Judge: Olivia Rosales, Case: 21STCV24604, Date: 2022-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV24604 Hearing Date: December 6, 2022 Dept: SEC
SOLARES v. CITY OF NORWALK, et al.
CASE
NO.: 21STCV24604 consolidated with
21STCV39337 and 21STCV14685
HEARING:
7/5/22 @ 9:30 AM
JUDGE: OLIVIA ROSALES
#5
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant Herman
Weissker Power, Inc.’s motion to oppose defendant Adriana Serrano’s application
for determination of good faith settlement is CONTINUED for 120 days to April
4, 2022, at 10:30 a.m. in Department C.
Moving Party to give
NOTICE.
Defendant
Herman Weissker Power, Inc. moves to challenge Defendant Serrano’s application
for good faith determination pursuant to CCP § 877.6.
This is a consolidated action
involving three actions: 1) Carina Solares v. Lexie
Granados, et al. (Case No. 21STCV4604 – LEAD case); 2) Adriana Serrano v. Lexie
Granados, et al. (Case No. 21STCV39337); and 3) Lexie Granados v. Adriana
Serrano (Case No. 21STCV14685).
The
operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges that on October 16, 2020, at
around 11:08 p.m., Plaintiff Carina Solares was a passenger in a vehicle
operated by Defendant Adriana Serrano when their vehicle collided with Defendant
Lexie Granados at an intersection. (SAC,
¶¶ 1-3.) “At
that time, Plaintiff’s vehicle entered the intersection of Alondra Boulevard
and Pioneer Boulevard on a green light. At the same time, Granados’ vehicle
entered the same intersection also on a green light.” (SAC, ¶ 3.)
“While both Plaintiff’s vehicle and Granados’ vehicle were in the
intersection, the traffic signals and street lights at the intersection
suddenly turned off, and a collision occurred between Plaintiff’s and Granados’
vehicle.” (Id., ¶ 4.) “At that time, the
traffic signals were not blinking red, nor were there any posted signs prior to
entering the intersection regarding a power outage. Contrary, there had been a
planned power outage at the intersection of Alondra Boulevard and Pioneer
Boulevard to occur between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.” (Id., ¶ 4.)
“The traffic signals and streetlights came back on around 11:38
p.m.” (Id., ¶ 5.) Based thereon, the SAC asserts causes of action
for:
1.
Negligence
2.
Dangerous
Condition
Any
party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint
tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt may seek a judicial determination
that a settlement was made in good faith; such a determination bars any other
joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative
indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. The party asserting the lack of good faith
shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”
(CCP § 877.6 (a), (c)-(d).)
The
intent and policies underlying § 877.6 require that a number of factors be
taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total
recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in
settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a
recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he
were found liable after a trial. Other
relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy
limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or
tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 498-501.)
Finally,
practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the
basis of information available at the time of settlement. A defendant's settlement figure must not be
“grossly disproportionate” to what a reasonable person, at the time of the
settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be. The party asserting the lack of good faith
has the burden of proof and should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that
the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” in relation to these factors as
to be inconsistent with the equitable
objectives of the statute. Such a
demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a settlement
made in good faith within the terms of CCP 877.6. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 498-501.)
A
determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar
any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the
settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or
partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or
comparative fault. (CCP § 877.6(c).)
This court ruled at the prior
demurrer hearing that this action is only allowed to proceed against the City on
the theory that the street lights were simultaneously green for
both vehicles at the intersection. (Id.,
¶ 3.) “If Plaintiff is alleging that only her light was green and
Granados’s light was red, then this theory fails. If Plaintiff was in the
middle of the intersection on a green light, then Granados should have been
stopped at the intersection on her red light. If the traffic signals suddenly
shut off at the precise moment Plaintiff was in the middle of the intersection,
then Granados, whose vehicle should have been stopped at a red light, ‘shall
stop at the intersection, and may proceed with caution when it is safe to do
so.’ (Veh. Code § 21800(d)(1); see Cerna v. City of Oakland (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 1340, 1348 - “Third party conduct, by itself, unrelated to the
condition of the property, does not constitute a dangerous condition for which
a public entity may be held liable.”) Such a scenario does not create a
dangerous condition for which City is liable, and Plaintiff failed to cite any
case authorities supporting this theory. Plaintiff’s claim therefore lies with
Granados, and not the City.” (7/5/22
Minute Order.) This is the sole theory
that would connect Defendants Herman Weissker Power, Inc. and
Southern California Edison to this action.
Plaintiff Solares (a passenger) has
now settled with Defendant Serrano (the driver) for $20,000.00.
However, Defendant Southern
California Edison has not yet answered the complaint. This case is not at issue and discovery has
only recently commenced. Aside from
their own discovery responses, neither Solares nor Serrano have submitted any
independent evidence establishing that the lights were malfunctioning, as
alleged in the SAC. If there was no malfunctioning light, then the collision
was caused by driver error (either by Defendant Serrano or Defendant Granados,
or both).
Thus, the court finds that Serrano
failed to submit sufficient evidence of her proportionate liability under both
the scenario that the lights were malfunctioning and under the scenario that
the collision was caused by driver error.
In addition, although Serrano contends that she has submitted her policy
limits, no discovery has been conducted regarding Serrano’s financial condition.
Further, although Solares identified
a total of $24,997.21 in medical treatment (Mendoza Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. B – Nos.
6.4-6.5, 7.1-8.1), it is unclear if this sum represents Solares’s total
damages.
Accordingly,
lacking further information, this court cannot determine that the settlement
was made in good faith. Accordingly, the
motion is CONTINUED for 120 days to allow the parties to conduct further
discovery.