Judge: Olivia Rosales, Case: 21STCV41405, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV41405    Hearing Date: December 15, 2022    Dept: SEC

BELTRAN v. CITY OF BELLFLOWER

CASE NO.:  21STCV41405

HEARING:  12/15/22

 

#8

TENTATIVE ORDER

 

Defendant CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

 

Moving Party to give Notice.

 

No Opposition filed as of December 13, 2022. Due by December 2, 2022. (CCP §1005(b).)

 

This action was filed on November 10, 2021 by Plaintiff MARGARITA BELTRAN (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff alleges that: “[t]his Complaint concerns an officer-involved incident which occurred on February 7, 2021…. On or about February 7, 2021, Plaintiff was lawfully operating her vehicle near Coke Ave., & Artesia Blvd. Defendant JOHN DOE, under the course and cope of his employment, violently confronted Plaintiff and unjustifiably detained her without probable cause to believe that she had committed a crime, or would commit a crime in the future. Defendant JOHN DOE proceeded to assault and batter Plaintiff by acts which included, but were not limited to, harassing and/or illegally searching her person and/or personal property.” (Complaint ¶12.)

 

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) Battery; (2) Negligence; (3) Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision; and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

 

Defendant CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL (“CHP”) generally demurs to each cause of action.

 

Cal. Gov. Code §815 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person” except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code §815(a).) “[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.) Because the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or enactment, the statute or enactment claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified. (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School District (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.)

 

As argued by Defendant in the instant demurrer, Plaintiff fails to allege a statutory basis to hold CHP (a public entity) liable for the first and fourth causes of action.

 

Moreover, with respect to all claims, the CHP is a public entity, and thus the heightened pleading requirements for public entities applies. The Complaint pleads that JOHN DOE was an officer employed by the City of Bellflower, City of Lakewood, County of Los Angeles, and the CHP. (Complaint ¶3.)  The Complaint further pleads that John Doe violently confronted Plaintiff and unjustifiably detained her, then used unreasonable force upon Plaintiff by detaining her. (Complaint ¶17.) These conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish specific conduct by any CHP employees to meet the heightened pleading requirements that are required for claims against a public entity. Accordingly, as pled, the allegations are insufficient to impose liability against the CHP pursuant to Gov. Code §815.2.

 

The unopposed demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.