Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 19STCV40383, Date: 2024-10-24 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 19STCV40383    Hearing Date: October 24, 2024    Dept: 34

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ibiere Seck and Defendant Seck Law, P.C.’s Motion to Amend Judgment is GRANTED. 

 

Background

 

On November 7, 2019, Plaintiff The Cochran Firm California brought an action for declaratory relief and abuse of process against its previous at-will employee, Defendant Ibiere Seck.

 

Plaintiffs The Cochran Firm California and Dunn Law, APC (“Plaintiffs”) allege that Ibiere Seck departed the firm as of December 31, 2018, taking certain clients previously retained by Plaintiffs with her to her private practice, Defendant Seck Law, P.C. Plaintiffs assert that “the need for declaratory relief presented herein pertains to those cases and clients that Seck did not take with her, and pertains to a case originally retained by [Plaintiffs], that remained with [Plaintiffs] after Seck’s departure from [the firm], styled Reddick v. LACMTA, Case No. BC660135.” (Complaint, ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs seek:

 

“(1) A Declaration that a December 13, document titled ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (Exhibit A) does not create a valid fee-sharing agreement between COCHRAN and SECK in the Reddick matter because client referenced in ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ was never informed of any purported fee sharing agreement between SECK and COCHRAN, and did not consent in writing, to any fee sharing agreement, as required by Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 2- 200;

 

(2) A Declaration that in the Reddick matter, that SECK does not have the legal authority to assert a lien on the proceeds of that case, on the grounds that SECK, as a discharged employee of COCHRAN, does not have, and never has had, a contract for the provision of legal services with John Reddick, the plaintiff in the Reddick matter, (hereinafter referred to at ‘PLAINTIFF REDDICK’), who is, and always has been, a client of COCHRAN.” (Complaint, ¶ 1.)

 

On January 21, 2020, the court granted Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the second cause of action for abuse of process.

 

On April 14, 2024, Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint.

 

            On July 13, 2020, the court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees.

 

            On October 13, 2020, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Seck (“Cross-Complainant”) filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendant Brian J. Dunn dba The Cochran Firm California (“Cross-Defendant”) for breach of contract.

 

            On January 21, 2021, the court denied Cross-Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion.

           

            On February 10, 2021, Cross-Defendant filed an answer to the cross-complaint. 

 

            On April 14, 2022, the court granted Cross-Complainant’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Cross-Defendant.

 

            On May 25, 2022, the court entered judgment for Cross-Complainant.

           

            On August 2, 2023, the California Court of Appeal affirmed this court’s judgment.

 

            On June 25, 2024, Cross-Complainant filed its first Motion to Amend Judgment which the court took off calendar on September 6, 2024 due to non-appearance by either party.

 

            On September 24, 2024, Cross-Complainant filed its second Motion to Amend Judgment. As of October 16, 2024, no opposition or other responding documents have been filed.

 

Legal Standard

 

“The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., §473, subd. (d).)  The court, “regardless of the lapse of time, has inherent power to correct mistakes in its judgments or orders. [citation] This power, however, is limited to mistakes which are not the result of an exercise of judicial discretion.” (In re Sloan’s Estate (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 283, 292.)  “Whether an error is judicial rather than clerical depends up on whether it was the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination. If an error, mistake or omission is the result of inadvertence, but for which a different judgment would have been rendered, the error is clerical and the judgment may be corrected to correspond with what it would have been but for the inadvertence.” (Vallelunga v. Gomez (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 374, 292-293 [internal citations omitted].) 

 

Discussion

 

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ibiere Seck and Defendant Seck Law, P.C. (“Moving Party”) move to correct the name of Cross-Defendant Brian J. Dunn in the court’s judgment entered on May 25, 2024.

 

Moving Party argues that The Cochran Firm California (“Cochran Firm”) did not question or dispute that is was the cross-defendant named in the cross-complaint. (Motion, at p. 3.) Moving Party contends that the Cochran Firm only noted that it had been erroneously sued as Brian J. Dunn and that the correct entity name was Brian T. Dunn, a Professional Law Corporation twice in its answer and appeal. (Ibid.) As such, Moving Party argues that the identity of the Cross-Defendant was never in doubt as the Cochran Firm. (Ibid.)

 

However, Moving Party alleges that at the judgment debtor examination of Brian T. Dunn (“Dunn”), owner of the Cochran Firm, Dunn claimed that his corporation was not the judgment debtor in this case. (Id., at p. 3, Lowe Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) Thus, the Moving Party seeks to correct the name of Dunn in the court’s judgment to resolve any dispute over the correct identity of the Cross-Defendant and Judgment Creditor in this case. (Id., at p. 3.)

 

The issue is whether the error here is clerical in nature and whether the court may appropriately remedy the error. The court finds that the error here is clerical, and the court may amend the judgment to correct it. Ultimately, the cross-complaint was filed against the Cochran Firm explicitly and a judgment was granted for Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ibiere Seck and against the Cochran Firm. Since no judicial reasoning was involved and the error is clerical in nature, the court can amend the judgment which does not correctly set forth Dunn’s name.

 

Conclusion

 

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ibiere Seck and Defendant Seck Law, P.C.’s Motion to Amend Judgment is GRANTED.