Judge Olivia Rosales, Case 22NWCV00089 2022-07-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Olivia Rosales, Case: 22NWCV00089, Date: 2022-07-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV00089 Hearing Date: July 28, 2022 Dept: SEC

HUERTA v. CALIFORNIA FARMS MEAT COMPANY, INC.

CASE NO.: 22NWCV00089

HEARING: 07/28/22

JUDGE: OLIVIA ROSALES

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendants’ CITISTAFF SOLUTIONS, INC., and CALI FARMS’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The case is STAYED until conclusion of the arbitration.

Moving Party to give Notice.

Except for specifically enumerated exceptions, the court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate a controversy if the court finds that a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. (See CCP §1281.2.) “In California, [g]eneral principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate.” (Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420.) “A petition to compel arbitration or stay proceedings pursuant to CCP §§1281.1 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (C.R.C. Rule 3.1330.)

Defendants have submitted evidence of their involvement in interstate commerce and have admitted to being engaged in interstate commerce. (See Slater Decl., ¶2.) Therefore, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to this case.

(i) The Existence of an Arbitration Agreement

The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination. (Engalia v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951.)

The Court finds that Defendants have met the initial burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The Arbitration Agreement signed by Plaintiff and Defendant CitiStaff Solutions, Inc. states, in pertinent part “This Arbitration Agreement (‘Agreement) is celebrated between the Employee and CitiStaff its purchasers, clients, employees, and agents…. Employee acknowledges that signing this Agreement is voluntary…... [¶] Employee and Employer agree to submit exclusively to final and binding Arbitration any and all disputes, claims, or controversies (‘Claims’) they may have against each other, and against Employer’s clients, including its agents, owners, officers, directors, or current and former employees, arising out of the employment relationship between Employee and Employer or the termination of such relationship.” (Slater Decl., Ex. B.)

Plaintiff’s signature at the end of the Agreement, and the corroborating information contained in the Declaration of Ludivina Ledesma demonstrates that Plaintiff had knowledge of, reviewed (in Spanish), signed, and thus agreed to the Arbitration Agreement. The Court finds that Defendants have met the burden in proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a valid Arbitration Agreement exists between the parties.

(ii) Unconscionability

Plaintiff contends that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable.

The party seeking the defense of unconscionability bears the burden of proof. (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 911. “[T]he doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.” (Id. at 910.) “Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, and surprise occurs where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 247.) “The procedural element of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071.)

“[Procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability. [Citation]…. The unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts [ ] do not impose terms that have been variously described as ‘overly harsh,’ [citation], ‘unduly oppressive,’ [citation], ‘so one-sided as to shock the conscience,’ [citation] or ‘unfairly one-sided.’ [citation]. All of these formulations point to the central idea that unconscionability doctrine is [ ] concerned [ ] with terms that are ‘unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.’ (Sanchez, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 910-911.) If the Court finds that an agreement to arbitrate or any clause of such an agreement is unconscionable, the Court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. (Cal. Civ. Code §1670.5(a).)

Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable. Indeed, the Agreement appears to be a contract of adhesion in that it is, on its face, a form agreement drafted by the employer. Plaintiff argues that she was required to execute the Agreement as a condition of her employment and was not allowed to negotiate its terms. This is sufficient to indicate that the Agreement is a contract of adhesion. (See, e.g., Fitz v. NCR Corporation (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 721-722; Fittante v. Palms Springs Motors Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 708, 721; Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114-115.) A finding that an agreement is a contract of adhesion is normally sufficient to establish procedural unconscionability. (See, e.g., Flores v. Transamerica Homefirst (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 846, 854 [“A finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability. [Citation.]”].)

Notwithstanding, Plaintiff fails to make any showing that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable. The terms of the Arbitration Agreement appear on its face to be bilateral, reasonable, and not unfairly favorable to either party. As a result, the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement lacks the “one-sidedness” necessary to be deemed substantively unconscionable. (See e.g., Lhotka v. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 816, 825-826.) The Court does not find that the Agreement is so one-sided as to shock the conscience or that it “unfairly limits discovery”.

The motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.