Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 20STCV13546, Date: 2023-08-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV13546 Hearing Date: August 29, 2023 Dept: K
Defendant East Valley Glendora Hospital, LLC dba Glendora
Oaks Behavioral Health Hospital fka Glendora Community Hospital’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED in part (i.e., as to the first and second
causes of action asserted by Plaintiff Simon and as to the first cause of
action asserted by Plaintiff Frank) and DENIED as MOOT in part (i.e., as to the
third cause of action).
Background
Plaintiffs Simon Chico (“Simon”), Rachel Chico (“Rachel”) and Frank Chico (“Frank”) allege as follows:
In about
January 2019, Antonio Chico (“Antonio”) was a patient at Riverside Heights
Healthcare Center (“RHHC”) and Glendora Community Hospital. Defendants
transferred Antonio from RHHC to Glendora Hospital shortly before his death.
Antonio had a gastrointestinal hemorrhage during his hospital at Glendora
Hospital, which was entirely preventable and not recognized or treated. Antonio
died on or about January 7, 2019.
On December 23, 2020, this case was transferred from Department 32 of the Personal Injury Court to this instant department.
On March 2, 2021, Rachel dismissed her claims, without prejudice.
On August 16, 2021, Simon and Frank filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), asserting causes of action against East Valley Glendora Hospital, LLC dba Glendora Oaks Behavioral Health Hospital fka Glendora Community Hospital (sued as Glendora Hospital) (“Glendora Hospital”), Prime Healthcare Foundation, Inc, Prime Healthcare Services, Inc., RHHC, Nagasamudra S. Ashok, MD, Raymundo S. Bautista, MD, James C.J. Contreras, N.P., Kathleen Limpengco, RN, Norma Ortega, RN, Noelle Rubio, RN, MSN, Madhu Sudan, MD and Does 1-100 for:
1.
Medical
Malpractice
2.
Wrongful
Death
3.
Survival
On September 29, 2021, Simon and Frank dismissed RHHC, with prejudice.
On December 9, 2021, the court ordered the SAC dismissed without prejudice after Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear as the Order to Show Cause Re: Why the Case Should Not Be Dismissed For Lack of Prosecution and/or Sanctions for Failure to Appear at the 11/15/2021 Trial Setting Conference.
On April 13, 2022, the court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and set aside the December 9, 2021 dismissal as to Glendora Hospital only.
On August 16, 2023, Plaintiffs dismissed the third cause of action, without prejudice.
The Final Status Conference is set for October 31, 2023. Trial is set for November 14, 2023.
Legal Standard
The rules governing demurrers are generally applicable to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999; Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d) [“The grounds for motion. . . shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Where the motion is based on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. . ., the matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit”].)
A motion by a plaintiff may only be made on the grounds “that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).) A motion by a defendant may only be made on the grounds that (1) “[t]he court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint” or (2) “[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c).)
Although a nonstatutory motion “may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself” (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650 [quotation marks and citation omitted]), a statutory motion cannot be made after entry of a pretrial conference order or 30 days before the initial trial date, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (e).)
Discussion
Glendora Hospital moves the court for judgment on the pleadings as to the entire SAC asserted by Plaintiff Simon and as to the first and third causes of action asserted by Plaintiff Frank.
Request for Judicial Notice
The court denies Glendora Hospital’s Request for Judicial Notice as moot (see below).
Merits
At the outset, the court the court denies the motion as moot in part (i.e., as to the third cause of action), inasmuch as Plaintiffs have, subsequent to the filing of the motion, dismissed their third cause of action.
Standing Re: Plaintiff Simon
Glendora Hospital first asserts that Plaintiff Simon lacks standing to maintain his SAC. The court agrees.
Plaintiffs have alleged that decedent “died intestate and without issue and without living parents” (SAC, ¶ 1), that Plaintiff Frank is decedent’s brother (Id., ¶ 3), that Plaintiff Simon is Frank’s son and decedent’s nephew (Id., ¶ 2) and that Plaintiffs are decedent’s heirs under the laws of intestate succession and successors in interest pursuant to Probate Code § 6402, subdivision (c)[1]. (Id., ¶¶ 1-3).
However, “[u]nder the rules of intestate succession, only those persons identified as immediate successors to the decedent's estate constitute ‘heirs.’ Although the rules specify sequences of persons and groups potentially eligible to share in the decedent's estate, no individual is ordinarily a ‘proper heir [ ] at law’ unless the persons placed ahead of the individual under the rules cannot succeed to the estate.” (Hernandez v. Kieferle (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 419, 437 [citations omitted]; In re Collins’ Estate (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 86, 91 [“In the case of intestacy, the nearest class of kin, whether it contains one or more, inherits. Only heirs in the class of the closest degree of consanguinity to the decedent will take, regardless of the number of heirs in any class”].)
Simon, then, lacks standing as decedent’s “heir.” Glendora Hospital’s motion is granted in this regard.
First Cause of Action (i.e., for Medical Malpractice) Re: Plaintiff Frank
Glendora Hospital next asserts that Frank’s first cause of action is duplicative of his second cause of action for wrongful death. “The primary right theory. . . provides that a ‘cause of action’ is comprised of a ‘primary right’ of the plaintiff, a corresponding ‘primary duty’ of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty. . . A pleading that states the violation of one primary right in two causes of action contravenes the rule against ‘splitting’ a cause of action.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681.) Here, the first cause of action claims that “[Decedent’s] unnecessary and untimely death caused Plaintiffs, [Decedent’s] family, substantial emotional distress, as well as funeral and related costs.” (SAC, ¶ 23). The second cause of action merely reiterates this language. (Id., ¶ 31).
Frank represents that he does not oppose Glendora Hospital’s request to eliminate the first cause of action as duplicative of the second “if there is no substantial difference between them.” (Opp., 2:7-8). The court construes Frank’s position as a concession that the causes of action are duplicative. The motion is granted in this regard.
Therefore, it appears the only remaining Plaintiff is Frank and the only remaining cause of action is the second.
[1] Probate Code § 6402 reads, in
relevant part, as follows: “Except as provided in Section 6402.5 [i.e.,
pertaining to a predeceased spouse], the part of the intestate estate not
passing to the surviving spouse, under Section 6401, or the entire intestate estate
of there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows: . . . (c) If there is no
surviving issue or parent, to the issue of the parents or either of them, the
issue taking equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the
decedent. . .”