Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 19PSCV00610, Date: 2022-12-14 Tentative Ruling
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Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.
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Case Number: 19PSCV00610 Hearing Date: December 14, 2022 Dept: O
Background
Plaintiffs James Gulli and Jeanette Gulli (“Plaintiffs”) allege as follows:
Plaintiffs own the real property known as 618
Pearlanna Drive in San Dimas (“subject property”). On or about December 9,
2007, Plaintiffs leased the subject property to Dave Fetters and Daniele
Fetters (“The Fetters”), who lived in the subject property continuously from
that date until they suddenly abandoned the subject property. The subject
property was in good condition when the lease commenced. When Plaintiffs
visited the subject property, The Fetters never let them inside. Plaintiffs
believed The Fetters wanted privacy because of their autistic son. On or
about February 4, 2019, Plaintiffs were informed that The Fetters were not
living in the subject property. Plaintiffs came to inspect the subject property
and found that it was destroyed and in an uninhabitable condition of filth and
decay. On or about February 6, 2019, the City of San Dimas told Plaintiffs to
board up the subject property. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs had a written
Rental Dwelling Policy from State Farm General Insurance Company (“State Farm”)
for the subject property, insuring accidental direct physical loss to the
subject property. Plaintiffs made a claim under the policy but State Farm
denied it.
On July 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against State Farm, The Fetters and Does 1-100 for:
1.
Breach
of Insurance Contract
2.
Breach
of Lease
3.
Declaratory
Relief
On December 20, 2019, The Fetters’ defaults were entered.
On September 19, 2022, an “Order Granting [State Farm’s] Motion for Summary Judgment” was filed.
A “Default Prove Up Hearing as to the remaining two (2) Defendants” (i.e., The Fetters) is set for December 14, 2022.
Discussion
The sole cause of action asserted against The Fetters is the second cause of action for Breach of Lease.
On November 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed the following papers: (1) a Judicial Council Form CIV-100 Request for Court Judgment, (2) a proposed court default judgment on Judicial Council Form JUD-100 and (3) a “Declaration of James Gulli in Support of Default Judgment Against Dave Fetters and Daniele Fetters.”
Plaintiffs seek a judgment of $267,365.78 (i.e., comprised of $206,116.79 as the “[d]emand of complaint,” plus $55,746.99 in interest, plus $993.36 in costs and $4,508.64 in attorney fee).
The $206,116.79 is comprised of $6,978.89 in loan costs for a re-finance (needed to obtain money for the clean-up and repairs) (James Gulli Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. A), $1,900.00 in cash and non-monetary outlays (used to feed and pay day laborers), $16,503.28 in Chase credit card outlays (Id., ¶ 9, Exh. B), $152,734.62 in “checks and other outlays” (Id., ¶ 10, Exh. C) and $28,000.00 in lost rent (Id., ¶ 11, Exh. D)
There are several concerns with
Plaintiff’s submission:
1.
Plaintiffs
have not dismissed Does 1-100, to date.
2. Plaintiffs have not identified any monetary amounts in their complaint. Code of Civil Procedure § 580, subdivision (a) provides that “[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint, in the statement required by Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 425.115 . . .” “[I]n all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on recovery.” (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 824.) The prayer seeks, as to the second cause of action, “damages for breach of contract, including cost of repair under the Lease.” The prayer also seeks, as to all causes of action, costs of suit and “such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.”
3.
Plaintiffs
seek $4,508.64 in attorney’s fees (James Gulli Decl., ¶ 14), but they did not
request any such fees in their complaint (see Paragraph 2 above).
4.
Plaintiffs
have not provided the court with any documentary evidence reflecting the alleged
damage to the subject property.