Judge: Peter A. Hernandez, Case: 20STCV33881, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV33881 Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Dept: O
The Estate of Yaeli
Mozzelle Galdamez, et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al. (20STCV33881)
Defendant Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend, as to Plaintiffs’ first and third causes of action.
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.
Legal Standard
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)
Discussion
PVHMC (hereinafter “Defendant”) demurs to the first and third causes of action.
Negligence/Wrongful Death (First COA)
Defendant demurs to this cause of action on the grounds that there has been a misjoinder of parties. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs omitted all of the wrongful death takers of Decedent, and only included Martinez, but there is no allegation that the complete set of wrongful death takers are before the Court.
On September 6, 2022, Martinez filed a declaration to establish that she is Decedent’s successor in interest pursuant to CCP section 377.32 stating in relevant part: decedent’s name, the date and place of decedent’s death, that Martinez is Decedent’s biological mother and successor in interest, Decedent’s father is dead, Decedent died intestate, and Martinez is not aware of any person who has a superior right to commence this action. (See Martinez Decl., ¶¶ 2-12 filed on 09/06/22.)
“The wrongful death statute is ‘a procedural statute establishing compulsory joinder and not a statute creating a joint cause of action.’” (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 807 [quoting Cross v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 692].) While a nonjoined heir is not an ‘indispensable party’ to a wrongful death action, omitted heirs are ‘necessary parties’ such that “plaintiff heirs have a mandatory duty to join all known omitted heirs in the ‘single action’ for wrongful death.” (Id. at 808.) “If an heir refuses to participate in the suit as a plaintiff, he or she may be named as a defendant so that all heirs are before the court in the same action.” (Id.) “Defendants facing a wrongful death action in which all the heirs should have, but have not, been joined are entitled to move to abate the action.” (Adams v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 71, 77.) Heirs need not be joined if the wrongful death action is brought by the personal representative of the decedent. (Id. at 77-78.)
The Court finds that the FAC fails to establish that all of Decedent’s heirs have been joined in this action. While the FAC states that Martinez is Decedent’s representative, and Martinez filed a declaration purporting to show that she is Decedent’s successor in interest, the declaration fails to state whether Decedent has or had any issue. Accordingly, it is unclear whether an heir has been omitted.
CCP section
377.32 provides that a person who seeks to commence such an action as the
decedent’s successor in interest must file an affidavit or declaration
providing the following:
1.
The decedent’s name
2.
The date and place of the decedent’s death
3.
“No proceeding is now pending in California for
administration of the decedent’s estate.”
4.
If the decedent’s estate was administered, a copy of
the final order showing the distribution of the decedent’s cause of action to
the successor in interest
5.
Either of the following, as appropriate, with facts in
support thereof:
A.
“The affiant or declarant is the decedent’s successor
in interest (as defined in Section 377.11 of the California Code of Civil Procedure)
and succeeds to the decedent’s interest in the action or proceeding.”
B.
“The affiant or declarant is authorized to act on
behalf of the decedent’s successor in interest (as defined in Section 377.11 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure) with respect to the decedent’s interest
in the action or proceeding.”
6.
“No other person has a superior right to commence the
action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending
action or proceeding.”
7.
“The affiant or declarant affirms or declares under
penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
is true and correct.”
(Code Civ.
Proc., § 377.32(a).) A certified copy of the decedent’s death certificate
must also be attached to the affidavit or declaration. (Id., §
377.32(c).)
Here, Martinez’s declaration fails to state that no proceeding is now pending in California for the administration of Decedent’s estate, and if Decedent’s estate was administered, then attaching a copy of the final order showing distribution of Decedent’s cause of action to Martinez. In addition, as stated above, Martinez fails to state whether Decedent had any issue, and failure to include a statement as to Decedent’s issue makes it unclear whether Martinez has the superior right to proceed with this action. Furthermore, while Martinez is in the process of obtaining Decedent’s death certificate, attaching the Decedent’s death certificate is a requirement under CCP section 377.32. Accordingly, Martinez had failed to comply with CCP section 377.32 to be appointed Decedent’s personal representative.
“‘A probate or trust estate is not a legal entity; it is simply a collection of assets and liabilities.’” (Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1390 (quoting Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1344).) “‘As such, [the estate] has no capacity to sue or be sued, or to defend an action.’” (Id.) “‘Any litigation must be maintained by, or against, the executor [or personal representative] of the estate.’” (Id. (alteration in original).) “It is the personal representative of a probate estate that may ‘[c]ommence and maintain actions and proceedings for the benefit of the estate.’” (Id. (quoting Probate Code § 9820(a).)
Accordingly, the Estate and Martinez do not have the capacity to sue.
Thus, Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.
Negligence (Third COA)
Defendant demurs to this cause of action on the ground that the Estate lacks the capacity to bring any cause of action.
Here, as stated above in detail, the Estate and Martinez do not have the capacity to sue.
Thus, Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ third cause of action is SUSTAINED, with 20 days leave to amend.
Union’s Motion to
Strike
Defendant Union (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant”) demurs to Plaintiffs’ first and third causes of action. Defendant demurs to those causes of action on the grounds that it had not duty to prevent Decedent from committing suicide and no act or omission by Defendant was the cause of Decedent’s suicide.
The elements for negligence are: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)
“The elements of the cause of action for wrongful death are the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs.” (Ibid., emphasis in original.)
Defendant contends that it did not have a duty to prevent Decedent from committing suicide because it did not have custody or substantial control over Decedent. In addition, there are no facts alleged that show that Defendant knew that Decedent was going to commit suicide.
Under California law, there is generally no duty to prevent suicide unless there is a special relationship between the defendant and the decedent that gives rise to such a duty. (See¿Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 278, 293.) Courts have imposed a duty to prevent suicide where the decedent committed suicide in a hospital or other in-patient facility that had accepted the responsibility to care for and attend to the needs of the suicidal patient, or psychiatrists treating a mentally disturbed patient. (Id. at 292.)
Here, the FAC is devoid of any facts that Defendant was treating Decedent. The only connection between Defendant and Decedent is that the train that led to Plaintiff’s death/suicide was owned/operated by Defendant. There are no allegations in the FAC that establish that Defendant and Decedent had a special relationship that would give rise to a duty for Defendant to prevent Decedent’s suicide.
In addition, in California, suicide is considered a “superseding cause of harm," unless the defendant engaged in intentional conduct creating an irresistible impulse to commit suicide. (See Tate v. Canonica (1960) Cal.App.2d 898, 913-915.)
Here, the FAC is devoid of any facts that defendant engaged in any intentional conduct that created an irresistible impulse to commit suicide. Accordingly, the FAC is also devoid of any facts that Defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of Decedent’s death.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendant’s act of filing an answer to the initial Complaint is a judicial admission that Plaintiffs’ causes of action are viable is without merit. As a preliminary matter, “[t]he doctrine of judicial admissions [] does not apply to allegations in pleadings that have been superseded by amendments.” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 456.) In addition, Plaintiffs amended the first and third causes of action, added additional allegations, and to the extent those cause of action are deficient, Defendant may file a demurer.
While Plaintiffs include authority that leave to amend should be granted, Plaintiffs fail to articulate what facts could be alleged to render the deficient causes of action sufficient. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290 [The burden is on the plaintiff “to articulate how it could amend its pleading to render it sufficient.”])
Thus, Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs first and third cause of action is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.