Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 19PSCP00027, Date: 2023-10-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19PSCP00027 Hearing Date: October 4, 2023 Dept: K
Background
Petitioner City of Claremont (“City”) alleges that the property located at 1978 N. Indian Hill Boulevard in Claremont (“subject property”) is in a perpetual state of disrepair and requires a receiver to take possession and remedy compliance issues which property owner Respondent Sandblossom, LLC (“Respondent”) has failed to voluntarily abate.
On January 4, 2019, City filed a “Petition and Motion for an Order Appointing a Receiver to remedy Substandard Conditions (Health & Safety Code § 17980.7)” against Respondent. The court denied said petition, without prejudice, on March 11, 2019.
On February 10, 2020, the court granted City’s “Ex Parte Application for an Order Appointing a Receiver.” On February 13, 2020, Respondent filed a “Notice of Appeal” as to the February 10, 2020 order. On October 26, 2021, the remittitur was filed (affirmed).
On March 15, 2023, the court granted Receiver Mark Adams’ and California Receivership Group, BC’s request for discharge and exoneration of surety, awarded repayment of fees and costs in part and awarded attorney’s fees.
Legal Standard
“The following acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice, or proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority of the court: . . . (5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, subd. (a)(5).)
“When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or of the judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators, or other judicial officers.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211, subd. (a).)
“The facts essential to jurisdiction for a contempt proceeding are (1) the making of the order; (2) knowledge of the order; (3) ability of the respondent to render compliance; (4) wilful disobedience of the order.” (In re Liu (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 135, 140 [internal quotations and citation omitted].)
“When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge, a warrant of attachment may be issued to bring the person charged to answer, or, without a previous arrest, a warrant of commitment may, upon notice, or upon an order to show cause, be granted; and no warrant of commitment can be issued without such previous attachment to answer, or such notice or order to show cause.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1212.)
Discussion
Respondent moves the court for an order to show cause re: (1) holding the Receiver in contempt for willfully violating the court’s March 15, 2023 order, (2) releasing the Receiver’s May 9, 2023 deed of trust recorded in violation of the court’s March 15, 2023 order and (3) awarding attorneys’ fees and imposing fines against the Receiver.
On March 15, 2023, the court granted the Receiver’s request for discharge and exoneration of surety and granted its request for an order directing repayment of fees and costs in part. The court’s March 15, 2023 order states, in relevant part, as follows:
Despite
the lack of court authorization, the court is inclined to grant the
reimbursement for the
property taxes paid in the amount [of] $36,731.06. . . The
court is not inclined
to order reimbursement during the period of time after
Respondent posted the
undertaking on February 21, 2020. This pre-stay amount
totals $21,716.07 and is reflected in Exhibit No. 1 in the February 2020
Monthly Accounting report filed by the Receiver.[] As a result, the court will
reduce the following fees and costs in addition to the repayment of the
property taxes to $58,447.13 and
order, if necessary, that the Receiver’s Certificate be increased from
$25,000.00 to
reflect the new amount. . .
The court determines that the charging
affidavit is insufficient to issue an Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt. Ultimately,
Respondent and the Receiver disagree as to the scope of the court’s order. Respondent
argues that the court ruled on the amount of principal and interest that was
owed to the lender on the Receiver’s Certificate and that the court authorized
the Receiver to increase the Receiver’s Certificate to $58,447.13. The
Receiver, in turn, argues that the court did not rule on the amount of principal
and interest owed on the Receiver’s Certificate, that there is no language in
the order supporting that any such ruling was made and that the court
authorized the Receiver to increase the Receiver’s Certificate by an
additional $58,447.13.
The court construes the instant motion as
seeking clarification of the court’s March 15, 2023 order. First, the court’s
language that “the Receiver’s Certificate be increased from $25,000.00 to
reflect the new amount” stated therein was intended to convey that the
Certificate be increased to $58,447.13 total, not by $58,447.13. The
amount of $58,447.13 was comprised of $36,731.06 in property taxes, plus
$21,716.07 in costs and fees incurred by the Receiver prior to the stay, as
reflected in the February 2020 Monthly Accounting report filed by the Receiver.
All other requests for monies were denied.
The Receiver’s “Motion for Discharge of
Receiver, Exoneration of Surety, and Order Directing Repayment of Fees and
Costs” sought “an order to discharge the Receiver, settle all accounts, and
exonerate the surety.” (Motion, 1:24-25). The court notes that the Receiver
lodged a “(Proposed) Order Discharging Receiver” in connection with the
February 6, 2023 proceedings, which does not appear to make any express
reference to principal and interest owed on the Receiver’s Certificate.
Further, the Receiver represents that “[t]he Court could not have issued an
order on the amount of principal and interest owed to the lender because that
issue has never been before the Court. Again, the Receiver’s Motion for
Discharge requested repayment of $98,257.71 in unpaid fees and costs owed to the Receiver. It did not request the
determination of the principal and interest that is owed to the lender on the
duly recorded Receiver’s Certificate.” (Opp., 4:3-7.)
However, “[a]s a court officer, [a
receiver] ha[s] the duty to inform the court of all claims affecting the
receivership before obtaining a discharge of h[is] liabilities.” (Vitug v.
Griffin (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 488, 495.) “[A]ll issues concerning the
receiver’s actions are fully adjudicated as part of the final accounting.” (Southern
California Sunbelt Developers, Inc. v. Banyan Limited Partnership (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 910, 926.) “[T]he last chance to challenge the
receiver’s actions, management, and omissions is at the time of the final
accounting.” (Id. at 926-927). As Respondent argues, “[i]f the court
were to accept the Receiver’s logic. . ., then a receiver can encumber a
property with third party liens through a receiver’s certificate, seek only the
Receiver’s fees and costs, leave the liens unaddressed, and the receiver’s
final accounting and discharge motion would not fully resolve all issues
concerning the receiver’s actions as required under California law.” (Reply,
4:6-10).