establish “good cause” for whatever relief is requested. Generally, a deponent seeking a protective order will be required to show that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness involved in the discovery procedure clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110.)

Courts have considerable discretion in granting and crafting protective orders. (Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588.)

“A party seeking the protective order must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the issuance of a protective order is proper.” (Stadish v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145.)

Plaintiffs object to portions of the Foote Declaration. The Court overrules the objections.

Defendants generally argue that Plaintiffs did not engage in a meaningful meet and confer effort. Defendants do not expressly argue that the Court should deny the motion on this basis, instead arguing that Plaintiffs’ conduct subjects them to monetary sanctions. Therefore, the Court reaches the merits without examining if the meet and confer was so deficient that the Court should deny the motion outright. In any event, there is sufficient evidence to show that the parties did engage in some meet and confer efforts, though they did not resolve the dispute that led to this motion. (See generally Paul Decl. ¶¶ 12-27.)

Plaintiffs move for a protective order precluding Defendants from deposing Plaintiffs and the PMK at Union Pacific Railroad.

Plaintiffs generally argue that Defendants seek to inquire regarding improper issues, specifically what goes on outside the fence and outside the properties of the parties to this action. The nature of this deposition would then inflame the railroad and the pipeline companies to punish the Plaintiffs.

The sought protective order involves two sets of depositions: (1) Plaintiffs’ deposition; and (2) a PMK deposition of Union Pacific Railroad.

Regarding Plaintiffs’ deposition, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion to preclude Plaintiffs’ depositions in their entirety. Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.010 authorizes a deposition of another party. There are certain situations where a court may limit a deposition, but this Court is not convinced that there is such a danger of unreasonable burden, expense, or intrusiveness that the Court should preclude Plaintiffs’ depositions altogether. Plaintiffs identify their previous statements that can serve as judicial admissions, including in their Complaint and discovery responses. But Defendants are not obligated to adopt or accept those statements without their own inquiry. Defendants can inquire Plaintiffs’ evidence of their prescriptive easement claim (see generally Opposition 3:13-4:4 [identifying issues on which Defendants seek to gather facts]) and can do so through a deposition, the best discovery method to gather the facts directly from the source. Plaintiffs do not show that Defendants’ only reason to depose Plaintiffs is to harm Plaintiffs. As explained above in the discussion on the Compel Further Motion, Defendants seek discovery regarding certain topics that are irrelevant. However, Plaintiffs’ notice of motion only seeks a preclusion of Plaintiffs’ depositions in their entirety. (Motion ii:5-9.) A broad exclusion of the depositions is inappropriate because the notices of deposition do not limit the inquiry into improper topics. (Paul Decl. Ex. 1-2.) Therefore, the Court does not grant partial relief in the form of precluding Defendants’ inquiry into certain topics but otherwise allowing the depositions to proceed. The Court can only award the relief that is properly noticed before the Court.

Regarding a PMK deposition of Union Pacific Railroad, the Court rules above that the issues of the purported illegal and unsafe use of a road owned by Union Pacific Railroad is not relevant to this action. Therefore, a deposition should not proceed on that basis. The deposition notice seeks an inquiry generally into those specific, irrelevant topics. (Paul Decl. Ex. 3 at Attachment 4.) Therefore, the Court grants the motion. The Court notes that Defendants correctly identify that Plaintiffs have identified Union Pacific Railroad as a witness to SROG No. 2, i.e., “Identify all persons with knowledge of facts regarding or relating to your use of the Access Easement.” (Compare Opposition 6:7-8 with Compel Further Motion Foote Decl. Ex. A at p.4, E at p. 4.) This answer theoretically would permit a deposition into this topic. However, the deposition notice does not include this as one of the topics. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion as to this deposition.

In making this ruling, the Court rejects Defendants’ arguments regarding the public interest inquiry because this case does not involve analogous situations, i.e., it does not involve an issue of a public interest involving violations of the law that renders it appropriate for the Court to apply this federal doctrine. (Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo (1982) 456 U.S. 305, 313.)

The Court finds monetary sanctions are inappropriate for either side because the Court only partially grants Plaintiffs’ motion, i.e., as to the PMK deposition. Additionally, the Court finds that Defendants operated in good faith regarding what they believed was information relevant to their defenses.

The Court GRANTS IN PART the Compel Further Motion. Plaintiffs are to serve further responses to RPD Nos. 1, 3, 6-7 within 20 days. All other requests are DENIED.

The Court GRANTS IN PART the Protective Order Motion. Plaintiffs are precluded from deposing Union Pacific Railroad’s Person Most Knowledgeable on the topics as identified in the deposition notice (Paul Decl. Ex. 3 at Attachment 4). All other requests are DENIED.

[1] “The parties and relevant individuals share a last name. For clarity, convenience, and to avoid confusion, we refer to them by their first names and intend no disrespect.” (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 175, 188, fn. 13.)

[2] Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the missing separate statement is moot because the Court permitted its late filing.

[3] Presumably, Plaintiffs could use a narrower time period because a prescriptive easement requires five years of uninterrupted use. Therefore, use beginning in 2016 could be sufficient to support Plaintiffs’’ claim. Plaintiffs do not make this argument and the Court does not narrow the scope on its own on this basis.

[4] See Footnote No. 3.