Judge: Olivia Rosales, Case: VC067304, Date: 2022-12-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: VC067304 Hearing Date: December 13, 2022 Dept: SEC
ROSS v. RAMOS, et al.
CASE
NO.: VC067304
HEARING: 12/15/22
@ 1:30 PM
#9
TENTATIVE RULING
I.
Defendants Stephanie Ramos, Jonathan
Sanchez, Jose Ramos, and Raav Corporation’s motion for summary adjudication is
DENIED.
II.
Defendants Wilson and
Nodbeh Enterprises, Inc.’s motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.
Opposing Party to give
NOTICE.
The operative
Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleges that in February 2016, Plaintiff met
with ServPro Representatives regarding the operations of Plaintiff’s ServPro
franchise. (TAC, ¶ 16.) Defendants Nodbeh Enterprises, Inc. and
Nodbeh employee, Matthew Wilson, steered Plaintiff into a transaction with the
Ramos family. (Id., ¶¶ 11-12, 17.) Defendants indicated that Jose Ramos wanted to
purchase Plaintiff’s franchise. (Id., ¶
17.) ServPro further advised Plaintiff not to pursue any other
offers or interested buyers because the ServPro Representatives felt that Jose
Ramos was his best option largely due to his financial resources, the proximity
in location of Jose Ramos's franchise locations to Plaintiff s franchise
territory, and the outstanding reputation that Jose Ramos has with the
Franchisor. (Id., ¶ 19.)
Following preliminary negotiations
of the March 2016 meeting, Plaintiff and the Defendants had agreed that, in
consideration for selling Plaintiff s franchise: (1) the Ramos family would pay
Plaintiff $ 220,000.00; (2) The Ramos family would pay a $ 10,000.00 transfer
fee to the Franchisor; (3) The Ramos family would attempt to collect on
Plaintiff s franchise's outstanding receivables to be forwarded to Plaintiff,
in the amount of approximately $ 85,000.00; (4) Plaintiff would forward all new
service calls to Jose Ramos's Whittier ServPro location and waive the usual
referral fee; and (5) that Plaintiff could begin winding-up his business by
selling his equipment to third parties, which was valued at approximately
$20,000.00, terminating his lease, canceling his insurance, and laying off
Plaintiff s staff. (Id., ¶ 27.) In
reliance upon defendants’ representations and promises to buy his franchise,
plaintiff, fired his staff, transferred his business records, gave over his
computer server to the Ramos family, cancelled his insurance, sold off his
business equipment when Defendants declined to purchase that equipment, leaving
plaintiff unable to continue the business but giving confidential information
and all business assets and customer lists to defendants, and each of
them. (Id., ¶ 32, 59.) Plaintiff was advised by Matthew Wilson to
sign the "Non-Binding Agreement" with Jonathan Sanchez so that
Matthew Wilson could underreport financial information to the Franchisor in
order to get the Ramos family approved to purchase Plaintiffs franchise
territory. Matthew Wilson reassured Plaintiff that the initial agreement made
between Plaintiff and the Ramos family would not be affected in any way in
light of the "Non-Binding Agreement."
(Id., ¶ 37.)
On or about August 12, 2016, the Ramos family breached the
contract by indicating via letter drafted by the Ramos family's counsel that
the Ramos family was no longer interested in the transaction. (Id., ¶ 55.)
Based thereon, the TAC asserts causes of action for:
1.
Breach of
Written Contract
2.
Breach of
Oral Contract
3.
Breach of
Contract— Promissory Estoppel
4.
Intentional
Misrepresentation of Fact
5.
Negligent
Misrepresentation
6.
Promise
Made Without Intent to Perform
7.
Breach of
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
8.
Conspiracy
9.
Breach of
Written Contract to Negotiate an Agreement
10.
Professional
Negligence
11.
Intentional
Interference with Prospective Economic Relations
12.
Negligent
Interference with Prospective Economic Relations (Count 1)
13.
Negligent
Interference with Prospective Economic Relations (Count 2)
I.
Ramos, et al.’s MSA
Defendants Stephanie Ramos, Jose Ramos, Jonathan Sanchez and Raav
Corporation (collectively, the “Ramos Defendants”) move for summary adjudication of issues pursuant to CCP § 437c.
Objections
Plaintiff’s objections, interposed in Plaintiff’s response to
Defendants’ separate statements, are overruled because they do not comply with
CRC § 3.1354.
Standard
A defendant moving for summary
judgment/adjudication has met its burden of showing a cause of action has no
merit if the defendant can show one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause
of action cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).)
ISSUES 1-6
Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot
establish punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore, the
4th cause of action for Intentional Misrepresentation, 5th
cause of action for Negligent Misrepresentation, 6th cause of action
for Promises without Intent to Perform, 8th cause of action for
Conspiracy, 11th cause of action for Intentional Interference with
Prospective Economic Relations, and 12th cause of action for
Negligent Interference with Prospective Relations.
Defendants previously sought summary
adjudication of the 4th cause of action for Intentional
Misrepresentation, 5th cause of action for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 6th cause of action for Promises without Intent
to Perform, 8th cause of action for Conspiracy, 11th
cause of action for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic
Relations, and 12th cause of action for Negligent Interference with
Prospective Relations. (See Issues 4-6,
8, 10, and 11 of Defendants’ prior MSA.)
This court already ruled that triable issues exist regarding these
claims.
Further, Defendants previously submitted a
motion for summary adjudication on the very issue of punitive damages. (See Issue 12 of Defendants’ prior MSA.) This court already ruled that triable issues
exist as to punitive damages.
At
the summary
judgment/adjudication stage, a court should grant relief "unless it
appears that actual malice [or fraud or
oppression] may be proved at trial by clear and convincing evidence." (Basich v.
Allstate Insurance Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1119.) This standard
applies to "any summary judgment motion involving a claim that must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, including a claim for punitive
damages." (Id.) Rather than usurp the jury's role as the ultimate
factfinder, courts must evaluate a plaintiffs evidence at the summary
adjudication stage "with reference to the
clear and convincing evidentiary burden" and "with the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard in mind" (Id. at
1119-1120.)
Previously, this court noted under Issue 12
that the Ramos Defendants contended that Plaintiff cannot recover punitive
damages because there is no “clear and convincing evidence” that Defendants
have been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. However, this court ruled that a trier of
fact could find that the Ramos Defendants acted with malice. “Defendants encouraged Plaintiff to under-report
the purchase price to the franchisor (PSS 3-7), misrepresented their progress
on performing their obligations to collect Plaintiff’s receivables and prepare
the formal written contract (PSS 13, 14); misrepresented their intentions to
honor the contract. On July 26, 2016,
Sanchez told Plaintiff that the buyers had no intention of honoring the “true”
sale price; the he was changing the deal because the only executed writing
was the Non-Binding Term Sheet with the false lower price (PSS 15-19). On
July 26, 2016, Sanchez told Plaintiff the buyers were going to pay him less
than they had agreed to, and that "We talked to Matt [Wilson]. We're
just going to screw you here. That's the
way it is." (PSS 16; Leverone
Decl., Ex. C, Plaintiff Depo 205:15-208:21.) Later that day,
Hallauer, Wilson, and the buyers all understood that the buyers had a desire to
purchase the franchise from corporate for much cheaper "after they take
it back" from Plaintiff. (PSS 17-19.)”
Now, Defendants are improperly seeking
summary adjudication of the same claims that were previously denied, by adding
punitive damages to each claim in a piecemeal fashion.
“Although a claim for
punitive damages is specifically set forth as an area which may properly be the
subject of summary adjudication, in keeping with the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section
437c, subdivision (f), a grant of summary
adjudication in this area must cover the entire claim. The purpose of the enactment
of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f) was to
stop the practice of piecemeal adjudication of facts that did not completely
dispose of a substantive area.” (Catalano v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 91, 97.)
Here, Defendants’
motion does not completely dispose of a substantive area. As discussed above, summary adjudication was previously
denied as to each substantive area.
Therefore, the request to determine punitive damages in such a piecemeal
fashion is improper pursuant to Catalano v.
Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th 91.
Even if properly
requested, the court again finds, based on the evidence submitted, that a
trier of fact could determine that the Ramos Defendants acted with malice by
clear and convincing evidence.
“Defendants encouraged Plaintiff to under-report the purchase price to
the franchisor (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement (“PSS”) 3-7), misrepresented
their progress on performing their obligations to collect Plaintiff’s
receivables and prepare the formal written contract (PSS 13, 14);
misrepresented their intentions to honor the contract. On July 26, 2016, Sanchez told Plaintiff that
the buyers had no intention of honoring the “true” sale price; the he was
changing the deal because the only executed writing was the Non-Binding Term
Sheet with the false lower price (PSS 15-19). On July 26, 2016, Sanchez
told Plaintiff the buyers were going to pay him less than they had agreed to,
and that "We talked to Matt [Wilson]. We're just going to screw you
here. That's the way it is." (PSS 16; Leverone Decl., Ex. C, Plaintiff
Depo 205:15-208:21.) Later that day, Hallauer, Wilson, and the buyers all
understood that the buyers had a desire to purchase the franchise from
corporate for much cheaper "after they take it back" from Plaintiff.
(PSS 17-19.)
Accordingly,
summary adjudication of Issues 1-6 is DENIED.
II.
Wilson and Nodbeh
Enterprises, Inc.’s MSA
Defendants Wilson and Nodbeh Enterprises, Inc. (“Nodbeh”)
move for summary adjudication of the issue of punitive damages pursuant to CCP
§ 437c.
Objections
Plaintiff’s objections, interposed in Plaintiff’s response to
Defendants’ separate statements, are overruled because they do not comply with
CRC § 3.1354.
Standard
A defendant moving for summary
judgment/adjudication has met its burden of showing a cause of action has no
merit if the defendant can show one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause
of action cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).)
At
the summary
judgment/adjudication stage, a court should grant relief "unless it
appears that actual malice [or fraud or
oppression] may be proved at trial by clear and convincing evidence." (Basich v.
Allstate Insurance Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1119.) This standard
applies to "any summary judgment motion involving a claim that must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, including a claim for punitive
damages." (Id.) Rather than usurp the jury's role as the ultimate
factfinder, courts must evaluate a plaintiffs evidence at the summary
adjudication stage "with reference to the
clear and convincing evidentiary burden" and "with the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard in mind" (Id. at
1119-1120.)
The court finds that triable issues exist
regarding whether Wilson/Nodbeh acted with malice by clear and convincing
evidence based on Wilson/Nodbeh’s independent intentional misrepresentations as
well as Wilson/Nodbeh’s conspiracy to commit fraud based on the Ramos Defendants’
intentional misrepresentations.
Triable issues exist regarding whether
Nodbeh/Wilson intentionally misrepresented that the buyers had the financial
means to purchase Plaintiff’s franchise license. The franchisor required the buyers to have not
only the funds for a 50% down payment, but also for six (6) months of operating
expenses. (PSS 4.) Wilson/Nodbeh were
obligated under a “Trainer Responsibilities
document for “verifying the completeness of: the [Request for Consideration]
from prospective buyers, the non-binding term sheet, the acknowledgment of
receipt of [Franchise Disclosure Document] and the income statements and
balance sheet submitted for preliminary approval.” (PSS 36.) Wilson advised Plaintiff to go along with the
buyer’s plan to under-report the purchase price to the franchisor in order to
help them get approved. (PSS 3, 6, 7.) Wilson advised Plaintiff that he could count on the
contract he had with the buyers. (PSS 10.)
Triable issues also exist regarding whether
Wilson/Nodbeh conspired with the Ramos Defendants.
The Ramos Defendants wanted to buy Plaintiff’s franchise territory, and Wilson/Nodbeh
had Plaintiff on the “kill list” because his under-performing franchise was
negatively impacting Nodbeh’s income. (PSS 31-32.) Wilson/Nodbeh set the transaction in motion by
soliciting offers for Plaintiff’s business before ever proposing to Plaintiff
that he should sell. (PSS 1). Wilson
sent various texts to Jose Ramos saying “you DID NOT hear this from me, but
[followed by inside information about Plaintiff’s expectations for the price]”,
“call me and we will strategize”, and “I want you guys to have it obviously.”
(Leverone Decl., Ex. N, text messages between Wilson and Mr. Ramos.) Once the Ramos Defendants expressed interest, Wilson/Nodbeh
never advised
Plaintiff to list the franchise for sale and consistently told him not to do
so. (PSS 42.) Further, Wilson encouraged
Plaintiff to go along with the buyers’ plan to under-report the purchase price to the franchisor. (PSS 6.) On July 26, 2016, Sanchez told Plaintiff the
buyers were going to pay him less than they had
agreed to, and that “We talked to Matt [Wilson]. We’re just going to screw
you here. That’s the way it is.” (PSS 16; Leverone Decl., Ex. C, Plaintiff Deposition,
205:15-208:21.) On May 2 2016, Wilson
wrote McMains, “You can usually avoid having to do shit for Kevin [of Servpro
Industries] if you just get Josh to officially list it for sale with
corporate.” (PSS 41). Wilson/Nodbeh never advised Plaintiff to list
the franchise for sale with corporate and consistently advised him not to do
so. (PSS 42.) Hallauer, Wilson, and the Ramos
Defendants all understood that the buyers had a desire to purchase the
franchise from corporate for much cheaper “after they take it back” from
Plaintiff. (PSS 17-19.)
Based
on this conspiracy, a
trier of fact could also determine that Wilson/Nodbeh are liable for punitive
damages based on the Ramos’s fraud. (See also the Ramos Defendants’ MSA, Issues
1-6.)
Wilson/Nodbeh
had Plaintiff on the “kill list” because his under-performing franchise was
negatively impacting Nodbeh’s income. (PSS 31-32.) Wilson/Nodbeh solicited offers for
Plaintiff’s business before ever proposing to Plaintiff that he should sell.
(PSS 1). Wilson sent various texts to Jose Ramos saying “you DID NOT hear this
from me, but [followed by inside information about Plaintiff’s expectations for
the price]”, “call me and we will strategize”, and “I want you guys to have it
obviously.” (Leverone Decl., Ex. N, text messages between Wilson and Mr.
Ramos.) The Ramos Defendants encouraged Plaintiff to under-report
the purchase price to the franchisor (PSS 3-7), misrepresented their progress
on performing their obligations to collect Plaintiff’s receivables and prepare
the formal written contract (PSS 13, 14); misrepresented their intentions to
honor the contract. On July 26, 2016,
Sanchez told Plaintiff that the buyers had no intention of honoring the “true”
sale price; the he was changing the deal because the only executed writing
was the Non-Binding Term Sheet with the false lower price (PSS 15-19). On
July 26, 2016, Sanchez told Plaintiff the buyers were going to pay him less
than they had agreed to, and that "We talked to Matt [Wilson]. We're
just going to screw you here. That's the
way it is." (PSS 16; Leverone
Decl., Ex. C, Plaintiff Depo 205:15-208:21.) Later that day,
Hallauer, Wilson, and the buyers all understood that the buyers had a desire to
purchase the franchise from corporate for much cheaper "after they take
it back" from Plaintiff. (PSS 17-19.)
Therefore, based on the conspiracy and fraud, a
trier of fact could determine that Wilson and/or Nodbeh acted with malice by
clear and convincing evidence.
Accordingly, motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.