Judge: Olivia Rosales, Case: 22NWCV00659, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22NWCV00659    Hearing Date: December 15, 2022    Dept: SEC

ARCHIEHARRIS v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA

CASE NO.:  22NWCV00659

HEARING:  12/15/22

#6

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendant HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The case is STAYED until conclusion of the arbitration.

Moving Party to give Notice.

Except for specifically enumerated exceptions, the court must order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate a controversy if the court finds that a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. (See CCP §1281.2.) “In California, [g]eneral principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate.” (Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420.) “A petition to compel arbitration or stay proceedings pursuant to CCP §§1281.1 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (C.R.C. Rule 3.1330.)

The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination. (Engalia v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951.)

This is a lemon law action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hyundai Motor America (“Hyundai”) is “engaged in the business of manufacturing, marketing, promoting, distributing and selling consumer goods.” (Complaint ¶4.)  The Arbitration Agreement at issue is contained in a Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”) and is executed by Plaintiff and the non-party selling dealership—Norm Reeves Genesis of Cerritos (“Dealership”). As of December 13, 2022, the Dealership has not been named as a party to this action.

The Agreement states, in pertinent part “Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise… between you and us or our employees, agents successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by court actions.” (Ameripour Decl., ¶4, Ex. 2.)

It is undisputed that Hyundai is not a signatory to the RISC containing the Agreement.

Hyundai argues that Plaintiff’s claims arise out the purchase of the subject vehicle that form the basis of the RISC, and thus, it may enforce the Arbitration Agreement in the RISC under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that Hyundai is not an intended third party beneficiary of the RISC and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply.

As a general rule, only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce the agreement. (Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 613.) However, the equitable estoppel exception may enable a non-signatory party such as the vehicle manufacturer to invoke an agreement to arbitrate. (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Sup. Ct. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-37.) A plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in a contract where he or she relies on contract terms in acclaim against a non-signatory defendant, and when the causes of action against the non-signatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations that are subject to the arbitration clause. (Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 271.) Applying these principles, the Third District recently affirmed a trial court’s granting of an order compelling SBA plaintiffs to arbitrate their claim against a manufacturer even though the manufacturer was not a party or signatory to the sales contract that contained the arbitration provision. (Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 493.) In Felisilda, the sales contract provided that “[a]ny claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise ... between you and us ... which arises out of or relates to ... [the] condition of this vehicle ... shall ... be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.” (Italics added.)   There was no dispute that the Felisildas’ refund-or-replace claim against the manufacturer under the SBA related directly to the condition of the vehicle, because the suit alleged the existence of nonconformities covered by the express warranty that the selling dealer did not remedy after a reasonable number of attempts to repair. 

The Arbitration Agreement in the RISC here is identical to that in Felisilda. Further, a review of the Complaint at issue confirms that Plaintiff’s claims directly relate to the condition of the subject vehicle and the contention that Defendant violated warranties he received as a consequence of the RISC.

The Court determines that Hyundai may compel arbitration on the basis of equitable estoppel.

The Motion is GRANTED.