Judge Peter A. Hernandez, Case 20PSCV00347 2022-09-13 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

Plaintiff is 82 years old. Plaintiff and Defendant Tifei Guo (“Defendant”) met in 1999 and developed a romantic relationship, cohabitating, on and off, from about 2001-2019 in both New York and Los Angeles. From about 2000-2018, Plaintiff owned a company in New York. Plaintiff employed Defendant to help him operate the company and paid Defendant wages. Plaintiff was often in China. In about 2007, Plaintiff authorized Defendant to remit about $120,000.00 from his bank account (to which Defendant had been added for business purposes) to purchase a 4-acre piece of vacant land in New Jersey and to consummate the transaction. Defendant later told Plaintiff the transaction had been completed and showed him a copy of his bank statement reflecting the debited purchase amount. Defendant actually took title to this property under her own name, which Plaintiff did not discover until 2019.

In about 2002, Plaintiff purchased a house located at 17 Breuber Ave., Great Neck, New York 11023 (“Great Neck Property”) with his own funds. In about 2007 or 2008, Defendant asked Plaintiff to add her onto title to the Great Neck Property and represented that she would marry Plaintiff if he did so. Plaintiff added Defendant on title, but Defendant did not marry Plaintiff; instead, Defendant continued to make promises about marriage.

In 2015, the Great Neck Property was sold and Defendant kept $250,000.00 in proceeds from same; at that time, Defendant told Plaintiff she would move to Los Angeles with him and would marry him if Plaintiff purchased a home there for them. In 2016, Plaintiff purchased a house located at 20221 Evening Breeze Dr., Walnut, CA 91789 (“Walnut Property”) with his own funds; Defendant was added onto title. Plaintiff also paid $70,000.00 in renovation costs and has solely paid the mortgage, property taxes, insurance and maintenance.

In 2019, Defendant first indicated that she would not marry Plaintiff. Defendant has not returned to the Walnut Property. Plaintiff then looked into the details of his finances and discovered that Defendant had taken title to the New Jersey vacant land by herself.

On December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a verified First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), asserting causes of action against Defendant and Does 1-20 for:

The Final Status Conference is set for May 2, 2023. Trial is set for May 16, 2023.

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4^th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119 [emphasis theirs].)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (p)(2).) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Id. at 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Defendant moves the court for summary adjudication in her favor and against Plaintiff as to Plaintiff’s verified FAC as follows:

Issue #1: Plaintiff’s first cause of action (i.e., for Financial Elder Abuse) is barred by the four-year statute of limitations in Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.7;

Issue #2: Plaintiff’s second cause of action (i.e., for Quiet Title) is barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure § 338 and the four-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure § 343 and Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.7;

Issue #3: Plaintiff’s third cause of action (i.e., for Fraud) is barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure § 338;

Issue #4: Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action (i.e., for Breach of Fiduciary Duty) is barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure § 338 and the four-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure § 343; and

Issue #5: Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action (i.e., for Declaratory Relief) is barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure § 338 and the four-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure § 343 and Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.7.

At the outset, the court notes that Defendant’s motion reflects non-compliance with California Rules of Court Rule 3.1350, subdivision (b) (i.e., “[i]f summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.”) The issues identified in the notice of motion are not repeated verbatim in the separate statement. With that said, “the court’s power to deny summary judgment on the basis for failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350 is discretionary, not mandatory.” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 118.) Further, Plaintiff has not articulated any prejudice. The court admonishes counsel for Defendant but will proceed to the merits of the motion.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s separate statement reflects non-compliance with CRC Rule 3.1350, subdivision (f)(2) (i.e., “[o]n the right side of the page, directly opposite the recitation of the moving party's statement of material facts and supporting evidence, the response must unequivocally state whether that fact is ‘disputed’ or ‘undisputed.’”). Plaintiff fails to provide a “disputed” or “undisputed” response to Nos. 1, 14, 27, 40 and 53.

Also, Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s separate statement impermissibly includes objections. “[A] separate statement is not evidence; it refers to evidence submitted in support of or opposition to a summary judgment motion. (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 178, fn. 4 [emphasis theirs].) Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections contained in the opposing separate statement are summarily overruled on this basis.

The court rules on Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) as follows: Deny as to Exhibit B (i.e., complaint filed September 30, 2016 in case styled Zhang v. Zhang, Case No. BC634498 [“Case No. BC634498”]); Deny as to Exhibit C (i.e., First Amended Complaint filed July 24, 2017 in Case No. BC634498); Deny as to Exhibit D (i.e., Trial Brief of Li Zhe “Jerry” Zhang filed May 21, 2018 in Case No. BC634498); Deny as to Exhibit E (i.e., Request for Dismissal filed September 18, 2018 in Case No. BC634498); Deny as to Exhibit F (i.e., complaint filed October 4, 2018 in case styled Zhang v. Zhang, et al., Case No. BC723760 [“Case No. BC723760”]); Deny as to Exhibit G (i.e., December 24, 2019 minute order in Case No. BC723760); Deny as to Exhibit H (i.e., “Judgment by the Court Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c” in Case No. 723760); Granted as to Exhibit I (i.e., verified complaint filed May 26, 2020); Granted as to Exhibit J (i.e., verified FAC filed December 7, 2020) and Granted as to Exhibit N (i.e., November 2, 2020 tentative ruling on Defendant’s demurrer to complaint, adopted as final).

As to Exhibits A-H, “[t]here is. . . a precondition to the taking of judicial notice in either its mandatory or permissive form—any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue.” (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4^th 415, 422, fn. 2.) Defendant has made no showing of relevancy.

The court rules on Defendant’s evidentiary objections as follows: Overruled as to Nos. 1-10, 11 (except as to “because it was taken by my grandson”), 12 (first sentence only) and 13-15; and Sustained as to No. 11 (i.e., only as to “because it was taken by my grandson”) and No. 12 (second sentence only).

On May 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint. On December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a verified FAC against Defendant for (1) Financial Elder Abuse, (2) Quiet Title, (3) Fraud, (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (5) Declaratory Relief and (6) Partition. Plaintiff alleged therein, in relevant part, as follows: Plaintiff is 82 years old; Defendant is 62 years old. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff and Defendant first met in 1999 and developed a romantic relationship, cohabitating, on and off, from about 2001-2019 in both New York and Los Angeles. (Id., ¶ 7). From about 2000-2018, Plaintiff owned a company in New York. (Id., ¶ 8). Plaintiff employed Defendant to help him operate the company and paid Defendant wages. (Id.). In about 2007, Plaintiff wished to purchase a 4-acre vacant piece of land in New Jersey[2]; at the time, Defendant was helping Plaintiff run his business, the parties were living together and Plaintiff had added Defendant onto his bank account in order to assist him with business affairs as Plaintiff was often in China. (Id., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff authorized Defendant to remit about $120,000.00 from his bank account to purchase this land and to consummate the transaction. (Id.) Defendant later told Plaintiff the transaction had been completed and showed him a copy of his bank statement reflecting the debited purchase amount. (Id.) Defendant actually took title to this property under her own name. (Id.) Plaintiff never undertook to develop this land and just left it alone over the years, and did not discover that Defendant had taken title to the property until 2019. (Id.)

Also, in about 2002, Plaintiff purchased a house located at 17 Breuber Ave., Great Neck, New York 11023 (“Great Neck Property”) with his own funds and paid all associated expenses. (Id., ¶ 10.) In about 2007 or 2008, Defendant asked Plaintiff to add her onto title to the Great Neck Property and represented that she would marry Plaintiff if he did so. (Id., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff added Defendant on title, but Defendant did not marry Plaintiff; instead, Defendant continued to make promises about marriage. (Id., ¶¶ 11-12.)

In 2015, the Great Neck Property was sold; Plaintiff allowed Defendant to keep $250,000.00 in sales proceeds from the Great Neck Property based on her promise to move to Los Angeles and marry him if he purchased a house for them. (Id., ¶¶ 13-17.)

In 2016, Plaintiff purchased a house located at 20221 Evening Breeze Dr., Walnut, CA 91789 (“Walnut Property”) with his own funds; Defendant was added onto title. (Id., ¶¶ 18 and 19.) Plaintiff paid $70,000.00 in renovation costs and has solely paid the mortgage, property taxes, insurance and maintenance. (Id., ¶ 20.) In 2019, Defendant first indicated that she would not marry Plaintiff. (Id., ¶ 26.) Defendant has not returned to the Walnut Property. (Id.) Plaintiff then looked into the details of his finances and discovered that Defendant had taken title to the New Jersey vacant land by herself. (Id., ¶ 27.)

Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication as to the first five causes of action on the basis that they are each time-barred. Plaintiff’s first cause of action, for Financial Elder Abuse, is governed by a four-year statute of limitations. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15657.7 [i.e., “[a]n action for damages . . . for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult . . . shall be commenced within four years after the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the facts constituting the financial abuse”].)

Plaintiff’s second cause of action, for Quiet Title, is governed by the underlying theory of relief. (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476.) The limitations period for this claim, then, is no more than four years—i.e., three years based on a fraud claim (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d) [i.e., “[w]ithin three years: . . . [a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake”]), three or four years based on a breach of fiduciary duty claim (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 338/343; see American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4^th 1451, 1479 [“The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is three years or four years, depending on whether the breach is fraudulent or nonfraudulent”]), or four years based on Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.7.

Plaintiff’s third cause of action, for Fraud, is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338). Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, has a limitations period of no more than four years (Code Civ. Proc., § 343; see also, § 338 [i.e., three years].)

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action, for Declaratory Relief, is governed by the one applicable to an ordinary legal or equitable action based on the same claim. (Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5^th 935, 943.) The limitations period for this claim, then, is no more than four years—i.e., three years based on a fraud claim (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d)) three or four years based on a breach of fiduciary duty claim (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 338/343) or four years based on Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.7.

“The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action . . . sets the date as the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4^th 383, 397 [citations omitted].) “An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery rule,’ which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4^th 797, 807.) “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’” (Id. [citation omitted].) “Under the discovery rule, suspicion of one or more of the elements of a cause of action, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally trigger the statute of limitations period.” (Id.)

“Resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact.” (Id. at 810.) “There are no hard and fast rules for determining what facts or circumstances will compel inquiry by the injured party and render him chargeable with knowledge. It is a question for the trier of fact.” (United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 597.) “However, whenever reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion from the evidence, the question becomes one of law.” (Snow v. A.H. Robins Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 120, 128.)

Plaintiff discovered or at least believed Defendant had started her own company behind Plaintiff’s back before he purchased the Polo Road Property in 2014 or 2015. (COE, Exh. K, 151-10:12 and 179:5-9). Prior to the purchase of same, Plaintiff became aware of the fact that if he married Defendant without a prenuptial agreement Defendant would be entitled to have half of his property. (Id., 151:9-15, 180:10-20.) Plaintiff consulted with a family law attorney prior to purchasing the Polo Road property, asked the attorney about the community property rights Defendant would have if they were to get married and decided, after this meeting, that he was not going to marry Defendant unless she signed some sort of prenuptial agreement. (Id., 180:24-182:2, 185:6-9 and 186:1-5)

About a “half year” later after this meeting, Plaintiff had a conversation with Defendant about going to a family lawyer to prepare a prenuptial agreement. (Id., 186:18-187:1.) Plaintiff never put Defendant on title to the Polo Road Property because he wanted to have a “premarriage agreement about the properties, but she didn’t want to do it.” (Id., 172:19-173:8.) Plaintiff added Defendant to the title of the Walnut Property at the time of purchase on March 30, 2016. (Verified FAC, ¶¶ 18-19.) Before Plaintiff bought the Walnut Property and put Guo’s name on the title he discovered that Defendant had engaged in financial fraud against him. (COE, Exh. K, 210:15-18 and 212:1-4).

Defendant asserts that “[g]iven [Plaintiff’s] demand in 2015 that there would be no marriage unless Defendant [ ] signed a prenuptial agreement, any contention that Defendant [ ] was ‘leading [Plaintiff] on’ with ‘promises to marry’ after 2015 is completely disingenuous and illogical. Moreover, prior to the purchase of the Walnut Property in March of 2016, Plaintiff believed that Defendant [ ] was financially defrauding him and lying to him, thus any contention that Plaintiff did not ‘discover’ any of the foregoing until 2019 is simply not believable.” (Motion, 12:25:13-3.)

Defendant’s position, then, is that the statute of limitations began accruing, at the latest, on March 30, 2016 (i.e., the date Defendant was put on title to the Walnut Property) because Plaintiff could not have reasonably believed Defendant’s purported repeated promises to marry Plaintiff when Plaintiff himself was insisting on a prenuptial agreement that Plaintiff knew Defendant would not sign and because Plaintiff knew Defendant had engaged in financial fraud against him before then.

However, Plaintiff points to excerpts from his deposition transcript wherein he testified that “around like 2016 or 2017” there was “no point to have that agreement” because he “did not have money anymore.” (COE, Exh. K, 202:8-203:1.) Plaintiff also points to excerpts wherein he testified that Defendant’s starting of a company behind his back did not change his level of trust in Defendant because, when he asked Defendant why she started that company, Defendant said that it was for both of their benefit and that the money would be for both of them. (Id., 179:19-180:9.)

The court determines that the reasonable minds can draw different conclusions from the evidence with respect to the accrual of the statute of limitations; accordingly, Defendant’s motion is denied.

[1] The motion was filed (and electronically served) on May 3, 2022 and set for hearing on August 24, 2022. On August 16, 2022, the court rescheduled the August 24, 2022 hearing date to September 13, 2022; notice was waived.

[2] Plaintiff’s opposition clarifies that the subject land is actually situated in Pennsylvania, not New Jersey.